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7	For example, Amiya Sen’s Swami Vivekananda (2000). Sen’s work is useful because he 
presents Vivekananda in a manner which allows him to be seen as a complex individual who 
continues to be difficult to analyze (2000,	p.1). 
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commentary	on	the	way	Vivekananda	is	interpreted	by	varying	scholars	(1999,	pp.289-
371).	
Biographies	are	not	the	only	secondary	literature	available	on	Swami	
Vivekananda.	There	are	several	volumes	written	that	describe	the	way	Vivekananda	
impacted	the	nationalist	movement,	the	role	he	played	in	India’s	struggle	for	freedom,	
his	role	as	an	outspoken	‘neo-Vedantin’	or	alternatively	the	influence	he	had	on	the	
development	of	the	Ramakrishna	Mission.	Vivekananda’s	career	has	been	examined	in	
great	detail	and	scholars	have	repeatedly	offered	insights	on	the	trajectory	of	
Vivekananda’s	short	life.	For	example,	in	Swami	Vivekananda’s	Legacy	of	Service	
(2006b),	Gwilym	Beckerlegge	explores	the	relationship	between	Ramakrishna,	
Vivekananda	and	The	Ramakrishna	Mission	for	whom	seva	or	service	became	a	central	
focal	point:		
The	findings	of	these	critical	inquiries	have	challenged	the	Ramakrishna	
movement’s	understandings	of	the	origins	of	its	most	characteristic	beliefs	and	
practices	–	the	practice	of	seva,	its	conviction	that	Ramakrishna	was	an	Advaitin,	
and	the	basis	of	its	faith	in	Vivekananda’s	role	as	a	faithful	interpreter	of	
Ramakrishna’s	message	and	priorities	(2006(b),	p.2).	
	
On	the	other	hand,	Paul	Hacker	was	more	concerned	with	the	role	that	Vivekananda	
played	in	the	Indian	nationalist	movement	and	the	emergence	of	what	Hacker	classifies	
as	the	‘Neo-Hindu’:	
Vivekananda’s	practical	application	of	Vedantism	reveals	the	Neo-Hindu	whose	
primary	concern	is	nationalism.	His	commitment	to	religion	was	surely	genuine,	
but	nationalism	was	part	of	this	very	commitment.	Thus,	he	was	consistent	in	
making	the	religious	heritage	subservient	to	the	tackling	of	modern	national	
problems	(1995,	pp.240-241).	
	
In	contrast,	Tapan	Raychaudhari,	in	“Swami	Vivekananda’s	Construction	of	Hinduism”	
(1999)	explores	the	role	that	Vivekananda	played	in	the	Hindu	revivalist	movement	and	
argues:	
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he	[Vivekananda]	rejected	with	contempt	the	central	planks	in	the	propaganda	of	
Hindu	reaction.	The	fact	that	he	had	an	equal	lack	of	regard	for	the	Babu-
sponsored	reforms	has	obscured	that	act	of	rejection	(1999,	p.2).	
	
I	have	found	this	secondary	literature	to	be	invaluable	in	helping	me	to	understand	
Vivekananda.	It	is	with	the	aid	of	this	impressive	(yet	sometimes	problematic)	
secondary	literature	that	I	will	attempt	to	analyse	Vivekananda’s	writings,	and	the	role	
he	played,	in	the	development	of	the	term	‘Hinduism’.	As	I	trace	the	ideas	with	which	he	
engaged	I	will	demonstrate	how	he	used	them	to	formulate	his	own	ideas,	and	the	
resulting	impact,	they	had	both	in	India	and	in	the	diaspora.	Vivekananda’s	repackaging	
of	‘Hinduism’	is	one	of	the	most	important	aspects	of	his	legacy	since	it	allows	us	to	
understand	the	ways	in	which	his	epistemology	influenced	a	number	of	accepted	
definitions	and	worldviews.	This,	in	turn,	resulted	in	what	some	might	call	a	hegemonic	
form	of	‘Hinduism’	that	needs	to	be	problematized	in	contemporary	times	if	Hindu	
traditions	are	to	maintain	their	fluid	boundaries.	Keeping	these	ideas	in	mind,	we	can	
now	turn	to	Ashis	Nandy	in	order	to	unpack	some	crucial,	yet	oftentimes	
underestimated,	aspects	of	colonization.	As	we	shall	see,	colonization	was	not	one-
sided,	nor	was	it	limited	to	the	upper	echelon	of	society.	Vivekananda,	and	his	peers,	
were	also	in	a	position	to	impact	the	West;	an	idea	that	Ashis	Nandy	explores	in	some	
detail.	
Ashis	Nandy8	and	the	‘colonization	of	minds’	
	
Ashis	Nandy’s	book	The	intimate	enemy:	Loss	and	Recovery	of	Self	under	
Colonialism	(2006)	consists	of	two	essays	which	focus	on	the	psychology	of	colonization	
																																																								
8	Nandy	is	a	scholar	of	psychology	and	the	politics	of	culture	and	has	an	extensive	body	
of	work.	However,	for	the	purposes	of	this	discussion	I	will	concentrate	on	The	intimate	
enemy:	Loss	and	Recovery	of	Self	under	Colonialism	(2006)	since	it	is	arguably	his	most	
recognized	contribution	to	post-colonial	theory	and	the	one	which	directly	addresses	
some	of	the	issues	I	would	like	to	analyze.	
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in	general,	and	the	British	colonization	of	India	in	particular.	However,	Nandy	quickly	
clarifies	that	it	is	not	only	the	psychology	of	the	so-called	main	protagonists,	i.e.	the	elite,	
that	he	is	interested	in	studying	but	also	those	who	typically	have	not	had	a	prominent	
voice	in	this	historical	exchange:	
If	beating	the	West	at	its	own	game	is	the	preferred	means	of	handling	the	
feelings	of	self-hatred	in	the	modernized	non-West,	there	is	also	the	West	
constructed	by	the	savage	outsider	who	is	neither	willing	to	be	a	player	nor	a	
counterplayer	(2006,	p.xiii).		
	
Consequently,	Nandy	warns	his	readers	that	his	approach	is	non-conventional	and	
asserts:	
Fidelity	to	one’s	inner	self,	as	one	translates,	and	to	one’s	inner	voice,	when	one	
comments,	may	not	mean	adherence	to	reality	in	some	cultures	but	in	some	
others	they	do.	At	least	that	is	the	sole	defence	I	have	for	my	tendency	to	speak	of	
the	West	as	a	single	political	entity,	of	Hinduism	as	Indianness,	or	of	history	and	
Christianity	as	Western.	None	of	them	is	true	but	all	them	are	realities	(2006,	
p.xiii-xiv).	
	
With	this	statement,	Nandy	indicates	the	problematic	nature	of	categories,	and	
classifications,	especially	when	they	are	adopted	from	alien	cultures.	His	primary	
concern	however,	is	with	the	labels	‘colonizer’	and	‘colonized’	which	he	argues	are	
deceptive	when	one	examines	the	consciousness	of	the	participants.	Indeed,	one	could	
argue	that	Nandy’s	most	provocative	idea	appears	in	the	preface	of	his	work	which,	sets	
the	tone	for	his	subsequent	discussions.	He	contends	that	his	main	issue	is	not	with	the	
physical	colonization	of	lands	and	peoples	but	instead	with:	
the	second	form	of	colonization,	the	one	which	at	least	six	generations	of	the	
Third	World	have	learnt	to	view	as	a	prerequisite	for	their	liberation.	This	
colonialism	colonizes	minds	in	addition	to	bodies	and	it	releases	forces	within	
the	colonized	societies	to	alter	their	cultural	priorities	once	for	all.	In	the	process,	
it	helps	generalize	the	concept	of	the	modern	West	from	a	geographical	and	
temporal	entity	to	a	psychological	category.	The	West	is	now	everywhere,	within	
the	West	and	outside;	in	structures	and	in	minds	(Nandy,	2006,	p.xi,	emphasis	
added).		
	
Accordingly,	he	stresses:	
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This	is	primarily	the	story	of	the	second	colonization	and	resistances	to	it…	with	
a	colonialism	which	survives	the	demise	of	empires.	At	one	time,	the	second	
colonization	legitimized	the	first.	Now	it	is	independent	of	its	roots.	Even	those	
who	battle	the	first	colonialism	often	guiltily	embrace	the	second.	Hence	the	
reader	should	read	the	following	pages	not	as	a	history	but	as	a	cautionary	tale.	
They	caution	us	that	conventional	anti-colonialism,	too,	could	be	an	apologia	for	
the	colonization	of	minds	(Nandy,	2006,	p.xi,	emphasis	added).	
	
	 In	this	manner,	Nandy	reminds	his	readers	that	whereas	adaptation	to,	and	
adoption	of,	the	ideals,	language	and	value	systems	of	the	colonizers	may	have	been	a	
‘prerequisite	for	their	liberation’	before	Independence,	the	continued	adherence	to	such	
a	system	signals	a	much	deeper	rooted	problem	that	needs	to	be	identified	and	
addressed.	However,	since	Nandy	is	not	only	concerned	with	drawing	attention	to	the	
‘colonized	minds’	of	the	Indian	elite,	he	also	turns	his	attention	to	those	Indians	who	he	
believes	have	not	only	resisted	this	colonization	but	have	covertly	fought	back.	Thus,	
even	though	he	doesn’t	directly	affiliate	himself	with	the	subalternist	scholarship	that	
begins	to	emerge	during	the	1980’s,	his	arguments,	which	advocate	for	the	neglected	
role	of	the	indigenous	class,	seem	to	resonate	with	subalternist	philosophy.	Indeed,	one	
could	argue	that	Nandy’s	premise,	with	which	he	begins	his	discussion,	is	reminiscent	of	
Gayatri	Chakravorty	Spivak’s	now	famous	question,	“Can	the	Subaltern	Speak?”	(1988)9	
Nandy	asserts:	
the	colonized	Indians	do	not	remain	in	these	pages	simple-hearted	victims	of	
colonialism:	they	become	participants	in	a	moral	and	cognitive	venture	against	
oppression.	They	make	choices.	And	to	the	extent	they	have	chosen	their	
alternative	within	the	West,	they	have	also	evaluated	the	evidence,	judged	and	
sentenced	some	while	acquitting	others	(2006,	p.xiv).	
	
Interestingly	however,	Nandy	is	not	satisfied	with	this	binary	argument	and	
takes	his	analysis	one	step	further.	Consequently,	he	is	not	only	concerned	with	the	
																																																								
9	In	this	essay	Spivak	explores	the	ways	in	which	the	subalternist	project	has	tried	to	
give	a	voice	to	these	neglected	Indians	and	questions	the	validity	and	effectiveness	of	
this	scholarship	(Spivak,	1988).		
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Indians	who	adjusted	and	accommodated	their	belief	system	to	fit	the	needs	and	
demands	of	their	Christian	masters.	Nor	is	he	just	interested	in	the	Hindus	who	
continued	to	practice	their	polytheistic	rituals	and	pray	to	their	multiple	idols	despite	
paying	passing	homage	to	the	ideas	of	their	political	rulers.	Instead,	Nandy	takes	a	
three-pronged	approach	and	presents	his	readers	with	the	third	dimension	of	his	view	
of	colonization.	Accordingly,	he	contends	that	the	colonizers,	who	were	vested	with	the	
power	associated	with	empire,	were	very	often	forced	into	positions,	by	their	subjects,	
that	resulted	in	choices	which	they	may	not	have	made	under	other	circumstances.	
Here,	we	are	reminded	of	the	western	philosopher	Michel	Foucault,	and	his	ideas	
regarding	the	discursive	network	of	power.10	Nandy	elaborates	on	this	idea	when	he	
asserts	that	he	is	not	simply	arguing	that	the	colonized	made	choices,	and	had	a	certain	
degree	of	power	to	do	so,	but	rather,	that	this	power	was	taken	to	the	ultimate	level	
when	it,	in	turn,	colonized	the	minds,	and	lives,	of	the	colonizers	themselves.	Naturally,	
this	raises	questions	of	influence,	and	impact,	because	if	we	are	to	accept	Nandy’s	
premise	then	we	would	also	have	to	acknowledge	and	examine	the	way	the	colonized	
Indians	colonized	the	minds	of	their	Western	masters.	Analysing	this	three-dimensional	
version	of	colonization	is	precisely	what	Nandy	sets	out	to	do.		
	 Nandy	begins	his	argument	by	elaborating	how	Indian	intellectuals	reinterpreted	
their	own	ideology	and	philosophy	by	using	the	yardsticks	provided	by	their	colonizers:	
once	the	two	sides	in	the	British-Indian	culture	of	politics,	following	the	
flowering	of	the	middle-class	British	evangelical	spirit,	began	to	ascribe	cultural	
																																																								
10	For	example,	Foucault	asserts,	“Power	relations	are	rooted	in	the	system	of	social	
networks.	This	is	not	to	say,	however,	that	there	is	a	primary	and	fundamental	principle	
of	power	which	dominates	society	down	to	the	smallest	detail;	but,	taking	as	point	of	
departure	the	possibility	of	action	upon	the	action	of	others	(which	is	coextensive	with	
every	social	relationship),	multiple	forms	of	individual	disparity,	of	objectives,	of	the	
given	application	of	power	over	ourselves	or	others,	of,	in	varying	degrees,	partial	or	
universal	institutionalization,	of	more	or	less	deliberate	organization,	one	can	define	
different	forms	of	power”	(1982,	p.793).		
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meanings	to	the	British	domination,	colonialism	proper	can	be	said	to	have	
begun	(2006,	p.6,	emphasis	added).	
	
One	of	the	‘cultural	meanings’	that	came	to	play	a	big	role	in	the	psychology	of	
colonization	in	India	was	the	idea	of	sexual	domination.	The	British	Empire	had	
convinced	themselves	that	they	had	been	invested	with	manly	attributes	such	as	
“aggression,	achievement,	control,	competition	and	power”	(Nandy,	2006,	p.9).	Thus,	
this	allowed	them	to	rationalize	that	they	were	naturally	equipped	to	dominate	over	the	
less	aggressive,	and	therefore	more	feminine,	colonies.11	According	to	Nandy,	it	was	as	a	
result	of	this	cultural	colonization	that	the	affluent	and	educated	class	of	Indians	began	
searching	for	heroes,	within	their	scriptures,	who	emphasized	qualities	that	were	
usually	associated	with	masculinity	to	demonstrate	that	these	attributes	were	not	
absent	from	their	native	culture.	One	such	example	is	the	work	of	the	poet	Michael	
Madhusudan	Dutt	(1824-73)	whose	classic	Bengali	interpretation	Meghanadvadh	
Kavya:	
retells	the	Ramayana,	turning	the	traditionally	sacred	figures	of	Rama	and	
Laksmana	into	weak-kneed,	passive-aggressive,	feminine	villains	and	the	
demons	Ravana	and	his	son	Meghnad	into	majestic,	masculine,	modern	heroes	
(Nandy,	2006,	p.19).	
	
Another	popular	argument	from	Western	philosophers,	such	as	G.W.	Hegel,	was	
that	Indian	civilization	represented	the	childhood	of	humanity	from	which,	it	was	
necessary	to	progress	via	the	‘rational’	ideology	of	the	West	that	had	been	provided	by	
colonization.12	Nandy	argues	that	it	was	in	an	effort	to	neutralize	this	impression	of	
infantile	Hindu	traditions	that	the	scholar	Bankimchandra	Chattopadhyay	(1838-94)	
ignored	the	beloved	stories	of	the	child-god	Balgopal.	Instead,	Bankimchandra	
																																																								
11	We	will	explore	this	concept	of	‘effeminacy’	in	some	detail	in	Chapter	5.	
12	For	example,	“The	History	of	the	World	travels	from	East	to	West,	for	Europe	is	
absolutely	the	end	of	History,	Asia	the	beginning”	(Hegel,	1901,	p.163).	
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emphasized	the	manly,	powerful	god-King	Krishna,	ruler	of	Dwarka,	“a	normal,	non-
pagan	male	god	who	would	not	humiliate	his	devotees	in	front	of	the	progressive	
Westerners”	(Nandy,	2006,	p.	24).	Nandy	contends	that	many	elite	Indians,	who	were	
exposed	to	British	ideals	began	identifying	with,	and	adopting	for	themselves,	the	value	
systems	that	were	prized	by	their	colonial	masters.	This	absorption	and	simulation	is	
what	makes	the	colonization	of	minds	so	dangerous:	
More	dangerous	and	permanent	are	the	inner	rewards	and	punishments,	the	
secondary	psychological	gains	and	losses	from	suffering	and	submission	under	
colonialism.	They	are	almost	always	unconscious	and	almost	always	ignored.	
Particularly	strong	is	the	inner	resistance	to	recognizing	the	ultimate	violence	
which	colonialism	does	to	its	victims,	namely	it	creates	a	culture	in	which	the	
ruled	are	constantly	tempted	to	fight	their	rulers	within	the	psychological	limits	
set	by	the	latter.	It	is	not	an	accident	that	the	specific	variants	of	the	concepts	
with	which	many	anti-colonial	movements	in	our	times	have	worked	have	often	
been	the	products	of	the	imperial	culture	itself	(Nandy,	2006,	p.3).	
	
Nandy	then	moves	on	to	his	next	assertion	whereby	he	argues	that	he	does	not	
believe	that	all	Indians	succumbed	to	this	kind	of	colonization.	He	is	keen	to	draw	
attention	to	the	Indians	who	not	only	resisted	colonization,	but	in	fact,	pushed	back	in	
ways	that	were	not	always	evident.	What	is	interesting	however,	is	that	the	examples	he	
cites	are	of	Indian	men	who	are	normally	considered	to	belong	to	the	intellectual	elite;	
such	as	M.K.	Gandhi	(1869-1948),	Sri	Aurobindo	(1872-1950)	and	Iswarchandra	
Vidyasagar	(1820-1891).	Naturally,	this	raises	questions	as	to	how	these	Indian	elite	
can	be	confused	with	the	unheard	voices	that	Nandy	says	he	is	keen	to	bring	to	light	in	
the	preface	of	this	work,	where	he	unequivocally	states,	“it	is	the	unheroic	Indian	coping	
with	the	might	of	the	West	I	want	to	portray”	(Nandy,	2006,	p.xiii).	Why	then	does	
Nandy	choose	to	highlight	the	experiences	and	examples	of	these	well-known	Indian	
heroes?	As	a	result	of	his	choices,	one	cannot	help	but	question	if	Nandy	has	fallen	into	
the	very	trap	that	he	has	been	trying	to	warn	his	readers	of,	that	labels	of	any	kind	are	
not	easily	avoided.	Indeed,	Nandy	tucks	away	his	emerging	awareness,	in	a	footnote,	
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where	he	describes	his	experiences	when	he	was	first	studying	two	Indian	scientists,	
the	lesser	known	Srinivasa	Ramanujan	and	the	acclaimed	Indian	hero	Jagdish	Chandra	
Bose.	Nandy	acknowledges	that	in	the	first	stages	of	his	analysis,	his	sympathies	lay	
with	Ramanujan,	who	he	considered	to	be	the	underdog	since	he	had	not	embraced	
Western	ideology,	in	contrast	to	Bose,	who	seemed	to	represent	the	very	epitome	of	the	
modern	Indian	man.	However,	Nandy	himself	admits	that	he	soon	grasped:	
Ramanujan	was	not	especially	vulnerable	after	all…	Nor	was	Bose	particularly	
inauthentic;	the	cultural	problems	he	dealt	with	in	his	science	were	real	and	
immediate.	And	he,	too,	was	vulnerable.	As	he	negotiated	his	way	through	the	
ruthless	world	of	modern	science,	he	had	to	cope	with	the	hostility	which	the	
liminal	man	always	arouses	as	opposed	to	the	proper	alien	(Nandy,	2006,	
pp.102-103fn).	
	
Thus,	one	gets	the	impression	that	Nandy	himself	is	struggling	with	the	realization	that	
classification,	in	any	category,	is	relative	to	the	argument	being	made,	and	that	even	
elites	like	Gandhi,	are	heroes	only	when	viewed	from	a	certain	perspective.	Indeed,	
when	examined	from	the	context	of	the	British	elite,	who	were	forced	to	engage	with	
him,	then	Gandhi	himself,	could	be	qualified	as	a	subaltern	voice!13		
In	fact,	it	is	this	idea,	which	Nandy	gives	birth	to,	but	which	he	never	overtly	
develops	to	its	logical	conclusion,	that	turns	out	to	be	the	most	fascinating	aspect	of	his	
study.	Unfortunately	however,	Nandy	skirts	around	the	edges	of	this	argument	by	using	
Gandhi	as	his	primary	example,	of	a	person	of	Indian	origin,	who	does	not	allow	his	
mind	to	be	colonized	by	Western	ideals.	Yet,	he	never	explains	how	Gandhi	fits	into	this	
category	of	‘unsung’	heroes.	After	all,	instead	of	using	Gandhi	to	make	his	point	about	
the	Indian	minds	who	covertly	resisted	colonization	shouldn’t	Nandy	be	highlighting	
instances	where	such	resistance	emerged	from	people	who	he	describes	as	the	“savage	
																																																								
13	According	to	Ranajit	Guha,	“The	word	‘subaltern’	…stands	for	the	meaning	as	given	in	
the	Concise	Oxford	Dictionary,	that	is,	‘of	inferior	rank’”	(1994(b),	p.vii).	
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outsider	who	is	neither	willing	to	be	a	player	nor	a	counterplayer”	(2006,	p.xiii)?	Rather,	
Nandy	chooses	to	elaborate	on	the	way	Gandhi	(an	Indian	who	is	rarely	described	as	a	
‘savage’14)	refused	to	accept	the	premise	that	the	West	deserved	to	be	mimicked	since	it	
had	classified	itself	as	both	‘civilized’15	and	modern.	According	to	Nandy,	it	is	worth	
noting	that	Gandhi	ignored	the	Western	value	system	that	prized	masculinity,	by	
adopting	weaving,	an	activity	that	was	usually	relegated	to	women.	Nandy	also	
acknowledges	that	Gandhi	was	sensitive	to	the	traditionally	accepted	ideas	of	‘shakti’	
when	he	points	out	that	Gandhi	naturally	assumed	that	there	was	a	“closer	conjunction	
between	power,	activism	and	femininity	than	between	power,	activism	and	masculinity”	
(2006,	p.53).16	Moreover,	Gandhi	recognized	the	“primacy	of	maternity”	(Nandy,	2006,	
p.54):	
In	sum,	Gandhi	was	clear	in	his	mind	that	activism	and	courage	could	be	
liberated	from	aggressiveness	and	recognized	as	perfectly	compatible	with	
womanhood,	particularly	maternity.	Whether	this	position	fully	negated	the	
Ksatriya	world	view	or	not,	it	certainly	negated	the	very	basis	of	the	colonial	
culture	(Nandy,	2006,	p.54).	
	
Additionally,	Nandy	draws	attention	to	the	fact	that	Gandhi	did	not	make	any	excuses	
for	this	playfulness	and	childlike	qualities	which	were	deemed	infantile	by	his	more	
‘proper’	peers:	
Not	only	did	every	Westernizer	and	Westernized	Indian	who	came	in	touch	with	
Gandhi	refer	at	least	once	to	his	child’s	smile,	his	admirers	and	detractors	
dutifully	found	him	childlike	and	childish	respectively.	His	‘infantile’	obstinacy	
and	tendency	to	tease,	his	‘immature’	attacks	on	the	modern	world	and	its	props,	
his	‘juvenile’	food	fads	and	symbols	like	the	spinning	wheel	–	all	were	viewed	as	
planks	of	a	political	platform	which	defied	conventional	ideas	of	adulthood	
(2006,	p.56).	
	
																																																								
14	The	closest	one	could	come	to	such	a	categorization	would	be	Winston	Churchill	who	
famously	referred	to	Gandhi	as	the	‘half	naked’	fakir	(The	Times,	1931).		
15	A	popular	hagiography	has	Gandhi	blatantly	refusing	to	even	acknowledge	that	the	
West	was	civilized.	He	is	said	to	have	responded,	when	asked	“what	he	thought	about	
Western	civilization”	by	saying,	“I	think	it	would	be	a	good	idea.”	
16	We	will	return	to	the	ideas	of	femininity	and	maternity	in	the	final	chapter.	
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What	is	particularly	perplexing	with	these	arguments	about	Gandhi,	and	others	Nandy	
makes	regarding	Aurobindo	and	Vidyasagar,	is	that	it	is	almost	as	if	he	is	trying	to	tear	
down	the	premise	with	which	he	started	i.e.	the	colonization	of	the	minds	of	the	Indians	
who	were	in	close	contact	with	their	colonizers.	As	a	result,	once	again,	we	witness	
Nandy’s	own	struggle	to	understand	the	Indian	consciousness	when	he	states:	
one	could	perhaps	say	that	in	the	chaos	called	India	the	opposite	of	thesis	is	not	
the	antithesis	because	they	exclude	each	other.	The	true	‘enemy’	of	the	thesis	is	
seen	to	be	in	the	synthesis	because	it	includes	the	thesis	and	ends	the	latter’s	
reason	for	being.	(2006,	p.99).		
	
Is	Nandy	suggesting	that	the	so-called	colonized	minds	of	the	Indians	were	simply	a	
form	of	synthesis	that	thereby	allowed	them	to	survive?	Isn’t	this	the	very	antithesis	of	
his	opening	argument	in	which	he	laments	the	minds	that	have	been	colonized	by	the	
West?		
What	then	of	the	third	kind	of	colonization?	This	idea,	which	is	compelling	in	and	
of	itself,	is	one	that	has	been	previously	alluded	to	in	Western	literature.	Indeed,	Nandy	
himself	highlights	the	work	of	George	Orwell	whose	essay	“Shooting	an	Elephant”	deals	
with	the	way	colonizing	officers	were	forced	into	unpleasant,	and	unsafe,	situations	due	
to	their	roles	as	officers	of	the	empire.	Nandy	asserts	that	Orwell:	
clearly	sensed	that	British	colonialism	had	created	the	demand	for	a	‘mother	
culture’	–	and	a	production	line	for	colonial	rulers	–	which	alienated	the	
colonizers	not	only	from	their	political	subjects	but	also	from	their	own	selves…	
that	the	subjugation	of	the	ruled	also	involved	the	subjugation	of	the	ruler,	that	
the	subjects	in	the	colonies	controlled	their	rulers	as	surely	as	the	rulers	
controlled	their	subjects	(2006,	p.39).	
	
What	Nandy’s	arguments	underscore	is	that	literature	such	as	Orwell’s,	and	others	like	
Rudyard	Kipling	and	Oscar	Wilde,	served	to	accentuate	the	problematic	aspects	of	
colonization	for	the	colonizing	country’s	general	population:	
Since	about	the	seventeenth	century,	the	hyper-masculine	over-socialized	
aspects	of	European	personality	had	been	gradually	supplanting	the	cultural	
traits	which	had	become	identified	with	femininity,	childhood,	and	later	on,	
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‘primitivism’.	As	part	of	a	peasant	cosmology,	these	traits	had	been	valued	
aspects	of	a	culture	not	wedded	to	achievement	and	productivity.	Now	they	had	
to	be	rejected	as	alien	to	mainstream	European	civilization	and	projected	on	to	
the	‘low	cultures’	of	Europe	and	on	to	the	new	cultures	European	civilization	
encountered	(2006,	p.37).		
	
Accordingly,	Nandy	argues	that	since	the	colonizers	themselves	had	to	adjust	and	
accommodate	their	belief	system,	to	be	able	to	effectively	prove	that	they	deserved	to	be	
rulers,	both	in	the	colonies	and	back	home,	they	were	in	fact,	to	some	degree,	colonized	
themselves.	Let	me	just	state	here	that	I	do	not	believe	that	Nandy	is	belittling	the	
immense	hardships	faced	by	the	Indians	who	were	colonized,	or	that	this	argument	
seeks	to	diminish	the	extent	of	their	suffering	and	sacrifice.	Instead,	Nandy	is	keen	for	
his	readers	to	understand	that	nothing	is	as	it	seems,	and	that	the	issue	of	colonization	
cannot	be	studied	as	a	one-dimensional	problem.	Instead,	it	needs	to	be	understood	as	a	
complex	component	of	our	history,	a	history	that	is	shared	by	both	the	colonizer	and	the	
colonized,	and	from	which	neither	is	easily	liberated.		
	 On	the	one	hand,	Indians	need	to	be	particularly	careful	when	using	Western	
languages,	terms,	ideas	and	theories.	This	is	because	they	are	oftentimes	embedded	
with	covert	constructs	that	are	linked	to	the	philosophy	and	traditions	that	were	
popular	in	the	West	when	they	‘came	of	age’	during	the	Enlightenment.	Without	
realizing	it,	non-Western	traditions	still	continue	to	try	and	find	a	way	to	make	their	
native	categories	adjust	to	Western	concepts	which	have	been	accepted	as	normative	
(and	therefore	more	valuable)	such	as	modernity,	monotheism	and	masculinity.	Such	
categories	reside	in	colonized	minds	and	need	to	be	removed	and	re-examined.	On	the	
other	hand,	Nandy	also	wants	to	argue	for	the	voice	of	those	who	have	been	silenced.	
However,	his	inability	to	present	viable	options	for	this	category	leads	to	the	conclusion	
that	Nandy,	though	sympathetic	to	this	unheard	voice	of	the	masses,	is	unable	to	find	a	
way	to	represent	them	faithfully	and	as	such,	switches	gears	to	examine	the	mind	games	
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played	by	the	colonized	elites.	Once	one	gets	away	from	the	fact	that	these	tales	of	
covert	resistance	are	not	stories	of	the	indigenous	population,	one	realizes	that	Nandy	is	
convinced	that	many	of	these	Indians,	whose	bodies	were	certainly	colonized,	had	not	
allowed	their	minds	to	be	colonized	as	well.		Nowhere	is	this	more	evident	than	when	
he	recounts	the	story	about	the	Aztec	priests	who,	even	when	they	were	pressurized	by	
their	conquerors,	refused	to	accept	that	their	Gods	were	dead	and	were	killed	because	
of	their	stubborn	loyalty	to	their	traditional	beliefs	(Nandy,	2006,	p.107).	In	contrast,	
according	to	Nandy,	brahmin	priests	would	have	never	allowed	themselves	to	be	killed	
in	this	situation,	and	instead,	would	have	bowed	down	to	the	Christian	God,	written	
beautiful	treatises	and	hymns	about	Jesus	whilst	still	holding	firm	to	their	own	
traditions	and	values.	So	much	so,	that	eventually,	“their	Christianity	would	have	looked	
after	a	while	dangerously	like	a	variation	on	Hinduism”	(Nandy,	2006,	p.108).	Similarly,	
Nandy	quotes	J.	Duncan	M.	Derrett	who,	in	1979,	realizes	that	Indians	never	really	
became	like	their	English	masters:	
Very	late	in	the	day	the	present	writer	woke	up	to	what	he	believes	to	be	the	fact,	
namely	that	Indian	tradition	has	been	‘in	charge’	throughout,	and	that	English	
ideas	and	English	ways,	like	the	English	language,	have	been	used	for	Indian	
purposes.	That,	in	fact,	it	is	the	British	who	were	manipulated,	the	British	who	
were	the	silly	somnambulists.	My	Indian	brother	is	not	a	brown	Englishman,	he	
is	an	Indian	who	has	learned	to	move	around	in	my	drawing	room,	and	will	move	
around	in	it	so	long	as	it	suits	him	for	his	own	purposes.	And	when	he	adopts	my	
ideas	he	does	so	to	suit	himself,	and	retains	them	so	far	and	as	long	as	it	suits	him	
(as	cited	in	Nandy,	2006,	p.77).	
	
Now,	whereas	it	may	suit	some	Indians,	and	Westerners,	to	argue	that	Indians	were	
never	really	colonized,	or	that	their	minds	are	still	colonized,	or	better	yet,	that	they	
colonized	the	minds	of	their	colonizers,	the	truth	of	the	matter	is	that	every	aspect	of	
this	argument	has	merit.	Indeed,	depending	on	the	examples	one	presents,	or	the	
position	one	takes,	all	the	above	premises	could	be	verified,	qualified	and/or	denied.	
These	answers	are	not	fixed	or	simple	but	fluctuating	and	complex.	Context,	purpose,	
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and	perspective,	all	play	a	key	role	in	the	answers	that	we	arrive	at.	Indeed,	Nandy’s	
arguments	are	particularly	useful	in	shedding	light	on	a	phenomenon	that	I	call	
‘continental	collision’,	an	idea	that	I	hope	will	offer	some	clarity	on	the	complexity	of	
this	discussion.	
	
Continental	Collision	
A	term	that	I	have	adopted	that	I	think	best	describes	the	interchange	of	ideas	
during	the	nineteenth	century	is	‘continental	collision’.	I	am	aware	that	‘continental	
collision’	is	a	phrase	that	is	usually	used	to	describe	the	geo-scientific	phenomenon	
associated	with	plate	tectonics	whereby	two	continents,	previously	divided	by	a	body	of	
oceanic	water,	collide	to	form	one	landmass.	This	collision	causes	disruptions	on	both	
continents	at	the	plate’s	boundaries,	such	as	earthquakes	and	volcanoes,	and	the	
creation	of	great	mountain	ranges,	oceanic	ridges	and	trenches.	This	also	results	in	the	
uneven	fusion	of	layers	of	landmass	from	both	continental	crusts,	which	create	suture	
zones.	These	suture	zones	are	continuously	pushing	against,	yet	at	the	same	time	
merging	with,	their	counterparts.	One	could	compare	such	a	scientific	geological	event	
with	what	happened	when	Western	ideas	collided	with	Eastern	philosophy.17	This	
intellectual	‘continental	collision’	also	has	suture	zones;	suture	zones	that	were	formed	
when	the	two	sides	exchanged	ideas	which	resulted	in	mounds	of	upheaval	that	were,	
and	still	are,	felt	economically,	socially	and	politically.	This	clash	of	two	alien	cultures	
has	resulted	in	ideas	intermingling	in	ways	that	have	oftentimes	made	each	side’s	
individual	contribution	difficult	to	discern.	These	suture	zones,	where	contrasting	
																																																								
17	I	am	using	a	creative	license	here	since	I	am	aware	that	these	geological	changes	
occur	over	millions	of	years	and	that	this	component	of	time	would	have	to	be	
drastically	modified	for	this	metaphor	to	be	appropriate	in	this	situation.	
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ideologies	are	forced	to	interact,	can	create	an	ideal	atmosphere	for	the	exposure	and	
exchange	of	foreign	concepts.	It	is	here	where	one	could	place	first-responders	like	
Rammohan	Roy	and	Bankimchandra	Chattopadhyay.	They	adopted	some	Western	ideas,	
but	used	Indian	materials	to	build	the	shields	they	needed	to	protect	themselves	from	
complete	annihilation,	due	to	this	impact	between	the	colonizing	Europeans	and	the	
colonized	Indians.	These	suture	zones	become	areas	for	negotiation	and	renegotiation.	
As	one	moves	away	from	the	immediate	site	of	suture	zones,	the	effects	of	this	
collision	are	not	as	evident	to	the	naked	eye	since	they	are	occurring	below	the	surface,	
where	different	layers	of	ideas	are	searching	for	ways	to	stabilize	after	the	collision.	It	is	
this	unseen	impact	that	scholars	have	drawn	attention	to	in	recent	years.18	Not	because	
it	can,	or	should,	be	stopped	but	because	it	needs	to	be	understood	and	acknowledged.	
This	is	the	unseen	‘colonization	of	minds’	that	Nandy	warns	us	against.	And	finally,	and	
perhaps	most	importantly,	we	have	those	elements	that	intentionally	push	back	against	
these	suture	zones	in	an	effort	to	maintain	some	of	the	integrity	of	the	landmass	before	
collision.	They	are	the	bulwarks	against	complete	integration	and	the	ones	who	realize	
that	certain	ideas	cannot,	and	must	not,	be	compromised	because	that	would	lead	to	a	
debilitating	blow	and	the	complete	submission	of	one	landmass	under	the	other.	These	
people	are	the	ones	who	recognize,	albeit	instinctively,	that	fault	lines	exist,	which,	if	
they	are	not	protected,	will	result	in	the	devastation	of	their	native	culture.	This	is	
where	Nandy	places	Gandhi,	and	I	would	place	Vivekananda,	because	a	case	can	be	
made	that	he	was	responsible	for	pushing	back	in	ways	that	are	still	evident	today.	
Geological	metaphors	have	been	used	before	and	one	of	the	most	useful	
elaborations	of	this	theory,	regarding	India,	has	been	put	forth	by	Gerald	James	Larson	
																																																								
18	Some	of	these	ideas	are	explored	in	Subaltern	Studies	I:	Writings	on	South	Asian	
History	and	Society	(1982).	
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in	India’s	Agony	Over	Religion	(1995).	However,	before	embarking	on	his	own	
exploration	Larson	draws	attention	to:	
the	work	of	Fernand	Braudel	and	Michel	Foucault	both	of	whom	have	made	use	
of	geological	metaphors	in	their	discussions	of	world	history,	stressing,	on	one	
level,	the	need	for	a	broad	perspective	over	time	(la	longue	durée),	while	
stressing,	on	another	level,	the	need	for	an	appreciation	of	basic	discontinuities	
in	the	historical	process,	disruptions	and	upheavals	that	belie	all	attempts	at	
fashioning	simple	continuities	(1995,	p.50).	
	
Larson’s	use	of	this	metaphor,	however,	focuses	particularly	on	the	Indian	subcontinent:	
Indian	civilization	is	viewed	in	terms	of	layers	or	levels	of	sedimentation	
together	with	the	juxtaposition	of	discrete	tectonic	plates	that	interact	with	one	
another,	forming	fault	lines	that	become	foci	over	long	periods	of	time	for	the	
release	of	gigantic	pressures,	a	release	of	pressures	exhibiting	on	occasion	
catastrophic	violence	and	upheaval.	From	one	point	of	view,	there	is	great	
stability	which	derives	from	the	preservation	of	many	layers	and	the	peculiar	
balance	of	forces	that	are	largely	distinct	from	one	another	but	nevertheless	
interdependent	at	certain	crucial	pressure	points.	From	another	point	of	view,	
there	is	always	the	risk	of	violent	upheaval	and	dissolution	(1995,	p.50).	
	
Despite	his	concern	with	“violent	upheavals	and	dissolutions”	Larson	nonetheless	
acknowledges:	
What	is	especially	illuminating…	is	the	manner	in	which	a	rather	messy	mixture	
of	apparently	discontinuous	components	can	come	together	to	form	an	overall	
continuity,	in	the	case	of	the	geological	metaphor,	the	sedimented	layers	and	
tectonic	plates	of	diverse	origins	nevertheless	coalescing	into	a	given,	continuous	
portion	of	earth	(1995,	p.51).	
	
What	Larson’s	discussions	emphasize	are	the	multi-layered	dimensions	of	the	Indian	
civilization	which	have	been	accrued,	layer	after	layer,	over	time.	Indeed,	one	could	
argue	that	these	many	layers	were	what	made	the	foundation	of	India’s	civilization	
strong,	thereby	allowing	its	indigenous	population	to	build	on	earlier	layers,	instead	of	
being	annihilated	by	invading	traditions.	For	the	purposes	of	this	study,	my	research	
will	concentrate	on	the	areas	of	collision,	the	suture	zones,	and	the	varied	ways	in	which	
Hindus	reacted	and	responded	to	these	‘violent’	disruptions.	Especially	since,	it	was	
these	collisions	that	caused	the	ripple	effects	that	eventually	resulted	in	new	layers	of	
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ideas;	ideas	that	contribute	to	the	unique,	multifaceted	quality	of	the	Indian	
subcontinent.		
What	I	hope	the	term	‘continental	collision’	conveys	is	that	this	meeting	of	minds,	
and	cultures,	was	a	symbiotic	process.	Ideas	were	not	simply	imposed	upon	the	Indian	
people	in	a	way	which	did	not	leave	them	any	choice	but	to	be	passive	responders.	
Instead,	the	collision	that	was	caused	by	this	encounter	reverberated	on	both	sides	of	
the	world.	A	great	example	of	this	is	the	search	for	a	Hindu	term	for	the	Western	idea	of	
‘religion’.	The	label	was	not	passively	translated	in	the	Indian	subcontinent	as	
nationalist,	and	religious	leaders	alike,	struggled	to	find	a	term	that	best	reflected	their	
ideas.	A	fact	that	is	evidenced	in	the	continued	ambiguity	of	terms	such	as	‘sanatana	
dharma’	or	even	simply	‘dharma’.	For	example,	in	Dharmatattva	(1888),	which	is	
written	in	the	style	of	a	dialogue	between	a	teacher	and	his	student,	Bankimchandra	
Chattopadhyay	contends:	
DISCIPLE:	But	a	confusion	remains.	We	use	dharma	to	mean	Christian	dharma,	
Buddhist	dharma,	Vaishnava	dharma,	and	so	on.	Should	we	not	say	Christian	
culture,	Buddhist	culture,	Vaishnava	culture	instead?		
MASTER:	You	have	created	confusion	for	yourself	by	standing	the	word	‘dharma’	
on	its	head.	The	word	is	used	to	convey	a	wide	variety	of	meanings,	but	the	sense	
in	which	you	have	used	it	is	not	home-grown	but	merely	a	modern	equivalent	of	
the	English	word	‘religion’.		
DISCIPLE:	Very	well,	let	us	hear	about	religion	then.		
MASTER:	Whatever	for?	Religion	is	a	Western	term,	and	Western	scholars	have	
turned	out	various	theories	on	it.	It	is	another	matter	that	not	one	of	these	
theories	tallies	with	another.	
DISCIPLE:	But	is	there	no	eternal	law	that	can	be	found	in	all	religions?		
MASTER:	There	is;	only,	there	is	no	reason	to	call	it	religion.	Call	it	dharma	
instead,	and	all	your	doubts	will	be	dispelled	(2003,	pp.46-47).		
	
Indians	were	active	participants,	who	used	the	many	layers	that	were	already	evident	in	
their	history,	to	help	them	manipulate	the	way	they	could	push	back,	at	the	suture	
zones,	that	were	created	by	this	European	invasion.	Indeed,	when	looked	at	in	this	way	
one	could	just	as	easily	ask:	how	did	Hindu	traditional	ideas	change	the	way	Western	
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traditions	came	to	view	themselves?	How	did	the	discovery	of	Hindu	traditional	norms	
change	the	meaning	of	‘religion’	in	the	West?	And	perhaps	most	importantly	for	the	
purposes	of	this	study;	how	did	Vivekananda,	who	grew	up	under	the	shadow	of	British	
colonization,	challenge	the	Western	ideology	that	threatened	to	subsume	his	traditions	
in	this	‘continental	collision’?	What	makes	this	analysis	of	Vivekananda	particularly	
important	today	is	the	fact	that,	until	recently,	scholarship	primarily	focused	on	the	
impact	that	Western	ideas	have	had	on	the	emergence	of	this	normative	label	
‘Hinduism’.	Richard	King	argues	that	this	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	scholars	are	
not	sensitive	to	the	role	that	Indians	played	in	the	development	of	this	concept:	
Much	of	the	work	exploring	the	colonial	emergence	of	the	concept	of	“Hinduism”	
in	the	1990s	attempts	to	highlight	the	role	of	orientalist	influences	rather	than	
deny	indigenous	agency	(2006,	p.709).	
	
Whereas	this	may	be	true	in	certain	cases,	the	fact	is	that	overall	there	has	been	a	
much	larger	emphasis	on	how	Western	ideology	influenced	Indian	ideas.	Accordingly,	
Vivekananda	offers	us	an	opportunity	to	examine	the	way	an	authentic	Indian	voice	not	
only	impacted	this	label	‘Hinduism’	but	also	the	term	‘religion’.	I	am	not	suggesting	that	
I	am	the	first	person	to	address	this	discussion.	Instead,	I	am	attempting	to	build	upon	
arguments	presented	by	a	vast	array	of	scholars,	many	of	whose	arguments	we	will	
encounter	in	the	ensuing	pages.	These	academics	have	already	written	about	some	of	
the	ways	Indians	took	an	active	role	in	the	construction	of	their	own	identities	despite	
colonization.	However,	to	the	best	of	my	knowledge,	scholars	have	not	yet	analysed,	in	
detail,	the	role	that	Vivekananda	played	in	assuring	that	this	‘continental	collision’	did	
not	result	in	a	loss	that	would	have	been	devastating	for	the	survival	of	Hindu	traditions	
and	philosophical	ideas.	Hopefully	this	study	will	shed	some	light	on	Vivekananda’s	
contribution	to	the	creation	of	a	pan-Indian	Hindu	identity	that	relied	as	much	as,	if	not	
more	so,	on	its	Indian	heritage	as	it	did	on	its	colonizers’	terminology.	Only	then	will	we	
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be	able	to	understand	how	this	native	voice	continues	to	impact	the	Hindu	nationalist	
movement	in	India	today.	And	why	it	is	imperative	that	we	shed	some	light	on	how	
some	of	his	ideas,	like	the	creation	of	a	hierarchy,	which	may	have	been	necessary	for	
nation-building,	could	prove	to	be	detrimental	to	the	preservation	of	the	dynamic	
Indian	landscape	in	contemporary	times.		
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The	Heathen	is	not	the	only	one	who	is	blind…	(Balagangadhara,	2005)19	
A	brief	survey	of	the	theories	of	‘religion’	
 
 
It	is	not	often	that	we	pause	to	think	about	the	deeper	implications	that	are	
embedded	in	the	words	that	we	use	daily.	Very	often,	these	words	have	accumulated	a	
variety	of	significances,	over	centuries	of	usage,	that	are	not	always	apparent.	In	fact,	it	
could	be	argued	that	such	attention	to	language	is	usually	confined	within	the	walls	of	
institutions	of	higher	learning,	where	students	are	occasionally	encouraged	to	analyse	
the	language	they	use,	so	that	they	might	recognize	how	words	can	manipulate	the	way	
we	interpret	the	world	around	us.	It	is	an	awareness	of	this	unseen	influence,	that	
language	has	upon	the	way	we	construct	our	world,	that	Michel	Foucault	seems	to	be	
referring	to	when	he	declares	“knowledge	is	power.”	In	a	series	of	interviews	conducted	
in	the	1970’s,	Foucault	warns	his	readers:	
The	exercise	of	power	perpetually	creates	knowledge	and	conversely,	knowledge	
constantly	induces	effects	of	power…	Knowledge	and	power	are	integrated	with	
one	another	and	there	is	no	point	of	dreaming	of	a	time	when	knowledge	will	
cease	to	depend	on	power…	It	is	not	possible	for	power	to	be	exercised	without	
knowledge,	it	is	impossible	for	knowledge	not	to	engender	power	(1980,	p.52).	
	
Consequently,	it	has	become	a	common	practice,	amongst	lecturers	of	undergraduate	
religious	studies	courses,	to	begin	the	semester	by	asking	students	to	define	the	term	
‘religion’.	Especially	since,	they	understand	that	this	attention	to	the	power	of	
definitions	cannot	be	taken	lightly	with	this	term.	Lecturers	are	rarely	surprised	when	
the	ensuing	discussions,	and	arguments,	are	usually	heated	and	result	in	such	a	wide	
range	of	definitions,	that	the	students	themselves	are	bewildered	by	their	inability	to	
collectively	define	a	word	they	have	used	in	everyday	language	for	most	of	their	lives.	
																																																								
19	This	is	a	play	on	the	title	of	S.N.	Balagangadhara’s	book.	
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The	fact	that	no	conclusive	definition	can	be	established	for	this	most	commonly	
used	term,	seems	like	an	appropriate	place	to	start	the	present	discussion.	By	surveying	
the	way	modern	historians	of	religion20		have	endeavoured	to	investigate	the	
boundaries	of	this	term	we	will	have	a	multifaceted	understanding	of	the	many	
‘genealogies	of	religion’21;	a	necessary	tool	in	current	times.	Not	only	will	this	allow	me	
to	use	this	term	with	a	relatively	adequate	recognition	of	its	variant	significances,	but	it	
will	also	permit	me	to	determine	where	I	‘stand’	in	this	continuing	debate.22	And,	most	
importantly,	by	conducting	an	in-depth	exploration	of	the	contemporary	usage	of	this	
term	we	will	be	better	equipped	to	perceive,	in	the	following	chapters,	how	
Vivekananda	engaged	with	this	Western	concept,	what	aspects	he	rejected	and	which	
components	he	embraced.	This,	in	turn,	will	allow	us	to	understand	that	Vivekananda	
was	not	simply	responding	to	his	colonizers’	ideas	but	instead,	was	an	active	participant	
in	a	dialogue	that	still	rages	on	today.			
	
W.	C.	Smith	
	 W.C.	Smith’s	The	Meaning	and	End	of	Religion	(1963)	is	considered	to	be	a	classic	
for	students	interested	in	the	study	of	comparative	religions.	(Asad	2001,	p.205).	His	is	
one	of	the	earliest	contemporary	voices	to	have	emphasized	the	inherent	problems	with	
the	term	‘religion’,	and	how	this	word	had,	and	continues	to	have,	a	particularly	
																																																								
20	This	is,	by	no	means,	an	exhaustive	survey	of	the	scholars	who	have	spoken	on	this	
subject.	Rather,	these	are	some	of	the	voices	who	have	been	influential	in	my	own	
understanding	of	these	arguments.		
21	According	to	Foucault,	there	is	not	just	one	genealogy,	of	any	idea	or	concept,	that	can	
be	traced	through	history.	Rather,	there	are	many	genealogies,	which	compete	
depending	on	the	discursive	elements	present	during	their	evolution.	(1980,	p.117).		
22	J.Z.	Smith,	makes	the	argument	that	a	historian	has	‘no	place	to	stand’	(1978).	This	
suggests	that	academics	do	not,	and	should	not,	have	an	agenda	when	they	study	
‘religion’.	Unfortunately	however,	this	is	rarely	true	since	scholars	come	with	their	own	
contextual	bias	that	naturally	influences	the	‘stand’	they	take.		
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Western	bias.	Voices	like	Smith’s,	eventually	forced	other	scholars	of	‘religion’	to	pause,	
and	take	note	that	they	were	using	Western	linguistic	tools	to	understand	the	non-
Western	world.	Smith	draws	attention	to	the	fact	that	the	words	that	academics	utilize	
must	be	carefully	chosen	and	understood	for	them	to	be	used	appropriately	in	
contemporary	times:		
To	understand	the	world,	and	ourselves,	it	is	helpful	if	we	become	critical	of	the	
terms	and	concepts	that	we	are	using.	Further,	to	understand	other	people	and	
other	ages,	it	is	requisite	that	we	do	not	presume	uncritically	that	their	meanings	
for	words	are	the	same	as	ours.	A	mature	history	of	ideas	must	rest	on	careful	
scrutiny	of	new	words,	and	also	of	new	developments	in	meanings	of	old	words.	
Once	attained,	it	may	further	our	realistic	understanding	of	the	world	itself…	We	
must	be	alert	lest,	out	of	casualness	or	lack	of	historical	perception,	we	fail	to	
notice	changes	in	word	usage	that	may	be	quite	significant,	so	that	we	read	back	
into	the	past	what	are	actually	our	innovations	(1963,	pp.16-17).		
	
According	to	Smith,	‘religion’	is	a	term	whose	equivalent	is	not	easily	found	in	many	
languages.	Nevertheless,	colonized	countries	with	alternate	traditions,	have	been	forced	
to	compensate	for	this	apparent	lack	in	their	vocabulary	by	creating	new	terms,	or	
utilizing	words	with	somewhat	similar	identities,	to	fill	this	void.	Consequently,	Smith	
articulates,	in	detail,	the	many	ways	this	term	has	been	(mis)appropriated,	and	applied,	
not	only	to	the	so-called	‘primitive’	people	of	North	and	South	America,	but	also	to	the	
evidently	‘sophisticated’	societies	of	Egypt,	Iran,	India	and	China;	all	of	whom	lack	an	
equivalent	term	for	the	word	‘religion’	(1963,	pp.54-55).			
	 What	is	important	to	note	is	that	Smith	is	not	arguing	against	the	existence	of	
worldviews	which	include	gods,	rituals	and	traditions	in	these	‘other’	parts	of	the	world.	
Rather,	he	is	denying	that	there	is	some	kind	of	‘essential’	religious	characteristic	that	
exists	in	these	diverse	communities,	which	can	then	be	isolated	by	scholars	in	order	for	
them	to	be	studied.	Smith	asserts,	“essences	do	not	have	a	history.	Essences	do	not	
change.	Yet	it	is	an	observable	and	important	fact	that	what	have	been	called	religions	
do,	in	history,	change”	(1963,	pp.143-144).	He	traces	the	history	of	this	term	to	support	
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his	claim	whereby	he	argues	that	the	term	‘religion’	has	a	distinctively	Western	(and	
Christian)23	bias	and	demonstrates	how	this	word	has	evolved	over	centuries.	First,	at	
the	hands	of	Greek,	Roman	and	Christian	philosophers,	and	then	via	the	discoveries	of	
Western	explorers	and	invaders.	This,	he	argues,	belies	the	assumption	that	‘religion’	is	
a	label	that	can	be	applied	universally	to	other	cultures	without	prejudice:	
The	concept	‘Religion’,	then,	in	the	West	has	evolved.	Its	evolution	has	included	
long-range	development	that	we	may	term	a	process	of	reification:	mentally	
making	religion	into	a	thing,	gradually	coming	to	conceive	it	as	an	objective	
systematic	entity	(Smith,	1963,	p.51).			
	
This	is	especially	important	when	one	contrasts	Smith’s	work	with	scholars	from	
the	latter	half	of	the	19th	century	such	as	Max	Muller,	one	of	the	founding	fathers	of	the	
‘science	of	religion’.	Muller	advocated	for,	and	succeeded	in,	establishing	a	separate	
discipline	with	this	name,	which	was	supposed	to	be	based	on	rational	thought.	
Ironically	however,	this	is	the	same	person,	who	in	his	first	lecture	on	the	‘Science	of	
Religions’,	in	1870,	saw	the	necessity	of	‘selling’	his	ideas	to	the	Christian	public	who	
needed	to	be	convinced	that	he	was	not	trying	to	undermine	the	supremacy	of	
Christianity	(Muller,	2002,	p.118).		In	contrast,	Smith	contests	the	essential	quality	of	
‘religion’	by	using	a	double	edged	sword.	On	the	one	hand,	he	makes	a	case	against	a	
Christo-centric	reified	idea	of	‘religion’	that	can	be	used	to	evaluate	traditions	across	the	
globe.	On	the	other	hand,	he	challenges	the	essential	characteristic	of	any	‘religion’,	
Christianity,	Islam,	Hinduism,	etc.	because	these	belief	systems	have	not	remained	
static,	but	rather,	have	evolved	over	time	in	such	a	way	that	even	followers	of	the	same	
tradition	rarely	understand	them	identically.		
																																																								
23	I	am	aware	that	using	the	label	‘Western’	in	the	singular	is	problematic	since	there	are	
numerous	Western	societies,	all	of	which	are	not	homogenous.	Similarly,	I	am	also	
aware	that	there	are	many	‘Christianities’	whose	philosophies	are	not	consistent.	
However,	for	the	purposes	of	this	argument,	it	is	the	most	efficient	way	to	describe	
these	entities	since	their	influence	on	this	subject	has	been	relatively	uniform.		
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What	is	interesting	however,	is	that	whereas	Smith	recognizes	the	inherent	
problems	with	this	label,	nevertheless,	he	is	not	willing	to	relinquish	the	ideas	that	are	
associated	with	it.	Indeed,	not	unlike	Mircea	Eliade,	one	gets	the	impression	that	Smith	
was	also	advocating	for	a	kind	of	homo	religiosus:	
we	must	note	that	what	we	call	‘religion’	is	of	much	wider	prevalence	and	of	
much	longer	standing	than	is	the	use	of	this	term,	or	indeed	of	any	other	term,	to	
designate	it.	In	every	human	community	on	earth	today,	there	exists	something	
that	we,	as	sophisticated	observers,	may	term	religion,	or	a	religion.	And	we	are	
able	to	see	it	in	each	case	as	the	latest	development	in	a	continuous	tradition	that	
goes	back,	we	can	now	affirm,	for	at	least	one	hundred	thousand	years	(Smith,	
1963,	p.18).			
	
Consequently,	Smith	surmises	that	the	best	way	to	retain	the	ideas	associated	with	
‘religion’	is	by	discarding	this	term	and	replacing	it,	by	what	he	considers	to	be,	
alternative,	non-conflictive	labels.	As	such,	Smith	advocates	for	the	use	of	‘cumulative	
traditions’	and	‘faith’	instead	of	‘religion’	because	he	believes	these	words	will	better	
represent	the	history	and	evolution	of	the	diverse	belief	systems	that	have	developed	
across	the	world.	Accordingly,	Smith	defines	these	terms:		
By	‘faith’	I	mean	personal	faith…	For	the	moment	let	it	stand	for	an	inner	
religious	experience	or	involvement	of	a	particular	person:	the	impingement	on	
him	of	the	transcendent,	putative	or	real.	By	‘cumulative	tradition’	I	mean	the	
entire	mass	of	overt	objective	data	that	constitute	the	historical	deposit,	as	it	
were,	of	the	past	religious	life	of	the	community	in	question:	temples,	scriptures,	
theological	systems,	dance	patterns,	legal	and	other	social	institutions,	
conventions,	moral	codes,	myths,	and	so	on:	anything	that	can	be	and	is	
transmitted	from	one	person,	one	generation,	to	another,	and	that	an	historian	
can	observe	(1963,	pp.156-157).			
	
The	issues	with	these	replacements	that	Smith	puts	forth	are	surprisingly	obvious.	On	
the	one	hand,	it	could	be	debated	that	any	search	for	a	‘universal’	label	is	filled	with	
pitfalls	since	this	will	naturally	require	it	to	have	some	‘essential’	characteristics;	which	
is	the	crux	of	Smith’s	concern	with	the	term	‘religion’	in	the	first	place!	Furthermore,	if	
one	decided	to	include	every	aspect	of	society	into	a	definition	of	‘cumulative	traditions’	
then	would	it	not	be	easier	to	simply	stick	to	categories	such	as	history	and	
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anthropology?	Why	do	we	need	a	separate	designation	called	‘cumulative	traditions’?	
On	the	other	hand,	the	term	‘faith’	is	a	very	common	Christian	idea	and	one	cannot	help	
but	be	taken	aback	by	Smith’s	naiveté	at	not	realizing	that	this	term	will	also	come	with	
its	own	set	of	Western	(and	Christian)	baggage.	It	is	evident	that	Smith	does	not	realize	
that	the	concepts	‘faith’	and	‘cumulative	traditions’	also	have	the	potential	to	take	on	
‘reified	essential’	characteristics	just	like	the	term	‘religion’	which	he	wants	us	to	
discard.	This	seems	to	indicate	that	Smith	was	still	looking	for	a	way	he	could	
homogenize	some	terms	in	order	to	make	them	applicable	globally.	Considering	that	
this	seems	to	be	what	he	was	arguing	against	in	the	first	place,	his	work	leaves	us	with	
more	questions	than	answers.	Indeed,	ultimately	one	gets	the	impression	that	whereas	
Smith	was	able	to	see	the	problematic	nature	of	the	study	of	‘religion’,	he	was,	in	the	
end,	unable	to	make	a	clean	break	from	the	use	of	the	linguistic	tools	that	he	had	grown	
accustomed	to	using.		
	
J.	Z.	Smith	
	 Perhaps	it	is	because	there	was	such	a	need	for	academics	to	make	bold	
statements	and	take	a	radical	stance,	to	separate	themselves	from	scholars	such	as	
Smith,	Muller	and	Eliade,	that	the	celebrated	scholar,	J.Z.	Smith,	makes	this,	oft	quoted,	
statement	in	Imagining	Religion:	From	Babylon	to	Jonestown	(1982):	
while	there	is	a	staggering	amount	of	data,	of	phenomena,	of	human	experiences	
and	expressions	that	might	be	characterized	in	one	culture	or	another,	by	one	
criterion	or	another,	as	religious	–	there	is	no	data	for	religion.	Religion	is	solely	
the	creation	of	the	scholar’s	study.	It	is	created	for	the	scholar’s	analytic	
purposes	by	his	imaginative	acts	of	comparison	and	generalization.	Religion	has	
no	independent	existence	apart	from	the	academy.	For	this	reason,	the	student	of	
religion,	and	most	particularly	the	historian	of	religion,	must	be	relentlessly	self-
conscious.	Indeed	this	self-consciousness	constitutes	his	primary	expertise,	his	
foremost	object	of	study	(1982,	p.11,	emphasis	in	original).		
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It	is	obvious	that	J.Z.	Smith	is	challenging	the	rules	of	this	discussion	since	he	is	calling	
for	religious	studies	scholars	to	completely	separate	themselves	from	arguments,	that	
are	even	remotely	influenced	by	the	idea	that	‘religion’	is	a	sensitive	category,	and	
therefore	must	be	treated	with	particular	care.	An	argument	that	is	eloquently	conveyed	
by	W.C.	Smith	when	he	states,	“[i]t	has	been	said	that	one	must	tread	softly	here,	for	one	
is	treading	on	men’s	dreams”	(1963,	p.5).	Instead,	J.Z.	Smith	argues	that	‘religion’	must	
be	treated	like	any	other	academic	category	that	has	been	created	for	scholars	to	
examine	a	certain	aspect	of	human	society.	What	is	interesting	however,	is	that	J.Z.	
Smith,	like	W.C.	Smith,	is	also	arguing	against	any	‘essential’	quality	of	‘religion’.		
	 To	support	his	ideas,	in	the	essay	“Religion,	Religions,	Religious”	(1998)	J.Z.	
Smith	relies	on	David	Hume’s	discussion	in	the	Natural	History	of	Religion	(1749-51).	
Hume	argues	against	the	innate	quality	of	‘religion’	on	the	simple	premise	that	no	two	
‘religions’	are	identically	described	by	their	followers.	Despite	the	widespread	usage	of	
the	term	‘religion’,	nevertheless,	Hume	contends	that	‘religion’	is	not	an	original	aspect	
of	nature	(Smith,	J.Z.,	1998,	p.274).	By	using	arguments	like	Hume’s,	which	contest	the	
validity	of	the	idea	that	‘religion’	is	“an	original	instinct	or	primary	impression	of	
nature”	(as	cited	by	Smith,	J.Z.,	1998,	p.274)	and	James	H.	Lueba’s	(1912)	contention	
that	there	are	more	than	fifty	definitions	for	the	term	‘religion’	J.Z.	Smith	asserts	that	
‘religion’	“is	a	second-order	generic	concept”	(1998,	p.281).	As	such,	he	argues,	“there	
may	well	be	a	primary	and	valid	human	experience	that	gives	rise	to	the	secondary	
religious	interpretations,	but	the	truth	of	the	experience	is	no	guarantee	of	the	validity	
of	the	interpretation”	(Smith,	J.Z.,	1998,	p.274).	Accordingly,	one	of	his	principal	
concerns	is	the	way	this	term,	and	the	ideas	attached	to	it,	are	treated	differently	than	
any	other	discipline	in	the	academy.	Indeed,	he	seems	to	be	diametrically	opposed	to	
W.C.	Smith	who	spends	a	considerable	amount	of	time	defending	the	views	of	
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theologians	and	practitioners,	who	he	believes	are	not	given	their	due	place	in	this	
discourse.	In	contrast,	J.Z.	Smith	argues	that	the	way	‘religion’	is	understood	and	
categorized	has	a	lot	to	do	with	the	power	dynamics	of	society:	
the	distinction	of	religion,	has	usually	been	attempted	in	a	monotheistic	fashion.	
Scholars	have	engaged	in	the	quest	for	the	unique	and	definitive	sine	qua	non,	the	
“that	without	which”	religion	would	not	be	religion	but	rather	an	instance	of	
something	else.	In	the	main,	the	results	of	this	enterprise	have	not	been	
convincing;	they	have	failed	to	achieve	consensus.	They	have	been	poorly	
formulated	and	violate	the	ordinary	canons	of	definition.	But	this	is	less	
disturbing	than	the	fact	that	the	presuppositions	of	the	monotheistic	enterprise	
have	been	deliberately	tampered	with	for	apologetic	reasons	(1982,	p.5).	
	
Instead,	J.Z.	Smith	advocates	that	historians	of	‘religion’	adopt	a	polythetic	approach	if	
they	want	to	arrive	at	a	more	complex	understanding	of	the	ways	in	which	religious	
ideas	have	been	influenced	by	various	power	structures.	He	believes	that	only	when	
scholars	develop	a	more	efficient	system	of	categorization,	which	allows	for	multiple	
points	of	identification	will	these	ideas	be	applicable	to	a	wider	range	of	religious	
traditions.	He	argues	this	can	be	achieved	with	the	polythetic	method,	which	he	adopts	
from	a	study	on	taxonomy	done	in	1963:		
[a]	mode	of	classification	which	surrendered	the	idea	of	perfect,	unique	single	
differentia	–	a	taxonomy	which	retained	the	notion	of	necessary	but	abandoned	
the	notion	of	sufficient	criteria	for	admission	to	a	class.	In	this	new	mode,	a	class	
is	defined	as	consisting	of	a	set	of	properties,	each	individual	member	of	the	class	
to	possess	“a	large	(but	unspecified)	number	of	these	properties,	with	each	
property	to	be	possessed	by	a	“large	number”	of	individuals	in	the	class,	but	no	
single	property	to	be	possessed	by	every	member	in	the	class.	If	the	class	
contained	a	large	population	it	would	be	possible	to	arrange	them	according	to	
the	properties	they	possessed	in	common	in	such	a	way	that	each	individual	
would	most	closely	resemble	its	nearest	neighbor	and	least	closely	resemble	its	
farthest.	The	probability	would	be	high	that	the	individuals	at	either	extreme	
would	scarcely	resemble	one	another,	that	is,	they	may	have	none	of	the	
properties	of	the	set	in	common	(Smith,	J.Z.,	1982,	p.4).	
	
However,	according	to	J.Z.	Smith:	
this	would	have	to	eschew	the	impossible	supposition	of	a	common	ancestor,	
replacing	it	by	a	model	of	multilinear	evolution.	But	I	know	of	no	such	attempt…	I	
know	of	no	examples	of	attempts	at	the	polythetic	classification	of	religions	or	
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religious	phenomena.	It	is	in	this	area	that	the	most	fruitful	future	work	will	be	
done	(1982,	p.8).	
	
J.Z.	Smith	is	also	arguing	against	the	idea	of	an	‘essential’	definition	of	‘religion’.	
Nonetheless,	unlike	W.C.	Smith,	he	is	not	advocating	for	the	replacement	of	this	word	by	
other	terms	but	rather	a	change	in	strategy	and	methodology	in	the	study	of	these	
‘religions’.	This	ties	in	neatly	with	his	argument	that	Leuba	was	not	actually	lamenting	
that	there	were	so	many	definitions	of	‘religion’	but	rather	that	“the	moral	of	Leuba	is	
not	that	religion	cannot	be	defined,	but	that	it	can	be	defined,	with	greater	or	lesser	
success,	more	than	fifty	ways”	(Smith,	J.Z.,	1998,	p.281).	
	 According	to	J.Z.	Smith,	the	only	means	to	get	away	from	a	monothetic,	and	
therefore	‘essential’,	categorization	of	‘religion’	is	to	avoid	looking	for	something	that	
makes	it	unique	and	special.	Instead,	he	believes	that	the	best	method	for	a	student	to	
approach	the	study	of	‘religion’	is	by	finding	a	way	to	understand	and	appreciate	the	
commonalities:	
Does	one	focus	on	those	things	which	“excite	horror	and	make	men	stare,”	or	
does	one	concentrate	on	“common	stories”	on	“what	we	see	in	Europe	every	
day”?	It	is	a	tension	between	religion	imagined	as	an	exotic	category	of	human	
experience	and	expression,	and	religion	imagined	as	an	ordinary	category	of	
human	expression	and	activity.		
It	has	been	my	continued	presupposition	that	the	latter	choice	for	imagination	is	
the	more	productive	for	the	development	of	history	of	religion	as	an	academic	
enterprise	(Smith,	J.Z.,	1982,	pp.xii-xiii,	emphasis	in	original).	
	
Whereas	there	is	much	to	be	commended	in	J.Z.	Smith’s	approach,	which	questions	the	
way	‘religion’	and	religious	studies	have	been	categorized,	lamentably	he	does	not	
actually	articulate	how	this	polythetic	approach	of	his	would	work.	And	perhaps	most	
importantly,	he	does	not	specify	how	such	a	‘set	of	properties’	would	be	identified,	nor	
which	linguistic	tools	scholars	would	use	to	create	these	classifications.	Would	each	
tradition	use	their	own	set	of	classifications?	What	language	would	they	be	in?	Who	
would	decide	which	‘terms’	were	to	be	utilized?	If	we	do	not	use	the	same	terminology,	
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then	how	will	we	make	ourselves	understood	by	‘others’?	After	all,	for	us	to	celebrate	
the	‘common	stories’	do	we	not	first	need	to	decide	if	there	is	a	common	language	that	
can	be	spoken?	And	most	importantly,	whose	language	is	that	going	to	be?	Is	there	a	
language	that	we	can	share	whose	words	are	not	already	embedded	with	meaning?		
	
Talal	Asad	
	 The	questions	mentioned	above	are	similar	to	the	ones	that	the	anthropologist,	
Talal	Asad,	seems	to	be	asking	in	his	collection	of	essays	Genealogies	of	Religion:	
Discipline	and	Reasons	of	Power	in	Christianity	and	Islam	(1993).	He	begins	by	noting	
that	it	is	still	considered	important	for	non-Western	students	to	study	the	‘religion’	and	
philosophy	of	the	West	since	it	is	presumed	that	these	ideas	must	have	directly	
influenced	non-Western	thought.	However,	he	notes	that	on	the	other	hand,	Western	
scholars	and	students	do	not	always	feel	the	same	need:	
the	assumption	that	Western	history	has	had	an	overriding	importance	–	for	
good	or	ill	–	in	the	making	of	the	modern	world…	It	has	sometimes	been	noted	
that	peoples	from	the	non-Western	countries	feel	obliged	to	read	the	history	of	
the	West	(but	not	each	other’s	histories)	and	that	Westerners	in	turn	do	not	feel	
the	same	need	to	study	non-Western	histories.	The	history	of	modern	Western	
thought,	for	example,	can	be	(and	is)	written	on	its	own,	but	not	so	the	history	of	
contemporary	Arab	thought	(Asad,	1993,	p.1).	
	
Keeping	this	in	mind,	it	is	not	surprising	that	Asad	also	speaks	out	against	the	
essentialist	definition	of	‘religion’	because	it	is	evident	to	him	that	this	essentialist	
structure	cannot	be	applied	to	all	‘religions’:	
My	argument	is	that	there	cannot	be	a	universal	definition	of	religion,	not	only	
because	its	constituent	elements	and	relationships	are	historically	specific,	but	
because	that	definition	is	itself	the	historical	product	of	discursive	processes	
(1993,	p.29).		
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One	of	the	strategies	that	Asad	uses	to	convince	his	readers	of	this	premise	is	to	dissect	
Clifford	Geertz’s	well-known	definition	of	‘religion’	and	articulate	the	reasons	why	this	
emphasis	on	symbolism	cannot	be	used	without	prejudice	(Asad,	1993,	p.29).	
	 Whereas	Asad’s	arguments	about	Geertz	are	interesting,	it	is	his	emphasis	on	the	
problems	with	post-Enlightenment	ideas	of	secular	society	that	are	most	compelling.	To	
begin	with,	he	echoes	Foucault’s	arguments	about	power	when	he	states	“I	want	to	
examine	the	ways	in	which	the	theoretical	search	for	an	essence	of	religion	invites	us	to	
separate	it	conceptually	from	the	domain	of	power”	(Asad,	1993,	p.29).	Additionally,	he	
also	highlights	the	fact	that	Western	society’s	inclination	to	limit	‘religion’	to	the	private	
sphere	has	resulted	in	a	situation	whereby	religious	identities	that	do	not	necessarily	
limit	themselves	to	the	so-called	‘private’	sphere	are	considered	problematic	and	
dangerous.	He	argues	that	this	effort,	in	and	of	itself,	to	corral	‘religion’	in	the	private	
sphere	is	a	power	play	since	it	only	allows	for	a	Western,	post-Enlightenment	
understanding	of	the	space	that	‘religion’	must	occupy,	which	does	not	always	resonate	
with	religious	ideas	in	other	parts	of	the	world.24	This	insistence,	of	most	modern	
Western	nations,	to	separate	‘religion’	from	state,	according	to	Asad,	just	serves	to	
disguise	the	fact	that	the	secular	state	has	managed	to	convey	the	impression	that	its	
philosophy	is	unbiased,	without	prejudice	and	universal,	in	comparison	to	those	nations	
that	allow	‘religion’	to	play	a	more	significant	role	in	public	society:		
Perhaps	the	feeling	that	secular	arguments	are	rationally	superior	to	religious	
ones	is	based	on	the	belief	that	religious	convictions	are	the	more	rigid.	But	there	
is	no	decisive	evidence	for	thinking	this.	Religious	traditions	have	undergone	the	
most	radical	transformations	over	time.	Divine	texts	may	be	unalterable,	but	the	
ingenuities	of	human	interpretations	are	endless	–	quite	apart	from	the	fact	that	
some	of	the	conditions	of	human	doubt	and	certainty	are	notoriously	
inaccessible	to	conscious	argument.	Fanatics	come	in	all	shapes	and	sizes	among	
																																																								
24	This	is	an	issue	that	we	will	explore	in	the	final	chapter,	since	the	Hindu	nationalist	
movement	is	quite	vocal	about	‘Hinduism’	being	the	foundation	upon	which	India	was	
built.	
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skeptics	and	believers	alike	–	so	do	individuals	of	tolerant	disposition.	As	for	the	
claim	that	among	the	religious,	coercion	replaces	persuasive	argument,	it	should	
not	be	forgotten	that	we	owe	the	most	terrible	examples	of	coercion	in	modern	
times	to	secular	totalitarian	regimes	–	Nazism	and	Stalinism.	The	point	that	
matters	in	the	end,	surely,	is	not	the	justification	that	is	used	(whether	it	be	
supernatural	or	worldly)	but	the	behavior	that	is	justified.	On	this	point,	it	must	
be	said	that	the	ruthlessness	of	secular	practice	yields	nothing	to	the	ferocity	of	
religious	(Asad,	1993,	pp.235-236).	
	
	 Identifying	who	is	speaking,	and	for	whom	they	are	speaking,	are	Asad’s	main	
concerns	and	he	repeatedly	demonstrates	how	different	power	structures	impose,	and	
coerce,	those	around	them.	Interestingly,	this	argument	could	be	augmented	by	those	
made	by	the	American	scholar	Robert	N.	Bellah	who	states	that	the	birth	of	the	nation	
created	something	called	a	civil	‘religion’	which,	in	turn,	produced	its	own	set	of	
symbols	and	rituals.	Bellah	contends	that	the	American	Constitution,	the	many	
monuments	created	in	the	memory	of	the	leaders	of	this	nation,	and	rituals	like	the	
Pledge	of	Allegiance,	can	all	be	interpreted	as	symbols	of	a	civil	‘religion’.	“America	[is]	
the	promised	land.	God	has	led	his	people	to	establish	a	new	sort	of	social	order	that	
shall	be	a	light	unto	all	nations”	(Bellah,	1970,	p.175).	Arguments	such	as	Asad’s	and	
Bellah’s,	highlight	the	fact	that	the	term	‘secular’	is	not	benign	or	without	significance,	as	
we	are	led	to	believe.	Instead	the	labels	‘secular’	and	‘religious’	are	reciprocal	categories	
which	are	equally	involved	in	the	struggle	for	power	and	hegemony	and	as	such	cannot,	
and	must	not,	be	considered	less	prejudiced	or	biased	than	the	other.25		
	 Accordingly,	Asad	questions	the	categories	‘secular’	and	‘religious’	by	tracing	
their	boundaries,	and	demonstrating	the	ambiguity	of	their	borders,	and	contends	that	
that	the	walls	dividing	these	categories	are	more	porous	than	is	usually	assumed.	Asad	
is	building	on	some	of	Foucault’s	ideas	here,	a	debt	he	openly	acknowledges,	in	an	
																																																								
25	In	the	final	chapter,	we	will	analyze	this	term	‘secular’	and	its	impact	on	the	
emergence	of	a	strong	nationalist	agenda	in	India.		
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interview	conducted	by	David	Scott.	Asad	claims	Foucault,	“suddenly	had	made	strange	
all	those	things	that	are	so	familiar	to	us,	[and]	forced	us	to	think	about	the	assumptions	
on	which	they	are	built”	(Scott,	2006,	p.275).	A	philosophy	which	Asad	then	adopts	for	
his	own	work	when	he	tries	to	expose	how	these	terms	are	the	location	of	a	power	
struggle.	He	attempts	to	trace	the	complex	past	of	these	terms	by	problematizing	the	
manner	in	which	rituals	have	been	translated	as	symbolic	acts	in	modern	secular	
society.	Asad	points	out,	in	contrast,	that	in	the	past	the	embodiment	of	ritual	
performance	was	more	closely	associated	with	ideas	of	discipline	and	embodied	
involvement	in	religious	traditions.	Consequently,	he	laments	that	whereas	historically,	
rituals	were	conducted	to	help	a	person	to	‘better’	themselves,	by	learning	how	to	
imbibe	religious	teachings,	and	acquire	learning	through	action,	in	the	modern	world,	
religious	rites	are	oftentimes	simply	symbols	of	the	‘religion’	one	claimed	to	profess.	
Accordingly,	Asad	quotes	the	theologian	Hugh	of	St.	Victor	(c	1096-1141)	who	contends,	
“Sacraments…	are	known	to	have	been	instituted	for	three	reasons:	on	account	of	
humiliation,	on	account	of	instruction,	on	account	of	exercise”	(as	cited	in	Asad,	1993,	
p.78).	Consequently,	Asad	deduces	that	these	rituals	were	“parts	of	a	Christian	program	
for	creating	in	its	performer,	by	means	of	regulated	practice,	the	‘mental	and	moral	
dispositions	appropriate	to	Christians”	(1993,	p.78).	Asad	claims	that	a	single	
dimensional	reading	of	ancient	terms	results	in	inefficient	definitions	and	translations	
that	are	an	attempt	at	“simply	domesticating	the	original”	(Scott,	2006,	p.275)	which,	
more	often	than	not,	lead	to	erroneous	conclusions.	“In	modern	thinking,	belief	is	the	
core	of	religion	and	therefore	the	core	of	that	which	is	private,	truly	one’s	own.	This	
goes	back	to	a	sharp	body-mind	distinction	that	was	established	in	early	modernity”	
(Scott,	2006,	p.	287,	emphasis	in	original).	However,	Asad	argues:	
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This	is	not	a	matter	of	simply	leaving	out	a	dimension	that	is	very	real	in	people’s	
lives	and	that	enables	them	to	be	carriers	of	a	tradition.	It	raises	questions	about	
the	autonomy	of	a	space	for	argument.	Because	argument	is	itself	interwoven	
with	the	body	in	its	entirety,	it	always	invokes	historical	bodies,	bodies	placed	
within	particular	traditions,	with	their	potentialities	of	feeling,	of	receptivity,	and	
of	suspicion	(Scott,	2006,	p.288).		
	
What	Asad	offers	us	here	is	a	keener	understanding	of	the	discrepancies	inherent	
in	the	terms	that	scholars	of	‘religion’	continue	to	use.	By	nuancing	some	of	these	
concepts,	and	demonstrating	the	inability	to	contain	these	categories,	he	highlights	the	
need	for	a	more	comprehensive	understanding	of	the	history	of	such	terms,	with	their	
embedded	meanings	that	are	not	immediately	evident.	Asad	focuses	on	many	of	the	
issues	with	these	modern	categories,	while	also	accentuating	how	Western	and	non-
Western	traditions	are	not	on	a	level	playing	field.	However,	whereas	Asad	does	point	
us	in	the	right	direction	he	does	not	offer	us	any	solutions	that	can	be	easily	
implemented.	Consequently,	his	emphasis	on	the	need	for	scholars	“to	suppress	their	
personal	distaste	for	particular	traditions	if	they	are	to	understand	them”	(Asad,	1993,	
p.200)	is	not	accompanied	by	a	methodological	explanation	of	how	this	(almost)	
impossible	task	of	keeping	context	at	bay	is	to	be	achieved.	In	fact,	if	one	is	to	
understand	Asad	correctly,	then	one	is	left	with	the	impression	that	this	can	only	be	
accomplished	either	by	scholars	limiting	their	studies	to	their	native	cultures,	or,	by	
somehow	exorcising	contextual	bias	from	any	interpretations	or	debates.	Therefore,	
while	his	answers	are	certainly	thoughtful	and	provocative,	unfortunately	they	do	not	
provide	a	course	of	action	that	is	viable.26	
	
	
																																																								
26	The	scope	of	this	work	does	not	allow	me	to	explore	all	of	Asad’s	work	and,	as	such,	
my	critique	is	limited	to	this	particular	book,	which	has,	undoubtedly,	been	his	most	
recognized	work	to	date.		
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S.N.	Balagangadhara	
	 It	is	this	sense	of	frustration	that	one	hears	when	reading	The	Heathen	in	his	
Blindness	(1994)	by	S.N.	Balagangadhara.	This	work,	which	is	bombastic	in	its	tone,	calls	
for	the	elimination	of	the	term	‘religion’	for	any	belief	system	other	than	Christianity,	
Judaism	and	Islam	(Balagangadhara,	2005,	p.336).	Many	scholars	before	
Balagangadhara	have	called	for	this	term	to	be	discarded	and,	as	such,	this	is	not	a	novel	
call	to	arms.	For	example,	we	have	already	examined	W.C.	Smith’s,	J.Z.	Smith’s,	and	Talal	
Asad’s	arguments	and	they	are	not	alone.	They	are	accompanied	by	other	interesting	
voices,	such	as	the	French	anthropologist	Daniel	Dubuisson	who	argues:	
what	is	in	question	is,	in	fact,	nothing	more	or	less	than	certain	pretensions	of	
modern	Western	science	to	conceive	of	humankind	and	the	world	according	to	
codes	that	it	has	elaborated	and	to	points	of	reference	it	has	fixed.	Or,	if	we	
prefer	to	turn	this	observation	into	a	blunter	question,	is	Western	anthropology,	
religious	anthropology	in	particular,	in	its	quest	for	the	Other	and	for	our	very	
humanity,	capable	of	discovering	anything	but	itself	–	that	is,	anything	other	than	
its	own	categories	and	its	own	way	of	conceiving	the	world?	(2003,	p.6,	emphasis	
in	original)	
	
Similarly,	scholars	such	as	Russell	McCutcheon	and	Timothy	Fitzgerald	have	also	
challenged	the	validity	of	this	category	of	‘religion’	and	the	subsequent	need	for	a	
separate	department	of	religious	studies,	arguing	instead,	that	these	ideas	are	just	as	
easily	categorized	as	history,	sociology	or	anthropology.	For	example,	Fitzgerald	
laments:		
religion	is	still	widely	if	somewhat	loosely	used	by	historians	and	social	scientists	
as	if	it	were	a	genuine	crosscultural	category.	Typically	such	writers	treat	
religion	as	one	among	a	number	of	different	kinds	of	sociocultural	phenomena	
whose	institutions	can	be	studied	historically	and	sociologically.	This	approach	
may	seem	to	have	some	obvious	validity	in	the	context	of	societies	(especially	
western	Christian	ones)	where	a	cultural	and	juridical	distinction	is	made	
between	religion	and	non-religion,	between	religion	and	the	secular,	between	
church	and	state…	in	most	crosscultural	contexts	such	a	distinction,	if	it	can	be	
made	at	all,	is	at	best	unhelpful	and	at	worst	positively	misleading	since	it	
imposes	a	superficial	and	distorting	level	of	analysis	on	the	data	(2000,	p.4).	
	
Likewise,	McCutcheon	argues	that	the	assumption	that	‘religion’	is:	
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unique,	and	sociohistorically	autonomous,	is	itself	a	scholarly	representation	that	
operates	within,	and	assists	in	maintaining,	a	very	specific	set	of	discursive	
practices	along	with	the	institutions	in	which	these	discourses	are	articulated	
and	reproduced	(1997,	p.3).	
	
Perhaps	it	is	in	response	to	arguments	such	as	these	that	Balagangadhara	feels	the	need	
to	showcase,	in	exhaustive	detail,	the	way	this	term	‘religion’	is	(almost)	synonymous	
with	the	ideas	normally	associated	with	the	Abrahamic	‘religions’	in	general,	and	
Christianity	in	particular.	This	leads	Balagangadhara	to	the	conclusion	that	‘religion’	is	
an	illegitimate	category	when	applied	to	any	of	the	non-Abrahamic	traditions.		
	 To	prove	his	theory,	Balagangadhara	highlights	how	the	word	‘religion’	
originates	from	the	Latin	word	religio	or	traditio,	i.e.	tradition,	an	alternative	term	used	
for	the	same	purpose	during	the	Greco-Roman	period.27	Indeed,	traditio,	or	religio,	were	
associated	almost	entirely	with	the	enactment	and	fulfilment	of	ritual	duties	which	were	
an	integral	aspect	of	one’s	familial	obligations	and	crucial	to	the	well-being	of	society.	So	
embedded	were	these	words	in	the	idea	of	rites	and	rituals	that	Balagangadhara	
contends	that	when	this	word	was	eventually	used	by	Christians,	in	relation	with	
doctrine	and	belief,	the	Romans	could	not	comprehend	how	the	Christians	claimed	to	
have	‘religion’	when	they	were	against	the	continued	performance	and	practice	of	
familial	religious	rites	(2005,	pp.52-53).	Nevertheless,	the	term	was	eventually	
appropriated	by	Christians	who	gave	it	a	very	different	identity.	Balagangadhara	points	
out	that	initially,	according	to	the	etymology	outlined	by	the	Roman	philosopher	and	
statesman	Cicero	(c65	BC),	“those	who	carefully	reviewed	and	so	to	speak	retraced	the	
lore	of	the	ritual	were	called	“religious”	from	‘relegere	(to	re-trace	or	re-read)’”	(as	cited	
in	Balagangadhara,	2005,	p.	222).	However,	approximately	three	hundred	years	later	
																																																								
27	Balagangadhara	is	not	the	first	scholar	to	trace	the	etymology	of	this	term.	W.C.	Smith	
also	offers	up	a	concise	history	that	is	very	useful.		
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this	definition	was	declared	‘inept’	by	the	Christian	philosopher	Lactanius	(c320	AD)	
and	was	replaced	by	a	new	etymology,	which	was	better	suited	to	Christian	ideas.	This	
was	articulated	by	the	modern	Belgian	philosopher	Leo	Apostel,	“re-ligare	(to	tie	
together,	to	link)…	religious	phenomena	as	instruments	of	connection,	as	modes	of	
union”	(as	cited	in	Balagangadhara,	2005,	p.222).	Furthermore,	according	to	Lactanius:	
The	name	of	religion	is	taken	from	the	bond	of	piety,	because	God	has	bound	and	
fastened	man	to	Himself	by	piety,	since	it	is	necessary	for	us	to	serve	Him	as	Lord	
and	obey	Him	as	father…	They	are	superstitious	who	worship	many	and	false	
gods;	but	we,	who	supplicate	the	one	true	God,	are	religious	(as	cited	in	
Balagangadhara,	2005,	p.223).	
	
Thus,	Balagangadhara	demonstrates	how	early	Christians,	who,	according	to	the	
Romans	had	no	religio	because	they	had	no	traditio,	neatly	renovated	the	argument	
whereby	the	Roman	‘pagans’	had	no	‘religion’	because	they	had	no	clear	doctrines,	
covenants,	saviours	or	scriptures.		
	 Thereafter,	Balagangadhara	goes	on	to	trace	the	evolution	of	this	term	from	early	
Christianity	all	the	way	through	modern	times.	What	he	accomplishes	with	the	telling	of	
this	intricate	history	is	to	convince	his	readers	that	this	term	‘religion’	became	one	of	
the	most	important	ways	in	which	Christians	identified	themselves.	So	much	so,	that	he	
states,	“if	the	word	‘religion’	refers	to	something	at	all,	it	refers	at	least	to	Christianity	
because	the	latter	refers	to	itself	as	a	religion	(i.e.	it	uses	the	word	with	respect	to	
itself)”	(Balagangadhara,	2005,	p.292).	However,	he	does	not	limit	this	definition	to	
Christianity	and	goes	on	to	argue	that	Judaism	and	Islam	are	also	‘religions’	since	
“Christianity	did	not	merely	baptize	Judaism	and	Islam	as	rival	religions.	The	latter	also	
saw	Christianity	as	a	rival	religion	under	the	same	description”	(Balagangadhara,	2005,	
p.	292).	And	therefore,	according	to	Balagangadhara,	they	too	accepted	this	label	
‘religion’	for	themselves.	What	makes	this	particular	argument	difficult	to	accept	is	the	
way	he	reasons	that	Judaism	and	Islam	must	also	be	‘religions’:	
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Of	course,	it	is	possible	that	Judaism	and	Islam	merely	reacted	to	the	attacks	of	
Christianity	and	accepted	Christianity’s	self-description…	[however]	Each	of	
these	three	religions	singled	out	exactly	the	same	rivals	under	the	same	
description	elsewhere	unerringly.	Judaism	had	singled	out	the	Roman	religio	as	
its	rival	before	Christianity	was	even	born;	Islam	had	picked	out	precisely	those	
Indian	traditions	as	its	rivals,	which	Christianity	was	also	to	identify,	centuries	
before	the	European	Christians	launched	their	major	and	massive	evangelising	
activities	(Balagangadhara,	2005,	p.293,	emphasis	in	original).	
	
One	could	counter	this	argument	in	multiple	ways;	first,	let	us	not	forget	that	the	
Christians,	and	then	the	Muslims,	appropriated	the	Hebrew	Bible	as	their	own,	thereby	
identifying	a	common	history.	Naturally,	this	also	meant	that	they	would	have	to	adopt	
the	so	called	‘rivals’	of	the	ancient	Jews.	Secondly,	whereas	it	may	be	true	that	the	
Jewish	people	had	also	recognized	the	Romans	as	their	rivals,	it	is	also	evident	that	they	
were	challenging	the	validity	of	each	other’s	traditions	and	ritual	activities,	not	their	
doctrines.	This	is	a	point	that	Balagangadhara	himself	sheds	light	on	when	he	argues	
that	the	Jews	had	already	proven	that	they	were	a	people	with	traditio	that	was	older	
than	the	Romans	since	they	had	traced	their	history	to	Moses	who	clearly	predated	
Homer	(Balagangadhara,	2005,	pp.47-48).	This	allowed	the	Jewish	community	to	
establish	that	they	came	from	an	ancient	people	with	whom	they	shared	a	common	
ancestry,	traditions	and	rituals.	Moreover,	whereas	it	may	be	possible	to	argue	‘Islam	
picked	out	precisely	those	Indian	traditions	as	its	rivals,’	this	would	simply	prove	that	
the	Muslims	recognized	Indian	traditions	as	just	that,	i.e.	rival	traditions.	Furthermore,	
Balagangadhara	claims	that	Islam	and	Judaism	are	also	‘religions’	because	of	the	way	
‘religion’	has	been	formulated	and	defined.	If	this	is	the	case	then	one	presumes	that	the	
Jews	and	the	Muslims,	just	like	the	Christians,	must	have	also	embraced	this	identity	
without	question.	However,	there	are	many	Jews	and	Muslims	who	are	not	comfortable	
with	the	parameters	and	boundaries	that	the	term	‘religion’	has	set.	We	have	already	
seen	that	Asad	argues	against	the	separation	of	‘religion’	from	state	since,	according	to	
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him,	this	is	not	a	natural	division	in	many	Islamic	states.	Similarly,	Daniel	Boyarin,	a	
scholar	of	Jewish	studies,	does	not	accept	that	Judaism	adopted	this	label	without	
reservations.	Instead,	he	highlights	the	complexity	of	these	issues	in	Borderlines	(2004):	
While	Christianity	finally	configures	Judaism	as	a	different	religion,	Judaism	
itself,	I	suggest,	at	the	end	of	the	day	refuses	that	call,	so	that	seen	from	that	
perspective	the	difference	between	Christianity	and	Judaism	is	not	so	much	a	
difference	between	two	religions	as	a	difference	between	a	religion	and	an	entity	
that	refuses	to	be	one	(Boyarin,	2004,	pp.7-8).	
	
Why	is	it	so	important	for	Balagangadhara	to	include	Judaism	and	Islam	in	the	
parameters	he	has	set	for	this	term	‘religion’?	One	could	speculate	that	this	may	make	
Balagangadhara’s	ensuing	arguments,	which	claim	that	Hinduism	is	not	a	‘religion’,	
more	compelling	because	it	allows	him	to	separate	the	Western	Abrahamic	‘religions’	
from	Indian	traditions	who,	presumably,	do	not	share	the	same	ancestry.	Be	that	as	it	
may,	what	he	does	accomplish	is	a	particularly	convincing	argument	that	firmly	
harnesses	the	label	‘religion’	to	Christianity,	and	its	relevant	history,	which	makes	it	
extremely	difficult	to	use	this	term	without	even	graver	reservations.	However,	whereas	
this	may	convince	us	to	discard	the	term	‘religion’	when	not	speaking	about	Christianity,	
it	does	not	offer	us	any	answers	on	how	to	conduct	studies	of	a	religious	nature	from	
here	on	out.	Thus,	although	Balagangadhara	himself	acknowledges	the	necessity	for	
some	linguistic	tools	(2005,	p.341),	which	will	allow	for	these	investigations	to	be	
carried	out,	he	also	admits	that	he	does	not	have	any	answers.	Nevertheless,	he	does	
insist	that	replacing	the	term	‘religion’	with	alternative	terms	like	‘worldview’,	which	
was	made	popular	by	Ninian	Smart	(Balagangadhara,	2005,	p.341),	would	not	resolve	
this	dilemma	but	would	simply	lead	us	back	to	the	same	impasse	with	essentialized	
ideas	that	become	reified	over	time.		
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Richard	King	
	 According	to	Richard	King	in	Orientalism	and	Religion	(1999).	the	best	way	to	
address	this	impasse	is	by	“changing	the	subject”	(1999,	p.1):	
I	wish	to	argue	that	both	philosophy	and	the	history	of	ideas	should	take	more	
seriously	not	only	the	social	location	of	the	concepts	under	examination	but	also	
their	involvement	in	a	wider	cultural	field	of	power	relations,	or	what	has	
become	known	as	‘the	politics	of	knowledge’.	In	particular,	I	wish	to	argue	for	an	
awareness	of	the	mutual	imbrication	of	religion,	culture	and	power	as	categories.	
This	is	not	to	say	that	religion	and	culture	can	be	reduced	to	a	set	of	power	
relations	but	rather	that	religion	and	culture	are	the	field	in	which	power	
relations	operate	(1999,	p.1).	
	
For	King,	the	first	issue	that	needs	to	be	investigated	is	not	the	different	ways	‘religion’	
has	come	to	be	defined.	Instead,	he	wants	to	question	why	‘religion’	has	been	
categorized	in	a	manner	which	forces	it	to	be	restricted	to	the	private	domain.	To	
emphasize	his	point,	he	links	the	concepts	‘religion’	and	‘mysticism’	together.	At	first	
glance,	one	would	assume	that	whereas	the	two	concepts	are	related,	they	are	not	the	
same.	However,	he	highlights	how	extensively	these	terms	have	been	used	
interchangeably	after	the	Enlightenment	era.	He	argues	that	since	the	term	‘religion’	
became	so	embedded	in	its	institutional	background,	scholars	like	William	James28	
began	adopting	the	term	‘mysticism’	to	distinguish	what	they	believed	was	the	
‘essential’	core	of	religious	experiences	from	its	outer	trappings	of	doctrines	and	dogma.	
Indeed,	“for	James	‘organized’	or	institutional	religion	was	‘second-hand’	religion.	True	
religion	was	to	be	found	in	the	private,	‘religious’	and	mystical	experiences	of	
individuals	(King,	1999,	pp.21-22).	As	King	points	out,	one	of	the	key	strategies	used	
																																																								
28	William	James	seminal	work	The	Varieties	of	Religious	Experience:	A	Study	in	Human	
Nature	(1902)	is	a	crucial	turning	point	in	the	way	the	term	‘mysticism’	began	to	be	
widely	used	to	describe	religious	experience	for	a	wide	range	of	religious	traditions.	For	
a	detailed	survey	on	William	James	and	his	impact	on	modern	scholarship,	refer	to	
William	James	and	the	varieties	of	religious	experience:	a	centenary	celebration	(2005).	
Ed.	Jeremy	Carrette		
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here	is	that	the	‘mystical’	is	taken	from	the	public	sphere	and	placed	squarely	in	the	
private	realm	(1999,	p.13).	In	hindsight,	this	shift	is	not	surprising	in	the	post-
Enlightenment	era	when	rationality	and	science	were	regarded	as	the	priceless	gems	of	
modern	civilization.	As	a	result,	‘religious’	experiences,	which	were	now	being	labelled	
‘mystical’	experiences,	were	viewed	as	‘private’	experiences,	which	did	not	need	
confirmation	or	validation	from	outside	sources.	For	example,	Grace	Jantzen	quotes	
James	when	she	points	out	that	“he	concludes	famously	that	mystical	states	‘are	and	
have	the	right	to	be	absolutely	authoritative	over	the	individuals	to	whom	they	come’	
yet	‘non-mystics	are	under	no	obligations	to	acknowledge	in	mystical	states	a	superior	
authority’”	(as	cited	in	Jantzen,	2005,	p.98).	
According	to	King,	this	move,	which	took	the	‘mystical’	from	the	public	realm	to	
the	private	sphere,	was	in	fact,	a	power	play.	He	argues	that	removing	the	‘religious’	or	
the	‘mystical’	from	its	context	severely	underplays	the	role	that	‘mysticism’	has	played,	
and	continues	to	play,	in	social	and	political	situations:	
	The	very	fact	that	‘the	mystical’	is	seen	as	irrelevant	to	issues	of	social	and	
political	authority	itself	reflects	contemporary,	secularized	notions	of	and	
attitudes	towards	power.	The	separation	of	mystical	from	the	political	is	itself	a	
political	decision!	(King,	1999,	p.10).		
	
Like	Asad,	King	links	this	strategy	to	the	way	the	Western	world	continues	to	judge	
(usually	negatively)	any	state	where	‘religion’	is	openly	involved	in	political	decisions.	
The	way	these	states	and	their	politics	are	discredited,	gives	the	reader	an	idea	of	how	
the	privatization	of	‘religion’	has	allowed	many	Western	states	to	(wrongly)	presume	
that	any	government	that	allows	‘religion’	to	play	a	role	in	policy	making	is	invalid:	
One	consequence	of	the	modern	distinction	between	the	spheres	of	religion	and	
politics	has	been	to	foster	a	suspicion	among	Westerners	that	any	linkage	of	the	
two	realms	is	an	example	of	a	‘merely	rhetorical’	use	of	religious	discourse	to	
mask	some	underlying	political,	ideological	or	‘worldly’	intention	(King,	1999,	
p.13).	
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Furthermore,	he	also	argues,	“this	has	allowed	the	West	to	define	itself	as	progressive,	
scientific	and	liberal	in	contrast	to	the	superstitious,	tradition-bound	and	‘under-
developed’	Third	world	nations	of	Asia”	(2005,	p.111).	
	 It	is	evident	that	the	Enlightenment	era	was	a	crucial	turning	point	for	the	
development	of	Western	religious	ideas.	It	was	during	this	period	when	Christianity	was	
being	contrasted	with	science,	and	found	to	be	wanting	in	this	age	of	reason.	According	
to	King,	“the	association	of	‘the	mystical’	exclusively	with	a	realm	denoted	by	the	term	
‘religion’	is	a	product	of	secularization	which	‘filters	out’	the	religious	dimension	from	
other	aspects	of	human	cultural	activity”	(1999,	p.17).	Therefore,	it	is	hardly	surprising	
that	it	was	this	term	that	was	used	to	describe	the	Orient,	“the	representation	of	
Hinduism	and	Buddhism	as	‘mystical’	has	functioned	to	reinforce	Western	stereotypes	
of	Eastern	religion	and	culture	as	world-denying,	amoral	and	lacking	an	impulse	to	
improve	society”	(King,	2005,	p.111).	
	 This	was	further	complicated	by	the	fact	that	Western	countries	were	actively	
colonizing	the	rest	of	the	world,	which	not	only	resulted	in	a	power	struggle,	but	also	
the	subsequent	interaction	of	different	cultures,	and	an	exchange	of	ideas	that	was	
unprecedented.	This	soon	led	to	the	development	of	the	category	‘world	religions’	
which	gave	the	semblance	of	plurality	and	a	non-hegemonic	attitude	by	including	the	
Abrahamic	‘religions’	with	the	newly	discovered	‘religions’	of	the	East.	However,	King	
contends:	
As	Tomoko	Masuzawa	(2005)	has	recently	argued,	the	discourse	of	‘world	
religions’,	whilst	appearing	on	the	surface	to	represent	a	liberal	and	pluralistic	
improvement	on	the	older	nineteenth	century	discourse	of	Christian	superiority,	
continues	to	perpetuate	an	underlying	Eurocentric	logic	that	frames	the	‘rest	of	
the	world’	as	little	more	than	ersatz	versions	of	European	civilizations	–	
variations	on	a	single	theme.	This	has	been	the	main	consequence	of	the	
universalization	of	the	category	of	religion	across	disparate	geographical,	
temporal,	ethnic	and	civilizational	zones,	namely	the	establishment	of	a	
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paradigmatic	template	for	writing	‘universal	history’,	framed	by	the	categories,	
experiences	and	local	histories	of	white	Europeans	(2010,	p.104).	
	
Indeed,	Masuzawa	states:	
the	new	discourse	of	pluralism	and	diversity	of	religions,	when	it	finally	broke	
out	into	the	open	and	became	an	established	practice	in	the	first	half	of	the	
twentieth	century,	neither	displaced,	nor	disabled	the	logic	of	European	
hegemony	–	formerly	couched	in	the	language	of	the	universality	of	Christianity	
–	but,	in	a	way,	gave	it	a	new	lease	(2005,	p.xiv).	
	
Similarly,	King	is	also	interested	in	highlighting	the	role	that	European	ideas	have	
played,	and	continue	to	play,	in	the	formation	of	these	modern	categories.	Furthermore,	
he	is	particularly	concerned	with	exposing	the	role	that	politics	has	had	in	the	so-called	
‘private’	realm	of	‘religion’,	both	in	the	East	and	West:	
The	broad	methodological	stance	that	I	have	been	advocating	throughout	this	
book	could	be	described	as	an	attempt	to	‘anthropologize’	the	West	(Paul	
Rabinow),	in	particular	to	render	contemporary	Western	constructions	of	reality	
‘exotic’	by	drawing	attention	to	the	cultural	particularity	of	such	knowledge	
systems	and	their	historical	involvement	in	the	systematic	and	violent	
suppression	of	non-Western	ways	of	life,	forms	of	knowledge	and	constructions	
of	reality	(King,	1999,	p.187).	
	
He	is	advocating	for	a	contextual	analysis	which	would	help	to	eradicate	some	of	the	
issues	surrounding	the	definitions	of	these	categories.	However,	whereas	his	
suggestions	do	give	us	a	way	in	which	to	decipher	the	past,	he	does	not	offer	us	a	
method	for	dealing	with	the	current	usage	of	these	categories,	which	is	undeniably	
necessary	if	scholars	today	are	to	continue	to	dialogue	with	cultures	other	than	their	
own.	Indeed,	he	seems	to	be	aware	of	this	dilemma	and	acknowledges,	“the	
postmodernist	and	post-structuralist	interest	in	dissolving	unities	into	more	complex	
heterogeneities	has	much	in	common	with	similar	postcolonial	moves	but	has	been	seen	
by	some	as	undermining	the	legitimacy	of	the	‘search	for	identity’	by	oppressed	groups”	
(1999,	p.197).	Thus,	even	though	we	get	the	sense	that	King	recognizes	the	issues,	since	
he	stresses	the	need	for	definitions	to	be	constantly	contextualized	and	not	“disengaged	
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from	[their]	historical	location”	(1999,	p.198),	he	does	not	offer	us	the	tools	that	are	
necessary	for	continued	dialogue	across	cultural	divides.		
	
Conclusion	
	 If	I	am	to	be	completely	honest	however,	I	should	acknowledge	that	I	do	not	have	
any	real	answers	either.	Indeed,	I	would	argue	that	it	is	for	this	very	reason	that	I	keep	
searching	for	solutions	in	the	works	of	these	and	other	scholars.	Unfortunately,	I	have	
not	come	up	with	a	response	that	seems	immediately	viable.	As	such,	even	though	
discarding	these	terms	seems	like	the	simplest	solution,	it	can	be	one	of	the	hardest	
things	to	put	into	practice.	After	all,	these	concepts	have	become	tools	of	
communication	for	too	many	people	for	scholars	to	simply	advocate	for	their	removal.	
Yet,	continuing	to	use	them	is	also	problematic,	and	frustrating,	for	those	who	are	aware	
of	the	limitations	of	these	categories	but	cannot	find	a	way	out	of	this	dilemma.	One	of	
the	solutions	that	scholars	offer	is	the	need	for	an	awareness	of	the	complex	history	of	
these	labels,	and	no	doubt	this	is	a	step	in	the	right	direction.	But,	where	do	we	go	from	
there?	Any	new	terms	that	academics	might	come	up	with	will	eventually	be	fraught	
with	the	same	issues.	This	leads	us	to	an	impasse.	Nonetheless,	since	we	have	to	move	
forward,	I	must	choose	a	label	that	can	be	used	for	the	word	‘religion’,	a	term	which	will	
also	be	recognized	as	a	tentative	term;	a	virtual	house	of	cards	since	all	these	concepts	
run	the	risk	of	becoming	essentialized	or	reified.	Keeping	these	arguments	in	mind,	I	
will	nevertheless	use	the	term	‘tradition’	since	it	is	a	label	that	seems	to	best	allow	for	
the	inclusion	of	embodied	rituals,	texts,	relationships	with	the	supernatural,	location,	
ancestry,	philosophy	and	most	importantly,	context.	However,	I	do	so	with	the	explicit	
understanding	that	like	W.C.	Smith,	if	too	wide	a	definition	is	used	for	the	term	
‘tradition’	then	it	will	soon	become	an	empty	concept	which	serves	no	real	purpose.		
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And	finally,	the	main	reason	why	it	was	so	important	to	begin	this	project	with	a	
detailed	survey	of	some	of	the	ways	the	term	‘religion’	has	come	to	be	understood	is	
because	Vivekananda	himself	struggled	with	defining	this	concept.	Accordingly,	we	will	
see	how	many	of	the	dilemmas	identified	by	these	modern	scholars,	with	using	the	label	
‘religion’,	are	not	new	discussions	but	rather	the	continuation	of	a	debate	that	began	
centuries	ago	with	colonization.	In	fact,	W.C.	Smith’s	effort	to	find	alternate	labels,	J.Z.	
Smith’s	search	for	a	common	web	of	ideas,	Asad’s	refusal	to	relegate	‘religion’	to	the	
private	sphere,	Balagangadhara’s	arguments	against	the	Abrahamic	religions,	and	King’s	
rejection	of	overarching	labels	are	all	topics	that	were	addressed	by	Vivekananda.	
Consequently,	this	survey	of	modern	voices	debating	the	value	of	the	label	‘religion’	
allows	us	to	have	a	framework	from	which	to	comprehend	the	value	of	investigating	
how	Vivekananda’s	voice	impacted	these	discussions.	In	the	previous	chapter,	we	saw	
that	Bankimchandra	refused	to	limit	the	definition	of	‘dharma’	to	the	western	concept	of	
‘religion’.	Similarly,	in	Chapter	5,	we	will	discuss	how	Vivekananda	also	resisted	the	use	
of	this	term	‘religion’	as	he	did	not	believe	that	it	adequately	articulated	the	nuances	in	
Hindu	traditional	ideas.	This	in	turn,	highlights	how	‘continental	collision’	does	not	
imply	a	simple	domination	of	one	culture	over	another	but	rather,	areas	of	negotiation	
and	renegotiation;	repercussions	of	which	are	still	being	felt	in	the	discussions	of	the	
scholars	surveyed	in	this	chapter.	Keeping	these	arguments	in	mind,	we	will	now	
investigate	some	of	the	nuances	in	the	so-called	creation,	and	history,	of	another	hotly	
contested	term,	‘Hinduism’.		
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The	‘Hinduism’	Question	
	
One	simply	has	to	look	at	a	shelf	of	books	on	modern	‘Hinduism’	in	order	to	
realize	that	the	use	of	the	label	‘Hinduism’	is	fraught	with	issues	that	are	yet	to	be	
resolved.	Titles	such	as	Imagined	Hinduism	(2006),	Imagining	Hinduism	(2003),	Was	
Hinduism	Invented	(2005)	and	Who	Invented	Hinduism	(2006)	alert	readers	to	the	fact	
that	this	label	has	become	a	sparring	ground	for	many	scholars	of	Indian	traditions.	
Especially	since	this	has,	in	turn,	led	to	the	production	of	volumes	of	essays	such	as	
Representing	Hinduism	(1995),	Hinduism	Reconsidered	(2005)	and	Defining	Hinduism	
(2005),	all	of	which	offer	excellent	observations,	but	which	unfortunately,	do	not	put	
many	of	the	pertinent	issues	to	rest.	Indeed,	as	we	saw	with	the	term	‘religion’	in	the	
previous	chapter,	scholars	have	raised	questions	about	the	appropriateness	of	using	a	
term	like	‘Hinduism’	to	describe	the	many	diverse	Hindu	sects	for	centuries	now.	
Consequently,	it	may	not	surprise	readers	to	learn	that	the	more	one	investigates	these	
issues,	the	more	confusing	they	become,	and	that	even	academics	who	claim	to	have	
taken	a	side,	are	unable	to	draw	clear	lines	of	separation.	Instead,	we	are	left	with	
multiple	fuzzy	borders	and	overlapping	ideas	that	challenge	the	very	categories	that	are	
being	used	to	analyse	this	data	in	the	first	place.	As	we	trace	the	arguments	of	some	of	
the	voices	in	this	field,	we	will	realize	that	it	is	not	the	data	that	is	confusing,	but	rather,	
the	repeated	use	of	Western	categories	that	may	be	keeping	scholars	from	arriving	at	a	
resolution	that	is	appropriate	for	the	Indian	traditions	that	they	are	attempting	to	
interpret.	Indeed,	these	contemporary	discussions	are	a	continuation	of	arguments	that	
were	being	debated	amongst	natives,	and	their	colonizers,	during	the	British	Raj.	And,	
as	we	will	witness	in	the	ensuing	chapters,	this	was	a	dialogue	that	Vivekananda	was	
deeply	invested	in.	He	not	only	refused	to	use	these	terms	without	first	dissecting	them	
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and	then	refashioning	them	to	suit	his	needs,	he	also	made	an	effort	to	challenge	their	
western	definitions	thereby	participating	in	this	ongoing	controversy.	As	such,	this	
current	survey	will	offer	us	a	frame	of	reference	from	which	to	better	understand	the	
complexities	of	the	position	he	took,	not	to	mention,	the	enduring	relevance	of	his	
arguments	today.		
	
Paul	Hacker	
Paul	Hacker	was	one	of	the	earliest	contemporary	academics	to	investigate,	in	
some	detail,	the	many	components	of	what	he	considered	to	be	a	hitherto	unexamined	
use	of	this	title	‘Hinduism’.29	In	his	essay	“Aspects	of	Neo-Hinduism	as	Contrasted	with	
Surviving	Traditional	Hinduism”	(1995)	Hacker	argues	that	there	is	a	distinction	
between	intellectuals	who	believed	that	Western	colonization	had	resulted	in	the	much	
needed	reform	of	Indian	traditions,	and	those	who	held	that	Western	influences	had	
simply	been	the	catalyst	that	led	to	an	Indian	renaissance:	
The	use	of	the	term	‘reform’	betrays	the	European	who	wishes	to	bring	
betterment	to	India;	‘renaissance’,	on	the	other	hand,	indicates	the	atmosphere	
of	Hindu	nationalism…	In	the	Indian	cultural	life	of	the	nineteenth	and	early	
twentieth	centuries	there	actually	were	events,	which,	if	evaluated	from	the	
angle	of	European	culture,	can	be	described	as	‘reforms’.	But	these	very	reforms	
were	claimed	by	Hindus	as	their	own	achievement,	which	is	quite	correct	
inasmuch	as	Hindus	effected	the	changes.	Thus	it	is	quite	natural	that	Hindu	
nationalism	saw	these	changes	as	a	revival	of	Hinduism	(Hacker,	1995,	p.230).	
	
Hacker	mainly	focuses	on	Indian	nationalists,	most	of	whom,	he	claims,	preferred	using	
terms	like	‘revival’	when	bringing	about	change	since,	this	coincided	more	effectively	
with	their	nationalist	ideals.	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	while	Hacker	acknowledges	
that	native	voices	like	Rammohan	Roy’s	were	precursors	to	those	from	the	nineteenth	
																																																								
29	Whereas	Hacker	was	a	prolific	writer	I	will	concentrate	primarily	on	his	essay	
“Aspects	of	Neo-Hinduism	as	Contrasted	with	Surviving	Traditional	Hinduism”	(1st	ed.	
1970).		
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and	twentieth	century,	he	does	not	concede	that	these	early	leaders	would	have	
probably	classified	themselves	as	reformers.	Perhaps	this	is	because	this	would	
undermine	Hacker’s	theory	which	argues	that	the	Western	influenced	Indian	
nationalists	were	more	comfortable	with	the	title	‘revivalist’	rather	than	the	designation	
of	‘reformer’.30	Be	that	as	it	may,	Hacker	only	seems	to	be	concerned	with	leaders	from	
the	late	19th	and	20th	century;	leaders	who	he	then	goes	on	to	label	as	‘Neo-Hindus.’	
	 To	describe	what	he	meant	by	Neo-Hindus	Hacker	first	contrasted	them	with	the	
Hindus	who	he	considered	to	be	their	‘other’;	that	is,	those	who	were	explicitly	intent	on	
retaining	their	ancient	ideas	and	rituals,	whom	he	labelled	‘Traditional	Hindus’.	This	
idea	of	Hacker’s,	which	suggests	that	there	were	two	kinds	of	people	who	called	
themselves	Hindus,	is	worth	paying	closer	attention	to	since	it	sets	up	a	binary	that	is	
oftentimes	challenged	in	the	work	of	later	scholars	who	study	‘Hinduism’	(as	we	shall	
observe	with	Wilhelm	Halbfass	in	the	next	section).	According	to	Hacker,	the	main	
difference	between	the	two	groups	was	their	connection	with	the	past.	Hacker	seems	to	
be	implying	that	whereas	Traditional	Hindus	were	not	averse	to	incorporating	new	
ideas	into	their	existing	worldviews,	they	were	unwilling	to	allow	these	concepts	to	
undermine	their	association	with	their	ancestral	texts.	In	contrast,	Neo-Hindus,	in	
Hacker’s	opinion,	had	at	some	time,	been	disenchanted	with	the	traditional	system	in	
which	they	grew	up,	and	as	such,	were	more	willing	to	accept	foreign	ideas	and	use	
them	to	reinterpret	their	ancient	scriptures	and	ideology:		
Neo-Hinduism	and	Hindu	traditionalism	are	not	two	definite	systems	but	rather	
two	distinct	mental	attitudes…	Traditional	Hinduism	assimilates	and	absorbs	
extraneous	elements	in	a	manner	characteristically	distinct	from	Neo-Hinduism.	
Unlike	the	latter,	it	maintains	a	living	continuity	with	the	past.	Even	in	the	past,	
																																																								
30	In	Nationalization	of	Hindu	Traditions	(1999)	Vasudha	Dalmia	unpacks	the	
complexities	embedded	in	these	labels,	and	the	way	Hindus	either	appropriated	or	
rejected	them.	A	topic	which	we	will	return	to	in	Chapter	6	when	we	try	to	establish	
which	designation	best	suited	Vivekananda’s	agenda.		
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Hindu	groups	often	absorbed	foreign	elements.	These	certainly	changed	the	
appearance	of	the	religion	of	the	respective	groups.	But	at	the	same	time	most	of	
the	old	values	retained	previous	vitality.	
In	Neo-Hinduism,	on	the	contrary,	the	continuity	with	the	past	is	broken.	The	
typical	Neo-Hindu	has	at	some	period	of	his	life	lost	his	confidence	in	his	native	
religion	(1995,	p.232).	
	
Despite	articulating	this	distinction	between	these	two	groups,	Hacker	quickly	clarifies	
that	he	is	not	implying	that	this	signified	the	existence	of	a	cohesive	or	comprehensive	
tradition.	Instead,	he	contends:		
Neo-Hinduism	is	not	a	unified	system	of	ideas.	In	fact,	it	is	chiefly	because	of	one	
common	trait	that	I	classify	religious	thinkers	as	Neo-Hindus.	Their	intellectual	
formation	is	primarily	or	predominantly	Western.	It	is	European	culture,	and	in	
several	cases	even	the	Christian	religion,	which	has	led	them	to	embrace	certain	
religious,	ethical,	social	and	political	values.	But	afterwards	they	connect	these	
values	with,	and	claim	them	as,	part	of	the	Hindu	tradition	(Hacker,	1995,	p.231).	
	
The	underlying	conflict	in	this	argument	of	Hacker’s	is	noteworthy.	On	the	one	hand,	he	
argues	that	the	Neo-Hindus	were	the	intellectual	offspring	of	Western	colonialism	and	
their	actions	were	predominantly	influenced	by	Western	ideas.	Yet,	on	the	other	hand,	
Hacker’s	reflections	also	highlight	what	made	the	political	struggle	of	these	prominent	
Indian	nationalists	uniquely	different	from	those	of	their	Western	counterparts.	They	
were	convinced	that	the	only	way	to	bring	about	the	change	necessary	for	India’s	
independence,	was	to	encourage	a	much-needed	overhaul	of	the	existent	system.	For	
instance,	when	speaking	of	India’s	second	president,	Sarvepalli	Radhakrishnan	and	his	
vision	for	the	future	of	India,	Hacker	observes	that	whereas	the	Western	idea	of	a	
‘nation	state’	had	taken	root	in	Radhakrishnan’s	imagination,	nevertheless,	it	had	done	
so	in	a	rather	unique	fashion:	
this	nationalism	appears	in	a	peculiarly	Indian	garb.	Radhakrishnan	attributed	
the	political	downfall	not	to	political	causes	but	to	the	intellectual	incoherence	
and	ethical	rottenness	of	his	national	religion.	Accordingly,	he	seeks	the	remedy	
for	the	evil	not	in	political	measures	but	in	religious	change	(Hacker,	1995,	
p.233).	
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One	is	immediately	struck	by	the	fact	that	Hacker	is	surprised	that	the	separation	
between	the	public	and	the	private	sphere,	which	had	become	mandatory	for	Western	
society,	was	not	reflected	in	the	way	Indian	nationalists	were	attempting	to	structure	
their	own	society.	Moreover,	Hacker	recognizes	that	Radhakrishnan	was	not	alone,	
since	other	leaders	like	Bankimchandra,	Vivekananda	and	Gandhi	were	also	invested	in	
the	idea	that	the	best	way	to	improve	the	state	of	the	country,	was	by	enabling	a	
modernization	of	the	national	‘religion’,	i.e.	‘Hinduism’.	Indeed,	as	far	as	Hacker	is	
concerned,	this	was	one	of	the	most	important	factors	that	qualified	these	leaders	as	
Neo-Hindus.	However,	their	insistence	on	the	fact	that	India’s	success	was	intimately	
associated	with	its	ability	to	modernize	its	traditional	ideals	raises	several	questions.31	
For	example,	if	these	nationalists’	intellectual	formation	was	so	indebted	to	Western	
ideals	then	why	were	they	not	incorporating	the	separation	of	‘religion’	and	state	in	
their	own	political	campaigns?	Did	this	imply,	as	both	Asad	and	King	have	suggested,	
that	the	Western	categories	of	politics,	state	and	‘religion’	were	not	easily	transferable	
on	to	this	uniquely	Indian	situation?	Unfortunately	however,	instead	of	exploring	the	
validity	of	these	categories,	and	their	application	to	the	Indian	subcontinent,	Hacker	
simply	states	that	this	leads	“to	the	conclusion	that	nationalism	is	the	chief	impulse	of	
typical	Neo-Hindu	thinking”	(Hacker,	1995,	p.233).	Whereas	this	may	be	true,	Hacker	
does	not	explain	how	nationalistic	ideals	could	have	anything	to	do	with	‘religious’	
beliefs	and	why	these	categories	could	not	be	separated	neatly	in	the	Indian	context.		
																																																								
31	Whereas	‘modern’	and	‘modernize’	are	complex	terms	that	can	be	interpreted	in	a	
myriad	of	ways,	for	the	purposes	of	this	project	I	will	limit	myself	to	Gustavo	Benevides	
definition;	“since	signification	takes	place	within	a	system	of	oppositions,	in	order	to	
count	oneself	among	the	moderni	one	had	to	distinguish	oneself	from	the	antiqui”	
(1998,	p.186)	
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	 In	fact,	Hacker	simply	ignores	the	issues	that	emerge	because	of	his	findings,	
preferring	instead	to	focus	on	how	alternate	interpretations	of	Hindu	terms	were	
adopted	by	native	followers,	which	he	argues,	led	to	the	creation	of	an	undeniable	
divide	between	Traditional	Hindus	and	Neo-Hindus.	He	points	out	that	for	Traditional	
Hindus,	the	concept	of	“dharma	comprises	norms	or	patterns	of	conduct,	most	of	which	
differ	according	to	a	man’s	caste	and	stage	of	life”	(Hacker,	1995,	p.237).	This	implies	
that	for	Traditional	Hindus,	caste	was	not	a	category	that	could	be	ignored	or	discarded.	
Alternatively,	he	contends,	“most	of	the	prominent	Neo-Hindus,	on	the	other	hand,	have	
reinterpreted	dharma	more	or	less	radically	according	to	Western	models”	whereby	
caste	no	longer	played	a	central	role	in	its	definition	(Hacker,	1995,	p.238).	He	also	uses	
the	example	of	Bankimchandra	to	demonstrate	how	many	Neo-Hindus	had	practically	
reinvented	this	concept	to	make	it	compatible	with	Western	ideology:	
Bankim	Candra	Cattopadhaya	[sic]	was	perhaps	the	first	to	offer	such	a	
reinterpretation	[of	dharma].	In	order	to	evaluate	his	novel	concept,	we	first	
have	to	note	that	the	word	dharma	has	other	meanings	beside	the	meaning	
‘pattern	of	conduct’	…	The	word	may	also	signify	‘an	essential	quality’	of	a	thing.	
Moreover,	many	modern	Indian	languages	use	it	as	an	equivalent	of	the	
European	word	‘religion’.	Bankim	achieved	his	reinterpretation	by	fusing	all	the	
three	meanings	I	mentioned,	namely	(1)	pattern	of	conduct,	(2)	essential	quality,	
(3)	religion.	Thus	he	arrived	at	the	conclusion	that	religion	is	man’s	essential	
quality,	denoted	by	the	word	‘humanity’(manusyatva)	but	it	is	at	the	same	time	a	
pattern	of	conduct,	an	ideal	whose	realization	man	is	obliged	to	strive	for	
(Hacker,	1995,	p.238).	
	
By	using	examples	such	as	these,	Hacker	concludes	that	Neo-Hindus	adopted	many	of	
their	ideas	from	Western	philosophy,	and	then	went	on	to	restructure	Indian	terms	to	
fit	foreign	models.32	On	the	other	hand,	when	speaking	of	how	Traditional	Hindus	
adopted	some	of	the	same	ideas,	Hacker	argues	that	they	did	so	by	introducing	new	
concepts	into	their	traditional	texts.	This	allowed	them	to	reinterpret	certain	aspects	of	
																																																								
32	For	e.g.	Hacker	suggests,	“Bankim	remodeled	Hinduism	according	to	what	he	had	
learned	from	the	positivists	Auguste	Comte	and	John	Stuart	Mill”	(1995,	p.238).	
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their	scriptures,	without	calling	for	a	“transmutation”	of	the	ideas	that	were	previously	
held	by	the	community.	Accordingly,	he	demonstrates	how	the	idea	of	‘seva’	(service)	
for	brahmins	was	viewed	negatively	in	ancient	times	because	brahmins	were	the	
‘superior’	caste,	and	as	such,	could	not	be	seen	demeaning	themselves	by	serving	those	
who	were	of	a	lower	caste.	However,	Hacker	asserts	that	during	the	British	Raj,	when	
the	emphasis	was	placed	on	‘service’	by	various	Christian	groups,	Traditional	Hindus	
reinterpreted	their	texts	to	reflect	the	ideas	of	their	colonizers:	
the	ideas	of	seva	with	the	attitude	of	“being	pleased	with	the	well-being	of	all	
creatures,”	which	has	been	an	ethical	value	commonly	recognized	in	India	at	
least	from	the	time	when	Buddhism	was	preponderant	in	the	subcontinent,	and	
which	occurs	in	the	Bhagavadgita	and	in	a	considerable	number	of	passages	in	
the	Great	Epic.	Yet	the	modern	notion	of	seva	…	gives	an	active	turn	to	what	
previously	was	essentially	a	mental	disposition,	and	it	is	precisely	this	turn	
which	reveals	influence	from	outside.	Nevertheless,	the	addition	of	the	new	value	
does	not	imply	a	transmutation	of	the	traditional	concept	of	dharma	(Hacker,	
1995,	p.238).	
	
	 No	doubt,	this	term	‘seva’	acquired	different	caveats	at	the	hands	of	Traditional	
Hindus,	which,	in	turn,	changed	the	way	this	concept	was	to	be	understood.	As	such,	
Hacker’s	argument	that	this	did	not	constitute	as	a	“transmutation”	highlights	the	
difficulty	with	distinguishing	the	way	Traditional	Hindus	reinterpreted	ideas,	in	
comparison	with	the	methods	adopted	by	Neo-Hindus.33	Indeed,	as	if	to	complicate	
matters	further,	on	the	one	hand,	Hacker	argues	that	Neo-Hindus	took	new	ideas	from	
other	traditions,	especially	Christianity,	and	found	a	way	to	connect	them	with	
dominant	native	traditions.	Yet,	on	the	other	hand,	he	argues	that	Neo-Hindus	
reinterpreted	Hindu	concepts	in	such	a	way	to	make	them	more	compatible	with	
Western	ideals,	which	in	turn,	made	their	native	identity	unrecognizable.	For	example,	
Hacker	classifies	Gandhi	as	a	Neo-Hindu	who	was	evidently	influenced	by	his	exposure	
																																																								
33	This	concept	‘seva’	is	one	of	the	cornerstones	of	Vivekananda’s	legacy	and	is	a	topic	
that	we	will	investigate	extensively	in	the	following	chapters.		
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to	Western	philosophy,	literature	and	‘religion’.	Nevertheless,	Gandhi	went	on	to	
advocate	for	the	return	of	‘Ramarajya’	(the	rule	of	Ram),	a	period	when	the	King	Ram,	
who	was	known	for	his	moral	backbone	and	devotion	to	dharma,	ruled	his	kingdom	
justly.	So,	is	Gandhi	really	a	Neo-Hindu	or	is	he	a	Traditional	Hindu?	Is	it	possible,	or	
even	necessary	to	draw	this	distinction?	After	all,	what	purpose	does	it	serve?	Is	this	
distinction	only	important	because	it	allows	scholars	to	divide	modern	Hindus	into	
categories,	i.e.,	conservative,	liberal,	traditional,	‘neo’,	etc.,	that	are	a	natural	component	
of	Western	‘religious’	theory?	Indeed,	one	could	argue	that	the	walls	dividing	
Traditional	Hindus	and	Neo-Hindus	have	such	porous	borders	that	the	continued	use	of	
these	terms	would	only	further	complicate	matters.		
	 The	most	ironic	aspect	of	this	argument	is	that	Hacker	himself	recognized	the	
problems	that	could	be	associated	with	distinguishing	these	two	categories	when	he	
states,	“[i]t	may	even	happen	that	one	and	the	same	person	combines	elements	of	both	
ways	of	thinking”	(Hacker,	1995,	p.232).	Thus,	one	has	to	wonder	why,	if	Hacker	saw	
the	pitfalls	of	such	a	distinction,	he	still	insisted	on	dividing	the	Indian	intellectual	
public	in	this	rather	futile	way.	Moreover,	what	makes	this	attempt	of	Hacker’s,	to	
separate	Hindus	into	these	distinct	identities,	even	more	frustrating	is	that	it	takes	away	
from	one	of	the	more	compelling	aspects	of	his	argument;	that	Hindus,	in	general,	have	
tended	to	adopt	foreign	ideas	and	reinterpret	them	in	such	a	way	as	to	allow	them	to	be	
compatible	with	their	own	traditions.	This	concept	that	Hacker	calls	‘inclusivism’	is	not	
applicable	only	to	Neo-Hindus	but	instead	is	a	term	that	can	be	used	for	both	groups.34	
Indeed,	Hacker	himself	recognizes	this	because	he	states	that	this	attitude:		
																																																								
34	We	will	return	to	this	term	‘inclusivism’	in	the	final	chapter	since	it	is	a	label	that	has	
been	used	for	‘Hinduism’	in	general,	and	Vivekananda	in	particular,	and	as	such,	has	
become	a	defense	mechanism	for	many	Hindus	and	the	nationalist	movement	when	
they	are	accused	of	being	intolerant	towards	other	traditions.		
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is	not	restricted	to	Neo-Hinduism.	In	fact,	it	stems	from	hoary	antiquity.	In	some	
publications	of	mine	I	have	called	it	‘inclusivism.’	It	consists	in	claiming	for,	and	
thus	including	in,	one’s	own	religion	what	really	belongs	to	an	alien	sect	(Hacker,	
1995,	p.244).	
	
Consequently,	if	this	is	a	trait	that	is	common	to	both	Neo-Hindus,	and	Traditional	
Hindus,	doesn’t	this	problematize	the	lines	of	division,	that	Hacker	has	drawn	between	
these	two	categories,	even	further?	This	trait	‘inclusivism’	exemplifies	one	of	the	most	
important	aspects	of	Hindu	traditions;	i.e.	the	fact	that	the	categories,	which	scholars	
have	grown	accustomed	to	using,	are	not	airtight	on	the	Indian	subcontinent	and,	as	
such,	must	be	used	with	extreme	caution	and	many	disclaimers.	By	explicating	this	
inclusivist	attitude,	that	is	relatively	common	amongst	Hindus,	Hacker	demonstrated	
why	it	is	still	so	difficult,	even	today,	for	scholars	to	articulate	what	‘Hinduism’	is	
because	so	much	can	be	included	in	this	category	that	eventually	the	label	itself	is	
oftentimes	deemed	redundant.	Keeping	Hacker’s	ideas	in	mind,	I	will	now	turn	to	
Wilhelm	Halbfass,	who	not	only	engages	with	Hacker’s	arguments	but	also	goes	on	to	
build	valuable	ones	of	his	own.		
	
Wilhelm	Halbfass	
In	India	and	Europe:	An	Essay	in	Understanding	(1988),	Wilhelm	Halbfass	
responds	to	Hacker	to	problematize	some	of	his	key	ideas.	For	instance,	Halbfass	also	
agrees	that	the	differentiation	between	‘neo’	and	‘traditional’	is	not	clear;	“Hacker’s	two	
categories	are	not	mutually	exclusive	and	not	always	clearly	distinguishable.	There	are	
possibilities	of	transition,	overlap	or	combination”	(1988,	p.220).	However,	he	argues	
that	it	is	because	these	‘neo’	and	‘traditional’	ideas	can	co-exist	harmoniously	even	
within	a	single	person	that	results	in:	
the	peculiar	ambivalence	and	range	of	variation	which	may	be	seen	in	modern	
Indian	thought:	orthodoxy	and	receptivity,	openness	and	self-assertion,	the	new	
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interpretation	of	indigenous	concepts	and	a	Hinduization	of	Western	concepts,	
all	these	intermix	in	a	variety	of	ways	(Hacker,	1995,	p.220).	
	
In	his	opinion,	to	understand	‘modern	Indian	thought’,	it	is	necessary	to	trace	the	
development	of	orthodox	ideas	into	those	which	are	considered	‘neo’	Hindu.	This	leads	
him	to	make	an	interesting	observation,	whereby	he	suggests	that	in	fact,	Neo-Hindu	
ideas	are	the	midway	point	between	orthodox	beliefs	and	Westernized	theories:		
Standing	between	traditionalism	and	orthodoxy	on	the	one	hand	and	a	mere	
mimicry	of	Western	models	on	the	other,	it	[Neo-Hinduism]	represents,	so	to	
speak,	the	xenological	core	of	modern	Indian	thought	(Hacker,	1995,	p.222).	
	
He	contends	that	whereas	Neo	Hindu	ideas	“may	indeed	be	contrasted	with	
traditionalism”	it	makes	more	sense	to	see	them	not	at	opposite	ends	of	a	spectrum,	but	
rather,	as	two	adjacent	points	on	a	single	trajectory.		
Perhaps	the	reason	why	this	is	such	an	intriguing	idea	is	that	Halbfass	is	arguing	
against	the	commonly	held	belief	that	Neo-Hindus	are	the	most	Westernized	Hindus.	
Instead,	Halbfass	contests	Hacker’s	ideas	of	binary	concepts	and	alternatively	offers	up	
the	suggestion	that	Neo-Hindus	may	simply	be	just	a	few	shades	more	Western,	or	less	
orthodox,	but	not	completely	different	entities	as	is	oftentimes	asserted.	Unfortunately	
however,	he	eventually	concludes	that,	“[i]n	general,	it	is	obvious	that	Hacker’s	scheme	
is	a	simplification,	although	a	useful	and	convenient	one”	(Hacker,	1995,	p.221).	What	is	
problematic	about	this	statement	is	that	even	though	Halbfass	recognizes	the	
ambiguous	nature	of	these	labels,	and	repeatedly	tries	to	add	nuances	to	their	
definitions,	he	nevertheless	feels	compelled	to	use	them,	and	even	goes	as	far	as	
agreeing	with	Hacker	that	they	are	“useful	and	convenient.”	One	cannot	help	but	ask;	
“useful	and	convenient”	for	who?	For	scholars	who	have	become	accustomed	to	using	
them?	Doesn’t	this	insistence	on	the	continued	use	of	questionable	labels	suggest	a	
certain	bias?	Why	is	Halbfass	so	intent	to	find	a	way	to	warrant	their	use?	Is	it	because	
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Western	scholarship	has	grown	accustomed	to	describing	Indian	ideas	and	Hindu	
intellectuals	in	this	manner?	And	perhaps	most	importantly,	why	haven’t	Indians	today	
adopted	these	labels	and	made	them	their	own?	After	all,	whose	convenience	are	we	
interested	in,	and	is	convenience	a	good	enough	reason	to	comply	with	the	status	quo?	
Halbfass	argues:		
Self-questioning	and	the	critique	of	Eurocentric	preconceptions	are	necessary	
ingredients	of	any	responsible	study	of	India.	However,	the	attempt	to	eliminate	
all	western	constructs	and	preconceptions	and	to	liberate	the	Indian	tradition	
from	all	non-Indian	categories	of	understanding	would	not	only	be	impractical,	
but	also	presumptuous	in	its	own	way.	Although	it	would	seem	to	be	
diametrically	opposed	to	the	Hegelian	Eurocentric	method	of	subordinating	and	
superseding	non-European	traditions,	it	would	raise	the	problem	of	a	“reverse	
Eurocentrism”	(2005,	p.25,	emphasis	in	original).	
	
This	may	be	true	in	certain	cases,	particularly	when	the	‘natives’	have	adopted	and	
appropriated	such	labels	for	themselves,	but	this	is	not	the	case	here.	Indeed,	one	could	
argue	that	Halbfass’	observations	on	the	connectivity	between	these	two	categories	
should	actually	compel	him	to	discard	these	labels	but	this	is	not	the	stance	that	he	
takes.	Fortunately	however,	this	does	not	diminish	the	value	of	the	rest	of	his	
arguments,	whereby	he	draws	interesting	conclusions	regarding	certain	ideas	and	
tendencies	that	he	believes	were	very	influential	in	the	development	of	the	Hindu	
identity.	
Halbfass	begins	by	basing	his	theories	on	a	basic	premise,	that	should	be	self-
evident,	but	which	he	argues	is	oftentimes	ignored:	
Traditional	Hinduism	has	not	reached	out	for	the	West.	It	has	not	been	driven	by	
the	zeal	of	proselytization	and	discovery,	and	by	the	urge	to	understand	and	
master	foreign	cultures.	It	has	neither	recognized	the	foreign,	the	other	as	a	
possible	alternative,	nor	as	a	potential	source	of	its	own	identity.	“It	has	at	no	
time	defined	itself	in	relation	to	the	other,	nor	acknowledged	the	other	in	its	
unassimilable	otherness.”	India	has	discovered	the	West	and	begun	to	respond	to	
it	in	being	sought	out,	explored,	overrun	and	objectified	by	it.	Its	initial	position	
in	the	encounter	was	that	of	a	target	of	European	interests	and	expectations.	It	
was	not	the	course	of	Indian	history,	not	the	inner	dynamism	of	the	Hindu	
tradition,	that	led	to	the	encounter.	Europeans	took	the	initiative.	They	went	to	
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India.	This	is	a	simple	and	familiar	fact.	Yet	its	fundamental	significance	of	the	
hermeneutics	of	the	encounter	between	India	and	the	West	is	often	forgotten	
(1988,	p.172,	emphasis	in	original).	
	
The	issues	that	Halbfass	seems	to	be	struggling	with	revolve	around	his	interest	in	
uncovering	who	speaks	for	this	tradition,	and	why.	This	leads	Halbfass	to	a	series	of	
questions	which	ask	how	one	can	actually	decide	the	role	that	traditional	ideas	have	
played,	whether	they	need	to	be	‘reformed’	and	if	they	should,	in	fact,	be	considered	to	
be	the	‘only’	valid	voice	of	Hindu	India:	
Can	those	who	preserve	the	traditional	schemes	of	knowledge	not	just	as	
contents	of	historical	awareness,	but	as	ways	of	seeing	the	world	–	can	those	
guardians	and	representatives	of	the	tradition	and	its	authoritative	language	
provide	it	with	a	living	presence?	Can	they,	who	speak	the	language	of	the	
tradition,	also	speak	for	it	in	the	modern	world?	Can	they	present	it	to	the	West	
and	the	Westernized	world	without	simply	being	used	as	sources	of	information	
or	objects	of	historical	curiosity?	Can	they	in	turn	comprehend	this	world	within	
the	horizon	of	their	own	inherited	knowledge?	Do	they	possess	traditional	
means	of	understanding	which	are	sufficient	to	respond	to	and	interpret	the	
modern	world?	Does	the	tradition	itself	provide	such	a	framework	of	
understanding?	Is	the	tradition	of	the	Sanskrit	pandits	the	most	authentic	form	
of	survival	of	traditional	Hinduism?	Are	they	more	qualified	to	speak	for	the	
tradition	than	the	Neo-Hindus?	Do	they	represent	the	continued	life	and	strength	
of	the	tradition	–	or	its	final	petrification?	(1988,	pp.260-261)	
	
It	is	with	questions	like	these	that	Halbfass	gets	to	the	heart	of	his	own	investigation	
which	tries	to	determine	who	is	speaking	for	the	Hindus,	whether	they	are	qualified	to	
do	so,	and	perhaps	most	importantly,	if	the	lens	that	is	commonly	used	to	analyse	these	
traditions	is	useful	when	trying	to	understand	Indian	ideas.		
	 One	of	the	most	interesting	observations	that	Halbfass	makes	is	that	historically,	
Hindus	did	not	engage	with	‘other’	invading	traditions	in	quite	the	same	manner	as	the	
West	was	accustomed	to.	He	points	out	that	early	Indian	philosophers	did	not	need	the	
foreign	‘other’	to	form	their	own	identity.	Instead,	these	ancient	Hindus	cultivated	an	
attitude	whereby	they	believed	that	they	had	nothing	to	learn	from	the	‘mlecchas’	
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(foreigners)	who	repeatedly	invaded	their	territories.	Halbfass	highlights	ancient	and	
medieval	Sanskrit	literature	which	seem	to	imply:	
Why	should	a	Hindu	who	sees	himself	as	part	of	an	all-inclusive	tradition	and	is	
committed	to	a	truth	which	is	timeless	and	complete	be	interested	in	foreign	
customs	and	traditions?	Why	should	he	explore	the	amorphous	multitude	of	the	
countries	of	mlecchas?	What	could	he	possibly	learn	from	them?	Certainly	
nothing	that	could	affect	his	understanding	of	dharma	–	the	sacred	norm,	the	
hereafter,	those	goals	and	means	of	human	existence	which	are	not	accessible	to	
empirical	knowledge.	The	Veda	is	the	only	legitimate	source	of	transempirical	
cognition	(1988,	pp.182-183).	
	
There	are	two	main	ideas	that	need	to	be	unpacked	here.	On	the	one	hand,	Halbfass	
argues	that	Indian	literature	does	not	report	on	philosophical	or	‘religious’	debates	and	
indeed	could	be	accused,	in	this	respect,	of	being	“a	tradition	of	silence	and	evasion”	
(1988,	p.182).	On	the	other	hand,	he	also	highlights	that	these	Sanskrit	texts	did	not	
simply	ignore	the	physical	existence	of	these	other	traditions,	nor	did	they	fail	to	
recognize	these	mlecchas	as	“able	soldiers,	craftsmen,	artisans,	etc.”	(Halbfass,	1988,	
p.186).	Thus,	the	foreigners	were	not	completely	ignored,	but	rather,	only	their	
efficiency	and	skill	was	acknowledged	in	a	limited	fashion.	In	contrast,	in	matters	
regarding	tradition,	philosophy	or	social	norms,	these	mlecchas	were	not	allowed	to	
weigh	in;	indeed,	they	were	not	even	considered	viable	opponents.	Is	it	because	they	
thought	these	foreigners	were	unworthy?	Or,	instead,	as	Halbfass	suggests,	is	it	because	
they	considered	their	world	view	to	be	so	complete	that	they	did	not	even	feel	the	need	
to	consider	the	validity	or	value	of	external	philosophical	or	traditional	concepts?	
	 Another	interesting	idea	that	emerges	from	Halbfass’	exploration	of	the	
depiction	of	foreigners,	in	Indian	literature,	is	the	idea	that	the	Vedas,	in	spite	of	not	
being	the	central	texts	for	many	Hindus,	served	as	a	point	of	departure	from	which	
Hindus	could	describe	their	own	traditional	positions:	
regardless	of	the	highly	elusive	and	ambiguous	nature	of	the	historical	
relationship	between	the	Veda	and	Hinduism,	the	Hindu	tradition	has,	for	many	
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centuries,	defined	itself	in	relation	to	the	Veda…	We	may	even	say:	There	would	
be	no	Hinduism	without	the	Veda;	its	identity	and	reality	depends	upon	the	idea,	
or	fiction,	of	the	Veda	(2005,	p.21).	
	
Halbfass	asserts	that	even	if	a	certain	group	of	Hindus	completely	rejected	the	Vedas,	
their	position	could,	and	oftentimes	was,	evaluated	by	its	relationship	with	these	texts.	
Consequently,	he	argues	that	for	many	Hindu	sects,	the	Vedas	actually	provided	the	
‘other’	by	which	different	groups	organized	their	own	ideas.	This	could	explain	why	
Hindu	traditions	did	not	find	it	necessary,	to	evaluate	or	compare	themselves	to	mleccha	
philosophical	ideas,	to	form	their	own	identity.	This	is	especially	surprising	for	many	
scholars	since	it	is	an	accepted	Western	norm	to	believe,	that	it	is	by	defining	the	
external	‘other’,	that	one	is	able	to	define	oneself.	Scholars	have	argued	that	it	is	only	
with	the	invasion	of	Western	colonialists,	who	were	deeply	invested	in	comparing	
Western	‘religions’	with	Eastern	philosophies,	that	Hindus	felt	a	need	to	form	a	
collective	identity.	However,	one	could	just	as	easily	argue	that	this	did	not	necessarily	
imply	that	Hindus	did	not	have	an	internal	connectivity	with	each	other	(albeit	a	
negative	one	in	many	cases)	which	allowed	them	to	form	a	collective	identity;	a	
collective	identity	that	was	eventually	labelled	‘Hinduism’.	Indeed,	Halbfass	contends:	
It	is	important,	however,	not	to	overlook	the	traditional,	premodern	dimensions	
of	unity	and	identity,	contextuality	and	coherence,	and	the	centripetal	and	
inclusive	elements	in	what	W.	Cantwell	Smith	calls	the	“luxuriant	welter”	of	
traditional	Hindu	life.	To	be	sure,	this	is	not	the	dogmatic	and	institutional	
identity	of	an	“organized	religion”;	but	on	the	other	hand,	it	is	neither	an	
“Orientalist	construction,”	nor	can	it	be	reduced	to	a	Brahmanical	fiction	or	
projection	(2005,	p.27).	
	
Halbfass	is	invested	in	ensuring	that	Hindu	agency,	in	the	development	of	their	own	
identity,	should	not	be	ignored.	Indeed,	he	is	particularly	interested	in	affirming	that	the	
label	‘Hinduism’,	whose	ancestry	and	origins	are	repeatedly	challenged,	should	not	be	
discarded.	By	exploring	the	relationships	that	Indians	had	with	their	mleccha	invaders,	
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he	argues	for	the	validity	of	his	contention	that	the	label	‘Hinduism’	is	not	one	that	was	
simply	applied	by	foreign	mleccha	invaders:	
The	modern	idea	of	“Hinduism,”	or	of	the	“Hindu	religion,”	is	a	reinterpretation	
of	the	traditional	ideas	and,	in	a	sense,	a	hybridization	of	the	traditional	self-
understanding.	Yet	it	is	by	no	means	a	mere	adaptation	of	western	
superimpositions.	It	is	also	a	continuation	of	the	tradition,	an	expression	and	
transformation	of	that	self-understanding	which	articulates	itself	in	its	
commitment	to	the	Vedic	revelation.	It	is	this	commitment	that	provides	the	
focus	for	traditional	Hindu	self-understanding,	and	that	provides	a	paradigm	and	
exemplary	precedent	even	for	those	movements	that	pay	little	attention	to	the	
Vedic	revelation,	or	try	to	supersede	and	replace	it	(Halbfass,	2005,	p.28).	
	
It	should	not	come	as	a	surprise	then	that	this	particular	assertion	about	the	validity	of	
the	label	‘Hinduism’,	its	origins,	and	its	continued	applicability	to	modern	Hindu	
thought,	has	been	the	crux	of	numerous	arguments.	Another	scholar	who	has	done	a	
considerable	amount	of	research	on	this	issue	is	David	Lorenzen.		
	
David	Lorenzen	
In	his	essay	“Who	Invented	Hinduism?”	(2005)	David	Lorenzen	attempts	to	
unravel	some	of	the	arguments	that	scholars	have	made	regarding	the	legitimacy	of	this	
label	‘Hinduism’	and	the	people	who	are	accredited	with,	or	who	take	credit	for,	its	
‘invention’.	Lorenzen	begins	by	separating	scholars	on	Hindu	traditions	into	two	
distinct	categories.	In	the	first	group,	he	places	those	who:	
have	put	forward	the	claim	that	Hinduism	was	constructed,	invented,	or	
imagined	by	British	scholars	and	colonial	administrators	in	the	nineteenth	
century	and	did	not	exist,	in	any	meaningful	sense,	before	this	date.	Prominent	
among	scholars	who	have	made	this	constructionist	argument,	if	I	can	call	it	that,	
are	Vasudha	Dalmia	(1995),	Robert	Frykenberg	(1989),	Christopher	Fuller	
(1992),	John	Hawley	(1991),	Gerald	Larson	(1995),	Harjot	Oberoi	(1994),	Brian	
Smith	(1989)	and	Heinrich	von	Stietencron	(1995	and	1997)	(Lorenzen,	2005,	
p.52).	
	
Lorenzen	chooses	to	highlight	some	of	these	scholars	since	they	have	made	strong	
statements	in	defence	of	their	positions.	For	example,	Heinrich	von	Stietencron	argues:	
	 71	
Hinduism	in	toto,	with	various	contradicting	systems	and	all	the	resulting	
inconsistencies,	certainly	does	not	meet	the	fundamental	requirements	for	a	
historical	religion	of	being	a	coherent	system	(2005,	p.46).		
	
Robert	Frykneberg	goes	even	further	when	he	states:	
A	continued	and	blind	acceptance	of	this	concept	[Hinduism]	–	not	to	mention	an	
uncritical	but	all	too	common	holding	of	many	underlying	assumptions	about	it	
during	the	past	century	–	is	not	only	erroneous,	but,	I	would	argue,	it	is	
dangerous	(2005,	p.82).	
	
But	perhaps	the	worst	argument	comes	from	John	Hawley	who	contends:	
Hinduism	–	the	word	and	perhaps	the	reality	too-	was	born	in	the	19th	century,	a	
notoriously	illegitimate	child.	The	father	was	middle-class	and	British,	and	the	
mother,	of	course,	was	India	(1991,	p.20).	
	
This	insensitive	visualization	of	‘Hinduism’	as	an	“illegitimate	child”,	and	of	India	as	a	
mother	of	questionable	morals,	is	exactly	the	kind	of	argument	that	has	caused	such	a	
furore	over	the	legitimacy	of	the	use	of	this	label.	As	such,	it	is	disappointing	that	
Lorenzen	regards	it	as	“one	of	the	wittiest”	(2005,	p.55)	analogies	made	by	recent	
scholars.	That	being	said	however,	Lorenzen	perceives	himself	as	belonging	to	the	
opposing	team	of	scholars:	
On	the	other	side	of	the	argument	are	several	scholars	who	have	directly	
questioned	this	claim	from	various	points	of	view.	They	include	Lawrence	A.	
Babb	(1986),	Wendy	Doniger	(1991),	Gabriealla	Eichinger	Ferro-Luzzi	(1989),	
Alf	Hiltebeitel	(1991),	Cynthia	Talbot	(1995),	Thomas	Trautman	(1997),	Peter	
van	der	Veer	(1994),	and	myself	(1995)	(2005,	p.53).	
	
Considering	this	stance,	it	is	fitting	that	Lorenzen	dedicates	the	rest	of	his	essay	to	try	
and	demonstrate	that	the:	
claim	that	Hinduism	was	invented	or	constructed	by	European	colonizers,	mostly	
British,	sometime	after	1800	is	false.	The	evidence	instead	suggests	that	a	Hindu	
religion	theologically	and	devotionally	grounded	in	texts	such	as	the	Bhagavad	
Gita,	the	Puranas,	and	philosophical	commentaries	on	the	six	darshanas	
gradually	acquired	a	much	sharper	self-conscious	identity	through	the	rivalry	
between	Muslims	and	Hindus	in	the	period	between	1200	and	1500,	and	was	
firmly	established	long	before	1800	(Lorenzen,	2005,	p.53).	
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On	the	other	hand,	Lorenzen	is	also	quick	to	clarify	that	this	does	not	imply	that	
he	believes	that	the	label	‘Hinduism’	was	used	extensively	before	the	arrival	of	the	
Westerners.	Instead,	he	agrees	with	other	contemporary	scholars	who	have	shown	how	
“the	word	‘Hinduism’	became	common	in	English	only	in	the	second	quarter	of	the	
nineteenth	century,	and	mostly	in	books	by	British	authors”	(Lorenzen,	2005,	p.54).	
Accordingly	Lorenzen	states:	
In	a	search	through	several	early	nineteenth-century	journals,	I	managed	to	find	
one	example	of	the	word	“Hinduism”	(with	a	“u”)	in	a	letter	published	in	the	
1818	volume	of	The	Asiatic	Journal	and	Monthly	Register	(London)	and	no	less	
than	seven	examples	(also	with	a	“u”)	in	an	article	by	John	Crawfurd	on	
Hinduism	in	Bali,	published	in	the	1820	volume	of	Asiatick	Researches	of	
Calcutta.	More	significant	are	two	appearances	of	the	term	in	English	language	
texts	by	Rammohan	Roy	published	in	1816	and	1817,	which	have	been	noted	
and	discussed	recently	by	Dermot	Killingley	(1993)	(2005,	p.53-54).	
	
Interestingly,	parts	of	this	argument	have	recently	been	refuted	by	Geoffrey	A.	Oddie	
who	has	shown	that	Charles	Grant,	a	director	of	the	East	India	Company:	
was	one	of	the	first	Europeans	(if	not	the	first)	to	use	the	term	‘Hindooism’	in	
both	his	private	and	semi-official	correspondence.	He	used	the	term	in	
correspondence	with	Thomas	Raikes	in	September	1787	(2006,	p.71).	
	
Oddie	makes	an	interesting	observation	when	he	contends:	
Also	significant	is	the	fact	that	Grant	seems	to	have	assumed	that	an	England-
based	recipient	of	his	letter	would	already	understand	the	meaning	of	the	word	
when	he	used	it	in	his	letter	to	Raikes	in	England	in	September	1787	(2006,	
p.71).	
	
Ironically,	Oddie’s	comments	strengthen	Lorenzen’s	argument	that	‘Hinduism’	was	not	
constructed	in	the	nineteenth	century.	As	such,	it	is	especially	puzzling	that,	despite	
being	aware	of	Grant’s	work,	which	he	mentions	in	his	essay	(Lorenzen,	2005,	p.61),	
Lorenzen	fails	to	make	this	connection	himself.	Particularly	since	this	is	the	crux	of	
Lorenzen’s	argument,	whereby	he	is	most	interested	in	demonstrating	that	even	though	
it	hadn’t	been	labelled	‘Hinduism’,	the	idea	of	‘Hinduism’	was	widely	prevalent	before	
British	colonization.		
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To	make	his	point,	Lorenzen	argues	that	‘constructionist’	scholars	have	
privileged	the	geo-cultural	definition	of	the	word	‘Hindu’,	whereas	he	believes	this	label	
carried	strong	religious	implications	as	well:	
everyone	agrees	that	the	word	derives	from	Sindhu,	the	native	name	for	the	river	
Indus.	There	is	also	a	consensus	that	the	name	Sindhu	became	“Hind”	or	“Hindu”	
in	Persian	languages	and	then	re-entered	Indian	languages	as	“Hindu,”	originally	
with	the	sense	of	an	inhabitant	of	the	lands	near	and	to	the	east	of	the	Indus.	
Most	proponents	of	the	British	construction	of	Hinduism,	not	surprisingly	begin	
by	stressing	this	geographical	etymology	and	then	simply	deny	that	use	of	the	
word	“Hindu”	in	a	religious	sense	was	of	any	importance	until	the	nineteenth	
century	(2005,	p.57).	
	
In	contrast,	the	basis	of	Lorenzen’s	argument	is	that,	before	the	Western	colonizers	
arrived,	the	Hindus	already	had	a	collective	identity	that	had	been	necessary	in	the	face	
of	Muslim	domination.	He	contends	that	the	designation	‘Hindu’,	was	not	a	term	simply	
used	for	geographical	and	ethnic	reasons	since	this	would	imply,	by	default,	that	the	
Muslims	who	had	settled	in	India,	or	those	who	had	converted	to	Islam,	should	also	
have	been	called	Hindus.		
What	then	of	the	vast	majority	of	Muslims	in	India	who	were	indigenous	
converts	of	low-caste	Hindu	origin?	If	“Hindu”	remained	a	purely	ethno-
geographical	term,	except	perhaps	in	the	eyes	of	a	few	Muslim	intellectuals,	at	
least	these	converts	should	have	been	called	“Hindus”	or	“Hindu	Muslims.”	There	
is	in	fact	little	or	no	evidence	that	this	ever	happened	(Lorenzen,	2005,	p.58).	
	
This	fact	is	contested	by	Frykenberg	who	asserts:	
In	this	sense	reference	to	“Hindoo”	Christians	or	“Hindoo”	Muslims	–	namely	
references	to	Christians	and	Muslims,	etc.,	of	India	who	were	characteristically	
and	distinctively	‘Hindoo”	or	Indian	in	their	culture	and	style	of	life	–	are	not	
uncommon	(2005,	p.85).35	
	
Perhaps	Lorenzen	feels	justified	in	ignoring	these	cases,	where	Christians	or	Muslims	
were	assigned	this	prefix	‘Hindu’,	due	to	their	negligible	numbers	(in	comparison	to	the	
																																																								
35	Furthermore,	in	a	personal	email	exchange	with	Dr.	Frykenberg	dated	October,	21st,	
2011,	where	I	asked	for	clarification	on	how	he	came	to	this	conclusion,	he	stated	that	
these	ideas	were	mined	from	petitioners	in	the	Manuscript	District	Records	regarding	
the	regions	Tinnevelly	and	Tanjore	between	the	periods	1790	to	1835.	
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majority	who	were	not	labelled	in	this	fashion).	Instead,	he	bases	his	arguments	on	the	
premise,	whereby	converts	were	not	called	Hindu	Muslims	or	Hindu	Christians,	and	
investigates	numerous	accounts	of	‘Hinduism’	that	have	been	recorded	dating	back	to	
the	fifteenth	century.	He	argues	that	there	are	three	main	sources	for	these	accounts;	
European,	Hindu	and	Muslim.	Lorenzen	contends	that	even	though	there	are	“three	
different	master	narratives;	one	metaphysical,	one	historical	and	one	classificatory”	
(2005,	p.58)	however:	
there	is	almost	no	text	on	Hinduism	that	follows	any	one	model	exclusively.	
Nonetheless,	the	dominant	model	is	undoubtedly	the	historical	one,	and	one	of	
the	first	fully-developed	examples	of	this	model	is	presented	in	Monier	Monier-
Williams’	influential	book	Hinduism,	first	published	in	1877	and	later	reprinted	
in	several	revised	editions.	The	importance	of	this	text	justifies,	I	think,	taking	its	
account	of	Hinduism	as	a	“standard	model”	of	the	religion	(2005,	p.59).	
	
This	is	important	because	Lorenzen	then	goes	on	to	demonstrate	how	the	different	
histories	of	‘Hinduism’,	preceding	this	text,	all	share	common	traits	with	this	‘standard	
model’	thereby	belying	the	notion	that	the	idea	of	a	collective	Hindu	identity	did	not	
exist	earlier.	Thus,	Lorenzen	questions:	
When,	then,	did	British	and	other	European	observers	first	identify	Hinduism	–	
whether	called	Hinduism,	Hindu	religion	or	religion	of	the	Hindus	–	as	a	single	
set	of	religious	beliefs	and	practices?	I	have	already	mentioned	the	1820	article	
by	John	Crawfurd	as	one	of	the	earliest	sources	to	use	the	word	“Hinduism.”	
What	is	also	interesting	is	the	fact	that	Crawfurd	uses	the	terms	“Hinduism,”	
“Hindu	religion,”	and	“Hindus”	in	the	context	of	Bali,	where	the	Hindus	are	
clearly	not	Indians	in	any	racial	or	ethno-geographical	sense.	What	I	want	to	
show	here,	however,	is	that	virtually	all	of	the	more	scholarly	observers	among	
the	European	visitors	and	residents	in	India	before	1800	had	identified	
Hinduism	as	a	diverse	but	identifiable	set	of	beliefs	and	practices	clearly	
distinguished	from	Islam,	and,	less	clearly,	from	the	Sikh	and	Parsi	religions	as	
well	(2005,	p.61).	
	
By	charting	out	the	different	European	reports	and	documents	that	describe	Hindu	
religious	traditions,	Lorenzen	successively	illustrates	how	British	scholars	and	
administrators	cannot	be	the	only	Europeans	accredited	with	the	‘construction’	of	
Hinduism.	Instead,	he	identifies	Protestant,	Catholic,	Portuguese,	Spanish	and	
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missionary	accounts,	each	with	different	perspectives	and	agendas,	but	nevertheless	
describing	Hindu	ideas	in	a	relatively	similar	manner;	all	of	which	are	comparative	to	
Monier	Williams’	‘standard	model’:	
The	fact	that	virtually	all	European	accounts	–	whatever	the	language	or	period	
in	which	they	were	written,	and	whether	or	not	they	are	likely	to	have	mutually	
influenced	each	other	–	follow	this	same	general	outline	suggests	that	the	
European	writers	were	in	fact	“constructing”	Hinduism	directly	on	the	basis	of	
what	they	observed	and	what	they	were	told	by	their	native	informants.	These	
informants	were	in	turn	simply	summarizing	a	construction	of	Hinduism	that	
already	existed	in	their	own	collective	consciousness.	This	does	not	mean	that	
Hinduism	was	unchanged	during	this	period,	nor	that	the	European	and	colonial	
presence	did	not	foster	important	changes	in	the	way	Hinduism	was	
conceptualized	by	the	Hindus	themselves,	but	it	does	clearly	show	that	the	idea	
that	Hinduism	was	constructed	or	invented	by	nineteenth	century	Europeans	is	
mistaken	(Lorenzen,	2005,	pp.67-68,	emphasis	in	original).	
	
	 Of	course,	one	could	argue	that	the	reason	why	the	Europeans	gleaned	the	same	
information	from	their	native	informants	was	because	they	were	approaching	these	
traditions	with	their	own	cultural	baggage.	And,	as	such,	were	asking	the	same	
questions	and	looking	for	the	same	answers.	As	if	in	response	to	this	Lorenzen	turns	his	
attention	to	the	relevant	Hindu	sources.	Interestingly,	Lorenzen	picks	up	on	Halbfass’	
argument,	that	premodern	Sanskrit	sources	minimized	their	account	of	the	Muslim	
presence	and,	as	such,	Lorenzen	agrees	that	it	is	hard	to	ignore	Halbfass’	suggestion	that	
these	texts	were	guilty	of	a	“self-imposed	cultural	isolation”	(2005,	p.69).	However,	
Lorenzen	argues	that	whereas	it	may	be	true	that	these	texts	refused	to	engage	
extensively	with	the	Muslim	‘other’,	it	was	also	true	that	vernacular	literature	did	not	
operate	under	the	same	pretexts:	
The	bulk	of	this	evidence	takes	the	form	of	texts	composed	by	the	popular	
religious	poet-singers	of	North	India,	most	of	them	members	of	non-Brahmin	
castes.	This	literature	does	precisely	what	Sanskrit	literature	refuses	to	do:	it	
establishes	a	Hindu	religious	identity	through	a	process	of	mutual	self-definition	
with	a	contrasting	Muslim	Other	(2005,	p.70).	
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By	describing	the	various	references	that	were	made	to	the	‘Muslim	Other’,	Lorenzen	
highlights	numerous	ways	in	which	these	early	Hindu	poets	demonstrated	a	collective	
identity	which	they	didn’t	call	‘Hinduism’,	but,	which	could	be	read	back	as	just	that.	For	
example,	he	uses	quotes	from	the	religious	songs	of	the	Indian	poet	Kabir	who	lived	
approximately	between	the	years	1450	and	1520	A.D:	
Who	is	a	Hindu,	who	a	Turk?	
Both	must	share	a	single	world.	
Koran	or	Vedas,	both	read	their	books	(as	cited	in	Lorenzen,	2005,	p.72))	
	
Furthermore,	Lorenzen	points	out	that	in	a	“historical	romance	called	Kirtilata”	a	text	
that	was	written	approximately	“a	hundred	years	before	Kabir,”	there	is	a	reference	
made	to	the	dhamme	(dharma)	of	the	Hindus	and	the	Turks	which	“apparently	mean[t]	
something	quite	close	to	‘religion	of	the	Hindus’	and	‘religion	of	the	Muslims’”	(2005,	
p.73).	
Naturally,	this	raises	questions	about	the	very	definition	of	‘dhamme’,	or	dharma,	
and	whether	it	was	used	in	the	same	way	as	‘religion’36	or,	if	in	fact,	it	had	other	
definitions	that	could	be	applied	to	it	as	Hacker	has	already	highlighted.	Indeed,	because	
Lorenzen	translates	it	as	‘religion’	we	get	to	what	might	be	a	crucial	problem	with	his	
argument.	This	need	of	Lorenzen’s,	to	define	‘dhamme’	as	‘religion’,	a	Western	infused	
label,	undermines	some	of	the	emphasis	he	lays	on	the	need	to	accept	that	‘Hinduism’	
may	be	a	native	construct.	After	all,	Lorenzen	contends	that	there	was	a	collective	Hindu	
identity	and	he	offers	up	considerable	evidence	to	support	this	claim.	Moreover,	this	
collective	identity	is	comparable	to	what	Lorenzen	calls	the	‘standard	model’	of	
Hinduism.	Lorenzen	even	demonstrates	that	the	famous	Persian	historian,	Al-Biruni,	
has	an	account	of	the	‘religion’	that	he	found	on	the	Indian	subcontinent	which	is	
																																																								
36	A	point	that	Bankimchandra	refutes	in	the	first	chapter.	
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remarkably	like	the	‘standard	model’	accredited	to	Monier-Williams	approximately	
seven	hundred	years	later	(2005,	p.75).	However,	one	cannot	help	but	wonder	if	those	
who	apparently	had	this	collective	identity,	i.e.	the	Hindus,	would	have	accepted	this	
‘standard	model’	or	if	instead,	as	Halbfass	has	suggested	with	the	Vedas,	they	would	
have	identified	themselves	in	relation	to	it,	by	accepting	some	of	its	norms,	and	rejecting	
others.	Indeed,	it	is	only	with	the	arrival	of	the	British	that	this	web	of	ideas	had	to	be	
concretized,	whereby	walls	were	put	up	around	the	‘religion’	called	‘Hinduism’.		
So,	in	a	sense,	one	could	argue	that	it	was	not	that	a	Hindu	identity	did	not	exist,	
but	that	for	the	first	time	in	history,	this	massive	body	of	intertwined	ideas	was	being	
forced	into	a	box	called	‘religion’,	under	the	subheading	of	‘Hinduism’.	The	question	
then	arises	as	to	why	this	label,	which	simply	names	this	collective	identity,	and	calls	it	
‘Hinduism’	should	be	discarded.	Instead,	shouldn’t	we	discard	the	parameters	that	are	
set	for	‘Hinduism’	by	some	scholars?	One	could	argue	that	it	is	not	the	term	that	is	the	
problem;	it	is	the	need	to	use	Western	theoretic	tools	to	define	it	that	is	the	real	
problem.	Thus,	whereas	Lorenzen	is	convincing	in	his	argument	that	‘Hinduism’	existed	
before	the	British	arrived,	unfortunately	he	is	not	able	to	break	from	his	need	to	
describe	it	as	a	“single	religious	community”	(2005,	p.54)	rather	than	as	a	multi-layered	
plural	yet	connected	identity.	So	the	question	is	not	‘who	invented	Hinduism?’	or	“who	
constructed	Hinduism?”	but	rather	why	this	identity	does	not	conform	to	Western	
religious	models.	These	are	some	of	the	questions	which	Richard	King	seems	to	be	
grappling	with.		
	
Richard	King	
In	Orientalism	and	Religion	(1999),	Richard	King	argues	that	‘Hinduism’	has	
come	to	represent	an	idea	that	did	not	exist,	in	this	form,	before	colonialism.	As	such,	he	
	 78	
endeavours	to	shed	some	light	on	the	role	that	Western	Orientalism	has	played	in	the	
development	and	definition	of	this	term:	
The	notion	of	‘Hinduism’	is	itself	a	Western-inspired	abstraction,	which	until	the	
nineteenth	century	bore	little	or	no	resemblance	to	the	diversity	of	Indian	
religious	beliefs	and	practice	(King,	1999,	p.98).	
	
King	seemingly	takes	an	opposing	stance	from	Lorenzen:	
The	term	‘Hinduism’,	which	of	course	derives	from	the	frequency	with	which	
‘Hindu’	came	to	be	used,	is	a	Western	explanatory	construct.	As	such	it	reflects	
the	colonial	and	Judeo-Christian	presuppositions	of	the	Western	Orientalists	who	
first	coined	the	term	(1999,	p.100).	
	
Moreover,	he	laments	the	fact	that	scholars	of	Orientalism,	such	as	David	Kopf	are:	
seemingly	unaware	of	the	Eurocentric	agenda	underlying	it	and	the	extent	to	
which	the	superimposition	of	the	monolithic	entity	of	‘Hinduism’	upon	Indian	
religious	material	has	distorted	and	perhaps	irretrievably	transformed	Indian	
religiosity	in	a	Westernized	direction	(King,	1999,	p.100).	
	
What	is	important	to	note	however,	is	that	King	is	not	simply	asking	scholars	to	discard	
the	label	‘Hinduism’.	Rather,	he	urges	them	to	understand	that	when	they	use	this	label	
they	are,	in	all	actuality,	using	a	term	that	has	been	shaped	by	Western	ideology	and	as	
such,	“the	modern	conception	of	Hinduism	is	indeed	a	modern	development”	(King,	
1999,	p.101,	emphasis	in	original).	What	this	signifies,	for	King,	is	that	‘Hinduism’,	as	it	
came	to	be	used	by	the	British	colonialists	and	the	native	elites,	was	deeply	influenced	
by	the	categories	that	were	privileged	by	Western	concepts	of	‘religion’.	This	is	reflected	
in	the	fact	that	texts	such	as	the	Dharmasastras,	the	Vedas,	the	Bhagavad-Gita	and	the	
Puranas	all	came	to	occupy	a	pivotal	role	in	the	creation	of	this	category;	a	textual	
emphasis	that	was	not	evident	to	such	a	degree	in	earlier	times	when	practice	and	ritual	
played	a	central	role.	Furthermore,	he	asserts	that	since	these	Western	ideas	were	
themselves	strongly	influenced	by	Christian	values,	the	result	was	a	‘construction’	of	
‘Hinduism’	that	bore	a	stronger	resemblance	to	the	‘religion’	of	their	oppressors	rather	
than	to	the	traditional	ideas	of	their	ancestors:		
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Many	of	the	early	European	translators	of	Indian	texts	were	also	Christian	
missionaries,	who,	in	their	translations	and	critical	editions	of	Indian	works,	
effectively	constructed	uniform	texts	and	a	homogenized	written	canon	through	
the	imposition	of	Western	philological	standards	and	presuppositions	onto	
Indian	materials.	Thus	the	oral	and	‘popular’	aspect	of	Indian	religious	tradition	
was	either	ignored	or	decried	as	evidence	of	the	degradation	of	contemporary	
Hindu	religion	and	superstitious	practices	that	bore	little	or	no	relation	to	‘their	
own’	texts	(King	1999,	p.101).	
	
In	addition	to	this	emphasis	on	textual	authority,	Orientalists	were	also	inclined	to	look	
for	an	ecclesiastical	hierarchy,	a	model	with	which	they	were	familiar,	and	the	elite	
brahmins	filled	this	requirement	perfectly.	King	highlights	the	fact	that	the	combined	
effect	of	textual	emphasis,	and	the	need	for	a	native	hierarchical	support	system,	
resulted	in	the	privileging	of	the	brahmin	caste	who,	as	a	result,	benefitted	both	socially	
as	well	as	economically.		
	 The	question	that	arises	then	is	as	to	why	the	other	castes,	sects	and	religious	
groups,	whose	practices	and	philosophy	did	not	play	such	a	pivotal	role	in	the	formation	
of	this	modern	‘religion’	called	‘Hinduism’,	did	not	object	strongly	and	resist	this	
brahmin	‘take	over’.	King,	agreeing	with	scholars	like	Heinrich	von	Stietencron	and	
Robert	Frykenberg	before	him,	argues	that	the	reason	why	a	large	portion	of	the	Indian	
intellectual	community	was	amenable	to	this	situation	was	because	this	allowed	them	to	
present	a	united	front	in	their	struggle	for	freedom,	by	claiming	a	national	identity,	that	
bound	them	together,	i.e.	‘Hinduism’.	Accordingly,	King	concurs	with	von	Stietencron:	
western	students	saw	Hinduism	as	a	unity.	The	Indians	had	no	reason	to	
contradict	this;	to	them	the	religious	and	cultural	unity	discovered	by	western	
scholars	was	highly	welcome	in	their	search	for	national	identity	in	the	period	of	
struggle	for	national	union	(as	cited	in	King,	1999,	p.103).	
	
Furthermore,	King	also	reminds	us	that	according	to	Frykenberg:	
Brahmins	have	always	controlled	information.	That	was	their	boast.	It	was	they	
who	had	provided	information	on	indigenous	institutions	[for	Western	
Orientalists].	It	was	they	who	provided	this	on	a	scale	so	unprecedented	that,	at	
least	at	the	level	of	All-India	consciousness,	a	new	religion	emerged	the	likes	of	
which	India	had	perhaps	never	known	before	(as	cited	in	King,	1999,	p.104).	
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King	demonstrates	how	this	quest	for	a	national,	united	front,	resulted	in	the	emergence	
of	a	‘Hinduism’	that	did	not,	and	could	not,	correspond	with	what	had	existed	before	the	
arrival	of	the	Western	Orientalists.	Consequently,	he	agrees	with	the	Indian	historian	
Romila	Thapar	when	she	contends:	
this	new	Hinduism,	furnished	with	a	brahmanical	base,	was	merged	with	
elements	of	‘upper	caste	belief	and	ritual	with	one	eye	on	the	Christian	and	
Islamic	models’,	and	was	thoroughly	infused	with	a	political	and	nationalistic	
emphasis	(King,	1999,	p.104).	
	
Furthermore,	he	argues	that	this	‘Hinduism’	had:	
the	tendency	to	emphasize	Vedic	and	brahmanical	texts	and	beliefs	as	central	
and	foundational	to	the	‘essence’	of	Hinduism,	and	in	the	modern	association	of	
‘Hindu	doctrine’	with	the	various	brahmanical	schools	of	the	Vedanta	(in	
particular,	Advaita	Vedanta)	(King,	1999,	pp.102-103).	
	
According	to	King,	this	is	problematic,	and	needs	to	addressed,	because	this	‘essential	
Hinduism’	was,	in	actuality,	mimicking	the	beliefs	and	ideas	of	the	Abrahamic	‘religions’	
with	which	it	was	competing,	and	with	whom	it	wanted	to	stand	as	an	equal	member	in	
the	category	of	‘world	religions’:	
This	reflects	the	tendency,	during	and	after	European	colonialism,	for	Indian	
religion	to	be	conceived	by	Westerners	and	Indians	themselves	in	a	manner	
conducive	to	Judeo-Christian	conceptions	of	the	nature	of	religion,	a	process	that	
Veena	Das	has	described	as	the	‘semification’	of	Hinduism	in	the	modern	era.	
Thus,	since	the	nineteenth	century,	‘Hinduism’	has	developed,	and	is	notable	for,	
a	number	of	new	characteristics,	which	seem	to	have	arisen	in	response	to	
Judeo-Christian	presuppositions	about	the	nature	of	religion	(1999,	p.104).	
	
	 At	first	glance,	it	appears	as	if	he	is	offering	up	the	opposing	argument	to	
Lorenzen	since	he	is	quite	firm	in	his	belief	that	the	term	‘Hinduism’	is	problematic.	
However,	one	should	be	wary	of	simply	categorizing	these	two	scholars	as	opposing	
counsel.	On	the	hand,	it	does	seem	as	if	King	would	disagree	with	Lorenzen’s	argument	
that	the	‘standard	model’	of	‘Hinduism’,	that	Monier-Williams	first	published	in	1877,	
was	already	evident	centuries	before	the	arrival	of	the	British.	On	the	other	hand,	
whereas	this	‘standard	model’	may	not	resonate	with	King,	he	is	not	denying	Lorenzen’s	
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argument	that	there	was	a	collective	or	connected	identity	that	existed	before	the	
arrival	of	the	British.	Instead,	King	argues	that	this	identity	has	been	misrepresented,	
due	to	colonization,	and	the	subsequent	insistence	that	this	Indian	identity	be	made	to	
conform	with	Western	religious	ideas	and	categories.	He	asserts	that	the	‘religion’	that	
is	described	by	the	term	‘Hinduism’	does	not,	in	fact,	accurately	reflect	the	traditions	of	
the	Hindu	masses.	This	naturally	results	in	an	obvious	need	for	further	analysis	and	
interpretation,	a	need	that	he	is	aware	of.		
King	presents	an	interesting	solution	in	“Colonialism,	Hinduism	and	the	
Discourse	of	Religion”	(2010).	According	to	him,	one	way	to	resolve	this	issue	would	be	
to	recognize	that,	unlike	Western	religious	traditions,	which	tend	to	operate	under	a	
centripetal	model,	Indian	traditions	are	better	described	by	a	centrifugal,	or	perhaps,	a	
polycentric	model.	He	argues	that	Western	religious	traditions	operate	under	“a	
profoundly	centripetal	dynamic	that	seeks	to	overcome	difference	and	plurality	and	
unify	all	members	of	the	group	under	a	common	rubric”	(King,	2010,	p.106).	However,	
one	should	be	cautious	of	such	tendencies:	
Why	must	civilization	be	seen	as	centripetally	organized	in	terms	of	unitary	
identity-relations	to	be	accorded	cultural	respect?	How	might	one	move	to	
portray	non-western	civilizational	traditions	in	the	public	sphere	in	a	way	that	
resists	the	framing	of	discussions	about	‘Hinduism’	in	terms	of	the	binary	logic	of	
its	‘sameness	or	difference’	in	relation	to	Christianity	(or	say,	Islam)?	(King,	
2010,	p.107).	
	
He	answers	these	questions	by	arguing	that	the	centripetal	model	is	not	conducive	to	
Indic	ideas.	As	such,	newer	ways,	which	do	not	privilege	Western	explanatory	models,	
should	be	explored.	Furthermore,	according	to	him,	Indian	traditions	are,	in	actuality,	
one	of	the	best	examples	of	such	an	alternative	method:	
I	would	contend	that	a	centripetal	mono-logic	of	this	kind,	with	its	concern	to	
maintain	homogeneity	and	a	non-porous	and	bounded,	unitary	identity	in	the	
face	of	‘the	other’	(whether	labelled	heterodox,	pagan,	heathen,	or	‘other	world	
religion’)	has	not	been	the	dominant	model	in	operation	in	Indic	identity-
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formation.	This	is	not	to	say	that	Indic	movements	have	had	no	interest	in	
constructing	an	identity	in	opposition	to	‘others’	(mlecchas;	varna-jati;	
brahmanic-Srmanic	classifications	etc.),	but	rather	that	the	lack	of	a	single	
dominant	ecclesiastical	institution	(such	as	the	Church)	within	Indian	society	
resulted	in	models	that	took	accommodation,	plurality	and	a	certain	degree	of	
interactive	boundary-porousness	(what	in	the	West	has	often	been	pejoratively	
labelled	‘syncretism’)	as	normative.	Rejecting	the	centripetal	model	embedded	in	
dominant	western	assumptions	about	‘religion’	when	speaking	of	an	Indian	
context	does	not	entail	the	representation	of	Indian	traditions	as	‘chaotic,	
undifferentiated	collections	of	religious	beliefs	and	practices	(Lorenzen	2007),	
unless	one	is	unwilling	to	think	beyond	the	kind	of	(false)	binary	opposition	
through	which	mono-logical	systems	of	representation	operate	–	where	‘unitary’	
and	‘chaotic	and	undifferentiated’	become	the	only	possible	conceptual	options	
(King,	2010,	p.107-108,	emphasis	in	original).	
	
Nonetheless,	he	is	reluctant	to	simply	call	these	Indian	religious	tendencies	centrifugal,	
because	he	wants	to	avoid	setting	up	binary	categories	that	could	lead	back	to	the	very	
issues	he	is	arguing	against.	Instead,	he	suggests	adopting	Julius	Lipner’s	(1996)	
suggestion	to	approach	Indian	religious	traditions	as	a	polycentric	model	that	does	not	
easily	slip	into	Western	monolithic	categories	(2010,	p.108).		
That	being	said,	however,	we	are	still	left	with	the	dilemma	of	naming;	a	dilemma	
that	King	is	not	unaware	of	but	for	which	he	doesn’t	offer	any	solutions.	This	is	
important	because	Hindus,	both	in	India	and	in	the	diaspora,	have	come	to	identify	with	
this	label	‘Hinduism’,	a	title	that	names	their	traditional	ideas	and	practices.	Now,	
scholars	are	free	to	argue	that	the	‘concept’	that	this	label	identifies	is	simply	a	myth.	
However,	this	particular	myth	has	become	the	reality	by	which	Hindus	today	not	only	
live	their	lives	but	also	understand	their	own	history.	Therefore,	whereas	this	label	does	
not	conform	to	the	parameters	that	have	been	set	by	Western	traditions,	it	is,	
nevertheless,	a	way	many	Hindus	have	come	to	understand	their	own	traditions,	a	myth	
which	helps	to	define	their	identity.	King	addresses	this	idea	of	‘myth’	in	“The	
association	of	‘religion’	with	violence”	(2007).	Here,	he	is	not	using	the	word	‘myth’	in	
the	negative	way	that	it	has	oftentimes	been	used	in	popular	literature,	and	as	it	is	
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defined	in	the	Oxford	dictionary;	“a	fictitious	or	imaginary	person	or	thing;	a	widely-
held	but	false	belief	or	idea;	a	misrepresentation	of	the	truth”	(Oxford	Dictionaries).	
Instead,	he	is	utilizing	the	word	‘myth’	much	in	the	same	way	that	Pierre	Bourdieu	uses	
the	word	‘doxa’,	which	is	a	term	he	coined	to	describe	the	worldview	of	a	people	
whereby:	
the	established	cosmological	and	political	order	is	perceived	not	as	arbitrary,	i.e.	
as	one	possible	order	among	others,	but	as	a	self-evident	and	natural	order	
which	goes	without	saying	and	therefore	goes	unquestioned	(Bourdieu,	1972,	p.	
166).	
	
King	concurs	with	Bourdieu	who	argues:	
a	doxa	occurs	when	a	particular	taxonomic	system	presents	itself	as	
corresponding	to	‘nature’	–	the	way	things	really	are,	rather	than	as	a	culturally	
constructed	artifice.	It	is	constituted	by	that	which	is	taken	for	granted	in	a	
specific	social	setting,	that	which	remains	literally	unquestionable	because	its	
arbitrary	and	socially	constructed	origins	have	been	occluded.	Doxa	forms	the	
unquestioned	truth	or	authority	that	frames	the	very	possibilities	of	thought	
itself	–	the	stage	upon	which	orthodoxies	and	heterodoxies	can	be	played	out	
according	to	a	set	of	rules	and	assumptions	that	none	of	the	participants	
question	(2007,	p.229).	
	
This	appears	to	be	what	King	is	implying	when	he	argues	that	‘Hinduism’	is	a	
myth	that	was	created	by	both	the	Western	scholars	and	native	elites,	but	which	now	
presents	itself	as	an	eternal	‘religion’	beyond	the	limits	of	history.	Bourdieu	and	King’s	
arguments	indicate	that	certain	worldviews,	become	so	deeply	embedded	into	the	
psyche	of	the	people,	that	they	are	not	challenged	because	“the	questions	they	answer	
cannot	be	explicitly	asked”	(Bourdieu,	1972,	p.168).	Thus,	one	could	argue	that	the	
questions	that	would	need	to	be	asked	of	the	Hindu	public,	regarding	their	collective	
identity	and	shared	traditions,	are	ones	that	are	so	deeply	embedded	that	they	could	
threaten	the	very	fabric	of	their	self-identity;	particularly	when	faced	with	presenting	
their	ideas	to	non-Indians.	Once	again	we	must	consider	whether	it	is	this	label	
‘Hinduism’	that	the	Hindus	use	to	describe	their	traditions	that	is	faulty,	or,	if	instead,	it	
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is	the	category	into	which	they	are	supposed	to	fit	that	is	the	problem.	Indeed,	could	it	
be	that	if	we	redefine	‘religion’	using	categories	such	as	centripetal,	centrifugal	and	
polycentric,	we	may	be	able	to	address	some	of	these	issues?	Of	course,	one	could	also	
argue	that	this	does	not	resolve	the	fact	that	many	aspects	of	Hindu	traditions	are	not	
included	in	the	mainstream	definition	of	‘Hinduism’,	which,	in	turn,	oftentimes	leads	
them	to	be	left	out	by	popular	text	books	and	testimonies.37	Fortunately,	scholars,	on	
both	sides	of	the	fence,	are	actively	trying	to	rectify	this	deficiency	and	this	trend,	to	
privilege	Western	tools	and	categories,	is	decreasing.	As	for	the	Indian	masses,	one	
might	argue	that	whereas	they	may	spout	Vedantic	ideals	when	pushed	by	outsiders	to	
define	or	encapsulate	their	practices	and	ideas,	they	do	not	usually	replicate	this	in	their	
personal	and	public	lives.	For	example,	Hindu	festivals	like	Ganesha	Chaturti	or	Durga	
Puja,	display	a	panorama	of	Gods	in	their	polytheistic	glory	being	celebrated	as	distinct	
identities	with	no	apparent	evidence	of	monolithic,	monotheistic	or	Advaitic	principles	
present.	Is	this	a	true	testimony	of	the	complex	traditions	that	Hindus	call	their	own?	Or	
instead,	is	the	historian	Romila	Thapar	accurate	when	she	labels	these	traditions,	calling	
them	‘Syndicated	Hinduism’,	a	doxa	that	has	been	created	by	the	Hindu	elite.	It	is	to	her	
arguments	that	we	must	now	turn.		
	
Romila	Thapar	
In	her	essay,	“Syndicated	Hinduism”	(2005)	Romila	Thapar	opens	her	discussion	
by	trying	to	distinguish	what	‘Brahmanism’	means,	especially	when	compared	to	its	
																																																								
37	Vasudha	Narayanan	addresses	how	textbooks	oftentimes	misrepresent,	or	simply	
ignore,	crucial	aspects	of	Hindu	traditions;	an	issue	that	we	will	return	to	in	the	final	
chapter.			
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apparent	opposite,	‘Sramanism’.	According	to	Thapar,	‘Brahmanism’	has	its	roots	in	the	
Vedas:	
The	Vedic	compositions	even	if	they	might	incorporate	elements	of	the	earlier	
religion,	emphasize	the	central	role	of	the	sacrificial	ritual	of	the	yajna,	are	
suggestive	of	some	elements	of	shamanism,	include	a	gamut	of	deities	where	the	
brahmana	is	the	intermediary	to	the	gods	and	worship	focuses	on	rituals	without	
images.	Because	of	the	pivotal	role	of	the	brahmana	it	is	sometimes	referred	to	as	
the	beginnings	of	Brahmanical	Hinduism	to	distinguish	it	from	other	important	
forms	of	Hinduism.	The	Vedic	compositions	and	the	Dharmasastras	(the	codes	of	
sacred	and	social	duties)	are	said	to	constitute	the	norms	for	Brahmanism	and	
the	religious	practices	for	the	upper	castes	(Thapar,	2005,	p.57).38	
	
In	contrast,	the	Sramanas	were:	
those	who	were	often	in	opposition	to	Brahmanism	such	as	the	Buddhists,	Jainas	
and	Ajivikas	and	a	number	of	other	sects	associated	with	both	renunciatory	
orders	and	a	lay	following,	who	explored	areas	of	belief	and	practice	different	
from	the	Vedas	and	Dharmasastras	(Thapar,	2005,	p.58).	
	
However,	Thapar	contends	that	although	several	of	these	dissenters	from	‘Brahmanism’	
could	arguably	be	included	under	the	umbrella	of	‘Hinduism’	nevertheless	there	has	
been	a	concerted	“attempt	to	define	Hinduism	as	Brahmanism	based	on	upper	caste	
rituals”	(2005,	p.61)	As	far	as	Thapar	is	concerned,	this	effort	is	largely	due	to	the	
impact	of	colonization	and	is	ill	suited	to	the	Indian	subcontinent:	
The	yardstick	of	the	Semitic	religions	which	has	been	the	conscious	and	the	
subconscious	challenger	in	the	modern	structuring	of	Hinduism,	would	seem	
most	inappropriate	to	what	existed	before	(2005,	p.57).	
	
According	to	Thapar,	there	are	a	range	of	beliefs	and	sects,	ideas	and	philosophies,	
rituals	and	practices,	that	co-inhabit	this	area,	but	which	are	left	out	from	the	all-
inclusive	label	‘Hinduism’,	thereby	making	this	kind	of	categorization	problematic.	
Instead,	she	highlights	the	differences	between	the	way	traditions	that	are	classified	as	
‘Hindu’	emerged	and	developed	in	comparison	to	their	Western	counterparts.	For	
																																																								
38	For	the	purposes	of	this	chapter	I	will	limit	my	comments	to	this	essay	of	since	it	is	
her	application	of	the	label	‘syndicated	Hinduism’	that	I	would	like	to	examine.		
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example,	there	are	no	linear	trajectories	that	can	be	traced	between	the	various	Hindu	
traditions:	
Present-day	Hinduism	therefore	cannot	be	seen	as	an	evolved	form	with	a	linear	
growth	historically	from	Harappan	through	Vedic,	Puranic	and	Bhakti	forms,	
although	it	may	carry	elements	of	these.	In	this	it	differs	even	from	Buddhism	
and	Jainism	leave	alone	Christianity	and	Islam	(Thapar,	2005,	p.56).	
	
Thapar	points	out	that,	as	a	result,	‘Brahmanism’	was	especially	different	from	its	
counterparts	because,	whereas	amongst	other	traditions,	when	a	sect	breaks	away	it	
“still	retains	the	historical	imprint	of	the	founder,	the	text	and	the	institution…	
Brahmanism	was	free	of	this”	(Thapar,	2005,	p.58).	Thapar	argues	that	this	is	because	of	
the	caste	system,	since	different	castes	highlighted	distinctive	aspects	of	scriptures	and	
traditional	practices,	thereby	privileging	alternate	rituals,	depending	on	the	community	
to	which	they	belonged.	However,	Thapar	concedes	that	despite	these	obvious	
differences	Hindu	traditions	were	often	seen	as	part	of	a	whole	since	Brahmanism	was	
influential	and	Sanskrit	was	the	language	of	choice,	thereby	giving	the	impression	that	
these	divergent	ideals	formed	some	kind	of	unity:	
Within	Brahmanism	there	was	also	segmentation	but	seen	from	the	outside	it	
seemed	an	entity.	Brahmanism	did	maintain	its	identity	and	survived	the	
centuries	although	not	unchanged,	particularly	after	the	decline	of	Buddhism.	
This	was	in	part	because	it	was	well-endowed	with	grants	of	land	and	items	of	
wealth	through	intensive	royal	patronage,	which	in	turn	reinforced	its	claim	to	
social	superiority	and	enabled	it	further	to	emphasize	its	distance	from	other	
castes	and	their	practices.	The	extensive	use	of	Sanskrit	as	the	language	of	rituals	
and	learning	enhanced	the	employment	of	brahmanas	in	work	involving	literacy	
such	as	the	upper	levels	of	administration	and	gave	them	access	to	high	political	
office	in	royal	courts.	This	again	supported	its	exclusive	status.	the	use	of	a	single	
language	–	Sanskrit	–	gave	it	a	pan-Indian	character,	the	wide	geographical	
spread	of	which	provided	both	mobility	as	well	as	a	strengthening	of	its	social	
identity	(Thapar,	2005,	pp.58-59).	
	
	Thapar	also	uses	the	example	of	the	Bhakti	movements,	that	emerged	in	the	medieval	
era,	to	make	her	point	that	even	though	different	groups	were	oftentimes	linked,	in	
reality,	they	were	quite	separate:	
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The	Pasupatas,	the	Alvars	and	Nayannars,	the	Saiva-Siddhanta	and	the	Lingayats,	
Jnanesvara	and	Tukarama,	Vallabharcarya,	Mira,	Caitanya,	Sankaradeva,	Basava,	
Lalla,	Tulasidasa,	and	so	on	are	often	bunched	together	as	part	of	the	Bhakti	
stream.	In	fact	there	are	variations	among	them	which	are	significant	and	need	to	
be	pointed	out	(Thapar,	2005,	p.59).	
	
Accordingly,	Thapar	highlights	the	fact	that	native	traditions	were	vastly	complex	and	
had	many	qualities	that	distinguished	them:	
The	sects	included	in	the	honeycomb	of	what	has	been	called	Hinduism	were	
multiple	and	ranged	from	animistic	spirit	cults	to	others	based	on	subtle	
philosophic	concepts.	They	were	oriented	towards	the	clan,	the	caste	and	the	
profession	or	else	on	the	reversing	of	these	identities	through	renunciation.	The	
social	identity	of	each	was	imprinted	on	its	religious	observances	(2005,	p.61).	
	
However,	Thapar	acknowledges	that	despite	this	disparity	between	
philosophies,	rituals,	and	practices,	eventually	Indian	leaders	perceived	the	need	for	a	
united	front	in	the	face	of	repeated	external	invasions,	and	the	colonization	of	this	
region.	After	all,	natives	were	now	being	grouped	together	as	the	‘other’;	an	‘other’	that	
had	to	find	a	way	to	define	themselves:		
The	impact	both	of	missionary	activity	and	Christian	colonial	power	resulted	in	
considerable	soul	searching	on	the	part	of	those	Indians	who	were	close	to	this	
new	historical	experience.	One	result	was	the	emergence	of	a	number	of	groups	
such	as	the	Brahmo	Samaj,	the	Prarthana	Samaj,	the	Arya	Samaj,	the	
Ramakrishna	Mission,	the	Theosophical	Society,	the	Divine	Life	Society,	the	
Swaminarayan	movement	et	al.,	which	gave	greater	currency	to	the	term	
Hinduism	(Thapar,	2005,	p.65).	
	
Thus,	unlike	in	the	ancient	and	medieval	past,	when	brahmins,	who	had	the	upper	hand,	
could	afford	to	ignore	the	mlecchas,	as	Halbfass	demonstrates,	now,	the	priestly	class,	
along	with	the	nationalists,	had	to	find	ways	to	respond	to	this	colonizing	‘other’.		
Here,	Thapar	may	be	referring	to	an	idea	that	gained	momentum	because	of	the	
theories	presented	by	Edward	Said	in	his	ground	breaking	book	Orientalism	(1979).	
Said	not	only	outlines	the	problems	and	dilemmas	entailing	the	categorization	of	the	
‘other’	but	he	also	points	out	how	this	need	for	definition	of	the	‘other’	is,	in	all	actuality,	
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a	need	to	define	oneself	(1979,	pp.1-4).39	In	fact,	one	gets	the	distinct	impression	that	
Said’s	concepts	resonate	with	Thapar	as	she	asserts:	
The	first	step	towards	the	crystallization	of	what	we	today	call	Hinduism	was	
born	in	the	consciousness	of	being	the	amorphous,	subordinate,	other.	In	a	sense	
this	was	a	reversal	of	roles	(2005,	p.	63).	
	
She	does	acknowledge	however,	that	since	it	was	the	upper	class	educated	natives	who	
interacted	with	these	colonizers,	first	Muslim,	and	then	Christian,	that	this	change	was	
particularly	visible	amongst	the	Indian	elite.	Furthermore,	as	King	has	already	pointed	
out,	Thapar	argues	that	since	“[t]here	was	much	more	dialogue	of	upper	caste	Hindus	
with	Christians	than	there	had	been	with	Muslims”	(2005,	p.65)	the	idea	of	a	unified	
‘Hinduism’	really	emerged	during	the	British	Raj.	As	a	result,	Thapar	notes:	
Those	among	these	[native]	groups	influenced	by	Christianity,	attempted	to	
defend,	redefine	and	create	Hinduism	on	the	model	of	Christianity.	They	sought	
for	the	equivalent	of	a	monotheistic	God,	a	Book,	a	Prophet	or	a	Founder	and	
congregational	worship	with	an	institutional	organization	supporting	it.	The	
implicit	intention	was	again	of	defining	“the	Hindu”	as	a	reaction	to	being	“the	
other”;	the	subconscious	model	was	the	Semitic	religion	(2005,	pp.65-66).	
	
It	is	because	of	this	interaction,	and	the	subsequent	efforts	of	the	Indian	elite	to	present	
a	united	voice	for	the	ensuing	nationalist	struggle,	that	gave	cause	for	the	emergence	of	
what	Thapar	calls	“Syndicated	Hinduism”.	Thus,	she	contends	that	despite	the	obvious	
variations,	and	contradictory	philosophies	that	engaged	with	each	other,	and	which	
continued	to	be	in	evidence,	nevertheless,	the	combined	requirement	of	administrative	
efficiency	by	the	British,	and	the	need	for	a	united	voice	for	political	reasons	by	the	
natives,	resulted	in	the	so-called	syndication	of	‘Hinduism’:	
Inevitably	the	Brahmanical	base	of	what	was	seen	as	the	new	or	neo-Hinduism	
was	unavoidable.	But	merged	into	it	were	also	various	practices	of	upper	caste	
worship	and	of	course	the	subconscious	model	of	Christianity	and	Islam.	Its	close	
links	with	certain	nationalist	opinion	gave	to	many	of	these	neo-Hindu	
movements	a	political	edge	which	remains	recognizable	even	today.	It	is	this	
																																																								
39	Said	presents	this	idea	in	the	“Introduction”	but	then	goes	on	to	develop	this	theory	
throughout	this	volume.	
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development	which	was	the	parent	to	what	I	should	like	to	call	Syndicated	
Hinduism	and	which	is	being	projected	by	some	vocal	and	politically	powerful	
segments	of	what	is	referred	to	as	the	Hindu	community,	as	the	sole	claimant	to	
the	inheritance	of	indigenous	Indian	religion	(Thapar,	2005,	p.74).	
	
Thapar	advocates	against	this	united	front	because	she	sees	it	as	a	vehicle	to	silence	
those	natives	whose	traditions	do	not	fit	comfortably	with	the	ideas	championed	by	the	
advocates	of	‘Syndicated	Hinduism’:	
Syndicated	Hinduism	claims	to	be	re-establishing	the	Hinduism	of	pre-modern	
times:	in	fact	it	is	only	establishing	itself	and	in	the	process	distorting	the	
historical	and	cultural	dimensions	of	the	indigenous	religions	and	divesting	them	
of	the	nuances	and	variety	which	were	major	sources	of	their	enrichment	(2005,	
p.79).	
	
It	is	evident	that	Thapar	is	concerned	about	the	fact	that	the	strategies	that	were	
used	by	the	nationalists,	during	India’s	struggle	for	independence,	are	still	being	utilized	
despite	being	both	outdated,	and	inappropriate.	Accordingly,	she	speaks	out	against	the	
growing	power	of	‘Syndicated	Hinduism’	which	she	thinks	is	particularly	problematic	
since	its	continued	success	can	silence	the	diverse	Hindu	traditions	that	were	prevalent	
before	colonization.	
Perhaps	the	major	asset	of	what	we	call	Hinduism	of	the	premodern	period	was	
that	it	was	not	a	uniform,	monolithic	religion,	but	a	flexible	juxtaposition	of	
religious	sects.	This	flexibility	was	its	strength	and	its	distinguishing	feature,	
allowing	the	inclusion	even	of	groups	questioning	the	Vedas,	disavowing	caste	
and	the	injunctions	of	the	Dharmasastras.	The	weakening	or	disappearance	of	
such	dissenting	groups	within	the	framework	even	of	religious	expression	would	
be	a	considerable	loss	(Thapar,	2005,	p.75).	
	
This	stance	of	Thapar’s	has	invited	a	fair	amount	of	criticism	from	contemporary	Hindu	
nationalists,	who	are	threatened	by	her	championing	the	cause	of	the	subaltern	voices	
that	that	have	emerged	over	the	last	few	decades.	This	subaltern	scholarship,	
spearheaded	by	Ranajit	Guha,	in	conjunction	with	other	Indian	and	Western	scholars,	is	
intent	on	shining	a	light	on	the	history	of	the	non-elites	whose	voice,	they	argue,	has	
been	subdued	and	ignored	in	favour	of	the	roles	and	opinions	of	the	elite,	both	Western	
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and	Indian.	The	subaltern	scholars,	and	Thapar,	are	concerned	about	the	silencing	of	the	
unheard,	and	therefore	undervalued,	indigenous	voices.	Thapar’s	argument	against	
‘Syndicated	Hinduism’	resonates	with	Guha’s	contention	whereby	he	asserts	that	
subaltern	scholarship	sheds	light	on	“the	failure	of	the	Indian	bourgeoisie	to	speak	for	the	
nation”	(Guha,	1994(a),	p.5,	emphasis	in	original);	an	issue	that	Nandy	also	highlights	in	
the	first	chapter.	What	is	ironic	is	that	Thapar	herself	has	been	accused	of	belonging	to	
the	Indian	elite	by	contemporary	nationalists,	a	point	we	will	return	to	in	the	final	
chapter.	For	now,	it	must	suffice	for	us	to	accept	that	whereas	Thapar	makes	some	
valuable	arguments,	against	the	continued	reliance	on	a	‘syndicated’	form	of	‘Hinduism’,	
she,	like	other	scholars	we	have	examined	in	this	chapter,	does	not	offer	any	concrete	
solutions	on	what	label,	or	labels	would	best	describe	the	traditions	of	India.	
	
Conclusion	
What	should	be	evident	by	now	is	that	the	idea,	that	multiple	traditions	are	all	
expected	to	somehow	find	a	way	to	adopt	this	label	‘Hinduism’,	as	their	own,	is	a	
challenging	proposition.	Indeed,	one	could	even	ask	why	holding	on	to	such	a	title	has	
become	so	important	to	scholars	such	as	myself.	After	all,	the	fact	that	Hindus	who	
celebrate	the	polytheistic	aspects	of	‘Hinduism’	during	festivals	like	Ganesha	Chaturti	
and	Durga	Puja	can	coexist,	and	participate,	in	the	same	landscape	as	Vedantins	who	
embody	monotheistic	ideals	brings	us	back	to	the	identical	questions	with	which	we	
started.	Thus,	not	only	are	we	still	asking	if	Hindu	traditions	can	be	grouped	together,	
but	we	may	also	be	wondering	why	such	a	collective	identity	is	so	crucial,	not	only	to	a	
great	number	of	Hindus	but	also	to	many	scholars.	The	answer	(in	true	Hindu	fashion?)	
is	multifaceted.	The	first,	and	perhaps	the	most	pragmatic	response,	is	that	this	label	
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allows	Hindus	to	have	“a	place	at	the	multicultural	table”	(Kurien,	2007).40	Hindu	
scholars	are	naturally	concerned	that	if	‘Hinduism’	is	no	longer	considered	a	valid	
category,	then	that	will	result	in	the	splitting	up	of	this	entity,	into	multiple	identities,	
which	could	result	in	Hindus	having	to	relinquish	their	seat	at	the	‘multicultural	table’,	
at	which	the	so-called	‘religions	of	the	world’	sit.	Furthermore,	it	is	also	important	to	
remember	that,	without	this	‘conventional’	label,	it	would	be	difficult	for	modern	
Hindus	to	represent	their	traditions	outside	India.	In	fact,	what	is	of	utmost	importance	
is	that	Hindus,	when	pushed,	whether	in	India	or	in	the	diaspora,	will	acknowledge	and	
in	fact	lay	claim	to,	this	collective	status.	Now,	we	may	argue	that	this	shared	identity	
was	first	emphasized	by	the	colonizers	and	was	not	an	essential	part	of	their	make-up	
before	this	period.	However,	even	if	one	were	to	agree	with	this	stance,	the	reality	is	
that	Hindus	have	adopted	this	kinship	as	part	of	their	identity	today.	So	much	so,	that	
Hindus	generally	acknowledge	the	occasional	need	for	this	collective	identity	and	access	
it	when	they	are	required	to	describe	themselves	to	non-Indians.	This	does	not	mean	
that	it	is	a	central	aspect	of	their	traditional	make-up,	but	simply,	one	of	the	
characteristics	of	their	multi-faceted	world-view.	For	scholars	to	demand	that	they	
discard	this	idea	would	be	as	presumptuous	as	it	was	for	colonizers	to	try	and	fit	Hindu	
ideas	into	Western	categories.	This	concept	of	connectivity	is	still	useful,	especially	as	a	
conventional	label	and	particularly	in	conversation	with	non-Indians,	for	it	to	be	
discarded	arbitrarily	by	scholars,	albeit	Hindu	ones	such	as	myself.		
On	the	other	hand,	it	also	cannot	be	denied,	that	many	scholars	would	argue	that	
this	is	a	simple	case	of	hegemony	which	needs	to	be	rectified.	So	much	so	that	certain	
																																																								
40	This	is	the	title	of	Prema	Kurien’s	book	which	explores	how	Hindus	in	the	diaspora	
have	adapted	to	the	American	religious	environment.		
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academics,	such	as,	Timothy	Fitzgerald41	and	S.N.	Balagangadhara42,	have	called	for	the	
dissolution	of	the	very	category	‘religion’.	Similarly,	Tomoko	Masuzawa	has	outlined,	in	
detail,	how	the	category	‘world	religions’	is	primarily	a	Western	construct	created	to	
enforce	and	give	expression	to	a	Western	‘religious’	agenda:	
what	I	hope	to	bring	to	the	foreground	is	a	certain	logic	or	certain	ideological	
persuasions	that	are	covered	over	by	and	at	the	same	time	still	operative	in	our	
present-day	discourse,	that	is,	in	the	now	familiar,	routinized	strategy	for	
mapping	the	world	religiously.	It	will	be	suggested,	in	effect,	that	the	new	
discourse	of	pluralism	and	diversity	of	religions,	when	it	finally	broke	out	into	
the	open	and	became	an	established	practice	in	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	
century,	neither	displaced	nor	disabled	the	logic	of	European	hegemony	–	
formerly	couched	in	the	language	of	universality	of	Christianity	–	but,	in	a	way,	
gave	it	a	new	lease	(Masuzawa,	2005,	p.xiv).	
	
In	the	last	chapter,	we	have	already	seen	how	this	category	‘religion’	is	difficult	to	
divorce	from	its	Western	influences	despite	the	alternate	options	that	are	regularly	
proposed.	The	truth	is	that	even	though	suggestions	such	as	“cosmological	formations”	
made	by	Daniel	Dubuisson	hold	many	charms,	the	probability	and	logistics	of	such	a	
change	occurring,	in	the	near	future,	is	not	very	promising.	Thus,	whereas	we	may	chafe	
at	the	use	of	this	label	and	category	and	may	even	opt,	like	myself,	to	use	a	modification	
of	it,	the	fact	is	that	a	real	alternative	has	yet	to	be	identified.		
Indeed,	despite	the	reservations	raised	by	Bankimchandra	in	the	previous	
chapter,	I	also	believed	that	for	the	purposes	of	this	project	I	would	eventually	discard	
the	title	‘religion’	and	instead,	adopt	the	Hindu	term	‘dharma’.	In	fact,	I	was	enthusiastic	
when	I	discovered	the	myriad	of	ways	in	which	this	Sanskrit	word	has	been	used	to	
																																																								
41	In	The	Ideology	of	Religious	Studies	(2000)	Timothy	Fitzgerald	explores	the	value	of	
the	category	‘religion’	and	its	continued	use	in	the	academy.	According	to	him	this	is	
oftentimes	an	invalid	category	created	by	Westerners,	for	Westerners,	and	as	such	
should	be	incorporated	into	other,	and	according	to	him,	less	problematic,	categories	
such	as	sociology,	history	and	anthropology.		
42	See	previous	chapter	for	a	short	survey	on	Balagangadhara’s	issues	with	the	
continued	use	of	the	label	‘religion’	and	his	reasons	for	discarding	what	he	perceives	to	
be	a	‘Christian’	category.		
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denote	Hindu	traditions.43	I	was	convinced	that	it	would	be	the	perfect	tool	to	describe	
the	various	Hindu	sects	that	are	included	under	the	banner	‘Hinduism’.	However,	I	also	
discovered	that	not	unlike	the	term	‘religion’	which	has	strong	ties	with	Christian	
ideology,	the	term	dharma	can	be	equally	associated	with	Vedic	and	Brahmanical	ideals	
of	maintaining	order	in	society.	Thus,	it	is	worth	noting	that	in	a	recent	exchange	on	the	
RISA-Listserv44	the	President	of	The	South	Asia	Research	and	Information	Institute,	Dr	
Sudalaimuthu	Palianappan	contends:	
What	you	say	about	'Hindu	dharma'	meaning	'Hinduism'	does	not	apply	to	Tamil	
usage…	In	fact,	to	me,	if	a	person	uses	'Hindu	dharmam'	and	'Sanātana	dharmam'	
in	Tamil,	it	is	a	very	likely	indication	of	the	person	adhering	to	either	orthodox	
brahminism	(as	in	the	writings	of	late	Kanchi	Śankarācārya)	or	Hindu	
nationalism.45		
	
Comments	like	these	naturally	made	me	cautious	since	the	last	thing	I	would	like	to	
encourage	is	a	reestablishment	of	the	dominance	of	Vedic	ideas	over	non-Vedic	ones.	
Unfortunately,	to	prove,	or	disprove,	that	dharma	would	be	an	appropriate	replacement	
for	the	category	‘religion’,	an	extensive	amount	of	research	would	be	required,	which,	is	
beyond	the	scope	of	this	project.	Thus,	I	return	to	my	previous	stance	whereby	I	will	use	
the	word	‘tradition’	in	the	hope	that	I	will	be	able	to	avoid	at	least	some	of	the	pitfalls	
that	have	been	highlighted	by	scholars	regarding	the	term	‘religion’.		
																																																								
43	A	good	place	to	begin	this	investigation	is	with	Halbfass	(1988).	In	the	chapter	
“Dharma	in	the	Self-Understanding	of	Traditional	Hinduism”	Halbfass	covers,	in	some	
detail,	the	many	ways	this	term	dharma	has	been	used	and	applied	by	Indian	texts,	
philosophers	and	religious	leaders.		
44	RISA	(Religion	in	South	Asia)	is	a	section	of	the	American	Association	of	Religion	
(AAR).	Members,	who	are	usually	scholars	involved	in	South	Asian	study	programs,	
have	access	to	an	official	email	list	which	allows	them	to	communicate	with	their	peers	
by	asking	questions	and	presenting	dilemmas.	RISA-Listserv	is	that	official	email	list.		
45	Sudalaimuthu	Palianappan,	RISA	Academic	discussion	list.	“…	but	what	is	wrong	with	
“Hindu	theology”?	October	14th	2011.	In	a	personal	email	exchange	with	Dr.	
Palianappan	he	suggested	“that	the	connotation	of	orthodoxy	in	the	use	of	‘dharma’”	is	
explicated	in	the	work	Hindu	Dharma:	The	Universal	Way	of	Life,	Chandrasekharendra	
Saraswati,	Bharatiya	Vidya	Bhavan,	Mumbai,	2008.		
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As	far	as	the	label	‘Hinduism’	is	concerned,	one	significant	factor	to	keep	in	mind	
is	that	this	title	has	provided	Hindus,	especially	in	recent	times,	with	a	voice	that	they	
may	not	have	had	if	these	traditions	were	split	up	(into	Vedantic,	Shaivite,	Vaisnavite,	
etc.)	and	the	title	‘Hinduism’	was	dissolved.	No	doubt,	there	are	times	when	these	
divisions	are	helpful	and	necessary,	just	as	titles	such	as	Protestant,	Catholic,	Lutheran,	
Baptist	etc.	are	important	ways	in	which	to	describe	the	complexities	of	Christianity.	
However,	the	label	‘Christianity’	also	serves	a	purpose,	a	purpose	that	may	be	vastly	
different	from	the	one	that	‘Hinduism’	serves,	but	which	is	important	nevertheless.	
Rosalind	O’Hanlon	and	David	Washbrook	highlight	this	occasional	need	for	overarching	
labels	when	they	cite	the	feminist	Denise	Riley	who	argues:	
If	feminism	abandons	the	category	of	women	and	the	proposition	that	they	have	
a	different	history,	it	dissolves	its	own	subject.	Although	feminists	contend	
strongly	amongst	themselves	as	to	whether	the	concept	of	woman	constitutes	a	
universal	category,	they	must	for	some	purposes	and	at	some	levels	continue	to	
act	as	if	such	a	category	indeed	exists,	precisely	for	the	reason	that	the	world	
continues	to	behave	and	treat	women	as	though	one	does	(O'	Hanlon	&	
Washbrook,	1992,	p.154).	
	
Similarly,	there	are	certain	circumstances	when	the	title	‘Hinduism’	has	served	as	a	
conventional	tool	that	has	been	necessary,	especially	when	discussing	diverse	traditions	
in	a	global	setting.	This	does	not	mean,	just	as	the	Buddhist	teaching	implies,	that	this	
label	is	an	‘ultimate’	or	final	category,	but	rather,	that	there	are	certain	circumstances	
where	its	use	has	some	benefits.	Some	scholars	have	argued	that	this	label	did	not	exist	
before	the	colonial	period	(King,	1999,	p.107).	Whereas	this	may	be	true,	the	suggestion	
that,	as	a	result,	it	should	not	be	used	retroactively	to	signify	a	collective	Hindu	identity,	
is	much	harder	to	accept.	Rather,	it	may	be	more	accurate	to	recognize	‘Hinduism’	as	a	
web	of	ideas	that	was	developing	on	the	Indian	subcontinent.	For	example,	King	
explores	the	notions	of	polycentric,	centrifugal	and	centripetal	theories	which	then	
leads	him	to	suggest	that	Indian	traditions	may	be	an	interesting	source	for	further	
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investigation,	and	the	eventual	disentanglement	from	a	“universalized	‘discourse	of	
religion’”	(2010,	p.110).		
Ancient	Indian	traditional	ideas	(Shaivite,	Tantric,	Vedic,	Sramanic,	etc.),	
coexisted	in	varying	degrees	of	harmony	and	dissent	without	having	a	strong	urge	to	
form	an	overarching	bond.	This	does	not	suggest	that	there	was	no	sense	of	kinship,	or	
shared	identity,	amongst	certain	groups	(geographical,	linguistic,	scriptural,	etc.)	during	
that	era,	but	rather,	that	there	was	no	imminent	need	to	name	these	identities.	
However,	with	the	Muslim	invasion	beginning	in	the	9th	century	CE,	the	indigenous	
residents	of	this	subcontinent	were	suddenly	forced	to	engage	with	a	fully	formed	
traditional	entity	that	had	very	clear	boundaries	of	belonging.	Perhaps	it	is	because	
these	natives	were	compelled	to	examine	their	belief	systems	and	worldviews,	in	the	
face	of	this	external	challenge,	that	they	realized	that	even	though	they	might	not	be	
identical	to	their	neighbours,	they	nevertheless,	had	more	in	common	with	other	native	
traditions	than	with	the	philosophic	and	ritual	ideals	of	their	conquerors.	Let	me	quickly	
state	here,	before	I	continue	to	examine	the	ways	in	which	these	indigenous	bonds	
developed,	that	my	purpose	for	pursuing	this	historical	timeline	is	not	to	lay	any	blame	
on	the	Indian	Muslim	community.	Rather	I	am	simply	identifying	a	historical	event	that	
served	as	a	catalyst	in	the	development	of	the	Hindu	identity.	Furthermore,	I	am	also	
aware	that	Hindu	and	Muslim	ideas	oftentimes	merged	to	form	a	special	kind	of	bond	
which,	is	evidenced	in	the	teachings	of	the	many	Sufi	saints	who	continue	to	be	
extremely	important	in	the	Indian	landscape.	And	finally,	by	highlighting	the	invasion	of	
the	Muslims	1000	years	ago,	I	am	not	challenging	the	rights,	influence	or	credentials	of	
the	Muslim	communities	who	share	in	the	rich	heritage	of	India	today.		
	 That	being	said,	once	the	Muslims	arrived	there	emerged	a	need	for	
identification,	and	naming,	that	had	not	been	evidenced	prior	to	their	arrival.	Indeed,	as	
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we	have	already	seen,	this	is	one	of	the	points	that	Lorenzen	successfully	conveys	
through	his	research.	However,	it	is	also	important	to	recognize	that	this	need	for	
identity	was	vastly	different	from	any	that	occurred	in	other	parts	of	the	world.	The	
major	differences	have	been	pointed	out	by	scholars	and	historians	over	the	past	few	
centuries.	Accordingly	they	argue;	here	is	a	tradition,	many	of	whose	practitioners	claim	
a	shared	identity,	but	yet	there	is	no	common	founder,	no	common	texts,	no	common	
rituals	and	practices,	no	common	God/gods,	no	common	prayers	and	no	common	
histories.	Indeed,	when	examined	with	this	rubric,	there	is	little	reason	to	see	
‘Hinduism’	as	a	common	identity	for	the	Hindus.	As	such,	this	was	not	a	tradition	like	
any	other;	indeed,	the	fact	that	it	did	not	fit	the	Western	rubric	of	‘religion’	is	what	
caused	so	much	trouble	in	the	first	place!	However,	on	the	other	hand,	Hindus	do	have	a	
shared	identity,	which	can,	and	for	practical	reasons	must,	be	named.	This	is	easier	said	
than	done,	which	is	evidenced	in	the	many	attempts	made	by	scholars	and	practitioners	
to	appropriately	describe	this	phenomenon.	One	of	the	most	interesting	analogies	
comes	from	Julius	J.	Lipner:	
Consider	the	magnificent	banyan	tree	(Ficus	bengalhensis)	of	the	Calcutta	
Botanical	Gardens.	As	a	banyan,	it	has	the	characteristic	of	sending	down	aerial	
shoots	many	of	which	have	grown	thick	and	strong	to	resemble	individual	tree	
trunks.	As	an	ancient	and	proliferating	banyan,	it	resembles	an	interconnected	
collection	of	trees	and	branches	without	any	obvious	botanic	centre.	Put	
simplistically,	the	conception	of	Hinduism	I	wish	to	propose	is	something	like	
this:	it	is	macrocosmically	one	though	microcosmically	many,	a	polycentric	
phenomenon	imbued	with	the	same	life-sap,	the	boundaries	and	(micro)centres	
seeming	to	merge	and	overlap	in	a	complexus	of	oscillating	tensions.	Further,	
unlike	the	botanic	model,	the	Hindu	banyan	does	not	appear	uniform	to	view.	
Rather,	it	is	a	network	of	variety,	one	complex	shading	into	another	and	so	
forming	a	multifaceted	unity	(Lipner,	1996,	p.109).	
	
Whereas	Lipner’s	analogy	is	helpful	in	understanding	‘Hinduism’,	his	suggestion	that	
‘Hinduism’	is	“macrocosmically	one”	is	problematic	since	this	takes	away	some	of	the	
fluidity	that	these	traditions	seem	to	champion.	Furthermore,	the	fact	that	Lipner	feels	
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the	need	to	identify	‘Hinduism’	even	at	a	‘macro’	level	in	the	singular	raises	red	flags	
that	we	have	already	encountered	with	Lorenzen’s	work	when	he	suggests	that	Hindus	
all	belong	to	a	“single	religious	community”	(2005,	p.54).	One	may	ask	at	this	point;	is	
this	not,	in	fact,	what	I	am	arguing	for	myself?	The	truth	is	that	whereas	I	am	defending	
the	idea	that	a	Hindu	identity	began	emerging	from	the	9th	century	CE	this	does	not	
automatically	imply	that	I	believe	that	it	was	singular.	Rather	I	would	propose	that	this	
collective	web	of	ideas	was	anything	but	singular.		
Keeping	this	distinction	in	mind,	the	closest	example	I	have	encountered	to	
describe	‘Hinduism’	in	its	multivalent	reality,	has	been	from	Gabriella	Eichinger	Ferro-
Luzzi	when	she	cites	the	ideas	of	the	Austrian	philosopher	Ludwig	Wittgenstein:	
The	rectification	of	our	thinking	about	concepts	had	to	await	Wittgenstein’s	
discovery	that	concepts	need	not	have	common	attributes	and	clear-cut	
boundaries	but	may	be	held	together	by	“a	complicated	network	of	similarities	
overlapping	and	criss-crossing”	(Wittgenstein	1976:	para	66),	in	other	words	
that	a	“family	resemblance”	may	exist	among	their	members.	Concepts	formed	in	
such	a	way	now	called	polythetic	cannot	be	defined	but	only	exemplified	(2005,	
pp.	294-295).	
	
According	to	Ferro-Luzzi	this	is	especially	important	for	a	tradition	like	‘Hinduism’:	
The	clear	definition	of	one’s	subject	matter	has	long	been	taught	to	be	an	
indispensible	condition	of	any	scientific	investigation.	Students	of	Hinduism	with	
its	bewildering	variety	have	found	this	requirement	quite	problematic	(2005,	
p.294).	
	
Consequently,	she	states:	
I	wish	to	show	that	it	is	not	necessary	to	abandon	the	term	Hinduism	or	deny	it	
the	status	of	a	religion.	What	should	be	abandoned	instead	is	the	conviction	that	
all	concepts	can	be	defined	because	they	must	possess	common	attributes	and	
clear-cut	boundaries	(Ferro-Luzzi,	2005,	p.294).	
	
She	then	goes	on	to	quote	the	Indian	scholar	M.N.	Srinivas,	who	in	the	1960	
Encyclopaedia	Britannica	argued,	“[w]hile	it	is	not	possible	to	define	a	Hindu,	it	is	not	
very	difficult	to	identify	a	person	as	a	Hindu”	(as	cited	in	Ferro-Luzzi,	2005,	p.295).	This,	
Ferro-Luzzi	notes,	only	serves	to	accentuate	her	argument	that	“while	a	“family	
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resemblance”	cannot	be	defined	by	any	constant	attribute,	it	is	often	possible	to	identify	
a	person	as	belonging	to	a	certain	family”	(2005,	p.295).	What	is	interesting	about	this	
idea	of	Ferro-Luzzi’s	is	that	it	is	remarkably	similar	to	the	argument	that	J.Z	Smith	made,	
in	the	previous	chapter,	when	he	argues	for	a	system	of	classification	which	would	do	
away	with	an	‘essentialist’	definition	of	religion.	Ferro-Luzzi	seems	to	be	on	the	same	
trajectory	and	perhaps	it	is	not	a	coincidence	that	she	is	applying	this	theory	of	a	‘family	
resemblance’	to	‘Hinduism’,	a	tradition	that	has	continuously	defied	definition	and	
closed	classifications.	This	polythetic	approach	of	Ferro-Luzzi’s	which	acknowledges	
“sporadic	overlapping	similarities”	(2005,	p.298)	is	particularly	effective	because,	as	she	
argues,	it	acknowledges	that	Hindus	such	as	“Tukaram,	the	seventeenth	century	
Maratha	saint	poet”	and	“the	Tamil	saint	poet	and	yogin	Tayummanavar”	each	accepted	
at	least	some	aspects	of	‘Hinduism’	despite	being	contemporaries	who,	at	face	value,	
seemed	to	be	on	two	ends	of	a	spectrum	(2005,	p.299).	Similarly,	how	else	can	we	
explain	the	fact	that	Tantric	ascetics	who	live	on	burial	grounds,	Radhasoamis	who	
reject	rituals	and	idol	worship,	Vaishnavas	who	celebrate	Gokulashtami	with	pomp	and	
splendour	(to	mention	just	a	few)	all	lay	claim	to	the	title	‘Hindu’?	
Another	aspect	of	Ferro-Luzzi’s	argument	that	is	interesting,	and	relevant	to	this	
current	discussion,	is	that	she	does	not	ignore	the	indigenous	traditions	that	are	native	
to	India,	but	whose	practitioners	do	not	claim	to	be	Hindus.	In	fact,	she	contends:	
it	has	precisely	been	my	purpose	to	demonstrate	that	all	boundaries	of	polythetic	
concepts	are	fuzzy.	Buddhism	and	Jainism	are	separate	religions	because	of	their	
members’	wish	to	be	separate	and	not	because	of	any	intrinsic	criteria	justifying	
their	separate	status.	For	instance,	the	rejection	of	the	authority	of	the	Vedas	and	
of	Brahman	priesthood,	the	major	ground	on	which	Buddhists	and	Jains	base	
their	separateness,	also	characterize	certain	sections	of	Hinduism.	This	is	not	to	
say,	of	course,	that	Buddhism	and	Jainism	have	no	features	distinguishing	them	
from	Hinduism…	But	a	community’s	possession	of	such	distinctive	features	is	no	
sufficient	criterion	for	being	classified	as	a	separate	religion.	Also	Hindu	
communities	have	distinctive	characteristics,	as	we	have	seen,	and	yet	they	do	
not	leave	the	Hindu	fold	(Ferro-Luzzi,	2005,	p.300).	
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Thus,	Ferro-Luzzi	concludes,	“Hinduism	should	be	considered	a	polythetic	concept	
made	up	of	a	criss-cross	of	overlapping	strands	rather	than	a	bounded	unit	possessing	
essential	features”	(2005,	p.300).	This	is	the	most	significant	aspect	of	Ferro-Luzzi’s	
argument	i.e.,	the	idea	of	a	‘family	resemblance’	and	a	polythetic	approach	to	‘Hindu	
traditions’;	not	to	mention,	her	unique	way	of	including,	yet	excusing,	Buddhist	and	Jain	
ideas	from	the	Hindu	fold.	This,	once	again,	brings	us	back	to	the	idea	that	these	
categories	are	not	airtight	but	porous.	Indeed,	the	theory	that	there	is	no	‘essential’	
quality	by	which	one	can	define	‘Hinduism’	is	a	challenge	to	the	very	structure	upon	
which	religious	studies	has	been	built	where	science	and	reason	have	oftentimes	been	
given	the	highest	place	of	honour.	However,	Ferro-Luzzi	argues:	
To	abandon	the	idea	that	patently	different	things	called	by	the	same	name	must	
have	some	kind	of	unity	and	to	accept	vagueness	and	disorder	for	what	they	are	
is	not	the	end	of	the	scientific	endeavour	but	a	new	start	(2005,	p.303).	
	
This	is	an	interesting	and	unique	way	to	re-examine	not	only	‘Hinduism’	but	other	
traditions	as	well.	Perhaps	it	is	worth	noting	that	more	than	any	other	tradition,	it	is	
‘Hinduism’	which	has	challenged	the	boundaries	of	the	category	‘religion’,	a	point	that	is	
acknowledged	by	several	scholars.	In	fact,	one	could	also	argue	that	‘Hinduism’	is	one	of	
the	main	reasons	why	the	category	‘religion’	has	received	so	much	scrutiny.	So	once	
again	we	need	to	ask	if	discarding	the	category	‘Hinduism’	is	prudent,	or	if	instead,	it	
would	be	more	constructive	to	reconfigure	this	idea	‘religion’.	Surely	it	is	time	to	adopt	a	
wider	definition	of	this	category	so	that	it	can	include	traditions	which	do	not	conform,	
and	should	instead,	be	identified	as	polythetic,	polycentric,	centrifugal,	etc.,	to	name	just	
a	few	suggestions	made	by	the	scholars	presented	here.	Fortunately,	scholars	are	
increasingly	recognizing	the	latent	deficiencies	with	the	Christo-centric	tools	that	are	
still	used	to	analyse	‘other’	traditions.	Indeed,	this	recent	scholarship	encourages	
academics	to	use	different	lenses	in	order	to	appreciate	complex	histories.	
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	 As	far	as	the	actual	title	‘Hinduism’	is	concerned	it	may	also	be	time	to	admit	that	
this	particular	label	has	been	tainted	by	years	of	colonial	rule	and	hegemony.	Indeed,	
the	title	‘Hinduism’	was	a	colonial	title	that	was	constructed	in	the	mould	of	Western	
models	that	it	was	expected	to	mimic.	This	label,	and	the	ideas	it	often	described	during	
the	colonial	period,	were	largely	influenced	by	Vedic	ideals	and	did	not	mirror	the	lives	
of	many	Hindu	practitioners.	One	of	the	reasons	why	this	label	has	become	problematic	
today	is	because	modern	scholars	are	aware	that	Hindu	ideas	and	practices	were	not	
adequately	understood	by	those	in	power	during	colonial	times.	What	was	included	
under	the	label	‘Hinduism’	was	limited	because	only	the	concepts	which	corresponded	
to	Western	‘religious’	ideas	were	allowed,	or	encouraged,	to	be	incorporated.	Thus,	even	
I,	a	Hindu	academic	living	in	the	diaspora,	have	to	admit	that	the	term	‘Hinduism’	is	
becoming	progressively	harder	to	use	because	it	suggests	a	closed,	and	rigid,	identity	
that	does	not	fit	the	need	of	modern	scholarship	and	of	the	diversity	inherent	in	the	
Hindu	population.	Therefore,	in	a	move	similar	to	the	one	I	made	with	the	term	
‘religion’,	I	propose	to	use	the	label	‘Hindu	traditions’46	because	whereas	this	allows	me	
to	separate	myself	from	the	‘isms’	that	have	gained	such	notoriety	in	recent	times,	it	also	
permits	me	to	acknowledge	the	‘family	resemblance’	thereby	retaining	some	level	of	
connectivity	with	Hindu	ideas,	ancient,	medieval	and	modern.	I	am	hoping	that	this	will	
																																																								
46	I	prefer	to	use	the	label	‘Hindu	traditions’	instead	of	the	term	‘Indic	civilization’	(as	
King	has	suggested)	because	the	other	traditions	that	lay	claim	to	the	label	‘Indic’	
actively	maintain	a	separate	identity	from	the	term	‘Hindu’.	Therefore,	as	Ferro-Luzzi	
points	out,	whereas	many	Hindus	might	include	all	‘other’	traditions	within	their	fold	
this	does	not	mean	that	the	‘other’	traditions	are	not	averse	to	this	kind	of	syncretism.	
Indian	Muslims,	Parsis,	Indian	Christians,	Indian	Buddhists	and	Sikhs,	when	faced	with	
having	to	explain	their	traditions	to	non-Indians,	would	not	classify	themselves	as	
Hindus.	It	is	out	of	respect	for	their	need	for	separation	that	I	would	prefer	using	the	
term	‘Hindu	traditions’	instead	of	‘Indic	civilization’,	especially	when	referring	to	the	
period	after	the	British	invasion,	with	which	my	work	is	primarily	concerned.		
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permit	me	to	encompass,	within	its	plurality,	the	many	Hindus	who	claim	these	
traditions,	but	reject	any	vestiges	of	conformity.	
	 And	finally,	as	we	conclude	these	two	chapters,	which	have	focused	primarily	on	
how	contemporary	scholars	engage	with	these	concepts,	we	should	have	a	reasonably	
comprehensive	foundation	from	which	to	analyse	Vivekananda’s	contributions	to	this	
debate.	He	was	one	of	the	earlier	native	voices	to	have	influenced	the	way	these	terms	
were	constructed,	or	rejected,	on	the	Indian	subcontinent.	As	such,	a	detailed	study	of	
where	this	discussion	stands	today,	and	why	these	concepts	are	framed	in	a	certain	way	
was	essential.	Vivekananda	did	not	simply	embrace	these	terms	and	use	them	
unwittingly.	He	was	acutely	aware	of	how	‘continental	collision’	had	effected	language	
and	consciously	made	decisions	about	the	terms	and	ideas	he	adopted	from	his	
colonizers.	Not	only	was	he	careful	in	his	selection	of	certain	terminology,	he	also	
aggressively	pushed	back	when	he	felt	these	labels	did	not	reflect	Hindu	ideas	
adequately.	Indeed,	many	of	the	points	Vivekananda	raises,	and	which	we	will	examine	
in	the	ensuing	chapters,	are	reflected	in	the	arguments	made	by	these	contemporary	
academics.	For	example,	Hacker’s	emphasis	on	‘inclusivism’	and	his	interest	in	
distinguishing	Traditional	Hindus	from	the	natives	he	classified	as	Neo-Hindus.	
Halbfass’	stress	on	the	role	of	the	Vedas.	Lorenzen’s	efforts	to	emphasize	the	historical	
ramifications	on	the	cultivation	of	this	term.	King’s	argument	that	India’s	polythetic	
approach	serves	to	highlight	the	unique	nature	of	Hindu	traditions.	And,	Thapar’s	
attempt	to	give	a	voice	to	the	masses	of	India.	All	these	ideas,	which	are	presented	here	
as	modern	debates,	are	topics	that	Vivekananda	engaged	with.	Consequently,	examining	
the	questions	raised	by	contemporary	academics	allows	us	to	be	better	equipped	to	
appreciate	the	relevance	of	Vivekananda’s	arguments.	This,	in	turn,	will	help	us	to	
identify	how	his	interpretations	continue	to	impact	modern	scholarship.	Hopefully,	this	
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will	lead	to	an	overt	acknowledgement	of	how	extensive	this	sharing	of	ideas	has	been	
over	the	past	few	centuries.		 	
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Swami	Vivekananda:	Made	in	India		
	
	
A	very	brief	biography	
	
	 Swami	Vivekananda	was	born	Narendranath	Datta	on	January	12th	1863	to	
Bhuvaneshwari	and	Vishwanath	Datta.	He	was	their	first	son	and	was	welcomed	with	
much	love	and	gratitude.	His	father,	a	successful	lawyer,	belonged	to	the	Bengali	elite	
and	was	a	worldly,	well-read	man	who	was	known	for	his	generosity	towards	his	
extended	family.	He	had	a	vast	circle	of	friends	and	acquaintances	from	all	walks	of	life	
and	religious	traditions.	In	contrast,	Vivekananda’s	paternal	grandfather	had	chosen	to	
renounce	the	world	after	the	birth	of	his	son,	Vishwanath,	and	Vivekananda	is	often	
compared	to	him	since	he	also	chose	the	path	of	a	renunciate.	Vivekananda’s	mother	
was	a	devout	Hindu	woman	who,	along	with	Vivekananda’s	grandmother,	brought	up	
her	children	to	respect	the	Hindu	pantheon	of	Gods.	Vivekananda	was	a	friendly	and	
good	natured	young	man	who	was	popular	with	his	friends	and	family	especially	since	
he	was	both	intelligent	and	fun-loving.	Vishwanath	arranged	for	his	children	to	be	
educated	by	a	private	tutor	during	their	younger	years.	As	such,	until	the	age	of	eight,	
Vivekananda	was	home-schooled,	along	with	the	children	of	relatives	and	neighbours.	
When	he	was	eight	years	old	Vivekananda	was	enrolled	in	Vidyasagar’s	Metropolitan	
Institute	from	where	he	graduated	in	1879.	Thereafter,	he	attended	The	Presidency	
College	but	due	to	ill-health,	which	resulted	in	poor	attendance,	he	was	forced	to	move	
to	the	General	Assembly	Institute	(Scottish	Church	College);	both	colleges	were	in	
Calcutta.	Vivekananda	studied	Western	logic	and	philosophy	along	with	ancient	and	
modern	European	history.	It	is	at	the	General	Assembly	Institute	that	he	first	heard	
about	Ramakrishna	from	the	principal	of	the	Institute,	William	Hastie.	Hastie,	while	
teaching	students	about	people	who	apparently	slipped	into	mystic	trances,	told	his	
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students	that	there	was	a	mystic	in	the	outskirts	of	Calcutta,	in	Dakshineswar,	who	went	
into	a	trance	while	praying	to	Kali.	Vivekananda,	who	was	sceptical	about	such	claims	
did	not	immediately	visit	Dakshineswar	even	though	his	interest	was	piqued.	Instead,	
he	continued	to	attend	meetings	of	the	Brahmo	Samaj	hoping	to	find	rational	answers	to	
his	own	philosophical	questions.	Occasionally,	he	was	asked	to	sing	devotional	songs	at	
these	Brahmo	meetings	and	it	was	in	such	a	setting	that	Ramakrishna	first	met	
Vivekananda	and	invited	him	to	visit	his	temple	in	Dakshineswar.	The	impact	on	both	
these	men,	when	they	first	met,	has	been	recorded	and	interpreted	extensively.	
Vivekananda	was	initially	wary	of	the	ways	in	which	Ramakrishna	seemed	to	be	able	to	
mesmerize	him.	Eventually	however,	Vivekananda	gave	in	to	his	natural	inclinations	
towards	the	life	of	a	sanyasi	(renunciate)	and	became	part	of	the	inner	circle	of	devotees	
who	served	Ramakrishna.	This,	even	though	his	father,	Vishwanath,	had	died	suddenly	
leaving	his	family	in	poverty.	It	was	a	time	of	great	angst	for	Vivekananda	as	he	chose	a	
path	that	his	family	had	not	envisioned	for	their	eldest	son.		
	 Before	Ramakrishna	took	samadhi	in	1886,	he	told	Vivekananda	that	he	was	
bestowing	all	his	spiritual	gifts	upon	him	so	that	he	could	continue	Ramakrishna’s	
legacy.	Vivekananda	and	ten	of	his	other	brother	disciples,	who	were	not	householders,	
took	monastic	vows	soon	after	Ramakrishna’s	death	and	began	their	spiritual	life	at	the	
Barangpore	Math	(monastery).	Between	the	years	1886	and	1893	Vivekananda	
travelled	across	India.	He	returned	intermittently	to	Barangpore	or	Calcutta	depending	
on	the	state	of	his	health.	At	times,	he	travelled	alone	and	at	times	he	was	accompanied	
by	one,	or	more,	of	his	brother	monks.	The	time	he	spent	travelling	across	India	is	
considered,	by	most	of	his	biographers,	to	be	his	formative	years	since	he	reportedly	
met	people	from	all	walks	of	life	who	inspired	his	future	plans.	For	example,	one	of	the	
places	he	visited	on	numerous	occasions	was	Madras,	in	South	India,	where	he	became	
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quite	popular.	Similarly,	he	developed	a	lasting	friendship	with	the	Raja	of	Ramnad	who	
became	one	of	his	staunchest	supporters.	Eventually,	his	well-wishers	in	South	India	
helped	collect	the	funds	required	for	him	to	travel	to	Chicago	for	the	Parliament	of	
Religions	that	he	had	expressed	an	interest	in	attending.	He	left	from	the	port	in	
Bombay	on	May	31st,	1893.	His	trials,	travails	and	successes	in	the	West	are	well	
documented	and	Vivekananda	eventually	travelled	across	the	United	States	and	Europe	
gaining	loyal	followers,	and	meeting	some	well-known	personalities,	on	both	continents.	
He	helped	establish	the	first	Vedanta	Society	in	New	York,	the	first	of	many	such	centres	
that	continue	to	spread	their	message	to	Westerners	and	Indians	in	the	diaspora.		
After	his	first	visit	to	the	West,	Vivekananda	brought	back	a	few	of	his	Western	
followers	to	India	in	the	hope	that	they	would	help	tackle	the	problems	of	poverty	that	
were	rampant	in	India.	He	hoped	to	accomplish	this	through	the	Ramakrishna	Mission	
Association	that	he	helped	establish	in	1897.	This	association	eventually	became	simply	
the	Ramakrishna	Mission	and	received	legal	status	in	1909.	Vivekananda	also	helped	
establish	the	Belur	Math	in	the	outskirts	of	Calcutta	in	1889	which	is	the	headquarters	
of	the	Ramakrishna	Order	of	monks.	Eventually,	the	governing	body	of	the	Ramakrishna	
Math	was	also	responsible	for	the	philanthropic	and	social	service	projects	of	the	
Mission.	The	Ramakrishna	Mission	and	Math	have	branches	all	over	India	and	in	some	
Western	cities.		
Of	the	Western	followers	who	remained	dedicated	to	Vivekananda,	Sister	
Nivedita	(Margaret	Elizabeth	Noble,	1867-1911)	is	the	most	well-known,	both	because	
of	her	publications	as	well	as	for	her	involvement	in	Indian	politics.	Vivekananda	made	
a	second	tour	of	the	West	but	it	took	a	toll	on	his	health	and	eventually	Vivekananda,	
who	had	always	been	delicate	of	health,	passed	away	at	the	very	young	age	of	39	on	July	
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4th,	1902.	A	short	poem	published	in	The	Indian	Mirror	on	July	10th,	1902,	sums	up	the	
way	Swami	Vivekananda	was	remembered	by	his	many	admirers:	
A	Tribute	to	Vivekananda	
Lo,	India	weeps,	with	the	sound	of	the	deathnell	tolling:		
A	star	has	faded	in	the	Eastern	sky.		
The	dreaded	foe,	the	fates	of	men	controlling		
Coldly	refuses	to	pass	the	hero	by,		
Weep	India	of	thy	noblest	son	bereft!		
Ahy	[sic]	genius	claimed	him	as	her	very	own.		
Upon	his	brow	her	glorious	mark	she	left,		
His	soul	was	kindred	to	the	gods	alone,		
And	India	gives	him	with	a	bitter	groan.		
********************************	
Honoured	by	Thee,	revered	and	loved	abroad;	
Who,	ah,	too	soon	from	their	midst	has	gone.		
He	tread	the	path	that	patriots	have	trod.		
And	loved	his	country	as	he	loved	his	God	(as	cited	in	Chattopadhyaya,	1999,	
p.286).	
	
	
The	Early	Years	
	 As	we	saw	in	the	previous	chapter	one	of	the	most	common	accusations	that	has	
been	hurled	at	the	Indian	elite,	who	emerged	during	the	colonial	period,	is	that	they	
were	simply	a	product	of	Western	influences.	For	example,	Gerald	James	Larson	states:		
Modern	Indians	notions	of	religion	derive	from	a	mixture	of	Christian	(and	
mainly	Protestant)	models,	Orientalist	and	largely	Western	reconstructions	of	
India’s	religious	past,	and	nineteenth	century	indigenous	reform	movements	
most	of	which	were	defensive	reactions	against	the	onslaught	of	Westernization	
and	Christian	missionizing	(1995,	p.5).	
	
I	intend	to	demonstrate	that	this	argument	does	not	hold	true	for	Vivekananda	thereby	
making	him	an	ideal	example	to	combat	this	theory.	Indeed,	Vivekananda’s	impact	on	
the	West,	whereby	he	pushed	back	against	many	of	the	preconceived	notions	that	
Orientalists	had	popularized,	came	from	a	man	who	was	not	simply	a	Western	creation,	
but	rather,	home	grown	(with	a	little	help	from	some	imported	fertilizer).	Similarly,	
Nicholson	also	contends:	
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No	one	can	deny	the	importance	of	these	intellectuals,	including	Ram	Mohan	Roy,	
Swami	Vivekananda,	Sri	Aurobindo,	Sarvepalli	Radhakrishnan,	and	Mohandas	
Gandhi,	in	shaping	Indians’	self-understanding	and	the	political	formation	of	
India	as	a	modern	nation-state.	Once	the	theory	of	the	British	invention	of	almost	
everything	in	modern	India	has	been	properly	debunked,	we	can	look	realistically	
at	the	ways	that	such	thinkers	creatively	appropriated	some	Indian	traditions	
and	rejected	others	(2014,	p.18,	emphasis	added).	
	
What	Nicholson	highlights,	is	that	there	is	still	a	covert	sense	amongst	academic	writers,	
that	voices	such	as	Vivekananda’s	were	heavily	influenced	by	Western	ideology.	The	
suggestion,	or	conviction,	that	is	still	apparent	in	many	of	the	ways	in	which	
Vivekananda	is	represented,	as	a	product	of	Western	thought,	needs	to	be	‘properly	
debunked’	if	we	are	to	engage	with	the	ideas	that	were	put	forth	by	Indians	like	him.	For	
example,	as	we	will	see	presently	with	Tapan	Raychaudhari,	even	scholars	who	want	to	
undermine	this	notion	that	‘all	ideas	are	Western’	eventually	return	to	it,	almost	as	if	
moths	drawn	to	a	flame.	Perhaps	the	problem	also	lies	with	the	fact	that	they	
themselves	are	influenced	by	earlier	scholars	who	framed	their	way	of	thinking.	For	
example,	Agehananda	Bharati	in	“The	Hindu	Renaissance	and	its	Apologetic	Patterns”	
(1970)	argues	that	scholars	like	B.G.	Tilak	(1856-1920)	chose	to	translate	the	
Bhagavad-Gita	into	Marathi	because	it	had	already	been	popularized	by	Orientalists:	
Yet	even	Tilak	chose	the	Gita,	not	only	because	it	was	the	text	into	which	political	
action	might	be	fitted	with	impunity	–	there	are	dozens	of	other	epic	texts	which	
prompt	their	audience	toward	activism.	There	is	no	doubt	in	my	mind	that	Tilak	
knew	one	or	all	of	the	several	English	translations	that	had	been	published	by	
this	time	(1970,	p.275).	
	
Arguments	such	as	these,	remind	us	that	it	is	important	for	us	to	take	note	of	these	
biases	that	are	oftentimes	ingrained,	a	‘colonization	of	minds’	if	you	will,	when	we	
analyse	the	way	Vivekananda	is	represented,	even	by	scholars	who	are	apparently	
impartial	in	their	interpretations.		
Returning	to	Vivekananda,	we	learn	that	like	many	other	Bengalis	from	affluent	
Indian	families	in	the	nineteenth	century,	he	had	a	rather	broad	education	that	
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encompassed	the	many	traditions	to	which	he	was	exposed,	in	colonial	India.	For	
example,	his	father	taught	him	to	show	respect	for	his	Muslim	and	Christian	brethren	
and	their	traditions	and	scriptures.	Accordingly,	Bhupendranath	Datta,	Vivekananda’s	
younger	brother,	writes	in	Swami	Vivekananda:	Patriot-Prophet	(1954)	that	their	father	
was	a	well-read	man	whose	library	was	filled	with	Sanskrit,	English	and	Persian	books	
in	topics	ranging	from	history,	religion,	Western	philosophy	and	literature:	
Bisvanath	[Vishwanath]	was	the	product	of	old	Hindu-Moslem	[sic]	Civilization	
and	the	new	English	culture	spreading	in	his	time.	He	had	European	friends.	He	
had	tastes	for	both.	In	dress,	food	and	etiquette	he	followed	the	old	joint	Hindu-
Moslem	tradition.	Again,	in	some	matters	of	daily	life	he	followed	European	
custom	like	other	gentry	of	the	period.	But	he	never	deviated	from	orthodox	
traditions.	He	gave	dakshinas	to	the	Brahmans,	and	honoured	the	pirs	as	well	
(Datta,	1954,	p.100).	
	
As	for	Vivekananda’s	mother,	she	exposed	him	to	Hindu	rituals	and	rich	stories	
from	‘Hindu’	mythology.	So	influential	were	his	mother’s	teachings	that	in	Europe	
Reconsidered:	Perceptions	of	the	West	in	Nineteenth-Century	Bengal	(2002),	Tapan	
Raychaudhari	observes	that	Vivekananda:	
	repeatedly	drew	upon	this	storehouse	of	simple	wisdom	in	his	lectures	abroad.	
[and]	Nivedeta’s	Cradle	Tales	of	Hinduism	based	on	stories	she	heard	from	her	
master,	is	generally	traced	to	the	same	source	(1988,	p.223).	
	
This	dichotomy	in	Vivekananda’s	early	childhood	is	mirrored	throughout	his	adult	
career.	On	the	one	hand,	he	was	influenced	by	traditional	philosophies	that	resonated	
with	him	at	a	very	deep	level	and	which	he	related	to	in	a	visceral	way.	This	is	reflected	
in	the	way	he	used	Hindu	parables	to	make	his	point	throughout	his	adult	career.	For	
example,	he	explains	the	concept	of	maya	by	using	the	story	of	Indra,	the	king	of	the	
devas,	who	forgot	who	he	was	when	he	was	incarnated	as	a	pig	(Vivekananda,	2009,	
vol.1,	p.248).	On	the	other	hand,	since	he	was	exposed	to	both	Western	and	Islamic	
concepts	during	his	early	years,	he	continuously	looked	for	ways	to	make	his	traditional	
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ideas	relevant	to	the	rest	of	the	world.	For	example,	he	used	Christian,	Jewish	and	
Islamic	theories	to	demonstrate	that	his	belief	in	monism	was	superior:	
Mohammed	found	that	Christianity	was	straying	out	from	the	Semitic	fold	and	
his	teachings	were	to	show	that	Christianity	ought	to	be	a	Semitic	religion,	that	it	
should	hold	to	one	God.	The	Aryan	idea	that	“I	and	my	Father	are	one”	disgusted	
and	terrified	him.	In	reality	the	conception	of	the	Trinity	was	a	great	advance	
over	the	dualistic	idea	of	Jehovah,	who	was	for	ever	separate	from	man.	The	
theory	of	incarnation	is	the	first	link	in	the	chain	of	ideas	leading	to	the	
recognition	of	the	oneness	of	God	and	man.	God	appearing	first	in	one	human	
form,	then	re-appearing	at	different	times	in	other	human	forms,	is	at	last	
recognised	as	being	in	every	human	form,	or	in	all	men.	Monistic	is	the	highest	
stage,	monotheistic	is	a	lower	stage	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.7,	p.100).	
	
We	will	return	to	Vivekananda’s	arguments	favouring	monism	in	the	following	chapter.	
For	now,	suffice	it	to	say	that	he	was	exposed	to	the	intricacies	of	these	theories	in	his	
youth.		
On	the	other	hand,	whereas	it	is	true	that	this	‘continental	collision’	began	early	
in	Vivekananda’s	life,	it	is	also	evident	that	one	of	the	strongest	influences	in	his	early	
years	was	that	of	his	mother,	Bhuvaneshwari	Devi.	Unfortunately,	Vivekananda	himself	
does	not	speak	of	his	early	childhood	in	his	vast	body	of	writings	and	as	such	we	must	
rely	on	other	sources	to	get	a	sense	of	this	time	in	his	life.	Nevertheless,	by	culling	
through	various	biographies	written	about	Vivekananda,	a	common	story	does	emerge.	
First,	we	learn	of	Vivekananda’s	fondness	for	wandering	monks	to	whom	he	gifted	
anything	of	value	that	he	could	lay	his	hands	on,	resulting	in	his	being	regularly	“locked	
up	when	monks	came	to	ask	for	alms”	(Chattopadhyaya,	1999	p.16).		This	affinity	for	
holy	men	stayed	with	him	throughout	his	life.	After	all,	not	only	did	he	become	a	disciple	
of	the	Bengali	mystic	Ramakrishna	but	he	also	repeatedly	sang	the	praises	of	holy	men	
and	advised	his	followers	to	learn	from	these	teachers:	
open	the	windows	of	your	hearts	to	the	clear	light	of	truth,	and	sit	like	children	at	
the	feet	of	those	who	know	what	they	are	talking	about	–	the	sages	of	India.	Let	
us	then	listen	attentively	to	what	they	say	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.44).	
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What	is	more	relevant	for	the	purposes	of	this	discussion	however,	is	that	Vivekananda	
highlighted	the	difference	between	the	way	holy	men	were	respected	in	India,	in	
comparison	to	the	West.	Thus,	he	exhibited	his	early	training	when	he	learned	how	to	
treat	sages	and	monks	as	great	teachers,	or	gurus,	who	must	be	honoured	by	society:	
With	the	teacher,	therefore,	our	relationship	is	the	same	as	that	between	an	
ancestor	and	his	descendant.	Without	faith,	humility,	submission,	and	veneration	
in	our	hearts	towards	our	religious	teacher,	there	cannot	be	any	growth	of	
religion	in	us;	and	it	is	a	significant	fact	that,	where	this	kind	of	relation	between	
teacher	and	the	taught	prevails,	there	alone	gigantic	spiritual	men	are	growing;	
while	in	those	countries	which	have	neglected	to	keep	up	this	kind	of	relation	the	
religious	teacher	has	become	a	mere	lecturer,	the	teacher	expecting	his	five	
dollars	and	the	person	taught	expecting	his	brain	to	be	filled	with	the	teacher’s	
words,	and	each	going	his	own	way	after	this	much	has	been	done	(Vivekananda,	
2009,	vol.3,	p.52).	
	
These	kinds	of	statements,	whereby	Vivekananda	highlights	the	differences	between	the	
Western	and	Indian	valorisation	of	teachers,	indicates	that	Vivekananda	was	relying	on	
his	Indian	heritage	for	his	cues	on	how	to	behave,	rather	than	on	the	Western	education	
that	he	received	both	in	his	childhood	and	in	his	adult	years.		
Another	aspect	of	Vivekananda’s	childhood	that	is	important	is	that	he	was	
exposed	to	female	deities	when	he	was	very	young.	Vivekananda	learned	to	pray	to	the	
Hindu	goddesses	at	an	early	age	as	his	evening	classes	would	end	with	prayers	to	
Saraswati,	the	Hindu	goddess	of	learning.	This	early	exposure	to	the	maternal	deities	
was	to	influence	Vivekananda	throughout	his	life	and	would	go	on	to	inform	the	way	he	
viewed	the	feminine	principle,	a	subject	which	we	will	examine	in	some	detail	in	the	
final	chapter.	He	was	further	influenced	on	this	topic	by	his	guru,	Ramakrishna,	whose	
attachment	to	the	Hindu	goddess	Kali	is	legendary.	So	enamoured	did	Vivekananda	
himself	become	with	the	maternal	aspect	of	the	divine	that	The	Complete	Works,	are	
peppered	with	reverential	references	to	the	Mother,	and	also	record	a	number	of	
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devotional	poems	dedicated	to	the	Goddess,	specifically	in	her	maternal	form.47	
Furthermore,	not	only	did	Vivekananda	learn	about	Hindu	goddesses	in	his	childhood,	
he	was	also	taught	stories	from	the	Hindu	epics	on	a	regular	basis:	
Hymns	in	praise	of	river	Ganges	and	Karna	of	Mahabharata	were	memorized…	
as	well	as	passages	of	great	length	from	the	Ramayana	and	the	Mahabharata	
(Chattopadhyaya,	1999,	p.17).	
	
Bhuvaneshwari	Devi	was	an	educated	woman	who	taught	her	children	many	tales	from	
these	Hindu	texts.	So	relevant	were	these	teachings	to	Vivekananda,	and	so	aware	was	
he	of	their	merit,	that	towards	the	end	of	his	life	he	advocated	for	the	translation	of	
these	texts	into	a	form	that	would	make	them	amenable	for	younger	students:	
We	must	compose	some	books	in	Bengali	as	also	in	English	with	short	stories	
from	the	Ramayana	and	the	Mahabharata,	the	Upanishads,	etc.,	in	very	easy	and	
simple	language,	and	these	are	to	be	given	to	our	little	boys	to	read	
(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.5,	p.371).	
	
Indeed,	The	Mahabharata	and	The	Ramayana	were	an	extremely	important	source	of	
reference	for	Vivekananda,	throughout	his	adult	life,	which	is	evidenced	by	the	fact	that	
he	not	only	gives	lectures	on	The	Ramayana	and	The	Mahabharata,	but	he	also	used	
stories	from	these	epics	to	elaborate	his	own	philosophy	and	teachings	(Vivekananda,	
2009,	vol.4,	pp.63-101).48	Stories	that	he	not	only	heard	from	his	mother	but	as	well	as	
from	his	great-grandmother	who	also	played	a	role	in	Vivekananda’s	early	religious	
education:	
She	[Vivekananda’s	great-grandmother]	was	a	Vaishnava	devotee	and	most	of	
her	stories	were	from	the	Bhagavatam	or	other	Puranas.	She	used	to	wake	up	the	
children	at	dawn	and	chanted	the	names	of	Krishna.	Mahendranath	comments	
that	Swami	Vivekananda	acquired	his	story-telling	ability	in	childhood	thus	and	
																																																								
47	For	an	example	of	Vivekananda’s	poems	dedicated	to	the	divine	mother	see,	“Kali	The	
Mother”	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.4,	p.384),	“Who	knows	how	Mother	plays”	
(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.5,	p.439)	and	“My	Play	is	done”	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.6,	
p.175)			
48	For	example,	Vivekananda	(2009)	Vol.4,	p.102,	p.162,	p.439;	Vol.5,	p.232;	Vol.7,	p.297,	
p.345.	
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many	of	his	lectures	in	the	West	were	learnt	from	his	great-grandmother	
(Chattopadhyaya,	1999,	p.19).	
	
What	is	particularly	interesting	about	Vivekananda’s	childhood	however,	is	that	
whereas	he	was	taught	Hindu	traditional	values	at	an	early	age,	as	we	have	already	
seen,	he	was	also	exposed	to	Muslim	and	Christian	ideas	because	of	his	father.	In	fact,	
Datta	highlights	the	role	their	father	played	in	making	them	into	the	men	they	became:		
The	writer	[Datta]	is	grateful	to	his	father	for	bringing	the	younger	generation	
out	of	the	octopus	of	priestly	superstitions	and	pointing	out	a	new	ideal	of	life.	
Bisvanath	was	a	liberal	Indian	with	a	synthetic	mind.	That	is	the	reason	why	his	
offsprings	became	“radicals”	in	ways	of	thinking.	Swami	Vivekananda	was	the	
product	of	his	social	environment	(Datta,	1954,	pp.101-102).	
	
As	such,	one	cannot	accuse	Vivekananda	of	choosing	Hindu	ideals	due	to	a	lack	of	
awareness	of	other	traditions	but	rather,	acknowledge	that	his	affinity	for	the	stories	
and	songs	that	he	learned	when	he	was	a	child	informed	his	sensibilities,	even	when	he	
was	an	adult.	Raychaudhari	remarks:		
The	cultural	ambiance	in	Biswanath’s	family	was	a	mixture	of	Indo-Muslim	and	
the	new	Indo-Anglian	mores.	But	in	no	way	was	it	alienated	from	the	traditional	
practices	and	beliefs	of	Puranic	Hinduism	and	the	simple	piety	that	went	with	it	
(1988,	p.223).	
	
So	much	so,	that	although	Vivekananda	went	on	to	become	a	strong	supporter	of	
Vedantic	ideals	he	nevertheless	acknowledged	the	role	that	bhakti	played	in	the	
development	and	survival	of	Hindu	traditional	ideas:	
He	[who]	wants	to	love	God,	he	relies	upon	and	uses	all	sorts	of	rituals,	flowers,	
incense,	beautiful	buildings,	forms	and	all	such	things.	Do	you	mean	to	say	they	
are	wrong?	One	fact	I	must	tell	you.	It	is	good	for	you	to	remember,	in	this	
country	especially,	that	the	world’s	great	spiritual	giants	have	all	been	produced	
only	by	those	religious	sects	which	have	been	in	possession	of	very	rich	
mythology	and	ritual	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.2,	p.392).	
	
Unfortunately	however,	some	scholars	prefer	stressing	the	Western	influences	that	
Vivekananda	was	exposed	to	as	he	grew	up.	For	example,	despite	being	aware	of	the	
traditional	experiences	that	influenced	Vivekananda,	nonetheless,	Raychaudhari	feels	
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compelled	to	conclude,	“The	young	Narendranath,	before	his	encounter	with	
Ramakrishna,	was	very	much	a	typical	product	of	western	education”	(1988,	p.224	).	
This	simplistic	conclusion	that	Raychaudhari	arrives	at	is	hard	to	reconcile	with	the	
words	of	Vivekananda,	who,	instead	declared	on	his	return	to	India	in	1897,	after	the	
Parliament	in	Chicago:	
if	there	is	one	word	in	the	English	language	to	express	the	effect	which	the	
literature	of	India	produces	upon	mankind,	it	is	this	one	word,	“fascination”.	It	is	
the	opposite	of	anything	that	takes	you	suddenly;	it	throws	on	you,	as	it	were,	a	
charm	imperceptibly.	To	many,	Indian	thought,	Indian	manners,	Indian	customs,	
Indian	philosophy,	Indian	literature	are	repulsive	at	the	first	sight;	but	let	them	
persevere,	let	them	read,	let	them	become	familiar	with	the	great	principles	
underlying	these	ideas	and	it	is	ninety-nine	to	one	that	the	charm	will	come	over	
them,	and	fascination	will	be	the	result	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.110).	
	
These	ideas	of	Vivekananda’s	can	hardly	be	because	of	the	training	that	he	received	
from	Ramakrishna	as	Raychaudhari	suggests.	Instead,	they	seem	to	indicate	a	
confidence	in	traditional	Indian	ideas,	a	confidence	that	was	developed	at	an	early	stage	
in	his	childhood	home.	So	much	so,	that	according	to	Vivekananda,	the	rest	of	the	world	
would	also	eventually	be	enthralled	by	Hindu	traditions	and	cultures,	especially	since	
they	all	owed	their	own	heritage	to	the	Indian	subcontinent!	
All	the	different	religions	which	grew	among	different	nations	under	varying	
circumstances	and	conditions	had	their	origin	in	Asia,	and	the	Asiatics	
understand	them	well.	When	they	came	out	from	the	motherland,	they	got	mixed	
up	with	errors	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.1,	p.321).	
	
As	we	will	see	in	the	following	chapter,	this	propensity	of	Vivekananda’s,	to	combine	all	
‘other’	traditions	under	a	single	banner,	a	banner	that	he	believed	was	‘made	in	India’	is	
something	he	learned	to	do	at	an	early	age	thanks	to	the	education	he	received	under	
his	parents’	tutelage.	So	much	so,	that	eventually	it	became	a	trademark	of	the	
‘Hinduism’	that	Vivekananda	propagated	in	his	later	years;	a	‘Hinduism’	that	Hacker	
later	goes	on	to	associate	with	‘inclusivism’.	
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The	Brahmo	Samaj	
The	Brahmo	Samaj	(initially	named	Brahmo	Sabha)	was	founded	by	the	Indian	
reformer	Rammohan	Roy	in	1829.	Thereafter,	it	was	headed	up	by	Debendranath	
Tagore	and	was	one	of	the	most	influential	reform	movements	with	a	strong	‘religious’	
component	in	colonial	India.	It	could	be	argued	that	since	the	Brahmo	Samaj,	and	all	its	
off-shoots,	were	created	by	Western	influenced	Bengali	elite	men,	it	should	be	classified	
as	part	of	the	impact	that	the	West	made	on	Vivekananda	since	he	was	quite	involved	
with	this	group	in	his	youth.	However,	this	would	be	a	simplistic	solution	since	the	West	
may	have	impacted	these	men	but	it	must	also	be	acknowledged	that	their	responses	to	
these	Western	ideas	was	uniquely	Indian.	In	The	Brahmo	Samaj	and	the	Shaping	of	the	
Modern	Indian	Mind	(1979),	David	Kopf	draws	attention	to	the	fact	that	Rammohan	was	
influenced	by	Unitarianism49	which	in	turn	affected	the	vision	and	ideals	that	he	had	for	
the	Brahmo	Samaj.	However,	Kopf	also	acknowledges:	
the	problems	faced	by	a	Rammohun	Roy	were	always	magnified	by	the	
perspective	of	cross-cultural	contact…	Rammohun	was	continually	challenged	by	
the	question	Europeans	in	India	invariably	raised:	do	you	improve	the	lot	of	
Hindus	from	within	the	system	or	must	you	undermine	it	by	assimilation	to	a	
foreign	system?	(1979,	p.11)	
	
Kopf	argues	that	Rammohan,	due	to	India’s	colonization,	was	constantly	aware	of	
having	to	find	a	way	to	reconcile	alternative	viewpoints.	One	could	surmise	that	
Rammohan	felt	the	need	to	find	a	way	to	manoeuvre	through	this	‘continental	collision’:	
Equally	interesting	was	Rammohun’s	use	of	the	comparative	religious	approach,	
which	constituted	another	marked	difference	between	himself	and	his	Western	
Unitarian	counterparts	…	Rammohun	was	challenged	by	the	need	to	reconcile	at	
least	two	major	faiths.	In	the	process	Rammohun	was	compelled	to	think	
																																																								
49	According	to	Kopf,	Unitarianism	“represented	a	new	and	radical	approach	to	religion,	
society	and	ethics.	It	was	a	pioneering	faith	that	emerged	out	of	the	changing	conditions	
of	the	nineteenth-century	world.	It	challenged	many	of	the	religious	presuppositions	of	
the	traditional	societies	of	Eurasian	civilizations.	Though	Unitarianism	was	never	a	
mass	movement,	the	implications	of	its	protest	had	far-reaching	effects	among	the	
modernizing	intelligentsia	in	India”	(1979,	p.3).	
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comparatively,	with	the	result	that	his	vision	sharpened	in	a	refreshingly	
expansive	manner,	leaving	a	narrow	sectarian	view	of	the	universe	behind	
forever	(Kopf,	1979,	p.13).	
	
Accordingly,	Kopf	advocates	scholars	to	be	sensitive	to	the	differences	in	the	
circumstances	that	guided	reform	movements	in	the	West,	versus	movements	like	the	
Brahmo	Samaj	in	India,	which	were	dominated	by	their	need	to	reconcile	colonial	
attitudes	with	traditional	values:	
It	is	in	this	context	that	we	ought	to	assess	the	social	aspect	of	the	Hindu	
reformation.	There	is	little	doubt	that	Rammohun	was	as	much	inspired	by	the	
social	gospel	of	Unitarianism	as	he	was	by	its	rational	religion.	But	it	is	well	to	be	
reminded	of	the	differences	between	historical	circumstances	in	Bengal	and	in	
the	West.	We	have	already	noted	that	Unitarians	in	England	were	among	the	first	
to	point	an	accusing	finger	at	nominal	Christians	for	ignoring	the	plight	of	the	
proletariat	in	the	new	urban	industrial	centers.	But	in	India	in	the	early	
nineteenth	century,	there	was	no	fundamental	change	in	technology,	no	
Industrial	Revolution,	no	industrial	urban	centers,	and	no	industrial	proletariat.	
Moreover,	foreign	rule	in	India	placed	social	reform	in	the	context	of	cultural	
encounter.	The	question	of	social	reform,	therefore,	was	less	the	need	to	cope	
with	the	consequences	of	a	changing	social,	economic,	and	political	order	as	it	
was	a	question	of	British	attitudes	to	Indian	culture	and	Indian	responses	to	
those	attitudes	(1979,	p.14).	
	
Consequently,	the	Brahmo	Samaj	had	a	rocky	history	and	underwent	a	number	
of	schisms	before	we	finally	witness	Vivekananda	engaging	with	their	members.	When	
Vivekananda	was	a	young	man	he	joined	the	Sadharan	Brahmo	Samaj	which	was	a	
group	that	separated	itself	from	Keshubchandra	Sen’s	(a	disciple	of	Debendranath	
Tagore)	Brahmo	Samaj	of	India	in	1878.50	According	to	Chattopadhyaya:	
There	is	no	doubt	that	some	of	the	more	liberal	ideas	of	Narendranath	that	went	
into	the	synthesis	of	Swami	Vivekananda	were	acquired	as	a	result	of	his	
association	with	the	Samaj	in	his	college	days.	But	there	was	a	singular	lack	of	
involvement	in	such	ideas	(1999,	p.32).	
	
Chattopadhyaya	contends	that	Vivekananda	was	not	particularly	interested	in	
expounding	Brahmo	ideas	but	rather	that	his	association	with	the	Samaj	was	largely	
																																																								
50	For	a	detailed	history	of	the	Brahmo	Samaj	refer	to	Kopf	(1979).	
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limited	to	him	singing	devotional	songs.	So	much	so,	that	many	scholars	have	even	
argued	that	this	opportunity	to	display	his	musical	talent	was	the	only	reason	for	his	
interest	in	the	Brahmo	Samaj	(Chattopadhyaya,	1999,	p.32).	However,	a	far	more	
moderate	view	is	that	Vivekananda’s	relationship	with	the	Samaj	was	complicated.	For	
example,	as	Sil	points	out:		
Brahmananda	Keshabchandra	Sen	suggested	that	India	should	learn	practical	
knowledge	from	Europe	and	in	exchange	should	teach	the	world	religious	
wisdom.	Keshab	wrote	in	his	“Religion	of	Love”	(1860)	that	the	religion	of	the	
Brahmo	Samaj	“is	not	the	religion	of	any	particular	community,	epoch	or	
country:	it	is	universal	religion;	it	is	a	Human	Catholic	Religion.”	It	is	Sen’s	
concept	of	universal	religion	that	the	Swami	imbibed	in	his	early	youth	as	a	
regular	visitor	to	the	Brahmo	Samaj	and	now	appropriated	and	preached	in	
Chicago	(1997,	pp.155-156,	emphasis	in	original).	
	
It	is	telling	that	some	of	these	ideas	are	reflected	in	a	lecture	that	Vivekananda	gave	
upon	his	return	to	India	after	the	Parliament	in	Chicago	in	1897,	on	his	way	from	
Colombo	(presently	Sri	Lanka)	to	Almora:	
Ours,	as	I	have	said,	is	the	universal	religion.	It	is	inclusive	enough,	it	is	broad	
enough	to	include	all	the	ideals.	All	the	ideals	of	religions	that	already	exist	in	the	
world	can	be	immediately	included,	and	we	can	patiently	wait	for	all	the	ideals	
that	are	to	come	in	the	future	to	be	taken	in	the	same	fashion,	embraced	in	the	
infinite	arms	of	the	religion	of	the	Vedanta	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	pp.251-
252).	
	
Statements	such	as	these,	which	seem	to	echo	the	words	of	Keshabchandra	Sen,	make	it	
easy	to	construe	that	this	interaction	with	the	Brahmos,	at	a	youthful	age,	may	have	
impacted	Vivekananda’s	discursive	methods.	Bhupendranath	also	speaks	of	his	
brother’s	involvement	with	the	Brahmo	Samaj	and	suggests	that	the	Brahmos	had	a	
larger	impact	on	Vivekananda	than	many	may	acknowledge:	
Narendranath	in	his	young	days,	joined	the	Brahmo	Samaj.	That	was	nothing	
unusual	in	those	days	amongst	the	youthful	intelligentsia.	He	came	in	contact	
with	Keshubchandra	Sen	and	Pandit	Shivnath	Sastri.	He	became	a	member	of	the	
Sadharan	Brahmo	Samaj.	Perhaps	the	mysticism	of	Keshubchandra	seemed	too	
much	[sic]	irrational	to	him.	He	used	to	sing	in	the	choir	of	the	church…	The	late	
Haromohan	Mitra	used	to	repeatedly	say	to	the	writer,	that	Swamiji	used	to	say:	
“But	for	Ramakrishna	I	would	have	been	a	Brahmo	missionary.”	He	was	an	
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enthusiastic	Brahmo	during	that	time.	But	that	trait	never	left	him.	Inspite	of	
Ramakrishna	and	medieval	Vedanta,	from	a	social	reformer	he	turned	a	social-
revolutionary.	This	the	reformers	have	failed	to	notice	(Datta,	1954,	pp.154-
155).	
	
Similarly,	Kopf	also	asserts:	
Though	future	events	built	on	Vivekananda’s	alleged	discipleship	under	
Ramakrishna	have	obscured	the	actual	influences	in	his	early	development,	
contemporary	evidence	points	clearly	to	the	formative	importance	of	Keshub	
and	Brahmoism.	K.K.	Mitra,	who	also	knew	Vivekananda	in	the	early	1880s,	has	
stated	that	the	latter	engaged	in	Brahmo	activities,	attended	Brahmo	meetings,	
lived	among	Brahmo	students,	and	loved	to	sing	Brahmo	songs	(1979,	p.205).	
	
Furthermore,	Sil	draws	attention	to	the	fact:	
Narendranath’s	intellectual	interests	had	been	greatly	influenced	by	the	
enlightened	social	and	spiritual	gospels	of	the	Brahmo	Samaj.	As	early	as	1819,	
the	founder	of	the	Brahmo	movement,	Raja	(king	or	prince	–	title	for	a	native	
chief)	Rammohan	Roy,	had	translated	Kathopanishad	into	English	–	a	work	that	
he	claimed	was	“intended	to	assist	the	European	community	in	forming	their	
opinion	respecting	Hindu	theology.”	He	had	emphatically	declared	that	“by	a	
reference	to	history	it	may	be	proved	that	the	world	was	indebted	to	our	
ancestry	for	the	first	dawns	of	knowledge	which	sprang	in	the	East”	(1997,	p.50).	
	
What	is	especially	noteworthy	is	that	Vivekananda	himself	acknowledged	his	respect	
for	Rammohan’s	social	work	in	India,	on	August	1st	1895:	
The	great	Hindu	reformer,	Raja	Ram	Mohan	Roy,	was	a	wonderful	example	of	
this	unselfish	work.	He	devoted	his	whole	life	to	helping	India.	It	was	he	who	
stopped	the	burning	of	widows.	It	is	usually	believed	that	this	reform	was	due	
entirely	to	the	English;	but	it	was	Raja	Ram	Mohan	Roy	who	started	the	agitation	
against	the	custom	and	succeeded	in	obtaining	the	support	of	the	Government	in	
suppressing	it.	Until	he	began	the	movement,	the	English	had	done	nothing.	He	
also	founded	the	important	religious	Society	called	the	Brahmo-Samaj,	and	
subscribed	a	hundred	thousand	dollars	to	found	a	university.	He	then	stepped	
out	and	told	them	to	go	ahead	without	him.	He	cared	nothing	for	fame	or	for	
results	to	himself	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.7,	p.86).	
	
So	indebted	did	Vivekananda	feel	Indians	should	be	to	Rammohan	that	he	asserted	in	
1897,	at	the	reception	held	for	him	in	Calcutta,	when	he	returned	triumphantly	from	the	
West,	that	one	of	the	main	reasons	that	Indians	and	India	had	fallen	behind	was	because	
“we	did	not	compare	notes	with	other	nations”	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.317)	and	
that	it	was	thanks	to	Rammohan	that	this	had	changed:	
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The	little	life	that	you	see	in	India,	begins	from	the	day	when	Raja	Rammohan	
Roy	broke	through	the	walls	of	that	exclusiveness.	Since	that	day,	history	in	India	
has	taken	another	turn,	and	now	it	is	growing	with	accelerated	motion	
(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.317).	
	
Apart	from	Rammohan,	as	we	have	already	seen,	various	scholars	have	argued	that	
Vivekananda	was	influenced	by	Keshabchandra	Sen,	one	of	the	leaders	of	the	Brahmo	
Samaj	whose	group,	some	argue,	he	eventually	did	join.	For	example,	“[a]ccording	to	
Christopher	Isherwood,	the	neo-Vedantist	biographer	of	Ramakrishna,	Vivekananda	did	
join	Keshub’s	Brahmo	Samaj	in	1880”	(Kopf,	1979,	p.205).	Furthermore,	Gwilym	
Beckerlegge	suggests,	“[i]t	is	possible,	therefore,	that	Vivekananda	continued	to	move	
between	these	two	Brahmo	groupings,	which	had	parted	company	with	some	
bitterness”	(2006,	p.140).	
What	is	much	more	important	to	note	is:	
Given	Vivekananda’s	own	eclectic	nature,	his	family	background,	and	
expectations	of	professional	employment,	which	were	bolstered	by	his	father’s	
ambitions,	it	is,	perhaps,	hardly	surprising	that,	as	a	young	man,	he	moved	
between	and	sought	the	company	of	some	of	the	most	noted	celebrities	of	his	
day;	Keshab	Chandra	Sen	was,	after	all,	‘the	hero	of	a	hundred	platforms’	and	‘the	
idol	of	young	Bengal’.	This	is	very	much	the	view	of	Bhupendranath	Datta,	
Vivekananda’s	brother,	who	observed	that	all	students	of	that	period	were	
imbued	with	ideas	of	reform	and	also	noted	Keshab’s	appeal	to	the	young	as	a	
‘unique	all-India	leader’	(Beckerlegge,	2006(b),	p.140).	
	
Sil	is	so	convinced	of	Keshabchandra	Sen’s	influence	on	Vivekananda,	and	his	efforts	to	
repackage	Hindu	ideas	and	India’s	role	in	the	world,	that	he	draws	attention	to	the	
following	passages	in	Keshabchandra	Sen’s	writings:	
In	1863	Keshab	declared	in	a	speech	titled	“The	Brahmo	Samaj	Vindicated”	that	
the	Brahmo	scriptures	were	grounded	in	the	Vedantic	truths	predicated	on	
natural	reasoning.	He	declared	in	Bath,	England,	on	15	April	1870	that	he	could	
“never	look	upon	the	redeeming	features	of	India	in	past	history	without	feeling	
a	thrill	of	patriotic	feeling.”	When	the	social	worker	Pandita	Ramabai	met	with	
him	and	discussed	the	project	of	female	regeneration,	Sen	presented	her	with	a	
copy	of	the	Vedas	so	that	she	would	act	in	consonance	with	the	cultural	
traditions	of	India	(1997,	pp.50-51).	
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Arguments	such	as	these	give	one	pause,	especially	since	the	idea	of	a	‘universal	
religion’,	and	the	centrality	of	the	Vedas	in	Hindu	traditions,	form	some	of	the	
cornerstones	of	Vivekananda’s	philosophy.	In	an	essay	titled	“Hinduism	and	Shri	
Ramakrishna”	Vivekananda’s	arguments	are	remarkably	similar	to	Keshabchandra	
Sen’s:	
The	authority	of	the	Vedas	extends	to	all	ages,	climes	and	persons;	that	is	to	say,	
their	application	is	not	confined	to	any	particular	place,	time	and	persons.		
The	Vedas	are	the	only	exponent	of	the	universal	religion.	(Vivekananda,	2009,	
vol.6,	p.181).	
	
The	natural	question	to	ask	then	is	why	this	Brahmo	link	is	downplayed	by	Vivekananda	
and	his	followers.	The	answer	lies	in	the	antagonism	that	developed	between	
Vivekananda	and	Pratap	Mazoomdar,	a	Brahmo	follower	who	Vivekananda	encountered	
at	the	Parliament	in	Chicago.	Initially,	when	they	met	at	the	Parliament	Vivekananda	
states	in	a	letter	to	his	brother	disciple,	Alasinga,	dated	2nd	November,	1893,	
“Mazoomdar	and	I	were,	of	course,	old	friends”	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.5,	p.20).	
However,	this	friendship	could	not	withstand	the	competition	to	be	the	‘voice’	of	India	
and	by	1894,	in	a	letter	to	his	brother	disciples	Vivekananda	comments,	“I	could	do	
much	more	work	but	for	the	Brahmos	and	missionaries	who	have	been	opposing	me	
unceasingly”	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.6,	p.263).	The	animosity	between	Vivekananda	
and	the	Brahmos	has	been	well	documented	and	Beckerlegge	points	out:	
Vivekananda’s	later	comments	on	the	Brahmo	tradition	became	extremely	
hostile	prompted	by	the	conviction	that	Protap	Chandra	Mozoomdar	and	other	
Brahmos	had	attempted	to	undermine	his	credibility	in	the	United	States	
(2006(b),	p.141).	
	
Perhaps	it	is	this	conviction	that	leads	Vivekananda	to	assert	in	a	letter	to	one	of	his	
American	disciples,	Professor	John	Henry	Wright	dated	the	24th	of	May,	1894,	
“I	never	identified	myself	with	Mr.	Mazoomdar’s	party	chief.	If	he	says	so,	he	does	not	
speak	the	truth”	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.7,	p.468,	emphasis	in	original).	The	editor	of	
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these	volumes	states	that	here	Vivekananda	is	referring	to	Keshubchandra	Sen	when	he	
speaks	of	the	‘party	chief’	and	this	is	probably	accurate	since	Vivekananda’s	tone	
becomes	more	aggressive	as	he	continues:		
I	had	connection	with	Pundit	Shiva	Nath	Shastri’s	party	[Sadharan	Brahmo	
Samaj]	–	but	only	on	points	of	social	reform.	Mazoomdar	and	Chandra	Sen	–	I	
always	considered	as	not	sincere,	and	I	have	no	reason	to	change	my	opinion	
even	now…	The	Brahmo	Samaj,	like	Christian	Science	in	your	country,	spread	in	
Calcutta	for	a	certain	time	and	then	died	out.	I	am	not	sorry,	neither	glad	that	it	
died.	It	has	done	its	work	–	viz	social	reform.	Its	religion	was	not	worth	a	cent,	
and	so	it	must	die	out.	If	Mazoomdar	thinks	I	was	one	of	the	causes	of	its	death,	
he	errs.	I	am	even	now	a	great	sympathizer	of	its	reforms;	but	the	“booby”	
religion	could	not	hold	its	own	against	the	old	“Vedanta”.	What	shall	I	do?	Is	that	
my	fault?	Mazoomdar	has	become	childish	in	his	old	age	and	takes	to	tactics	not	a	
whit	better	than	some	of	your	Christian	missionaries.	Lord	bless	him	and	show	
him	better	ways	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.7,	pp.468-469).	
	
What	is	relevant	in	this	discussion	is	that	the	relationship	between	Vivekananda,	the	
Brahmo	Samaj,	Keshubchandra	Sen	and	Protop	Mazoomdar	was	ambiguous.	In	spite	of	
this,	one	still	gets	a	clear	impression	that	Vivekananda	was	remarkably	aware	of	their	
teachings	and	ideas,	and	that	their	ideology	was	responsible	for	shaping	some	of	his	
own.	He	even	recognized	India’s	debt	to	the	Brahmo	Samaj	when	he	stated	in	an	article	
titled	“Modern	India”	as	late	as	1899:	
it	is	an	undoubted	fact	that	if	there	had	not	been	the	advent	of	Kabir,	Nanak,	and	
Chaitanya	in	the	Mohammedan	period,	and	the	establishment	of	the	Brahmo	
Samaj	and	the	Arya	Samaj	in	our	own	day,	then,	by	this	time,	the	Mohammedans	
and	the	Christians	would	have	far	outnumbered	the	Hindus	of	the	present	day	in	
India	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.4,	p.463).	
	
Similarly,	his	comments,	and	compliments,	for	Rammohan,	that	are	cited	above,	are	
dated	after	the	Parliament	when	he	had	already	had	his	falling	out	with	Mazoomdar.	
Thus,	this	acknowledgement	by	Vivekananda,	whereby	he	admits	that	missionizing	
movements	in	India	were	kept	in	check	by	groups	such	as	the	Brahmo	Samaj	
demonstrates	his	awareness	of	how	crucial	the	Brahmos	had	been,	not	only	in	the	early	
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stages	of	this	‘continental	collision’,	but	also	in	his	own	personal	experience	of	colonial	
domination.		
Of	course,	as	was	mentioned	at	the	beginning	of	this	discussion,	one	could	still	
argue,	at	this	juncture,	that	the	Brahmo	Samaj	itself	was	largely	influenced	by	Western	
ideology.	It	is	as	if	in	response	to	arguments	such	as	these,	which	are	reminiscent	of	
Hacker’s	binary	categories	in	the	previous	chapter,	that	Hatcher	warns	readers	not	to	
limit	their	thought	processes	to	simple	dichotomies,	such	as	traditional	vs.	modern.	
Instead,	they	should	build	arguments	that	allow	for	a	deeper,	more	comprehensive	
understanding	of	the	past:	
The	logic	of	the	tradition/modernity	dichotomy	seems	to	force	certain	
intellectual	moves	when	it	comes	to	the	study	of	Hinduism.	We	might	presume,	
for	instance,	that	we	can	identify	a	recognizable	“break”	with	tradition.	
Identifying	Rammohan	as	the	father	of	modern	Hindu	reform	is	to	see	in	him	the	
marker	of	such	a	break.	However,	the	counterpoint	necessarily	follows.	Don’t	
Rammohan’s	endeavors	build	upon	important	elements	of	previous	intellectual	
and	religious	life	in	South	Asia?	If	so,	one	is	compelled	to	conclude	that	no	radical	
break	took	place.	(2006,	p.54).	
	
Hatcher	explores	the	ways	in	which	Rammohan	in	particular,	and	the	Brahmo	Samaj	in	
general,	did	not	break	ties	with	their	traditional	past	but	instead,	re-interpreted	it	to	
suit	their	needs	in	colonial	India.	As	Hatcher	explains	it,	not	only	did	Rammohan	
maintain	his	connection	with	his	traditional	past,	but	in	fact,	studied	it	in	detail	which,	
in	turn,	allowed	him	to	create	his	own	ideological	path:	
Though	born	a	Brahmin,	Rammohan’s	spiritual	development	took	him	down	a	
number	of	intellectual	avenues.	Early	in	life	he	is	said	to	have	studied	in	both	
Patna	and	Benares,	centers	for	Arabic	and	Sanskrit	learning	respectively.	His	first	
published	essay	was	a	lengthy	rationalistic	appeal	for	monotheism,	written	in	
Persian.	Tuhfat	al-Muwahhidin	(A	present	to	the	believers	in	one	god).	Much	of	
his	most	mature	work	would	focus	on	mastering	and	translating	Sanskrit	texts	
on	Vedanta	from	the	Upanisads	to	the	Brahma	Sutras.	In	addition	to	his	
immersion	in	Indo-Persian	and	Vedantic	learning,	Rammohan	also	studied	
Tantra	and	had	worked	in	close	contact	with	the	English	collector,	John	Digby,	
for	a	dozen	years	in	the	outlying	districts	of	Bengal.	Thus,	by	the	time	he	settled	
in	Calcutta	in	1815,	he	had	amassed	the	kind	of	experience	that	would	earn	him	
acclaim	as	a	polymath	scholar	and	polemicist	(2006,	p.57-58).		
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Hatcher	concludes	that	when	Rammohan	established	the	Brahmo	Samaj	in	1828,	he	did	
so	by	using	Vedantic	tools:	
Those	gathering	with	Rammohan	were	encouraged	to	know	the	Supreme	God	
according	to	Rammohan’s	reading	of	the	Upanisads,	which	he	referred	to	as	the	
Vedant	(i.e.	Vedanta).	Following	the	classical	Hindu	tradition,	acquisition	of	such	
knowledge	would	require	study,	meditation,	and	diligent	restraint	of	the	
passions	(2006,	p.59).	
	
Indeed,	Hatcher	points	out	that	Rammohan	was	particularly	despised	by	Christian	
missionaries	since	he	had	found	a	way	to	bypass	their	insistence	on	Christ:	
Not	only	had	Rammohan	dared	to	subject	the	Gospels	to	rational	analysis,	in	the	
Brahmo	Samaj	he	offered	a	monotheism	devoid	of	both	grace	and	atonement.	To	
the	missionary,	what	Rammohan	offered	was	not	simply	heathen	error,	but	
worse,	the	means	to	be	a	theist	without	becoming	a	Christian	(2006,	p.65).	
	
Furthermore,	he	demonstrates	that	Rammohan’s	philosophy	was	kept	largely	intact	
even	through	the	many	incarnations	that	the	Brahmo	Samaj	went	through.	
Consequently,	if	we	take	a	moment	to	analyse	Hatcher’s	arguments,	then	it	stands	to	
reason	that	the	influence	that	the	Brahmo	Samaj	had	on	Vivekananda	cannot	be	
considered	a	result	of	Westernization,	but	rather,	another	example	of	how	this	
‘continental	collision’	reverberated	on	both	sides	of	the	globe.		
	
Sri	Paramahamsa	Ramakrishna	
	 To	argue	that	Vivekananda	was	impacted	by	his	guru,	Ramakrishna,	would	be	
stating	the	obvious,	because	the	relationship	between	Ramakrishna,	and	Vivekananda,	
has	been	well	documented	by	several	scholars	since	Vivekananda	was,	by	far,	
Ramakrishna’s	most	famous	disciple.51	Instead,	I	will	limit	my	inquiry	by	highlighting	
																																																								
51	Most	biographers	of	Vivekananda	and	Ramakrishna	cover	this	period	in	their	lives	in	
some	detail.	For	example,	Sen	(2000),	Sil	(1997)	and	Kripal	(1995).	Naturally	this	is	not	
an	exhaustive	list	but	instead	simply	a	cross-section	sampling	of	the	scholars	who	have	
written	about	both	men.		
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the	way	Ramakrishna	engaged	with	traditions	other	than	his	own.	If	we	take	a	moment	
to	examine	Vivekananda’s	propensity	to	view	all	spiritual	journeys	and	paths	as	headed	
for	a	singular	goal,	it	will	become	evident	that	his	narrative	was	strengthened	by	his	
master’s	teachings.	Considering	the	fact	that	this	idea,	that	all	traditions	have	a	common	
trajectory,	goes	on	to	form	the	main	impetus	behind	the	‘Hinduism’	that	Vivekananda	
advocated,	it	is	crucial	to	examine	how	Ramakrishna	presented	these	beliefs,	and	how	
Vivekananda	imbibed	them.	Hopefully,	this	demonstrates	that	Vivekananda	was	not	
simply	mimicking	ideas	presented	by	Western	Universalists,	but	rather,	that	this	
concept	of	‘oneness’	was	also	inspired	by	Ramakrishna’s	interpretation	of	a	variety	of	
traditions.		
	 Unlike	Vivekananda,	Ramakrishna	did	not	come	from	an	eclectic,	Bengali	
intellectual	family.	Instead,	he	was	the	son	of	a	strict	Brahmin	family	of	priests	and	
received	no	formal	education	in	his	youth.	However,	as	a	priest	in	a	Kali	temple	in	a	
small	town	neighbouring	Calcutta,	Ramakrishna	was	well-known	for	his	devotion	to	
Kali	and	the	euphoric	trances	into	which	he	fell	when	he	was	transformed	by	his	bhakti	
for	the	Mother.	Indeed,	Ramakrishna	became	quite	famous	amongst	the	Bengali	
intelligentsia,	and	in	Hindu	Revivalism	in	Bengal	(1993),	Amiya	Sen	states:	
By	implicitly	upholding	the	validity	of	Hinduism	and	the	Hindu	way	of	life	within	
the	broad	framework	of	Universalism,	by	not	insisting	on	strict	ritual	
enforcement	within	religious	life,	by	suggesting	that	God-realization	was	a	
tangible	and	attainable	human	objective,	Ramakrishna	paved	the	way	not	only	
for	a	new	pride	of	race	and	culture	but	also	for	the	toning	up	of	moral	and	
religious	life	in	late	nineteenth	century	Bengal	(1993,	p.294).	
	
In	“Comparative	Mystics:	Scholars	as	Gnostic	Diplomats”	(2004)	Jeffrey	Kripal,	one	of	
Ramakrishna’s	most	recent	(and	controversial)52	biographers,	draws	attention	to	the	
																																																								
52	Jeffrey	Kripal’s	book,	Kali’s	Child	(1998)	ruffled	quite	a	few	feathers	since	he	openly	
insinuates	that	Ramakrishna	had	homoerotic	tendencies,	which	he	occasionally	acted	
upon.	Indeed,	this	interpretation	of	his	forms	a	large	part	of	his	research.	For	a	
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fact	that	Indian	history	has	had	many	examples	which	showcase	“the	fluidity	of	culture	
and	the	mystical	denial	of	religious	difference”	(2004,	p.491).	However,	in	Kripal’s	
opinion,	what	made	Ramakrishna	unique	was	that	not	only	were	his	experiences	
“distinctly	mystical	and	unorthodox,”	but	that	they	were	“carried	on	in	a	social	
environment	imbued	with	debate	and	reform	inspired	by	the	dominating	presence	of	
Western	religious	thought”	(2004,	p.492).	What	seems	to	have	made	Ramakrishna’s	
experience,	of	this	‘continental	collision’,	especially	interesting	to	his	Indian	followers	
was	that	even	as	a	devotee	of	Kali,	he	experimented	with	other	Hindu	traditions,	as	well	
as	with	Christianity	and	Islam:	
he	engaged	in	Vaishnava,	Shakta	and	Advaita	Vedantic	sadhanas	(spiritual	
disciplines).	Or	as	he	put	it	himself,	he	practiced	and	thought	“according	to	the	
Puranas,”	according	to	the	Tantras,”	and	“according	to	the	Vedas,”	three	classes	
of	Hindu	scripture	that	represent	the	ways	of	theistic	devotion,	erotic	
transgression,	and	philosophical	deconstruction,	respectively	(Kripal,	2004,	
pp.492-493).		
	
Raychaudhari	suggests	that	one	of	the	reasons	why	Ramakrishna	was	popular,	and	
gained	so	much	traction	with	the	Bengali	intelligentsia,	was	because	he	offered	them	a	
way	to	access	their	traditional	beliefs	in	a	manner	in	which	they	could	take	pride:		
The	new	sociocultural	movements	[of	the	19th	century]	had	focused	attention	on	
religion	and	thus	produced	both	an	uncertainty	and	a	concern	about	faith	and	
spirituality.	But	they	had	failed	to	provide	solutions	acceptable	to	large	
members.	Keshab’s	inspired	preaching	in	the	mohullas	of	the	city	was	a	
conscious	assault	on	this	anomy	in	religious	life.	It	had	considerable	appeal.	
Many	of	the	young	people	who	became	devotees	of	Ramakrishna	were	at	first	
Keshab’s	followers.	The	fiery	orator	was	a	seeker	after	God.	By	his	own	
testimony,	Ramakrishna	was	a	person	in	communion	with	the	Deity.	Sections	of	
the	intelligentsia,	concerned	about	essential	religiosity	and	tortured	by	doubts,	
accepted	the	soothing	news	as	true.	The	news	was	all	the	more	satisfying	
because	the	saint	personified	the	tradition	of	syncretism	(1988,	p.237).	
	
																																																								
measured,	discussion	on	the	way	this	controversy	can	be	interpreted	see	Francis	X.	
Clooney	S.J.	“The	Meaning	of	a	Saint”	(2012)	
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However,	Raychaudhari	points	out	that	whereas	Hindu	conservatives	appreciated	some	
aspects	of	Ramakrishna’s	message	they	were	not	always	convinced	with	his	methods:	
The	veneration	of	Ramakrishna	by	a	section	of	the	urban	intelligentsia	was	based	
on	the	psychological	need	for	a	satisfying	spiritual	ideal,	generated	by	decades	of	
religious	controversy.	The	religious	idiom	and	overtones	of	the	burgeoning	
nationalism	probably	enhanced	that	need	as	well	as	the	veneration.	Hindu	
revivalism	may	have	found	some	comfort	in	the	reflected	glory	of	a	great	saint,	
especially	after	he	was	accepted	as	such	by	eminent	westerners.	Ramakrishna	
for	them	might	be	a	positive	proof	of	Hindu	superiority,	but	his	infinite	tolerance	
and	unsectarian	spirituality	was	hardly	their	cup	of	tea	(1988,	pp.237-238).	
	
It	is	this	syncretism,	that	may	not	have	been	a	palatable	‘cup	of	tea’	for	many	
conservative	Hindus,	which	made	Ramakrishna	unique,	thereby	allowing	him	to	be	the	
perfect	springboard	from	which	Vivekananda	was	able	to	rise	to	great	heights.		
A	few	words	about	‘syncretism’	might	help	clarify	how	scholars	have	used	this	
term	and	how	it	helped	Ramakrishna	gain	popularity	amongst	certain	sections	of	
Bengali	society.	According	to	Peter	van	der	Veer,	in	“Syncretism,	multiculturalism	and	
tolerance”	(1994b):		
Syncretism	is	a	term	used	in	Christian	theology	since	at	least	the	seventeenth	
century.	According	to	the	Oxford	English	Dictionary,	it	denotes	an	‘attempt	to	sink	
differences	and	effect	union	between	sects	or	philosophical	schools’.	While	
Erasmus	and	Rotterdam	used	the	term	in	1519	in	the	sense	of	reconciliation	
among	Christians,	the	theologian	Calixtus	of	Helmstadt	was	the	first	to	use	
‘syncretism’	in	theological	debate	to	mean	the	sinking	of	theological	differences,	
at	a	church	conference	in	Thorn	in	1645.	While	syncretism	thus	sounds	like	a	
positive	strategy	to	contain	conflict	and	promote	tolerance	or,	in	recent	parlance,	
at	least	‘dialogue’,	it	is	striking	how	pejoratively	the	term	is	often	used	by	the	
defenders	of	‘the	true	faith’.	It	is	seen	as	a	loss	of	identity,	an	illicit	contamination,	
a	sign	of	religious	decadence.	In	theological	disputes	it	was	generally	regarded	as	
a	betrayal	of	principles,	or	as	an	attempt	to	secure	unity	at	the	expense	of	truth	
(1994(b),	pp.196-197).	
	
On	the	other	hand,	van	der	Veer	also	recognizes	that	the	term	‘syncretism’	is	often	used	
by	historians,	and	comparative	religionists,	to	describe	the	ways	in	which	traditions	
have	changed	over	time:	
Syncretism	is	a	term	which	in	comparative	religion	refers	to	a	process	of	
religious	amalgamation,	of	blending	heterogeneous	beliefs	and	practices.	As	
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such,	it	is	an	aspect	of	religious	interaction	over	time.	This	can	be	seen	as	such	a	
broad	process	that	indeed	every	religion	is	syncretistic,	since	it	constantly	draws	
upon	heterogeneous	elements	to	the	extent	that	it	is	often	impossible	for	
historians	to	unravel	what	comes	from	where	(1994(b),	p.208).	
	
As	a	result,	he	acknowledges	the	complexities	of	this	term	and	warns	readers	to	pay	
special	attention	to	the	context	in	which	it	is	used:	
Syncretism	is	a	term	within	that	discourse	which	acknowledges	the	permeability	
and	fluidity	of	social	life,	but	is	used	to	evaluate	it.	That	evaluation	depends	on	
the	context	in	which	it	is	made.	Syncretism	can	be	seen,	negatively,	as	a	
corruption	of	the	absolute	Truth.	It	can	be	seen,	positively,	as	a	sign	of	tolerance.	
In	all	these	cases	it	has	to	be	discursively	identified	(van	der	Veer,	1994(b),	
p.209).	
	
The	question	thus	arises	as	to	whether	the	syncretism,	that	is	accorded	to	
Ramakrishna	by	scholars	such	as	Raychaudhari,	is	the	syncretism	which	argues	in	
favour	of	the	superiority	of	particular	‘essential’	truths	or,	if	instead,	it	is	used	in	the	
way	which	Wendy	Doniger	suggests	it	can	be	defined,	that	is,	“with	the	understanding	
that	it	denotes	the	fusion	of	a	number	of	religious	elements,	none	of	which	is	in	any	way	
a	pure	essence”	(Doniger,	2009,	p.548fn).	Interestingly	however,	in	the	case	of	
Ramakrishna,	this	idea	of	syncretism	takes	on	another	form	because,	whereas	he	was	
quite	eager	to	experiment	with	other	traditions,	he	was	also	extremely	clear	on	the	fact	
that	he	had	already	chosen	his	path,	the	path	of	Kali.	Thus,	Ramakrishna’s	syncretism	
had	more	to	do	with	him	advocating	multiple	paths	to	a	single	goal	rather	than	the	idea	
that	all	paths	were	the	same.	This	is	what	made	Ramakrishna’s	ideas	so	attractive	
during	this	time	of	‘continental	collision’	because,	he	recognized	and	respected	other	
traditions’	validity,	while	never	swerving	from	his	own	ideals.	Accordingly,	Sen	
remarks:	
In	truth,	Ramakrishna’s	ideas	did	not	consider	a	broad	respect	of	tolerance	
towards	all	faiths	to	be	innocent	of	personal	commitment	to	one.	This	would	
explain	his	eagerness	to	learn	the	fundamentals	of	Christian	faith	but	his	rather	
stiff	attitude	towards	Madhusudan	Dutt,	the	eminent	convert	to	Christianity…	
Ramakrishna	never	questioned	the	primacy	of	this	religious	identity,	his	basic	
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objection	was	towards	religious	bigotry…	The	preachings	of	Ramakrishna	
though	quite	unconnected	with	any	political	vision,	nevertheless	insist	on	
qualities	of	mutual	respect	and	tolerance	(1993,	p.309).	
	
So	much	so,	that	Sen	argues,	“[t]he	Universalism	of	Ramakrishna	is	palpably	different	
from	that	professed	by	Rammohun,	Bankim	or	Keshab	Chandra.	Its	hallmark	was	not	
syncretism	but	tolerance”	(1993,	p.	308).	Ramakrishna	was	nothing	like	the	Western	
Universalists	that	influenced	Indians,	like	Rammohan	Roy	or	Keshubchandra	Sen,	since	
Ramakrishna	had	had	no	exposure	to	Western	education.	Therefore,	it	would	be	more	
accurate	to	link	him	with	syncretic	Hindu	traditions	that	predated	the	advent	of	the	
West,	and	the	subsequent	colonization	of	India.	Raychaudhari	acknowledges	this:	
Ramakrishna’s	unqualified	reverence	for	all	faiths,	including	Keshab’s	
Christianized	devotionalism,	Christianity	itself	and	Islam,	links	him	with	the	
syncretic	tradition	of	the	Indian	middle	ages	rather	than	the	nineteenth-century	
Hindu	revivalism	(1988,	p.236).	
	
Kripal	is	in	agreement	with	this	assessment	since	he	also	argues	that	Ramakrishna	
reflects	the	“fluidity	of	culture	and	the	mystical	denial	of	religious	difference”	that	was	
evident	in	other	historical	figures	in	India’s	history	such	as	the	poet	Kabir,	the	Sikh	
founder	Guru	Nanak	and	the	Mughal	emperor	Akbar	(2004,	p.491).	What	made	
Ramakrishna	particularly	relevant	in	nineteenth	century	colonial	India	however,	is	that	
he	did	not	limit	himself	to	exploring	only	traditions	that	had	emerged	in	India	but	rather	
went	on	to	experiment	with	Islam	and	Christianity	as	well.	For	example,	at	one	point,	
before	he	gained	local	fame	as	a	saint,	Ramakrishna	adopted	Islam:	
He	repeated	the	name	of	Allah,	wore	Muslim	clothes,	prayed	the	daily	Muslim	
prayers,	and	even	refused	to	visit	the	Hindu	deities.	After	three	days	of	this	
discipline,	it	is	said	that	he	underwent	a	vision	of	a	brilliant	human	figure	with	a	
long	beard	(that	is,	a	male)	and	then	merged	into	“the	Fourth”	state	of	the	
unconditioned	brahman	(Kripal,	2004,	p.493).	
	
Vivekananda	also	speaks	of	Ramakrishna’s	experiments	with	other	traditions	in	his	
speech	“My	Master”:	
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He	wanted	to	understand	what	other	religions	were	like.	So	he	sought	teachers	
of	other	religions.	By	teacher	you	must	always	remember	what	we	mean	in	India,	
not	a	bookworm,	but	a	man	of	realisation,	one	who	knows	truth	at	first	hand	and	
not	through	an	intermediary.	He	found	a	Mohammedan	saint	and	placed	himself	
under	him;	he	underwent	the	disciplines	prescribed	by	him,	and	to	his	
astonishment	found	that	when	faithfully	carried	out,	these	devotional	methods	
led	him	to	the	same	goal	he	had	already	attained.	He	gathered	similar	experience	
from	following	the	true	religion	of	Jesus	the	Christ.	He	went	to	all	the	sects	he	
could	find,	and	whatever	he	took	up	he	went	into	with	his	whole	heart.	He	did	
exactly	as	he	was	told,	and	in	every	instance	he	arrived	at	the	same	result.	Thus	
from	actual	experience,	he	came	to	know	that	the	goal	of	every	religion	is	the	
same,	that	each	is	trying	to	teach	the	same	thing,	the	difference	being	largely	in	
method	and	still	more	in	language.	At	the	core,	all	sects	and	all	religions	have	the	
same	aim;	and	they	were	only	quarrelling	for	their	own	selfish	purposes	–	they	
were	not	anxious	about	the	truth,	but	about	“my	name”	and	“your	name”	
(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.4,	pp.173-174).	
	
	The	reason	why	these	experiences	of	Ramakrishna’s	are	especially	important,	in	regard	
to	Vivekananda,	is	because	Vivekananda	himself,	following	in	the	footsteps	of	his	
Master,	became	a	champion	of	syncretism.	In	an	interview	that	Vivekananda	gave	to	the	
Sunday	Times	in	London	in	1896	he	stated:	
I	am	a	disciple	of	Ramakrishna	Paramahamsa,	a	perfect	Sannyasin	whose	
influence	and	ideas	I	fell	under.	This	great	Sannyasin	never	assumed	the	negative	
or	critical	attitude	towards	other	religions,	but	showed	their	positive	side	–	how	
they	could	be	carried	into	life	and	practised	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.5,	p.190).	
	
Moreover,	Ramakrishna’s	approach	differs	quite	substantially	from	the	Universalists	
since	he	does	not	suggest	that	other	paths	offer	partial	truths.	Rather,	he	insists	that	just	
like	his	path	via	bhakti	encompassed	all	his	needs,	so	also	Christianity	and	Islam	offered	
their	followers	a	way	that	was	the	whole	truth.	Multiple	whole	truths	that	co-exist	in	
harmony	remains	a	novel	thought	even	today.	In	fact,	Ramakrishna’s	position	was	more	
tolerant	than	Vivekananda’s	emphasis	on	Vedanta.	A	fact	that	Vivekananda	himself	
seemed	to	acknowledge.	So	much	so,	that	Vivekananda	even	went	on	to	declare	upon	
his	return	to	Calcutta,	in	1897,	after	his	successful	experiences	in	America,	that	his	guru	
was	“a	man	whose	whole	life	was	a	Parliament	of	Religions	as	it	should	be”	
(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.315).	Considering	the	propensity	that	both	Ramakrishna	
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and	Vivekananda	had	towards	finding	a	sense	of	compatibility	within	traditions,	one	
might	be	wont	to	argue	that	their	positions	may	not	have	been	very	nuanced	or	that	
they	may	have	tended	to	take	a	simply	perfunctory	view	of	the	similarities	between	
traditions.	However,	Kripal	is	quick	to	point	out:		
It	is	also	important	to	realize	that	Ramakrishna’s	tendency	to	compare	religions	
did	not	prevent	him	from	criticizing	positions	that	he	found	dubious	or	
dysfunctional	in	one	religion	or	another.	He	was	particularly	hard	on	the	
orthodox	Vaishnavas	and	the	Christians,	whose	respective	doctrines	of	sin	struck	
him	as	useless	and	ultimately	destructive	(2004,	p.495).	
	
Similarly,	as	we	shall	see	in	the	following	chapters,	Vivekananda	did	not	shy	away	from	
criticizing	other	traditions	even	while	he	held	them	up	as	valid	paths,	a	skill	he	adopted	
from	his	guru,	who	on	the	one	hand,	“rebuked	Vivekananda	for	criticizing	certain	
Tantric	sects”	while	at	the	same	time	was	himself	critical	of	certain	aspects	of	
Theosophy	(Raychaudhuri,	1988,	p.236).	However,	Ramakrishna,	unlike	Vivekananda,	
never	suggested	that	the	different	religious	paths	were	a	hierarchical	system	that	
culminated	in	Vedantic	philosophy.	Or,	that	there	were	different	stages	to	
enlightenment	that	were	marked	by	certain	religious	paths.	Instead,	he	held	on	to	his	
belief	that	his	devotion	to	Kali	was	the	only	complete	truth	he	would	ever	need.	In	
contrast,	whereas	on	the	one	hand,	Vivekananda	accentuated	his	appreciation	for	the	
similarities	and	differences	within	traditions	while	observing	his	guru’s	behaviour;	on	
the	other	hand,	he	adopted	only	the	aspects	that	suited	his	own	needs.	As	Jyotirmaya	
Sharma	explains	it	in	Hindutva	(2003):		
Vivekananda	did	not	experience	this	oneness	of	faiths	like	Sri	Ramakrishna.	His	
attempt	remained	confined	to	the	intellectual	plane	and	lacked	the	intensity	of	
living	another	man’s	faith	with	one’s	‘whole	heart’.	Between	Sri	Ramakrishna	and	
Swami	Vivekananda,	the	disparity	in	method	to	arrive	at	the	same	conclusion	
made	all	the	difference.	Like	Jesus,	Sri	Ramakrishna	was	after	all	the	pure	sort,	
unencumbered	by	history	or	context,	but	immensely	rich	in	experience.	
Vivekananda	was	like	Paul,	the	thundering	sort,	who	had	to	spread	the	light	
quickly	and	effectively.	He	understood	well	that	religion	was	not	an	intellectual	
activity	but	an	act	of	realization.	But	he	was	often	impatient.	Hinduism	as	a	
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tolerant	and	all-embracing	faith	remained	for	him	an	aspiration,	never	an	
experience	(2003,	pp.90-91).	
	
Be	that	as	it	may,	for	the	purposes	of	the	present	discussion,	it	is	especially	important	to	
note	that	whereas	Ramakrishna	believed	in	the	idea	of	a	universal	goal,	he	did	not	
arrive	at	this	conclusion	because	of	Western	influences.	Instead,	Ramakrishna	
responded	to	the	‘continental	collision’	he	experienced	around	him	by	relying	on	Indian	
traditions	and	philosophy	which	then	allowed	him	to	articulate	his	position.	Both	these	
men,	Ramakrishna	and	Vivekananda,	used	tools	provided	to	them	by	their	traditions;	
tools	which	then	permitted	them	to	engage	with	Western	concepts	that	they	
encountered	due	to	this	‘continental	collision’.	
	
Conclusion	
The	Indian	influences	in	Vivekananda’s	life	are	not	limited	to	the	ones	covered	in	
this	brief	overview.	Indeed,	after	the	death	of	his	guru,	Vivekananda	set	out	on	his	own	
and	toured	India	extensively,	meeting	people	from	all	walks	of	life,	saints	and	kings,	
peasants	and	city	dwellers.	He	describes	many	of	these	wanderings	in	his	letters	and	
speeches,	and	it	is	generally	accepted	by	scholars	that	it	was	because	of	these	travels	
that	he	decided	to	make	the	trip	to	Chicago,	in	search	of	funds	to	help	his	fellow	
countrymen.	In	these	crucial	years	before	he	embarked	on	his	remarkable	journey	to	
the	Parliament	of	Religions	his	interaction	with	Western	civilization	was	limited	at	best.	
Instead,	he	sat	at	the	feet	of	the	Indian	saint	Pavhari	Baba,	learned	Sanskrit	by	studying	
Panini’s	grammar,	and	argued	about	Indian	philosophy	with	Parmadananda	Mitra,	a	
wealthy	learned	brahmin	householder.	Vivekananda	wandered	from	one	holy	city	to	
another,	rekindling	old	friendships,	and	making	new	ones,	as	he	experienced	the	
hardships	and	the	subsequent	generosity	of	the	natives	towards	a	wandering	monk	
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between	the	years	1887	to	1893.	Thus,	to	argue	that	in	spite	of	all	these	Indians	who	fed	
him,	cared	for	him,	inspired	him	and	honoured	him	that	Vivekananda	was	a	product	of	
Western	colonization	is	problematic.	Even	Raychaudhari,	who	is	wont	at	times	to	give	
too	much	credit	to	Western	influences,	finally	surmises:		
Vivekananda	eventually	acquired	a	masterly	knowledge	of	Indian	philosophy,	
but	his	basic	beliefs	and	religious	outlook	were	shaped	by	his	childhood	
environment.	Philosophical	skepticism	created	a	temporary	disquiet.	It	never	
displaced	entirely	the	faith	he	had	accepted	without	question	early	in	life.	…	
Vivekananda	later	assessed	the	moral	and	spiritual	life	of	the	western	peoples	
using	yardsticks	familiar	since	childhood.	His	discipleship	of	the	saint	and	
scholarly	studies	confirmed	and	elaborated	the	values	implicit	in	a	religiosity	he	
had	absorbed	almost	with	his	mother’s	milk	(1988,	p.238).	
	
As	we	turn	to	the	next	chapter,	which	traces	Vivekananda’s	experiences	in	the	West,	and	
how	this	influenced	the	way	he	presented	Hindu	ideas,	it	is	important	to	recognize,	that	
at	least	as	far	as	Vivekananda	is	concerned,	Western	colonization	did	not	usurp	or	
dominate	his	thought	process.	Instead,	Vivekananda	continuously	found	ways	to	
accommodate	Western	concepts	and	ideas,	with	the	Indian	traditions	that	he	had	grown	
up	with	during	this	period	of	‘continental	collision’.		
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Swami	Vivekananda:	At	the	Parliament	
	
At	a	conference	celebrating	the	150th	birth	anniversary	of	Vivekananda,	Dr.	Kapil	
Kapoor,	a	well-known	scholar	of	Indian	intellectual	traditions,	of	the	Jawaharlal	Nehru	
University	in	New	Delhi,	spoke	about	the	rich	Indian	ancestry	that	preceded	
Vivekananda.53	According	to	Kapoor,	Vivekananda	did	not	appear	on	the	international	
scene	from	an	intellectual	vacuum,	but	rather,	was	one	of	the	more	recent	Indian	voices	
in	a	long	tradition	of	great	Indian	minds.	He	argued	that	Vivekananda	rose	to	the	
repeated	challenges	made	to	his	traditional	beliefs	by	using	Western	terminology	in	
order	to	better	dispute	the	colonizers	who	were	demoralizing	Hindus	in	India.	Kapoor	
contends	that	Vivekananda	outwitted	Western	attacks	on	Hindu	traditional	ideas	by	
deftly	appropriating	the	very	methodology	they	used.	It	is	arguments	such	as	these	that	
make	it	so	important	to	analyse	Vivekananda’s	time	at	the	Parliament.	After	all,	it	was	in	
Chicago	that	he	began	accomplishing	the	feats	that	he	has	been	credited	with.	
Highlighting	details	of	Vivekananda’s	speeches	and	writings	will	demonstrate	how	his	
success	at	the	Parliament	crucially	impacted	the	way	Hindu	ideas	came	to	be	‘packaged’	
in	order	for	them	to	be	better	appreciated;	both	by	Western	audiences	and	by	educated	
colonized	Hindus.	Consequently,	in	this	chapter,	I	will	determine	what	Vivekananda	
believed	his	message	was	and	how	he	conveyed	it	to	the	Western	world.	Thereafter,	in	
the	following	chapter,	I	will	examine	how	he	adapted	and	accommodated	these	ideas	
when	presenting	them	to	his	Indian	audiences.	In	order	to	accomplish	this	goal	I	will	
concentrate	on	two	sets	of	lectures;	the	speeches	delivered	by	Vivekananda	at	the	
Parliament	of	Religions	in	Chicago	in	1893,	and	the	speeches	he	made	upon	his	return	to	
																																																								
53	Kapil	Kapoor,	De-subjugating	Timeless	Vocabularies-	Swami	Vivekananda	as	an	
Intellectual	Catalyst,	Saturday	International	Keynote	Speaker,	USC	School	of	Religion,	
International	Conference	on	Swami	Vivekananda,	October	18-19th	2013.		
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India	in	the	early	part	of	1897.	By	closely	examining	these	speeches	and	papers,	a	
relatively	clear	picture	of	Vivekananda’s	interpretations	of	certain	key	concepts	should	
emerge.	And,	perhaps	more	importantly,	it	will	become	evident	how	he	strategically	
used	them	to	suit	his	own	needs.	One	might	ask	why	I	have	chosen	these	particular	
periods	in	his	life	in	order	to	offer	up	a	window	into	Vivekananda’s	impact	on	Hindu	
ideas.	This	narrative	that	Vivekananda	recounted	at	the	Parliament	will	help	clarify	my	
reasons:		
A	frog	lived	in	a	well.	It	had	lived	there	for	a	long	time.	It	was	born	there	and	
brought	up	there,	and	yet	was	a	little,	small	frog.	…	it	everyday	cleaned	the	water	
of	all	the	worm	and	bacilli	that	lived	in	it	with	energy	that	would	do	credit	to	our	
modern	bacteriologists.	In	this	way	it	went	on	and	became	a	little	sleek	and	fat.	
Well,	one	day	another	frog	that	lived	in	the	sea	came	and	fell	into	the	well.		
“Where	are	you	from?”	
“I	am	from	the	sea.”	
“The	sea!	How	big	is	that?	Is	it	as	big	as	my	well?”	and	he	took	a	leap	from	one	
side	of	the	well	to	the	other.	
“My	friend,”	said	the	frog	from	the	sea,	“how	do	you	compare	the	sea	with	your	
little	well?”	
Then	the	frog	took	another	leap	and	asked,	“Is	your	sea	so	big?”	
“What	nonsense	you	speak,	to	compare	the	sea	with	your	well!”	
“Well,	then,”	said	the	frog	of	the	well,	“nothing	can	be	bigger	than	my	well;	there	
can	be	nothing	bigger	than	this;	this	fellow	is	a	liar,	so	turn	him	out.”	
That	has	been	the	difficulty	all	the	while.		
I	am	a	Hindu.	I	am	sitting	in	my	own	little	well	and	thinking	that	the	whole	world	
is	my	little	well.	The	Christian	sits	in	his	little	well	and	thinks	the	whole	world	is	
his	well.	The	Mohammedan	sits	in	his	little	well	and	thinks	that	is	the	whole	
world	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.1,	pp.4-5).	
	
This	anecdote	illustrates	what	Vivekananda	saw	as	being	the	primary	problem	
that	emerged	when	traditions	that	had,	for	centuries,	existed	in	a	relative	state	of	
isolation,	tried	to	engage	in	meaningful	discussions.	Consequently,	there	are	a	number	
of	subtle	messages	that	can	be	drawn	out	of	this	narrative.	First,	Vivekananda	could	be	
compared	to	the	frog	from	the	sea	who	knew	that	all	philosophic	truths	were	not	
contained	in	a	single	well	and	therefore	took	the	opportunity	to	educate	his	fellow	frog	
of	the	world	of	ideas	that	existed	in	distant	lands.	Secondly,	Vivekananda	implies	that	he	
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was	comparing	his	audience	to	the	frog	in	the	well	who,	despite	being	told	that	there	
was	a	world	outside	his	realm,	was	reluctant	to	acknowledge	this	truth.	Thus,	we	
understand	that	for	Vivekananda	this	moment,	when	people	from	multiple	wells	had	
come	together	at	the	Parliament,	was	a	turning	point,	an	opportunity	that	needed	to	be	
grabbed	with	both	hands	and	not	simply	squandered	away.	Indeed,	in	his	description	of	
the	role	that	Vivekananda	played	in	Indian	history,	Wilhelm	Halbfass	states:		
Vivekananda	was	aware	of	the	fact	that	in	his	undertaking	to	carry	Indian	
spirituality	into	the	West,	he	had	seized	an	historical	opportunity	created	by	
Europe	itself,	he	had	to	utilize	channels	of	communication	which	were	provided	
by	the	West	(1988,	p.242).	
	
The	second	moment	in	Vivekananda’s	life,	that	bore	equal	importance,	was	when	
he	returned	to	his	homeland.	Now,	he	was	the	frog	from	the	sea,	who,	if	one	should	want	
to	take	this	story	to	one	of	its	logical	conclusions,	came	back	with	tales	to	tell	of	the	
sights	he	had	seen,	and	the	lessons	he	had	learned	and	imparted.	It	was	in	these	two	
moments	that	Vivekananda	was	at	his	most	influential.	Initially,	when	he	found	himself	
on	a	world	stage	as	a	speaker	at	the	prestigious	Parliament	of	Religions,	surrounded	by	
dignitaries	from	across	the	globe.	And	thereafter,	upon	his	return	to	India,	after	his	
initial	Western	trip,	when	he	came	back	in	the	role	of	a	conquering	hero.	And,	whilst	this	
may	not	have	been	a	world	stage,	it	was	nevertheless	a	moment	in	time	when	he	had	the	
eyes	of	his	country	turned	towards	him.54	These	two	specific	periods	convey	how	
Vivekananda	influenced	the	theoretical	framework	the	West	utilized	to	understand	
India	and	its	traditions	and,	perhaps	more	importantly,	how	the	Hindus	chose	to	
represent	themselves	to	outsiders.	These	events	in	Vivekananda’s	life	highlight	how	his	
methodology	seemed	to	anticipate	the	need	that	society	would	have	for	‘consumer	
																																																								
54	For	a	detailed	review	of	the	way	Vivekananda	was	portrayed	in	Indian	publications	
before	his	return	see	“Swami	Vivekananda	in	Indian	Newspapers	1893-1896”	
(Chattopadhyaya,	1999,	pp.134-195).		
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friendly	packaging’55;	a	need	that	was	met	efficiently	by	the	way	Vivekananda	framed	
his	interpretation	of	India,	Indians,	and	Indian	traditions.	Unfortunately,	this	approach	
also	resulted	in	many	casualties	that	continue	to	effect	India	today.	
	
The	Swami	Gets	Acclimated		
	 The	first	speech	that	Vivekananda	gave	at	the	Parliament	was	relatively	short,	
and	simply	skimmed	on	the	topics	that	he	would	delve	into	with	more	detail	a	few	days	
later.	However,	before	we	examine	this	speech	it	is	important	to	note	here	that	
Vivekananda	spent	six	weeks	as	the	houseguest	of	various	American	families	before	his	
first	speech	at	the	Parliament.	This	period	was	very	relevant	for	Vivekananda	because	it	
allowed	him	to	acclimatize	himself	to	American	social	norms	which	impacted	the	
fluidity	with	which	he	spoke	at	the	Parliament.	Initially,	Vivekananda	seemed	to	be	at	a	
loss	as	to	how	to	proceed	on	American	soil.	Eventually	however,	he	was	fortunate	to	be	
taken	under	the	wing	of	some	influential	Americans	thereby	giving	him	the	opportunity	
to	test	his	arguments,	and	narrative	style,	with	smaller	Western	audiences	before	
having	to	face	the	world	at	large.	Perhaps	an	example	would	help	to	clarify	how	
Vivekananda	adjusted	his	methods,	once	he	realized	that	if	his	critique	of	Western	
society	was	not	subtle,	then	it	would	only	serve	to	upset	his	audience	and	cause	them	to	
distance	themselves	from	him.		
	 The	following	anecdote	is	from	Marie	Louise	Burke’s	six-volume	work	Swami	
Vivekananda	in	the	West:	New	Discoveries	(2013).	Here,	she	reports	about	a	talk	that	
took	place	in	a	New	England	village	a	few	weeks	before	the	Parliament.	This	dialogue,	
																																																								
55	I	realize	that	this	is	an	anachronistic	use	of	the	term	‘consumer	friendly	packaging’	
but	it	seems	rather	appropriate	considering	the	way	Eastern	philosophy	has	become	a	
‘hot	commodity’	in	the	West.		
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which	has	been	reprinted	here	in	its	entirety,	draws	attention	to	how	pivotal	those	
initial	weeks	were	for	Vivekananda.	It	gave	him	the	opportunity	to	experiment	with	
certain	facets	of	his	talking	points,	before	a	live	Western	audience,	prior	to	his	debut	at	
the	Parliament.	Furthermore,	it	serves	as	an	excellent	contrast	to	the	words	that	he	
spoke	on	that	world	stage,	efficiently	showcasing	how	quickly	he	learned	the	best	way	
to	‘package’	his	words	and	message.	
“Ah,	the	English,”	he	said,	“only	just	a	little	while	ago	they	were	savages,…	the	
vermin	crawled	on	the	ladies’	bodices,..	and	they	scented	themselves	to	disguise	
the	abominable	odor	of	their	persons….	Most	hor-r-ible!	Even	now,	they	are	
barely	emerging	from	barbarism.”	
“Nonsense,”	said	one	of	his	scandalized	hearers,	“that	was	at	least	five	hundred	
years	ago.”		
“And	did	I	not	say	‘a	little	while	ago’?	What	are	a	few	hundred	years	when	you	
look	at	the	antiquity	of	the	human	soul?”	Then	with	a	turn	of	tone,	quite	
reasonable	and	gentle,	“They	are	quite	savage,”	he	said.	“The	frightful	cold,	the	
want	and	privation	of	their	northern	climate,”	going	on	more	quickly	and	
warmly,	“has	made	them	wild.	They	only	think	to	kill….	Where	is	their	religion?	
They	take	the	name	of	that	Holy	One,	they	claim	to	love	their	fellowmen,	they	
civilize	–	by	Christianity!-	No!	It	is	their	hunger	that	has	civilized	them,	not	their	
God.	The	love	of	man	is	on	their	lips,	but	in	their	hearts	there	is	nothing	but	evil	
and	every	violence.	‘I	love	you	my	brother,	I	love	you!’	..	and	all	the	while	they	cut	
his	throat!	Their	hands	are	red	with	blood.”	…	Then	going	on	more	slowly,	his	
beautiful	voice	deepening	till	it	sounded	like	a	bell,	“But	the	judgment	of	God	will	
fall	upon	them.	‘Vengeance	is	mine;	I	will	repay,	saith	the	Lord,’	and	destruction	
is	coming.	What	are	your	Christians?	Not	one	third	of	the	world.	Look	at	those	
Chinese,	millions	of	them.	They	are	the	vengeance	of	God	that	will	light	upon	you.	
There	will	be	another	invasion	of	the	Huns,”	adding	with	a	little	chuckle,	“they	
will	sweep	over	Europe,	they	will	not	leave	one	stone	standing	upon	another.	
Men,	women,	children,	all	will	go	and	the	dark	ages	will	come	again.”	His	voice	
was	indescribably	sad	and	pitiful;	then	suddenly	and	flippantly,	dropping	the	
seer,	“Me,	-	I	don’t	care!	The	world	will	rise	up	better	from	it,	but	it	is	coming.	The	
vengeance	of	God,	it	is	coming	soon.”	
“Soon?”	they	all	asked.		
“It	will	not	be	a	thousand	years	until	it	is	done.”	
They	drew	a	breath	of	relief.	It	did	not	seem	imminent.		
“And	God	will	have	vengeance,”	he	went	on.	“You	may	not	see	it	in	religion,	you	
may	not	see	it	in	politics,	but	you	must	see	it	in	history,	and	as	it	has	been,	it	will	
come	to	pass.	If	you	grind	down	the	people,	you	will	suffer.	We	in	India	are	
suffering	the	vengeance	of	God.	Look	upon	these	things.	They	ground	down	those	
poor	people	for	their	own	wealth,	they	heard	not	the	voice	of	distress,	they	ate	
from	gold	and	silver	when	the	people	cried	for	bread,	and	the	Mohammedans	
came	upon	them	slaughtering	and	killing:	slaughtering	and	killing	they	overran	
them.	India	has	been	conquered	again	and	again	for	years	and	last	and	worst	of	
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all	came	the	Englishman.	You	look	about	India,	what	has	the	Hindoo	left?	
Wonderful	temples,	everywhere.	What	has	the	Mohammedan	left?	Beautiful	
palaces.	What	has	the	Englishman	left?	Nothing	but	mounds	of	broken	brandy	
bottles!	And	God	has	had	no	mercy	upon	my	people	because	they	had	no	mercy.	
By	their	cruelty	they	degraded	the	populace,	and	when	they	needed	them	the	
common	people	had	no	strength	to	give	for	their	aid.	If	man	cannot	believe	in	the	
Vengeance	of	God,	he	certainly	cannot	deny	the	Vengeance	of	History.	And	it	will	
come	upon	the	English;	they	have	their	heels	on	our	necks,	they	have	sucked	the	
last	drop	of	our	blood	for	their	own	pleasures,	they	have	carried	away	with	them	
millions	of	our	money,	while	our	people	have	starved	by	villages	and	provinces.	
And	now	the	Chinaman	is	the	vengeance	that	will	fall	upon	them;	if	the	Chinese	
rose	today	and	swept	the	English	into	the	sea,	as	they	well	deserve,	it	would	be	no	
more	than	justice.”	
And	then,	having	had	his	say,	the	Swami	was	silent.	A	babble	of	thin-voiced	
chatter	rose	about	him,	to	which	he	listened,	apparently	unheeding.	Occasionally	
he	cast	his	eye	up	to	the	roof	and	repeated	softly,	“Shiva!	Shiva!”	and	the	little	
company,	shaken	and	disturbed	by	the	current	of	powerful	feelings	and	
vindictive	passion	which	seemed	to	be	flowing	like	molten	lava	beneath	the	
silent	surface	of	this	strange	being,	broke	up,	perturbed	(Burke,	2013,	pp.31-33,	
emphasis	in	original).	
	
This	rather	dramatic	exchange	that	is	recounted	by	Burke,	who	is	a	follower	of	
Vivekananda,	and	whose	works	have	been	printed	under	the	auspices	of	the	
Ramakrishna	Mission,	helps	to	give	us	an	insight	into	the	way	Vivekananda	occasionally	
retaliated	when	addressing	issues	such	as	colonization	and	greed.	That	being	said,	
whereas	his	anger	and	frustration	here	are	apparent,	it	is	also	necessary	to	note	that	
anecdotes	such	as	these	are	few	and	far	between.	Indeed,	Vivekananda	was	not	usually	
wont	to	speaking	like	this	in	public,	which	is	evidenced	by	the	fact	that	even	during	the	
six	weeks	before	the	Parliament	he	gained	many	admirers	and	followers.	So	much	so,	
that	he	was	able	to	convince	the	audience	at	his	first	lecture	in	an	American	church	
(which	also	took	place	during	those	relevant	six	weeks)	to	make	a	very	strange,	for	its	
time,	donation	that	Burke	comments	on:	
this	was	undoubtedly	the	first	collection	“for	a	Heathen	college	to	be	carried	on	
on	strictly	heathen	principles”	ever	to	be	solemnly	contributed	to	by	a	New	
England	congregation;	and	no	one	but	Swamiji	could	have	brought	such	a	marvel	
to	pass	(2013,	p.39).	
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Vivekananda	frequently	gives	meaning	to	the	phrase	‘an	iron	fist	in	a	velvet	glove’	
throughout	his	career	whereby	he	delivers	many	a	powerful	message	without	
seemingly	leaving	a	mark.	A	skill	that	we	shall	see	he	repeatedly	demonstrated	
throughout	his	time	at	the	Parliament.	Obviously,	this	does	not	mean	to	suggest	that	
Vivekananda’s	public	speaking	skills,	and	his	comfort	level	when	speaking	to	large	
audiences,	are	not	to	be	commended.	Instead,	this	narrative	should	simply	serve	to	
remind	readers	that	he	was	fortunate	enough	to	have	had	a	few	weeks	of	intense	
discussions	with	some	prominent	Americans,	such	as	the	author	Kate	Sanborn	and	Dr	
John	Henry	Wright,	Professor	of	Greek	at	Harvard	University,	which	no	doubt	prepared	
him	for	this	endeavour.	This	is	reflected	in	how	carefully	he	chose	his	words	at	the	
Parliament,	a	fact	that	is	highlighted	by	contemporary	newspapers,	many	of	which	
report	on	the	warm	welcome	Vivekananda	received	and	his	lightening	rise	to	fame.56	
	
“Response	to	Welcome”	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.1,	pp.3-4)	
The	first	speech	that	Vivekananda	gave	at	the	Parliament	was	in	response	to	his	
welcome	on	the	11th	of	September	1893.	He	began	by	addressing	the	audience	as	
“sisters	and	brothers	of	America.”	This	was	obviously	not	a	common	way	to	address	
audiences	in	the	West	since	Reverend	John	Henry	Barrows,	the	chairman	of	the	World	
Parliament	of	Religions	states:	
When	Mr.	Vivekananda	addressed	the	audience	as	“sisters	and	brothers	of	
America,”	there	arose	a	peal	of	applause	that	lasted	for	several	minutes	(1893,	
p.101).	
	
																																																								
56	For	example,	a	news	report	titled	in	the	Boston	Evening	Transcript,	September	30,	
1893,	states	“He	is	a	great	favorite	at	the	parliament,	from	the	grandeur	of	his	
sentiments	and	his	appearance	as	well.	If	he	merely	crosses	the	platform	he	is	
applauded.”	Similarly,	the	Critic,	October	7,	1893,	states	“no	one	expressed	so	well	the	
spirit	of	the	Parliament,	its	limitations	and	its	finest	influence,	as	did	the	Hindoo	monk”	
(as	cited	in	Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	pp.472-475).		
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One	can	only	imagine	that	Vivekananda,	dressed	in	his	long	orange	robes	and	turban,	
must	have	been	quite	a	sight	to	see	leaving	no	doubt	that	this	was	a	representative	from	
a	distant	land.	Yet,	here	was	this	exotic	man,	addressing	the	audience	in	a	way	that	
immediately	indicated	his	desire	to	create	a	familial	bond	with	his	listeners.	
Vivekananda	then	goes	on	to	introduce	himself	as	a	representative	“of	the	most	ancient	
order	of	monks	in	the	world”	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.1,	p.3)	thereby	establishing	both	
his	own	ancestry	and	his	tradition’s	ancient	heritage.	This	is	followed	by	him	thanking	
his	audience	“in	the	name	of	the	mother	of	religions”	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.1,	p.3).	It	
is	hard	to	imagine	that	this	choice	of	words	was	not	intentional	since,	by	stating	that	he	
belonged	to	a	tradition	which	he	believed	to	be	the	‘mother	of	religions’,	he	was	
essentially	arguing	that	there	was	a	hierarchy	amongst	the	speakers	present,	and	that	
he	placed	the	tradition	that	he	represented,	at	the	top	of	that	system.		
	 This	argument	of	antiquity,	whereby	Vivekananda	claims	that	‘Hinduism’	is	the	
‘mother	of	all	religions’	since	it	is	the	most	ancient,	is	a	topic	that	was	being	hotly	
debated	in	the	19th	century.	In	1859,	Charles	Darwin	published	his	much-celebrated	
theories	of	evolution	in	On	The	Origin	of	Species.	These	ideas	were	then	applied	by	
Orientalists	when	studying	other	‘religions’.	One	of	the	most	common	arguments	used	
in	the	19th	century,	was	that	‘religion’	had	developed	from	primitive	pagan	ideas	to	the	
sophisticated	ideology	of	Christianity.	Eric	J.	Sharpe	contends	that	the	search	for	origins	
had	become	a	popular	lens	by	which	Western	scholars	studied	Eastern	traditions:	
In	the	evolutionary	scheme	religion	came	to	be	viewed	entirely	in	terms	of	
history…	Scholars	such	as	Taylor,	Marett,	Frazer,	Jevon	Caird	and	Max	Mueller	
concentrated	on	the	analysis	of	legend,	myth,	magic,	ritual	and	philosophy.	
Interest	came	to	be	centered	more	and	more	on	the	‘origins’	of	religion	viewed	as	
a	human	function,	a	universal	fact	of	human	experience	–	and	on	the	‘primitive’	
religions…	By	the	end	of	the	century…	it	was	coming	to	be	believed	that	all	
religions	could	be	arranged	in	‘stages’	corresponding	–	for	the	method	was	pure	
analogy	–	on	the	‘stages’	of	biological	evolution	(as	cited	in	Basu,	2002,	p.46).	
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It	was	not	only	Darwin’s	premise	that	influenced	these	thinkers	but	rather,	they	were	
also	responding	to	theories	presented	a	few	decades	earlier	by	G.F	Hegel.	As	Nandy	
points	out	(see	Chapter	1),	Hegel	surmised	that	India	had	remained	in	the	infancy	stage	
of	human	history,	and	as	such,	Indian	religious	ideas	were	to	be	understood	as	
immature	and	undeveloped.	King	observes:	
Hegel’s	representation	of	India	is	bound	up	with	his	own	conception	of	history	as	
the	unfolding	of	the	world-spirit	and	of	systematic	philosophy	as	a	movement	
towards	a	consciousness	of	freedom.	Within	this	universal	picture	of	world	
history,	divided	by	Hegel	into	childhood,	adolescence	and	maturity,	India	
represented	the	first	period	in	human	history	–	the	childhood	of	mankind.	Thus	
India	had	nothing	to	contribute	to	modernity	(1999,	p.124).	
	
This	was	a	negative,	and	indeed,	condescending	view	of	Eastern	ideas.	In	fact,	what	
Hegel’s	hypothesis	demonstrates	is	that	whereas	many	European	scholars	were	willing	
to	accept	that	civilization	may	have	originated	in	the	East,	they	also	firmly	believed	that	
these	beginnings	were	stunted	and	that	it	was	only	in	the	Western	world	that	
civilization	had	matured.	Accordingly,	King	contends:	
This	nostalgia	for	origins,	usually	grounded	in	an	evolutionary	history	of	
humankind,	tended	to	conceive	of	India	as	a	throwback	to	the	‘childhood’	of	
humankind.	While	Europe	and	the	New	World	were	undergoing	enormous	social	
and	political	changes,	India	seemed	to	have	remained	unchanged	for	thousands	
of	years,	representing	a	crucial	example	of	static	archaism	with	which	the	
dynamic	modernity	of	the	West	could	be	successfully	contrasted	(1999,	p.118).	
	
Many	Orientalists	even	went	as	far	as	to	argue	that	Christianity	was	the	best	example	of	
a	modern	‘religion’	since	its	ethics	were	compatible	with	reason	and	science.	In	
Religious	Revivalism	as	Nationalist	Discourse	(2002),	Shamita	Basu	notes:		
The	missionary	strategy	was	to	make	Christianity	appear	as	an	apostle	of	
modernity,	as	[Alexander]	Duff	regarded	‘true	literature	and	true	sciences’	to	be	
‘our	very	best	auxiliaries’.	The	discourse	of	Protestant	Christianity,	particularly	
as	it	existed	within	the	Evangelical	orders	in	the	nineteenth	century,	was	not	just	
valorized	as	a	religion,	but	as	a	moral	system,	a	bearer	of	ethical	values	that	were	
universal.	It	was	through	this	discourse	of	‘the	modern	as	the	Christian’	that	
Christianity	came	to	extrapolate	some	of	the	Enlightenment	conceptions	within	
its	own	liturgy	(2002,	pp.46-47).	
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It	is	against	this	backdrop,	which	invoked	images	of	infancy	and	immaturity,	that	many	
Christian	European	scholars	developed	their	narrative	of	Western	superiority	when	
referring	to	Hindu	traditions.	Balagangadhara	concisely	highlights	why	such	
terminology	is	problematic:	
A	slight	bit	of	an	unpacking	of	this	notion	of	‘childhood’	and	‘the	cradle	of	
civilization’	is	necessary	to	understand	what	the	German	Romantics	were	really	
saying.	Irrespective	of	what	any	single	thinker	said	or	did	not	say,	each	of	them	
had	accepted	the	framework	of	a	universal	history	of	humankind.	Whether	they	
liked	it	or	not,	there	was	a	consensus	that	the	European	culture	had	matured.	
One	may	mourn	the	absence	of	innocence	and	spontaneity	of	childhood;	one	may	
long	to	rediscover	the	absence	of	affectation	and	deceit	in	the	childhood;	but	it	
remains	incontrovertible	that	this	is	how	an	adult	looks	back.	By	calling	the	
Indian	culture	the	childhood	of	Man,	the	Romantic	thinkers	did	not	go	beyond	or	
against	the	Enlightenment	tradition	–	but	merely	extended	it	with	a	fanciful	
twist.		
The	same	reflections	are	applicable	to	the	appellation	‘cradle	of	civilization’.	To	
use	that	with	respect	to	a	culture	long	dead	and	gone,	like	the	Greek	or	Roman,	
might	be	construed	as	a	way	of	paying	homage,	tribute,	or	just	acknowledgement	
to	the	contributions	of	the	past.	What	does	it	mean	when	used	to	characterize	a	
living	culture?	It	can	only	mean	that	those	who	live	in	this	culture	are	still	in	their	
cradles	–	and	have	been	there	during	the	last	thousand	years	–	unlike	their	
European	counterparts	(2005,	p.124).	
	
	 As	far	as	Vivekananda	is	concerned,	one	simply	has	to	read	his	remarks	on	Hegel	
in	The	Complete	Works	to	learn	that	he	was	not	only	familiar	with	his	theories,	but	that	
he	vehemently	disagreed	with	them.	For	example,	his	disdain	for	Hegel	was	apparent	
when	he	not	only	rejected	Hegel’s	theories,	but,	adding	insult	to	injury,	also	argued	that	
Hegel’s	premise	had	already	been	discarded	by	early	Indian	philosophers:	
Just	as	you	find	the	attempts	of	Hegel	and	Schopenhauer	in	German	philosophy,	
so	you	will	find	the	very	same	ideas	brought	forward	in	ancient	India.	
Fortunately	for	us,	Hegelianism	was	nipped	in	the	bud	and	not	allowed	to	sprout	
and	cast	its	baneful	shoots	over	this	motherland	of	ours.	Hegel’s	one	idea	is	that	
the	one,	the	absolute,	is	only	chaos,	and	that	the	individualized	form	is	greater.	
The	world	is	greater	than	the	non-world,	Samsara	is	greater	than	salvation	
(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.342).	
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In	contrast,	Vivekananda	embraced	Darwin’s	theory	of	evolution	but	only	with	the	
caveat	that	the	ancient	Indian	philosopher,	Patanjali,	had	also	put	forth	a	similar	theory	
of	evolution:		
You	have	heard	of	the	doctrine	of	physical	evolution	preached	in	the	Western	
world	by	the	German	and	English	savants.	It	tells	us	that	the	bodies	of	the	
different	animals	are	really	one;	the	differences	that	we	see	are	but	different	
expressions	of	the	same	series;	that	from	the	lowest	worm	to	the	highest	and	
most	saintly	man	it	is	but	one	–	the	one	changing	into	the	other	and	so	on,	going	
up	and	up,	higher	and	higher,	until	it	attains	perfection.	We	had	that	idea	also	
(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.406).	
	
Indeed,	for	Vivekananda,	these	ideas	of	evolution	originated	in	the	Vedas;	“[t]he	idea	of	
evolution	was	to	be	found	in	the	Vedas	long	before	the	Christian	era;	but	until	Darwin	
said	it	was	true,	it	was	regarded	as	a	mere	Hindu	superstition”	(Vivekananda,	2009,	
vol.8,	p.25).	As	Vivekananda	explained	it,	India	may	have	been	the	‘childhood	of	
humanity’	and	the	‘cradle	of	civilization’,	but	that	did	not	mean	that	it	had	not	matured	
as	Western	Christian	scholars	were	wont	to	argue.	Instead,	for	Vivekananda,	India	was	
where	all	valuable	knowledge	had	first	originated.	Indeed,	according	to	Vivekananda,	
this	‘continental	collision’	had	been	occurring	for	centuries:	
Once	in	far	remote	antiquity,	the	Indian	philosophy,	coming	in	contact	with	
Greek	energy,	led	to	the	rise	of	the	Persian,	the	Roman	and	other	great	nations.	
After	the	invasion	of	Alexander	the	Great,	these	two	great	waterfalls	colliding	
with	each	other,	deluged	nearly	half	of	the	globe	with	spiritual	tides,	such	as	
Christianity.	Again,	a	similar	comingling,	resulting	in	the	improvement	and	
prosperity	of	Arabia,	laid	the	foundation	of	modern	European	civilization	
(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.4,	p.402).	
	
Vivekananda	is	probably	basing	his	arguments	regarding	the	relationship	between	
India,	and	the	Ancient	Greco-Roman	culture,	on	the	fact	that	philologists	in	the	18th	
century	had	revealed	a	direct	correlation	between	Sanskrit	and	European	languages.	In	
The	Shape	of	Ancient	Thought,	(2002)	Thomas	McEvilley	explores,	in	great	detail,	how	
the	Greeks	and	the	Indians	had	a	shared	philosophic	ancestry.	McEvilley	points	out	that	
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the	discovery	of	the	linguistic	connection	between	Sanskrit	and	European	languages	
was	literally	‘explosive’:	
The	situation	reached	explosive	volatility	in	1786,	two	years	after	the	founding	
of	the	Asiatic	Society	of	Bengal	(later	the	Royal	Asiatic	Society).	The	bombshell	
was	Sir	William	Jones’s	historic	assertion	to	a	meeting	of	the	Society	“that	no	
philologer	could	examine	them	all	three	[the	Latin,	Greek,	and	Sanskrit	
languages]	without	believing	them	to	have	sprung	from	some	common	source”	
(2002,	p.xxi).	
	
This	led	to	further	investigations	on	how	these	ancient	civilizations	may	have	also	
shared	other	basic	ideologies.	As	McEvilley	explains	it,	at	least	initially,	there	was	great	
excitement	amongst	a	certain	section	of	Western	intellectuals	who	believed	that	India	
may	very	well	be	the	‘cradle	of	civilization’:	
At	about	the	time	of	Jones’s	discovery	–	roughly	the	moment	when	the	Late	
Enlightenment	was	giving	way	to	the	Romantic	era	–	Western	scholars	
undertook	a	quest	for	the	absolute	source	of	civilization,	which	was	to	be	
discovered	by	means	such	as	philology,	and,	later,	archeology.	As	Raymond	
Schwab	has	argued,	the	discovery	of	the	linguistic	cognateness	of	India	to	the	
West	occurred	at	the	perfect	moment	to	intersect	with	that	search.	For	a	brief	
period	of	about	thirty-five	years	–	about	1785-1829	–	the	leading	candidate	for	
the	Ur-civilization	was	India.		
In	that	heady	Indocentric	phase,	on	the	heels	of	Jones’s	epochal	pronouncement,	
it	seemed	that	the	western	world’s	search	for	its	origin	–	that	is,	its	true	self	–	
would	be	fulfilled	by	plumbing	the	mystery	of	far-off	and	little-known	India.	
India	somehow	held	the	key	to	the	West’s	quest	for	ultimate	self-knowledge.	
Schlegel	declared	enthusiastically:	“Everything,	yes,	everything	without	
exception	has	its	origin	in	India.”	This	conviction	led	him	to	respond	to	Jones’s	
discovery	by	declaring	that	Sanskrit	was	not	only	cognate	with,	that	is,	a	sibling	
of,	Greek	and	Latin;	in	fact	it	was	the	“mother	language	of	Greek,	Latin,	Persian	
and	German.”	Not	dissimilarly,	Schopenhauer,	in	line	with	his	belief	in	“the	
underlying	unity	of	all	things,”	thought	that	both	Christianity	and	the	Ancient	
Egyptian	religion	had	originated	in	India	(2002,	p.xxii).	
	
Eventually	however,	with	the	discovery	of	the	Rosetta	Stone	in	Egypt	in	1821,	India	was	
displaced	as	the	source	of	all	civilization.	What	is	perhaps	more	important	to	note	here	
however,	is	that	this	idea,	that	India	was	the	‘cradle	of	civilization’	did	not	sit	well	with	
colonial	objectives.	After	all,	the	British	defended	their	right	to	colonize	with	the	
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argument	that	they	were	uplifting	a	fallen	race.	If	India	was	not	in	need	of	‘saving’	then	
they	could	lose	their	moral	argument	for	domination.	As	McEvilley	puts	it:	
In	time	an	account	was	worked	out	that	dissipated	the	problem	of	the	Indo-
Europeanness	of	Sanskrit	by	asserting	that	the	Aryans	had	indeed	been	white	
people,	but	they	had	been	absorbed	into	a	nonwhite	matrix,	leaving	their	
language	intact	while	their	skin	color	–	and	with	it	their	cultural	identity	–	was	
mostly	lost.	Modern	Indians,	then,	are	not	really	white	people,	though	they	use	a	
language	left	behind	by	earlier	white	conquerors,	and	the	racial	justification	for	
colonization	does	apply	after	all:	The	British	were	going	in	to	finish	up	the	job	
the	Aryans	had	begun	long	ago.	The	Greek	colonization	of	India	had	reinforced	
the	original	Aryan	input,	but	it	too	had	been	dissolved	and	absorbed	by	the	
larger	brown	body	of	humanity.	The	Greek	infusion	of	whiteness,	coming	after	
the	Aryan,	constituted	a	tradition	which	the	British	could	honorably	carry	on.	As	
one	British	imperialist	author	wrote:	“Ex	Occidente	Imperium;	the	genius	of	
Empire	in	India	has	come	to	her	from	the	West;	and	can	be	maintained	only	by	
constant	infusions	of	fresh	blood	from	the	same	source.”	James	Mill’s	idea,	from	
the	same	period,	that	“the	Indian	civilization	never	prospered	except	under	
foreign	domination”	seemed	a	clear	justification	for	imperialism	as	a	civilizing	
mission	(2002,	p.xxiii).	
	
It	seems	likely	that	Vivekananda	was	responding	to	these	arguments	when	he	claimed	
that	India	was	an	ancient	civilization	that	was,	in	actuality,	responsible	for	impacting	
Western	thought.	Of	course,	Vivekananda	was	not	the	first,	nor	the	only	Indian,	to	be	
pushing	back	against	these	ideas	presented	by	nineteenth	century	European	scholars.	
Instead,	there	were	other	Hindu	scholars	who	forcibly	fought	fire	with	fire	by	
presenting	their	own	theories	of	Hindu	superiority.	For	instance,	the	Arya	Samaj	were	
similarly	engaged	in	challenging	Western	claims	of	superiority:	
Locating	the	‘essence’	of	the	Hindu	tradition	in	origins	(arche),	in	this	case	the	
ancient	Vedas,	however,	was	also	prevalent	among	the	nineteenth	century	Hindu	
reformers	as	a	nationalist	and	anti-colonial	stratagem.	For	Dayananda	Saraswati	
and	the	Arya	Samaj,	for	instance,	the	Samhitas	were	the	source	of	all	legitimate	
manifestations	of	Hinduism	and	also	provided	evidence	of	the	superiority	of	
Hinduism	over	‘younger’	religions	such	as	Christianity.	For	Saraswati,	
Christianity	was	a	poor	imitation	of	the	Hindu	religion.	Indeed,	all	knowledge,	he	
believed,	could	be	demonstrated	to	have	originated	in	Mother	India	from	time	
immemorial,	including	modern	technologies	such	as	aircraft,	long-forgotten	and	
now	claimed	to	be	the	sole	invention	of	the	colonizing	Westerners	(King,	1999,	
p.119).	
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This	helps	explain	Vivekananda’s	strategy,	of	calling	‘Hinduism’	the	‘mother	of	all	
religions’,	which	was	probably	intentional,	since	this	immediately	put	to	rest	the	idea	
that	India	was	simply	the	‘cradle	of	civilization’.	Instead,	he	argued	that	India	was	also	
the	‘hand	that	rocked	the	cradle’!		
Let	us	turn	back	now	to	Vivekananda’s	speech	where	we	find	that	he	is	thanking	
his	audience	(and	this	is	just	in	the	first	paragraph),	“in	the	name	of	millions	and	
millions	of	Hindu	people	of	all	classes	and	sects”	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.1,	p.3).	
Vivekananda	adeptly	claimed	for	himself	the	title	of	‘the	voice	of	India’.	An	interesting	
tactic,	especially	since	he	was	not	the	only	Indian	present	at	the	Parliament.	Besides	
him,	to	mention	just	a	few,	there	was	P.C	Mazumdar	of	Calcutta	who	was	representing	
the	Brahmo	Samaj	along	with	B.B.	Nagarkar	of	Bombay;	Angarika	Dharmapala,	the	
General	Secretary	of	the	Maha-Bodhi	Society	representing	the	Southern	Buddhists	of	
Ceylon	(now	Sri	Lanka);	and	representing	the	Jain	community	of	Bombay	were	Muni	
Atmaramji	and	Virchand	A.	Gandhi	(Barrows,	1893,	pp.64-65).	However,	this	ploy	of	
Vivekananda’s	obviously	worked	because	it	is	Vivekananda	who	is	remembered	as	the	
‘voice	of	India’.	In	The	World’s	Parliament	of	Religions:	The	East/West	Encounter,	
Chicago,	1893,	(2009)	which	offers	a	contemporary	in-depth	analysis	of	the	Parliament,	
Richard	Hughes	Seager	reports:	
To	his	American	audience,	Vivekananda’s	physical	presence	evoked	a	sense	of	
both	familiarity	and	difference…	The	Daily	Inter-Ocean	noted	that	“great	crowds	
of	people,	the	most	of	whom	were	women,	pressed	around	the	doors	leading	to	
the	Hall	of	Columbus…	for	it	had	been	announced	that	Swami	Vivekananda,	the	
popular	Hindoo	[sic]	monk	who	looks	so	much	like	McCullough’s	Othello	was	to	
speak.”	More	substantially,	Merwin	Marie-Snell,	Bishop	John	Keane’s	secretary,	
was	quoted	as	saying	Vivekananda	was	“beyond	question	the	most	popular	and	
influential	man	in	the	Parliament	(2009,	p.111).	
	
Perhaps	the	most	remarkable	aspect	of	Vivekananda’s	popularity	at	the	
Parliament	was	that	he	gained	this	position	despite	the	fact	that	he	pulled	no	punches.	
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Indeed,	in	this	short	introductory	speech,	Vivekananda	finds	a	way	to	claim,	for	India,	
the	mantle	of	tolerance	and	respect	for	other	traditions	that	was	being	toted,	by	some,	
as	the	Parliament’s	greatest	achievement.57	Accordingly,	he	proclaims:		
I	am	proud	to	belong	to	a	nation	which	has	sheltered	the	persecuted	and	the	
refugees	of	all	religions	and	all	nations	of	the	earth.	I	am	proud	to	tell	you	that	we	
have	gathered	to	our	bosom	the	purest	remnant	of	Israelites,	who	came	to	
Southern	India	and	took	refuge	with	us	in	the	very	year	in	which	their	holy	
temple	was	shattered	to	pieces	by	Roman	tyranny.	I	am	proud	to	belong	to	the	
religion	which	has	sheltered	and	is	still	fostering	the	remnant	of	the	grand	
Zoroastrian	nation	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.1,	pp.3-4).	
	
By	highlighting	that	a	certain	Jewish	sect,	and	a	substantial	Parsi	community,	had	found	
a	home	in	India	Vivekananda	was	able	to	argue	that	this	constituted	a	legitimate	claim	
for	Indians	to	be	declared	a	tolerant	people	who	embraced	all	‘religions’.	Indeed,	this	
premise	of	Vivekananda’s,	whereby	he	argued	that	‘Hinduism’	accepted	all	traditions	as	
valid,	was	to	be	one	of	the	cornerstones	of	his	arguments	while	in	the	West.	He	
contended	that	‘Hinduism’	was	unique	because	of	the	fact	that	it	recognized	the	need	for	
many	paths,	or	streams,	of	‘religion’.	Consequently,	since	Hindus	agreed	that	all	these	
paths	and	streams	were	headed	towards	a	single	goal,	this	made	them	the	most	
‘religiously’	advanced	people.	To	examine	these	claims	of	Vivekananda	more	closely	
however,	a	few	definitions	and	clarifications	are	necessary.	As	such,	I	will	attempt	to	
shed	some	light	on	what	Vivekananda	meant	when	he	used	words	like	‘religion’,	God,	
Hindu	and	‘Hinduism’.	Terms	that,	as	we	have	already	discussed	in	the	first	two	
chapters,	are	still	hotly	contested	concepts	in	contemporary	times.		
	
	
																																																								
57	“Diversity	in	unity	was	the	dominant	ideal	that	informed	the	aspirations	of	the	
Parliament’s	leaders.	This	was	reflected	in	their	optimistic	vision	of	co-operation	among	
all	religions	on	a	shared	platform	of	tolerance	and	social	progress”	(Seager,	2009,	p.xiii)	
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Religion,	God,	Hindu	and	‘Hinduism’	
It	is	important	to	mention	here	that	Vivekananda	used	these,	and	other	Western	
terms	liberally,	and	did	not	always	find	it	necessary	to	explain	what	these	concepts	
meant,	or	the	context	in	which	he	was	utilizing	them.	Indeed,	even	though	he	
acknowledged	that	using	the	English	language	to	describe	Indian	ideas	could	oftentimes	
be	problematic,	he	nonetheless	opted	for	these	‘inadequate’	labels	because	he	wanted	to	
reach	a	wider	audience:	
A	friend	criticized	the	use	of	European	terms	of	philosophy	and	religion	in	my	
addresses.	I	would	have	been	very	glad	to	use	Sanskrit	terms;	it	would	have	been	
much	more	easy,	as	being	the	only	perfect	vehicle	of	religious	thought.	But	the	
friend	forgot	that	I	was	addressing	an	audience	of	Western	people	(Vivekananda,	
2009,	vol.4,	p.344).	
	
Fortunately,	however,	Vivekananda	did	occasionally	speak	about	the	parameters	that	he	
set	around	these	Western	concepts.	For	example,	he	described	what	the	term	‘religion’	
meant	to	him:	
In	every	religion	there	are	three	parts:	philosophy,	mythology,	and	ritual.	
Philosophy	of	course	is	the	essence	of	every	religion;	mythology	explains	and	
illustrates	it	by	means	of	the	more	or	less	legendary	lives	of	great	men,	stories	
and	fables	of	wonderful	things,	and	so	on;	ritual	gives	to	that	philosophy	a	still	
more	concrete	form,	so	that	every	one	may	grasp	it	–	ritual	is	in	fact	concretised	
philosophy	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.1,	p.72).	
	
In	a	speech	titled	“The	Necessity	of	Religion”	he	acknowledged	that	various	theories	of	
‘religion’	had	been	presented	by	previous	scholars	and	highlighted	the	two	that	he	felt	
held	the	most	substance:	
Two	theories	have	gained	some	acceptance	amongst	modern	scholars.	One	is	the	
spirit	theory	of	religion,	the	other	the	evolution	of	the	idea	of	the	Infinite.	One	
party	maintains	that	ancestor	worship	is	the	beginning	of	religious	ideas;	the	
other,	that	religion	originates	in	the	personification	of	the	powers	of	nature	
(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.2,	p.57).	
	
Vivekananda	then	went	on	to	present	his	own	theory:		
These	two	views,	though	they	seem	to	be	contradictory,	can	be	reconciled	on	a	
third	basis,	which,	to	my	mind,	is	the	real	germ	of	religion,	and	that	I	propose	to	
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call	the	struggle	to	transcend	the	limitations	of	the	senses	(Vivekananda,	2009,	
vol.2,	p.59).	
	
Furthermore,	for	Vivekananda	‘religion’	was	not	an	optional	state	of	being	and	he	would	
have	probably	agreed	with	Mircea	Eliade	that	man	is	essentially	‘Homo	religiosus’:	
It	is	my	belief	that	religious	thought	is	in	man’s	very	constitution,	so	much	so	that	
it	is	impossible	for	him	to	give	up	religion	until	he	can	give	up	his	mind	and	body,	
until	he	can	stop	thought	and	life.	As	long	as	a	man	thinks,	this	struggle	must	go	
on,	and	so	long	man	must	have	some	form	of	religion	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.4,	
pp.203-204).	
	
In	the	above-mentioned	speech,	he	also	argued	that	‘religion’	formed	the	basic	fabric	of	
every	society,	past	or	present:	
Of	all	the	forces	that	have	worked	and	are	still	working	to	mould	the	destinies	of	
the	human	race,	none,	certainly,	is	more	potent	than	that,	the	manifestation	of	
which	we	call	religion.	All	social	organizations	have	as	a	background,	
somewhere,	the	workings	of	that	peculiar	force,	and	the	greatest	cohesive	
impulse	ever	brought	into	play	amongst	human	units	has	been	derived	from	this	
power	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.2,	p.57).	
	
His	all-encompassing	theories	about	‘religion’	did	not	end	there	however,	because	he	
also	presented	a	utopian	interpretation	of	this	concept:	
There	is	one	religion	and	there	are	many	sects.	The	moment	you	give	it	a	name,	
individualise	it	and	separate	it	from	the	rest,	it	is	a	sect,	no	more	a	religion.	A	sect	
(proclaims)	its	own	truth	and	declares	that	there	is	no	truth	anywhere	else.	
Religion	believes	that	there	has	been,	and	still	is,	one	religion	in	the	world.	There	
never	were	two	religions.	It	is	the	same	religion	(presenting)	different	aspects	in	
different	places	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.1,	p.438).	
	
A	couple	of	points	need	to	be	highlighted	here.	First,	is	the	fact	that	since	Vivekananda	
had	attended	English	language	schools	and	universities,	he	had	been	introduced	to	
European	philosophy	and	theories	of	scientific	reasoning.	As	such,	he	was	quite	familiar	
with	the	different	interpretations	that	Western	scholars	had	put	forth	regarding	
‘religion’:	
At	the	beginning	of	the	nineteenth	century	man	tried	to	find	God	through	reason,	
and	Deism	was	the	result.	What	little	was	left	of	God	by	this	process	was	
destroyed	by	Darwinism	and	Millism.	Men	were	then	thrown	back	upon	
historical	and	comparative	religion.	They	thought	religion	was	derived	from	
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element	worship	(see	Max	Muller	on	sun	myths	etc.);	others	thought	that	religion	
was	derived	from	ancestor	worship	(see	Herbert	Spencer).	But	taken	as	a	whole,	
these	methods	have	proved	a	failure.	Man	cannot	get	at	Truth	by	external	
methods	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.6,	p.41).	
	
Now,	whereas	it	is	the	editors	of	The	Complete	Works	who	have	inserted	the	names	Max	
Muller	and	Herbert	Spencer	in	parentheses	here,	it	is	more	than	likely	because	
Vivekananda	mentioned	both	these	Western	scholars	frequently.	In	fact,	Vivekananda	
was	quite	familiar	with	Spencer’s	work:		
There	is	also	the	story	of	Narendranath’s	writing	a	letter	to	Herbert	Spencer,	for	
the	latter’s	permission	to	translate	his	book	on	‘Education’	in	Bengali,	and	‘the	
savant,	on	reading	the	letter,	was	much	impressed	by	the	writer’s	intellectual	
acumen.	Mahendranath	Datta	says	that	his	elder	brother	translated	this	book	in	
his	early	student	days.	It	was	named	Shiksha	and	was	published	by	the	Basumati	
printing	press	owned	by	Upendra	Nath	Mukherjee	(Chattopadhyaya,	1999,	p.31).	
	
However,	for	Vivekananda,	it	was	not	enough	to	demonstrate	that	he	was	
knowledgeable	about	these	Western	concepts.	Instead,	he	made	every	effort	to	argue	
that	Hindu	philosophers	had	already	discovered	these	ideas.	Consequently,	
Vivekananda	was	not	only	willing	to	quote	Spencer	but	indeed,	to	challenge	him:		
What	is	Spencer’s	unknowable?	It	is	our	Maya.	Western	philosophers	are	afraid	
of	the	unknowable,	but	our	philosophers	have	taken	a	big	jump	into	the	
unknown,	and	they	have	conquered	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.6,	p.104).	
	
As	for	Muller,	Vivekananda	had	a	personal	relationship	with	him	and	even	helped	
Muller	acquire	the	resources	he	needed	to	write	his	book,	Ramakrishna:	His	Life	and	
Sayings	(1898).	Vivekananda,	like	other	Indian	elites	in	his	day,	was	familiar	with	
Western	and	Orientalist	scholarship	and	demonstrated	this	awareness	whenever	it	was	
to	his	advantage.	Dermot	Killingley	reminds	us:	
Since	the	attitudes,	values	and	assumptions	of	this	[English-speaking]	world	had	
to	a	greater	or	lesser	extent	been	accepted	by	English-speaking	Indians,	together	
with	much	of	the	knowledge	that	marked	a	cultured	inhabitant	of	it,	the	West	
was	not	alien	to	them	(1999,	p.140).	
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As	a	result	of	this	‘continental	collision’,	we	are	also	able	to	legitimately	presume	that	
Vivekananda	was	familiar	with	concepts	such	as	‘natural	religion’	that	were	made	
popular	by	European	historical	figures	like	Jean	Bodin	(1530-1596)	and	Lord	Herbert	of	
Cherbury	(1583-1645).	These	Western	scholars	explored	the	theory	of	‘religion’	and	its	
relationship	to	reason,	and	many	of	their	ideas	are	reflected	in	terms	such	as	‘natural	
religion’	and	‘deism’.	For	example,	Robert	Yelle	states:	
Edward,	Lord	Herbert	of	Cherbury	(1583-1645),	who	advanced	a	concept	of	
natural	religion	and	the	origins	of	idolatry	that	anticipated	the	Deists,	held	
similar	views,	as	the	titles	of	two	of	the	chapters	in	his	work	On	Pagan	Religion	
(De	religione	gentilium)	illustrate:	“Why	there	were	so	many	Names	given	to	God,	
and	what	they	were”	and	“The	Worship	of	the	Sun	and	his	Several	Names.”	
Herbert	cautioned	that	“wise	people	did	not	think	that	the	Sun	itself…	was	the	
Supreme	God”	(2013,	p.56).	
	
Similarly,	Masuzawa	reminds	us:	
Earlier	Deists	–	such	as	Herbert	of	Cherbury	(1663)	and	John	Toland	(1696)	–	
typically	presupposed	that	there	was	the	original,	universal,	rational	and	ethical	
religion	common	to	all	humankind,	and	that,	with	a	passage	of	time,	this	original	
pure	theism	became	variously	“corrupted,”	with	the	result	that	different	peoples	
in	different	regions	of	the	world	came	to	practice	divergent	and	idiosyncratic	
religions.	(2000,	p.212).	
	
As	such,	Vivekananda	was	not	presenting	new	ideas	to	his	audience,	but	rather,	he	was	
using	his	familiarity	with	Western	intellectual	history	in	an	effort	to	convince	his	
audience	of	the	veracity	of	his	claims.	This	should	not	however,	diminish	the	
effectiveness	of	Vivekananda’s	methods	because,	whereas	he	may	have	known	that	his	
audience	was	aware	of	some	of	the	history	of	these	terms,	there	could	have	been	no	
certainty	of	their	widespread	acceptance.	Balagangadhara	points	out:	
It	is	equally	essential	for	us	to	note	that	the	ethnographic	data	about	other	
cultures	was	neither	complete	nor	exhaustive	during	this	period.	As	we	have	
already	seen,	they	were	not	even	free	of	ambiguity	or	inconsistencies.	During	the	
period	of	Bodin	or	Hume	or	even	Freud,	anthropological	investigation	had	not	
come	up	with	indisputable	evidence	showing	that	religion	was	a	cultural	
universal	(2005,	p.148).	
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Thus,	whereas	it	is	true	that	Vivekananda	was	not	pulling	these	theories	out	of	
thin	air,	it	is	also	true	that	he	demonstrated	an	acumen	for	appropriating	these	
discourses,	that	were	relevant	in	Western	society,	and	allying	them	with	his	own	
concept	of	‘religion’.	As	we	saw	in	the	second	chapter,	a	strong	argument	can	be	made	
that	the	term	‘religion’,	has	Christian	undertones.	However,	Vivekananda	took	every	
liberty	to	define	this	concept	in	a	way	that	appealed	to	his	needs,	and	in	doing	so	he,	like	
many	of	his	predecessors,	tried	to	divorce	it	from	its	Christian	roots.	For	example,	in	
Chapter	1	we	witnessed	how	Bankimchandra	discarded	the	label	‘religion’	and	replaced	
it	with	the	Hindu	concept	‘dharma’	which,	as	we	have	already	discussed,	is	a	complex	
term	that	is	not	universally	applicable	even	when	describing	Hindu	traditional	life.	
Similarly,	Vivekananda	also	attempted	to	define	the	label	‘religion’	in	ways	that	better	
suited	his	needs:	
In	Western	religion	the	idea	is	that	without	the	New	Testament	and	Christ	there	
could	be	no	religion.	A	similar	belief	exists	in	Judaism	with	regard	to	Moses	and	
the	Prophets,	because	these	religions	are	dependent	upon	mythology	only.	Real	
religion,	the	highest,	rises	above	mythology;	it	can	never	rest	upon	that.	Modern	
science	has	really	made	the	foundations	of	religion	strong.	That	the	whole	
universe	is	one,	is	scientifically	demonstrable.	What	the	metaphysicians	call	
“being”,	the	physicist	calls	“matter”,	but	there	is	no	real	fight	between	the	two,	
for	both	are	one.	Though	an	atom	is	invisible,	unthinkable,	yet	in	it	are	the	whole	
power	and	potency	of	the	universe.	That	is	exactly	what	the	Vedantist	says	of	
Atman.	All	sects	are	really	saying	the	same	thing	in	different	words	
(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.7,	pp.49-50).	
	
Of	course	‘monism’,	which	is	what	Vivekananda	was	referring	to	here,	was	not	an	
unfamiliar	concept	in	the	Western	world	and	we	will	address	those	arguments	later	in	
this	chapter.			
That	being	said,	it	is	interesting	to	note	that	whereas	Vivekananda	readily	
offered	up	his	qualifications	for	‘religion’,	he	was	not	able	to	define	‘God’	just	as	easily.	
Instead,	he	repeatedly	suggested	that	he	preferred	to	use	Sanskrit	terms,	such	as	
Brahman,	since	this	resonated	with	his	own	concept	of	‘God’:	
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What	do	I	mean	by	the	use	of	the	English	word	God?	Certainly	not	the	word	as	
ordinarily	used	in	English	–	a	good	deal	of	difference.	There	is	no	other	suitable	
word	in	English.	I	would	rather	confine	myself	to	the	Sanskrit	word	Brahman.	He	
is	the	general	cause	of	all	these	manifestations.	What	is	this	Brahman?	He	is	
eternal,	eternally	pure,	eternally	awake,	the	almighty,	the	all-knowing,	the	all-
merciful,	the	omnipresent,	the	formless,	the	partless.	He	creates	this	universe	
(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.123).	
	
Similarly:	
Take	for	instance,	the	English	word	God.	It	covers	only	a	limited	function,	and	if	
you	go	beyond	it,	you	have	to	add	adjectives,	to	make	it	Personal	or	Impersonal,	
or	Absolute	God.	So	with	the	words	for	God	in	every	other	language;	their	
signification	is	very	small	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.1,	p.219).	
	
The	dilemma	that	Vivekananda	was	facing	here	is	not	a	new	problem	but	rather	an	issue	
that	has	been	a	point	of	discussion	since	antiquity.	According	to	McEvilley,	this	need,	to	
find	a	way	to	define	the	‘undefinable’,	is	actually	one	of	the	oldest	philosophical	enigmas	
that	both	hemispheres	have	struggled	with:	
Many	passages	in	the	early	Upanisads	describe	brahman,	or	Being,	in	terms	
virtually	identical	to	those	with	which	Anaximander	[circa	540	BCE]	described	
the	Infinite.	“that	from	which	these	things	are	born,	that	by	which,	when	born,	
they	live,	that	into	which,	when	departing,	they	enter.	That,	seek	to	know.	That	is	
Brahman”.	As	Anaximander’s	Infinite	is	declared	by	him	to	be	neither	one	
element	nor	another,	the	brahman	is	declared	to	be	“neither	gross	nor	fine,	
neither	short	nor	long,	neither	glowing	red	like	fire	nor	adhesive	like	water”.	As	
Anaximander’s	Infinite	is	said	by	Aristotle	to	“surround	all	things	and	steer	
them,”	so	the	brahman	is	said	in	the	early	Upanisads	to	contain	all	things	and	to	
be	their	“inner	controller”.	As	Anaximander’s	Infinite	is	said	by	Aristotle	to	be	
divine	and	immortal,	so	the	brahman	“transcends	hunger	and	thirst,	sorrow	and	
delusion,	old	age	and	death”.	As	the	ground	of	being,	both	of	these	concepts,	
apeiron	and	brahman,	precede	all	specific	qualities	except	that	of	existing;	the	
source	of	the	pairs	of	opposites,	each	is	itself	beyond	them.		
This	concept	of	a	state	of	being	which	is	beyond	qualities,	or	prior	to	them,	is	the	
first	purely	philosophical	idea.	It	was	obtained	through	a	progressive	stripping	
away	of	concrete	imagery.	It	is	one	of	the	great	and	characteristic	products	of	
ancient	thought	–	both	Greek	and	Indian	–	and	has	retained	force	as	an	
expression	of	both	philosophical	and	mystical	insights	into	modern	times	(2002,	
p.33).	
	
In	the	case	of	Vivekananda,	despite	the	fact	that	he	found	the	word	‘God’	both	limiting,	
and	inadequate,	he	nevertheless	continued	to	use	this	label	since	he	could	not	replace	it	
with	Brahman	while	he	was	in	the	West.	He	probably	realized	that	even	though	it	had	its	
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shortcomings,	it	was	a	word	that	had	meaning	for	Westerners	in	the	19th	century,	and	
indeed	for	many	Indians	as	well,	and	as	such	had	to	be	endured.	
	 Two	other	concepts	that	are	crucial	to	our	understanding	of	Vivekananda,	and	
the	role	he	played	in	‘repackaging’	Hindu	ideas	during	the	colonial	era,	are	the	labels	
‘Hindu’	and	‘Hinduism’.	As	we	have	already	discussed,	these	terms	are	ambiguous	even	
today	and	are	continuously	being	defined,	redefined	and	challenged.	Vivekananda	gave	
definitive	answers	for	what	he	believed	these	words	meant	in	such	a	way	as	to	
seemingly	leave	no	room	for	discussion.	However,	despite	this	apparent	confidence,	
upon	closer	inspection	it	becomes	evident	that	Vivekananda	had	trouble	with	these	
terms.	Indeed,	one	gets	the	impression	that	he	particularly	struggled	with	defining	the	
term	‘Hindu’:	
There	is	a	word	which	has	become	very	common	as	an	appellation	of	our	race	
and	religion.	The	word	“Hindu”	requires	a	little	explanation…	This	word	“Hindu”	
was	the	name	that	the	ancient	Persians	used	to	apply	to	the	river	Sindhu.	
Whenever	in	Sanskrit	there	is	an	“s”,	in	ancient	Persian	it	changes	into	“h”,	so	
that	“Sindhu”	became	“Hindu”…	Now	this	word	“Hindu”	as	applied	to	the	
inhabitants	of	the	other	side	of	the	Indus	whatever	might	have	been	its	meaning	
in	ancient	times,	has	lost	all	its	force	in	modern	times;	for	all	the	people	that	live	
on	this	side	of	the	Indus	no	longer	belong	to	one	religion.	There	are	the	Hindus	
proper,	the	Mohammedans,	the	Parsees,	the	Christians,	the	Buddhists	and	Jains.	
The	word	“Hindu”	in	its	literal	sense	ought	to	include	all	these;	but	as	signifying	
the	religion	it	would	not	be	proper	to	call	all	these	Hindus.	It	is	very	hard,	
therefore,	to	find	any	common	name	for	our	religion,	seeing	that	this	religion	is	a	
collection,	so	to	speak,	of	various	religions,	of	various	ideas,	of	various	
ceremonials	and	forms,	all	gathered	together	almost	without	a	name,	and	
without	a	church	and	without	an	organization	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.228).	
	
As	a	result	of	these	inherent	difficulties,	Vivekananda	came	to	what,	at	least	initially,	
seems	to	have	been	a	tentative	working	conclusion:	
The	only	point	where,	perhaps,	all	our	sects	agree	is	that	we	all	believe	in	the	
scriptures	–	the	Vedas.	This	perhaps	is	certain	that	no	man	can	have	a	right	to	be	
called	a	Hindu	who	does	not	admit	the	supreme	authority	of	the	Vedas	
(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.228).	
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Interestingly,	this	is	the	same	conclusion	that	the	scholar	Halbfass	would	come	to,	over	
a	century	later:	
regardless	of	the	highly	elusive	and	ambiguous	nature	of	the	historical	
relationship	between	the	Veda	and	Hinduism,	the	Hindu	tradition	has,	for	many	
centuries,	defined	itself	in	relation	to	the	Veda.	The	Veda,	or	the	idea	of	the	Veda,	
has	provided	one	indispensable	focus	for	Hindu	self-understanding	(2005,	p.21).	
	
Now,	even	though	Vivekananda	finally	surmised	that	only	those	who	accepted	
the	Vedas	were	Hindus,	he	consistently	appropriated	Buddhist	and	Jain	ideas	and	called	
them	Hindu.	In	a	speech	presented	at	the	Parliament	on	the	26th	of	September	1893	
titled	“Buddhism,	the	Fulfillment	of	Hinduism”	he	stated:	
The	relation	between	Hinduism	(by	Hinduism,	I	mean	the	religion	of	the	Vedas)	
and	what	is	called	Buddhism	at	the	present	day	is	nearly	the	same	as	between	
Judaism	and	Christianity.	Jesus	Christ	was	a	Jew,	and	Shakya	Muni	was	a	Hindu.	
The	Jews	rejected	Jesus	Christ,	nay,	crucified	him,	and	the	Hindus	have	accepted	
Shakya	Muni	as	God	and	worship	him.	But	the	real	difference	that	we	Hindus	
want	to	show	between	modern	Buddhism	and	what	we	should	understand	as	the	
teachings	of	Lord	Buddha,	lies	principally	in	this:	Shakya	Muni	came	to	preach	
nothing	new.	He	also,	like	Jesus,	came	to	fulfil	and	not	to	destroy.	Only,	in	the	
case	of	Jesus,	it	was	the	old	people,	the	Jews,	who	did	not	understand	him,	while	
in	the	case	of	Buddha,	it	was	his	own	followers	who	did	not	realize	the	import	of	
his	teachings.	As	the	Jew	did	not	understand	the	fulfillment	of	the	Old	Testament,	
so	the	Buddhist	did	not	understand	the	fulfillment	of	the	truths	of	the	Hindu	
religion.	Again,	I	repeat,	Shakya	Muni	came	not	to	destroy,	but	he	was	the	
fulfilment,	the	logical	conclusion,	the	logical	development	of	the	religion	of	the	
Hindus	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.1,	p.21).		
	
I	am	not	even	going	to	try	and	address	the	multiple	controversies	that	these	statements	
could	raise,	with	both	Christians	and	Jews	alike,	since	that	is	beyond	the	scope	of	my	
research.	Instead,	I	would	like	to	draw	attention	to	the	fact	that	not	only	did	
Vivekananda	think	that	Buddhism	was	the	‘fulfillment	of	Hinduism’	but	that	he	believed	
that	the	Buddhists	had	not	understood	the	Buddha	themselves.	What	is	worth	nothing	
here	however,	is	that	one	also	gets	the	distinct	impression	that	this	was	his	way	of	
conceding	that	‘Hinduism’	needed	the	reform	that	the	Buddha	provided.	Whereas	this	
offers	no	consolation	to	a	Buddhist,	as	far	as	Vivekananda	was	concerned,	he	probably	
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believed	he	was	paying	the	Buddhists	a	compliment	when	he	suggested	that	Buddhism	
was	the	fulfilment	of	‘Hinduism.’	After	all,	for	Vivekananda,	‘Hinduism’	was	the	best	
‘religion’	known	to	man	and	being	the	fulfilment	of	such	a	‘religion’	could	only	be	seen	
as	an	expression	of	approval!	Indeed,	one	gets	a	clear	sense	of	Vivekananda’s	frustration	
with	the	fact	that	the	Buddhists	did	not	want	to	be	referred	to	as	Hindus	and	that	they	
did	not	accept	the	Vedas	as	their	ultimate	authority.		
	 Of	course,	this	appropriation	of	the	Buddha	was	not	novel	to	Vivekananda.	
Historians	have	argued	that	one	of	the	reasons	Buddhist	traditions	began	to	fade	away	
from	the	Indian	landscape	was	because	Hindu	philosophers	incorporated	many	
Buddhist	concepts	into	their	own	ideological	system.	Nowhere	is	this	more	evident	than	
with	the	smriti	scriptures	in	general	and	the	Vishnu	Puranas	in	particular,	texts	that	
gained	prominence	during	the	Puranic	period.	For	example,	in	The	Hindus	(2009),	
Wendy	Doniger	observes:	
The	myth	of	Vishnu’s	incarnation	as	the	Buddha	is	established	in	full	detail	in	the	
Vishnu	Purana,	represented	on	the	sixth-to-seventh-century	Dashavatara	temple	
at	Deogarh	and	mentioned	in	a	seventh-century	Pallava	inscription	and	an	
eighth-century	Tamil	inscription	(2009,	p.482).	
	
Furthermore,	she	elaborates:	
The	Bhagavata	Purana	says	that	Vishnu	became	the	Buddha	in	order	to	protect	
us	from	lack	of	enlightenment	and	from	fatal	blunders.	The	Varaha	Purana	
advises	the	worshiper	to	worship	Kalki	when	he	wants	to	destroy	enemies	and	
the	Buddha	when	he	wants	beauty.	The	Matsya	Purana	describes	the	Buddha	as	
lotus-eyed,	beautiful	as	a	god,	and	peaceful.	Kshemendra’s	eleventh-century	
“Deeds	of	the	Ten	Avatars”	and	Jayadeva’s	tenth-century	Gita	Govinda	tell	the	
story	of	the	Buddha	avatar	in	a	straight,	heroic	tale	based	on	the	standard	
episodes	of	Gautama’s	life	as	related	in	the	Pali	canon,	and	Jayadeva	says	that	
Vishnu	became	the	Buddha	out	of	compassion	for	animals,	to	end	bloody	
sacrifices.	The	Dashavatara-stotra,	attributed	(most	apocryphally)	to	Shankara	
(who	was	often	accused	of	being	a	crypto-Buddhist),	praises	the	Buddha	avatar.	
The	Devibhagavata	Purana	offers	homage	to	Vishnu,	“who	became	incarnate	as	
the	Buddha	in	order	to	stop	the	slaughter	of	animals	and	to	destroy	the	sacrifices	
of	the	wicked,”	adding	a	moral	judgement	to	Jayadeva’s	more	neutral	statement;	
although	the	last	phrase	might	be	translated	“to	destroy	wicked	sacrifices”	or	
taken	to	imply	that	all	sacrifices	are	wicked,	it	is	also	possible	that	only	wicked	
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(or	demonic,	or	proto-Buddhist)	sacrificers,	not	virtuous	Hindu	sacrificers,	are	
condemned.	These	texts	may	express	a	Hindu	desire	to	absorb	Buddhism	in	a	
peaceful	manner,	both	to	win	Buddhists	to	the	worship	of	Vishnu	and	to	account	
for	the	fact	that	such	a	significant	heresy	could	prosper	in	India	(Doniger,	2009,	
p.484).	
	
What	these	examples	from	Puranic	texts	demonstrate	is	that	Vivekananda	was	just	
another	Indian	voice	who	was	echoing	the	widespread	Hindu	doxa	that	the	Buddha	was	
an	incarnation	of	Vishnu.	While	this	was	already	deeply	problematic	when	it	was	
contained	to	the	Indian	subcontinent,	it	became	exponentially	worse	when	it	was	
broadcast	on	a	world	stage.58	
Another	Indian	community	that	Vivekananda	took	issue	with	were	the	Jains,	
which	he	also	addressed	by	trying	to	include	them	under,	what	he	perceived	to	be,	the	
‘Hinduism’	umbrella:	
Those	that	believe	in	the	Hindu	scriptures,	the	Vedas,	as	eternal	revelations	of	
truth,	are	called	orthodox	and	those	that	stand	on	other	authorities,	rejecting	the	
Vedas,	are	the	heterodox	in	India.	The	chief	modern	unorthodox	Hindu	sects	are	
the	Jains	and	the	Buddhists	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.2,	p.238).	
	
This	is	reminiscent	of	a	recent	argument	made	by	Halbfass	that	should	give	readers	a	
glimpse	into	the	fact	that	issues	such	as	these	continue	to	be	relevant,	thereby	
highlighting	the	complex	relationship	between	Indian	philosophic	traditions	and	the	
Vedas:	
The	modern	idea	of	“Hinduism,”	or	of	the	“Hindu	religion,”	is	a	reinterpretation	
of	the	traditional	ideas	and,	in	a	sense,	a	hybridization	of	the	traditional	self-
understanding.	Yet	it	is	by	no	means	a	mere	adaptation	of	western	
superimpositions.	It	is	also	a	continuation	of	the	tradition,	an	expression	and	
transformation	of	that	self-understanding	which	articulates	itself	in	its	
commitment	to	the	Vedic	revelation.	It	is	this	commitment	that	provides	the	
focus	for	traditional	Hindu	self-understanding,	and	that	provides	a	paradigm	and	
exemplary	precedent	even	for	those	movements	that	pay	little	attention	to	the	
Vedic	revelation,	or	try	to	supersede	it	and	replace	it	(Halbfass,	2005,	p.28).	
	
																																																								
58	We	will	return	to	Vivekananda’s	engagement	with	the	Buddhist	traditions	in	the	
following	chapters	as	we	explore	the	hierarchy	that	Vivekananda	tried	to	establish	
between	Indian	traditions.		
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As	we	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	the	difficultly	with	identifying	who	should	be	
called	Hindu	is	not	one	that	is	easily	resolved	even	in	contemporary	times.	As	far	as	
Vivekananda	is	concerned,	it	obviously	became	clear	to	him,	at	the	Parliament,	that	the	
Buddhists	and	the	Jains	considered	themselves	to	be	distinct	from	the	Hindus.	I	do	not	
mean	to	suggest	that	Vivekananda	was	ignorant	of	these	differences	when	he	lived	in	
India.	Instead,	I	would	argue	that	seeing	representatives	from	the	Buddhist	and	Jain	
communities,	being	acknowledged	as	separate	from	the	Hindu	representatives	at	the	
Parliament,	must	have	made	an	impression	on	Vivekananda.	After	all,	in	India	these	
traditions	were	usually	grouped	together	by	their	Western	colonizers.	However,	at	the	
Parliament,	they	were	expected	to	defend	distinct	traditions	and	identify	what	set	them	
apart.	This	may	have	come	as	a	surprise	to	Vivekananda	since	he	had	not	applied	
formally	to	attend	the	Parliament,	and	therefore,	was	probably	not	aware	of	the	various	
speakers	that	had	been	accepted	as	representatives	of	India.	I	do	not	know	if	one	can	
qualify	this	as	naïveté	on	Vivekananda’s	part	but,	it	seems	apparent	that	Vivekananda	
was	not	willing	to	accept	these	divisions,	because	he	repeatedly	tried	to	find	ways	to	
include	the	Buddhists,	and	the	Jains,	within	the	Hindu	fold.	Indeed,	he	firmly	believed	
that	they	shared	the	same	Vedic	philosophic	ancestry:	
upon	severe	analysis	you	will	always	find	that	the	essence	of	Buddhism	was	all	
borrowed	from	the	same	Upanishads:	even	the	ethics,	the	so-called	great	and	
wonderful	ethics	of	Buddhism,	were	there	word	for	word,	in	some	one	or	other	
of	the	Upanishads,	and	so	all	the	good	doctrines	of	the	Jains	were	there,	minus	all	
the	vagaries	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.230).	
	
Vivekananda	evidently	found	the	word	‘Hindu’	unreliable,	but	nevertheless	like	
Lorenzen,	accepted	that	its	implementation	had	first	become	popular	during	the	Mughal	
Empire	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.118).	It	is	also	significant	that	while	Vivekananda	
acknowledged	a	complex	relationship	with	the	Jains	and	the	Buddhists,	he	did	not	find	it	
necessary	to	include	Sikhism,	which	was	another	‘religion’	that	claimed	India	as	its	
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birthplace.	Indeed,	whereas	he	did	mention	the	Sikhs,	and	particularly	Guru	Nanak,	
numerous	times	in	his	writing,	he	never	engaged	with	them	in	a	challenging	way.	
Instead,	he	simply	swept	them	into	his	version	of	the	history	of	Hindu	traditions	along	
with	Sankara,	Kabir	and	Chaitanya	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.6,	pp.165,	394).	Perhaps,	
this	is	because	like	Ramakrishna,	Vivekananda	also	believed	that	“the	Sikh	Gurus	were	
but	reincarnations	of	ancient	Rishis”	(Sen,	1993,	p.298).	Or,	perhaps	more	accurately,	it	
was	because	the	Sikhs	were	not	considered	to	be	one	of	the	Western	decreed	‘great	
traditions’	and	as	a	result	they	did	not	have	a	representative	at	the	Parliament	since	it	
was	“[o]rganized	around	the	idea	of	ten	“great	traditions”	–	Confucianism,	Taoism,	
Shinto,	Hinduism,	Buddhism,	Jainism,	Zoroastrianism,	Judaism,	Christianity,	and	Islam”	
(Seager,	2009,	p.xiv).	Consequently,	Vivekananda	did	not	feel	an	inherent	need	to	justify	
why	the	Sikhs	should	be	included	under	the	Hindu	banner,	as	he	did	with	the	Buddhists	
and	the	Jains,	who	were	well	represented	at	the	Parliament.		
	 So	what	about	the	term	‘Hinduism’?	Was	this	just	as	problematic	for	
Vivekananda?	Actually,	one	gets	the	distinct	impression	that	defining	‘Hinduism’	was	
not	as	challenging	as	defining	‘Hindu’.	Perhaps	this	is	because	for	Vivekananda	
‘Hinduism’	was	just	another	way	of	saying	‘Vedantism’	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	pp.61,	
229).	Indeed,	he	repeatedly	defined	‘Hinduism’	as	the	‘religion’	of	the	Vedas:	
You	must	remember	that	what	the	Bible	is	to	the	Christians,	what	the	Koran	is	to	
the	Mohammedans,	what	the	Tripitaka	is	to	the	Buddhist,	what	the	Zend	Avesta	
is	to	the	Parsees,	these	Upanishads	are	to	us.	These	and	nothing	but	these	are	our	
scriptures.	The	Puranas,	the	Tantras,	and	all	the	other	books,	even	the	Vyasa-
Sutras,	are	of	secondary,	tertiary	authority,	but	primary	are	the	Vedas	
(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.332).	
	
Vivekananda	placed	special	emphasis	on	the	Upanishads	since	he	believed	that	the	
Upanishads	(also	known	as	the	‘end	of	the	Veda’,	or	Vedanta)	were	the	most	crucial	
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teachings	in	the	Vedas.	He	argued	that	the	term	‘Vedanta’	was	the	most	appropriate	
label	for	the	‘religion’	of	the	Hindus:	
The	Jnana	Kanda,	as	embodying	the	spiritual	teachings	of	the	Vedas	known	as	the	
Upanishads	and	the	Vedanta,	has	always	been	cited	as	the	highest	authority	by	
all	our	teachers,	philosophers,	and	writers,	whether	dualist,	or	qualified	monist,	
or	monist.	Whatever	be	his	philosophy	or	sect,	every	one	in	India	has	to	find	his	
authority	in	the	Upanishads.	If	he	cannot,	his	sect	would	be	heterodox.	Therefore,	
perhaps	the	one	name	in	modern	times	which	would	designate	every	Hindu	
throughout	the	land	would	be	“Vedantist”	or	“Vaidika”,	as	you	may	put	it;	and	in	
that	sense	I	always	use	the	word	“Vedantism”	and	“Vedanta”	(Vivekananda,	
2009,	vol.3,	p.229).	
	
This	leap	that	Vivekananda	made	from	Hindus	to	Vedantins	was	problematic,	especially	
since	the	Vedanta	darsana	(school	of	philosophy)	represents	only	one	of	the	six	
darsanas	that	are	commonly	associated	with	Hindu	traditions.	What	further	complicates	
matters,	however,	is	that	not	only	did	Vivekananda	associate	all	Hindu	ideas	with	
Vedanta	but	he	also	seemed	to	be	conflating	Vedantic	and	Advaitic	ideas	thereby	
making	it	difficult	to	see	the	difference	between	them.	Gwylim	Beckerlegge	points	out:	
Vedanta	represented	for	Vivekananda	the	highest	insight	of	Hinduism	and	the	
clearest	anticipation	to	date	of	the	universal	religion.	In	nineteenth-century	
Bengal,	Vedanta	was	widely	held	to	be	synonymous	with	Advaita,	and,	by	1896,	
Vivekananda	had	come	to	identify	“Vedantist”	with	“Hindu”.	The	elasticity	in	the	
usage	of	“Vedanta,”	“Advaita,”	and	“Hindu”	served	Vivekananda’s	purpose	when	
he	turned	to	a	non-dualist	form	of	Vedanta	as	the	“highest	generalization”	of	
religious	metaphysics	and	ethics.	When	speaking	of	Advaita/Vedanta	in	this	vein,	
Vivekananda	was	prepared	to	reduce	the	complexities	of	this	long-established	
Hindu	philosophical	tradition	to	a	very	generalized	level	of	meaning	(2004,	
pp.309-310).	
	
What	is	important	to	remember	here,	however,	is	that	it	is	clear	from	his	various	
lectures	and	discourses,	that	Vivekananda	was	quite	aware	of	the	distinctions	between	
Vedanta	and	Advaita.	In	fact,	he	oftentimes	pointed	out	the	variations	and	made	
clarifications:	
In	general	there	are	three	sorts	of	commentators	in	India	now:	from	their	
interpretations	have	arisen	three	systems	of	philosophy	and	sects.	One	is	the	
dualistic,	or	Dvaita;	a	second	is	the	qualified	non-dualistic,	or	Vishishtadvaita;	
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and	a	third	is	the	non-dualistic,	or	Advaita	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.1,	pp.358-
359).	
	
Moreover,	Vivekananda	articulated	the	difference	between	these	three	schools	of	
Vedanta:	
Dvaitism	–	small	circle	different	from	the	big	circle,	only	connected	by	Bhakti;	
Vishishtadvaitism	–	small	circle	within	the	big	circle,	motion	regulated	by	the	big	
circle;	Advaitism	–	small	circle	expands	and	coincides	with	the	big	circle.	In	
Advaitism,	“I”	loses	itself	in	God.	God	is	here,	God	is	there,	God	is	“I”	
(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.6,	p.122).	
	
And,	he	acknowledged	that	Advaita	was	not	the	only	school	that	used	the	Vedas	as	its	
basis:	
We	all	know	that	Advaitism	is	only	one	branch	of	the	various	philosophic	
systems	that	have	been	founded	on	the	Upanishads.	The	followers	of	the	
Vishistadvaitic	system	have	as	much	reverence	for	the	Upanishads	as	the	
followers	of	the	Advaita,	and	the	Vishishtadvaitists	claim	as	much	authority	for	
the	Vedanta	as	the	Advaitist.	So	do	the	dualists;	so	does	every	other	sect	in	India	
(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.229).	
	
Vivekananda	seemed	to	recognize	that	these	distinctions	were	not	always	obvious	to	
most	people.	As	a	result,	he	conceded	that	these	terms	were	often	conflated	and	
misquoted,	“I	want	to	make	it	a	little	clearer,	for	of	late	it	has	become	the	custom	of	
most	people	to	identify	the	word	Vedanta	with	the	Advaitic	system	of	Vedanta	
philosophy”	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.229).	Ironically,	he	argued	that	part	of	the	
reason	why	there	was	this	confusion	was	because	of	Western	scholarship:	
In	what	is	being	written	and	taught	in	the	West	about	the	religious	thought	of	
India,	one	school	of	Indian	thought	is	principally	represented,	that	which	is	
called	Advaitism,	the	monistic	side	of	Indian	religion:	and	sometimes	it	is	thought	
that	all	the	teachings	of	the	Veda	are	comprised	in	that	one	system	of	philosophy.	
There	are,	however,	various	phases	of	Indian	thought:	and	perhaps,	this	non-
dualistic	form	is	in	the	minority	as	compared	with	the	other	phases	
(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.2,	p.238).	
	
Nevertheless,	despite	recognizing	that	Advaitic	philosophy	was	‘in	the	minority’	he	
argued	repeatedly	that	it	was	this	philosophy	that	distinguished	‘Hinduism’	from	other	
‘religions’	and	was	the	pinnacle	of	any	religious	achievement	in	the	world.	For	
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Vivekananda,	Advaita	was	“the	fairest	flower	of	philosophy	and	religion	that	any	
country	in	any	age	has	produced,	where	human	thought	attains	its	highest	expression	
and	even	goes	beyond	the	mystery	which	seems	to	be	impenetrable”	(Vivekananda,	
2009,	vol.2,	p.247).	
Similarly,	he	argued	that	Advaita:	
is	the	salvation	of	the	world,	because	therein	alone	is	to	be	found	the	reason	of	
things.	Dualism	and	other	isms	are	very	good	as	means	of	worship,	very	
satisfying	to	the	mind,	and	maybe	they	have	helped	the	mind	onward;	but	if	man	
wants	to	be	rational	and	religious	at	the	same	time,	Advaita	is	the	one	system	in	
the	world	for	him	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.404).	
	
Consequently,	since	in	his	opinion,	Advaita	was	the	highest	level	that	any	‘religion’	could	
reach,	and	since	it	was	a	branch	of	Vedanta,	it	was	appropriate	to	use	the	term	Vedanta	
as	a	valid	and	legitimate	alternate	label	for	‘Hinduism’.	I	do	not	think	that	Vivekananda	
wanted	to	intentionally	conflate	Advaita	with	Vedanta.	That	much	seems	to	be	apparent	
since	he	consistently	tried	to	highlight	the	fact	that	Advaita	only	represents	one	of	the	
three	branches	that	are	routinely	included	under	Vedanta.	Rather,	one	gets	the	distinct	
impression	that	Vivekananda	is	struggling	to	find	a	resolution	to	this	dilemma	himself.	A	
characteristic	of	his	that	oftentimes	results	in	scholars	who	study	him	to	argue,	as	
Amiya	Sen	does	in	the	previous	chapter,	that	Vivekananda	occasionally	presented	
contrary	viewpoints	that	can	lead	to	opposing	conclusions	about	him.59	
That	being	said,	at	least	as	far	as	Vivekananda	was	concerned,	one	thing	was	
certain.	Advaita	was	the	best,	the	most	important,	and	indeed	the	epitome	of	all	
philosophy,	in	India	and	elsewhere.	Therefore,	the	problem	was	that	even	though	he	
distinguished	between	the	three	paths,	he	spoke	most	often,	and	the	most	highly	of	
Advaita.	Now,	since	he	was	speaking	exponentially	more	about	Advaita	than	any	other	
																																																								
59	This	is	an	issue	that	we	will	explore	in	some	detail	in	the	final	chapter.		
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aspect	of	Vedanta,	and	since	he	readily	conflated	Vedanta	with	‘Hinduism’,	it	is	not	
surprising	that	Advaita	was	often	understood	as	a	synonym	for	Vedanta,	and	therefore,	
as	an	alternative	label	for	‘Hinduism’;	both	by	his	listeners	and	his	followers.	And	finally,	
saying	that	these	definitions	are	problematic	would	be	an	understatement.	However,	I	
will	have	to	leave	that	for	further	discussion	and	analysis	in	the	following	chapters.	For	
now,	we	have	some	working	definitions	with	which	to	continue	examining	
Vivekananda’s	speeches.	This	should	allow	us	to	understand	why	Sister	Nivedita	stated,	
in	the	introduction	to	The	Complete	Works:		
Of	the	Swami’s	address	before	the	Parliament	of	Religions,	it	may	be	said	that	
when	he	began	to	speak	it	was	of	“the	religious	ideas	of	the	Hindus”,	but	when	he	
ended,	Hinduism	had	been	created	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.1,	p.x).	
	
	
“Paper	on	Hinduism”	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.1,	pp.6-20)	
	 The	main	paper	that	Vivekananda	presented	at	the	Parliament	was	simply	titled	
“Paper	on	Hinduism.”	It	was	in	this	speech	that	he	outlined	his	version	of	‘Hinduism’.	A	
version	that	captivated	not	only	his	American	audiences,	but	which	also	inspired	a	
newfound	respect	for	their	own	traditions,	amongst	his	Hindu	readers	in	India.	Sister	
Nivedita’s	claim	that	it	was	with	this	address	at	the	Parliament	that	the	term	‘Hinduism’	
was	finally	defined,	seems	to	ring	true.	Vivekananda	did	indeed	try	his	very	best	to	
demonstrate	that	the	‘religions	of	the	Hindus’	were	a	complex	myriad	of	traditions,	
philosophies	and	practices,	which,	despite	their	many	contradictions	and	contrasting	
theories,	could	be	presented	as	a	united	whole.	Vivekananda	put	forth	a	comprehensive	
definition	of	‘Hinduism’	as	a	vast,	intricate	and	elaborate	system;	a	description	that	is	
remarkably	similar	to	the	ones	that	J.Z.	Smith	and	Ferro-Luzzi	propose	in	previous	
chapters.	This	then	allowed	him	to	argue	that	it	could,	and	indeed	it	should,	serve	as	a	
	 163	
perfect	example	of	how	a	‘universal	religion’	should	appear.60	Whereas,	the	end	result	of	
his	efforts	did	not	culminate	in	a	‘universal	religion’,	it	did	give	Hindus	in	India	a	
platform	upon	which	they	could	unite	and	form	a	coalition	against	British	colonialism.	
Thus,	even	though	Vivekananda	repeatedly	claimed	that	he	was	a	renunciate	and	
therefore	was	not	interested	in	political	manoeuvrings,	nevertheless,	his	speeches	
inspired	many	to	find	common	ground	in	their	battle	against	foreign	oppression:	
Nationalism	thus	decided	to	write	the	history	of	the	Indian	nation	in	the	texts	of	
neo-Hinduism.	This	history	however	was	also	supposed	to	be	exemplary	to	the	
Indian	people.	The	return	to	the	essential	past	in	the	way	that	neo-Hindu	
ideologues	like	Vivekananda	imagined	was	supposed	to	act	as	a	great	counselor	
to	people	in	their	project	of	nationalist	regeneration	(Basu,	2002,	p.45).	
	
	 Vivekananda	began,	what	was	to	be	his	longest	presentation	at	the	Parliament,	
by	returning	to	his	claim	of	antiquity	for	‘Hinduism’.	He	qualified	this	by	saying	that	
there	were	two	others	that	shared	this	mantle	of	antiquity	with	Hindu	traditions,	
Zoroastrianism	and	Judaism.	However,	for	Vivekananda	this	similarity	ended	there	
since	he	went	on	to	state:	
while	Judaism	failed	to	absorb	Christianity	and	was	driven	out	of	its	place	of	
birth	by	its	all-conquering	daughter,	and	a	handful	of	Parsees	is	all	that	remains	
to	tell	the	tale	of	their	grand	religion,	sect	after	sect	arose	in	India	and	seemed	to	
shake	the	religion	of	the	Vedas	to	its	very	foundations,	but	like	the	waters	of	the	
seashore	in	a	tremendous	earthquake	it	receded	only	for	a	while,	only	to	return	
in	an	all-absorbing	flood,	a	thousand	times	more	vigorous,	and	when	the	tumult	
of	the	rush	was	over,	these	sects	were	all	sucked	in,	absorbed,	and	assimilated	
into	the	immense	body	of	the	mother	faith	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.1,	p.6).	
	
Once	again,	we	see	how	Vivekananda	invokes	the	image	of	the	‘mother’	an	idea	that	he	
believed	was	especially	powerful.61	Presenting	‘Hinduism’	as	the	‘mother	religion’	was	
his	way	of	granting	it	supremacy,	while	at	the	same	time	denying	Western	traditional	
ideas	the	right	to	claim	that	Hindu	philosophy	remained	in	its	infancy.	Notice	also	how,	
																																																								
60	We	will	return	to	this	idea	of	a	‘universal	religion’	in	the	following	chapters.		
61	In	the	final	chapter,	we	will	discuss	in	greater	detail,	Vivekananda’s	engagement	with	
the	‘feminine	principle’	as	‘mother’.	
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by	stating	“those	sects	were	all	sucked	in,	absorbed,	and	assimilated	into	the	immense	
body	of	the	mother	faith”	Vivekananda	summarily	appropriated	all	the	ideas	and	
philosophies	that	took	birth	on	Indian	soil.	This	problematic	attitude	of	Vivekananda’s	
was	compounded	by	his	next	statement:	
From	the	spiritual	flights	of	the	Vedanta	philosophy,	of	which	the	latest	
discoveries	of	science	seem	like	echoes,	to	the	low	ideas	of	idolatry	with	its	
multifarious	mythology,	the	agnosticism	of	the	Buddhists,	and	the	atheism	of	the	
Jains,	each	and	all	have	a	place	in	the	Hindu’s	religion	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.1,	
p.6).	
	
This	single	sentence	is	teeming	with	issues	that	would,	and	should,	deeply	
concern	contemporary	scholars.	First,	he	claimed	a	higher	spiritual	ground	for	Vedic	
philosophy,	while	arguing	that	contemporary	theories	of	science	and	reason	had	
already	been	expounded	in	the	Vedas.	Next,	he	placed	idol	worship	on	one	of	the	lowest	
rungs	of	the	Hindu	hierarchy,	thereby	creating	some	distance	for	himself	from	these	
practices	that	were	usually	viewed	unfavourably	by	the	Westerners.	And	finally,	he	
appropriated	Buddhist	and	Jain	theology	in	one	fell	swoop,	claiming	authority	over	
these	Indian	traditions.	That	being	said	however,	it	also	has	to	be	recognized	that	there	
are	a	number	of	reasons	why	Vivekananda’s	use	of	such	language	must	have	appealed	to	
his	audiences,	both	at	the	Parliament	and	in	India.	As	far	as	the	West	was	concerned,	
this	approach	allowed	them	to	understand,	in	language	that	was	familiar	to	them,	how	
traditions	that	were	seemingly	so	contradictory	could	exist	in	relative	harmony.	King	
points	out:		
it	would	seem	that	the	key	to	the	West’s	initial	postulation	of	the	unity	of	
‘Hinduism’	derives	from	the	Judaeo-Christian	suppositions	of	the	Orientalists	and	
missionaries.	Convinced	as	they	were	that	distinctive	religions	could	not	coexist	
without	frequent	antagonism,	the	doctrinal	liberality	of	Indian	religions	
remained	a	mystery	without	the	postulation	of	an	overarching	religious	
framework	that	could	unite	the	Indians	under	the	flag	of	a	single	religious	
tradition.	How	else	can	the	relatively	peaceful	coexistence	of	the	various	Hindu	
movements	be	explained	without	some	sense	of	religious	unity?	Why	else	would	
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Hindus	of	differing	sectarian	affiliations	accept	the	existence	of	rival	gods	unless	
they	belonged	to	the	same	religious	tradition	(1999,	p.105).	
	
King’s	argument	provides	an	explanation	as	to	how	Hindu	elites,	both	before	and	during	
Vivekananda’s	time,	recognized	this	inherent	need	that	the	Westerners	had	to	see	
‘Hinduism’	as	a	coherent	and	unified	‘religion.	In	response,	these	elite	voices	tried	to	
present	a	comprehensive	version	of	their	traditional	ideas.	On	the	one	hand,	this	gave	
them	an	opportunity	to	be	accepted	on	the	world	stage	since	they	seemed	to	be	offering	
a	viable	response	to	the	hegemony	of	Western	religious	traditions.	On	the	other	hand,	
this	also	gave	Indians	a	platform	from	which	to	create	a	nation.	King	goes	on	to	clarify:	
This	Hindu	attitude	does	not	merely	reflect	the	colonization	of	their	thought-
processes	by	the	Orientalists.	Postulation	of	Hindu	unity	was	to	be	encouraged	in	
the	development	of	Indian	autonomy	from	British	rule.	Swaraj	(home	rule)	was	
seen	to	be	inconceivable	without	the	unification	of	India	along	nationalistic	and	
cultural	lines.	Not	only	that,	although	sectarian	clashes	have	always	occurred,	in	
general	Indian	religious	groups	appear	to	have	been	able	to	live	together	in	a	
manner	unprecedented	in	the	history	of	the	Judaeo-Christian	religions	in	the	
West	(1999,	pp.106-107).	
	
It	was	this	theory,	that	Indians	had	found	some	way	to	co-exist	in	relative	harmony,	that	
Vivekananda	repeatedly	revisited	and	which	formed	a	cornerstone	of	his	argument.	
Thus,	even	though	he	oftentimes	found	ways	to	separate	himself	from	idolatry,	he	never	
went	so	far	as	to	say	that	such	ideals	required	reform.	Instead,	he	argued	that	they	
needed	to	be	understood	as	an	alternative,	usually	lower,	but	nevertheless	viable,	
option	for	many	Hindus.		
As	we	saw	in	the	previous	chapter,	this	idea	that	there	are	different	paths	
depending	on	the	kind	of	person	you	are,	or	the	background	you	come	from,	or	the	
community	you	belong	to,	is	one	that	was	used	regularly	by	Vivekananda’s	guru	
Ramakrishna.	Ramakrishna	routinely	advocated,	both	with	his	words	and	his	actions,	
that	there	were	many	ways	to	understand	and	engage	with	the	divine.	For	example,	Sen	
notes:	
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the	broad	eclecticism	of	Ramakrishna	who	seems	to	have	cleverly	grafted	an	
innate	defence	of	Hinduism	into	his	fairly	tolerant	and	flexible	spiritual	
framework.	This	was	achieved	through	the	reemphasis	on	the	traditional	
concept	of	adhikari-bheda	–	worship	in	keeping	with	the	social	and	spiritual	
status	of	the	individual	(1993,	p.34).62		
	
Sen	contends	that	this	approach	of	Ramakrishna’s	“tended	to	make	its	[Hinduism]	
idolatrous	forms	of	worship	spiritually	consistent	with	Vedantic	monotheism”	(1993,	p.	
34).	Accordingly,	Sen	argues	that	many	of	Vivekananda’s	ideas,	regarding	the	
relationship	between	the	Hindu	philosophy	that	reveres	a	God	with	attributes	(Saguna	
Brahman)	versus	those	that	honour	a	God	without	attributes	(Nirguna	Brahman)	stems	
from	Ramakrishna’s	teachings	which	“legitimized	the	worship	of	a	Sakar	–	Saguna	Iswar	
(God	with	form	and	attributes)	together	with	a	belief	in	the	Nirakar	–	Nirguna”	(1993,	
p.291).	
These	ideas	of	Ramakrishna’s,	ideas	that	were	culled	from	traditional	Hindu	
philosophy,	are	what	Vivekananda	now	publicized	and	championed.	One	of	the	most	
unique	aspects	of	Vivekananda’s	modus	operandi	was	his	ability	to	not	only	defend	
Hindu	philosophy,	ideals	and	practices,	but,	to	present	them	in	a	way	which	was	not	
hesitant	or	defensive,	but	rather,	proud	and	forceful.	It	was	this	capacity	of	his,	to	
highlight	the	accomplishments	and	validity	of	the	Indian	way	of	life,	which	made	him	
stand	apart	from	earlier	Indian	elites.	Basu	argues	that	it	was	with	Vivekananda	that	
both	the	West,	and	Indians	alike,	saw	the	potential	that	India	had.	This,	in	turn,	allowed	
Indians	an	opportunity	to	regain	their	voice	after	centuries	of	colonial	subjugation:	
This	theme	of	cultural	competence,	the	ability	of	colonial	society	to	become	
modern,	which	in	the	case	of	nineteenth-century	colonial	India	implied	that	it	
could	make	similar	claims	of	universalism	like	the	European	Enlightenment,	is	
crucial	to	all	Third	World	nationalism.	Before	Vivekananda,	the	Brahmos,	in	
order	to	be	modern	had	discarded	Hinduism.	In	opposition	the	Hindu	revivalists	
discarded	the	modern	in	order	to	regain	their	autonomy	as	Hindu.	In	
Vivekananda	finally	the	modern	is	acclaimed	as	Hindu	(Basu,	2002,	p.38).	
																																																								
62	We	will	return	to	this	idea	of	adhikari-beda	in	the	concluding	chapter.		
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Unlike	many	of	his	predecessors,	who	oftentimes	took	a	defensive	position	when	
engaging	with	the	West,	Vivekananda	went	on	the	offensive.	He	was	not	only	wont	to	
uphold	the	many	wonders	of	India	but	was	equally	capable	of	highlighting	the	errors	of	
Western	ways.	Accordingly,	Sen	states:	
By	the	late	1880s	the	entire	Renaissance	tradition	in	Bengal	was	replete	with	
pungent	critiques	and	counter-offensives	vis-à-vis	Western	civilization	and	
culture….	That	the	West	was	largely	‘barbaric’	at	a	time	when	civilization	was	at	
its	peak	in	Asia	is	a	belief	reflected	in	the	writings	of	many	established	writers	in	
nineteenth	century	Bengal;	none	of	them	however,	approached	the	question	with	
as	much	courage	and	fervour	as	Vivekananda	(1993,	p.336).	
	
Vivekananda	repeatedly	attacked	European	ideas	and	nowhere	was	this	more	evident	
than	in	his	strident	critique	of	European	civilization	in	his	essay	“The	East	and	the	
West”:	
And	may	I	ask	you	Europeans	what	country	have	you	ever	raised	to	better	
conditions?	Wherever	you	have	found	weaker	races,	you	have	exterminated	
them	by	the	roots,	as	it	were.	You	have	settled	on	their	lands,	and	they	are	gone	
for	ever[sic].	What	is	the	history	of	your	Americas,	your	Australia,	and	New	
Zealand,	your	Pacific	Islands	and	South	Africa?	Where	are	those	aboriginal	races	
there	today?	They	are	all	exterminated,	you	have	killed	them	outright,	as	if	they	
were	wild	beasts.	It	is	only	where	you	have	not	the	power	to	do	so,	and	there	
only,	that	other	nations	are	still	alive	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.5,	pp.536-537).	
	
Raychaudhari	argues	that	in	the	case	of	Vivekananda,	his	propensity	to	highlight	the	
deeply	problematic	nature	of	colonization	while	at	the	same	time	elevate	India’s	
accomplishments	did	not	stem	from	a	sense	of	‘inadequacy’:	
The	youthful	monk’s	encounters	with	the	West	are	overshadowed	by	his	deep	
conviction,	based	on	his	life-experience,	that	in	his	chosen	field	of	endeavour,	he	
had	nothing	to	learn	from	the	dominant	culture	of	the	day.	Instead,	he	offered	to	
teach	the	West	and	advised	his	fellow	countrymen	to	learn	from	those	areas	of	
western	life	where	contemporary	India	was	obviously	deficient.	His	perceptions	
of	Europe	and	America	were	deeply	coloured	by	his	faith	in	what	has	been	
reduced	to	a	clumsy	cliché	–	India’s	spiritual	superiority.	Cultural	self-assertion	
was	very	much	a	part	of	his	mission	both	abroad	and	at	home.	But	his	belief	in	
the	ultimate	excellence	of	the	Hindu	spiritual	inheritance	–	the	Vedantic	concepts	
as	well	as	the	way	of	Yoga	in	particular	–	was	not	informed	by	any	need	to	
compensate	for	the	sense	of	inadequacy,	the	characteristic	predicament	of	
Europe’s	Afro-Asian	subjects	(1988,	p.220).	
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It	was	this	trait	of	Vivekananda’s	that	gave	him	a	sense	of	authority,	which	then	allowed	
him	to	declare	that	India	was	more	than	competent	to	stand,	shoulder	to	shoulder,	with	
Western	philosophic	ideals.		
	 The	way	that	Vivekananda	succeeded	in	accomplishing	this	goal	was	by	using	
monistic	Advaitic	ideals.	He	created	a	hierarchy	amongst	Hindu	traditions	whereby	the	
philosophical	ideas	of	the	Vedas,	but	especially	the	Upanishads,	were	considered	the	
apex	of	all	wisdom,	Hindu	and	otherwise.	Vivekananda	set	about	presenting	a	
worldview	that	allowed	for	all	other	traditional	philosophies	and	practices	to	coexist,	no	
matter	if	they	were	of	Indian	origin	or	not.	He	allowed	them	their	validity,	but	only	
insofar	as	they	ultimately	agreed	with	the	Vedanta.	Of	course,	Vivekananda	was	not	
always	blatant	in	his	efforts	to	sell	his	worldview,	but	instead	he	relied	on	both	overt	
and	covert	techniques	to	support	his	cause.	In	this	speech	at	the	Parliament	he	baldly	
declared,	“The	Hindus	have	received	their	religion	through	revelation,	the	Vedas”	
(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.1,	p.6),	thereby	establishing	that	the	Vedas	were	considered	to	
be	‘revealed’	truths.	He	must	have	known	that	this	would	raise	the	value	of	the	Vedas	in	
the	eyes	of	his	Judeo-Christian	audience,	which,	in	turn,	would	allow	Hindus	to	claim	
equal	legitimacy	for	their	scriptures	when	challenged	by	their	Western	counterparts.	
Vivekananda	then	goes	on	to	declare	that	creation	was	“without	beginning	or	end”	
(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.1,	p.7)	since,	to	argue	anything	else	would	be,	according	to	him,	
equivalent	to	arguing	that	God	did	not	always	exist.	This	is	a	particularly	interesting,	
and	in	some	ways,	antagonistic,	tactic	adopted	by	Vivekananda	considering	the	fact	that	
‘creationism’	was	one	of	the	foundations	of	the	Western	worldview.	Instead,	
Vivekananda	chose	to	align	himself	with	ideas	of	science	and	reason,	thereby	suggesting	
that	Hindu	philosophy	was	more	amenable	to	these	modern	concepts	than	Christianity.	
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He	further	emphasized	that	the	seers,	to	whom	these	revelations	were	made,	also	
included	women.	This	is	especially	important	since	a	majority	of	his	most	avid	Western	
listeners	were	female	and	as	such	responded	well	to	hearing	that	female	seers	were	
revered	in	India.	However,	this	was	not	only	a	means	for	him	to	endear	himself	to	his	
audience	but	also	a	way	in	which	he	could	demonstrate	how	well	suited	Hindu	ideas	
were	for	a	world	in	which	women	were	beginning	to	question	ideas	of	gender	
inequality.	Vivekananda	repeatedly	used	Western,	scientific	language	to	explain	such	
Hindu	ideas	as	time,	an	indestructible	soul,	and	the	idea	of	reincarnation.	The	language	
he	used	to	highlight	the	strengths	and	glory	of	the	Hindu	past	were	catered	to	appeal	to	
Western,	scientific	minds.	Indeed,	his	language	which	offered	up	the	complex	ideas	of	
Western	philosophers	like	Hegel,	Darwin,	Spencer	etc.,	in	broad	strokes	and	no-
nonsense	formulas,	took	both	the	West	and	India	by	storm.		
	
Idol	worship	justified?	
	 Before	concluding	this	chapter,	a	few	words	need	to	be	said	about	Vivekananda’s	
treatment	of	idol	worship.	Particularly	since	this	was	instrumental	in	helping	him	to	
establish	a	hierarchy	amongst	Indian	traditions;	a	problematic	tactic	that	becomes	
evident	when	he	returns	to	India.	Especially	considering	that	this	hierarchy	continues	to	
influence	the	way	many	Hindus	in	India	today	view	their	traditional	ideas.	What	is	
noteworthy	is	that	it	was	only	after	establishing	that	the	Hindu	traditions	he	ascribed	to	
were	amenable	to	science	and	reason	that	Vivekananda	took	up	the	matter	of	multiple	
deities.	It	is	true	he	did	mention	this	‘hot	button’	issue	in	the	opening	sentences	of	his	
speech,	but	it	was	not	until	later,	when	he	had	already	demonstrated	that	Indian	ideas	
were	not	outdated,	that	he	revisited	this	point	in	some	detail;	a	smart	tactical	move	on	
his	part.	First,	he	established	the	lofty	ideals	of	Vedanta.	Thereafter,	he	showcased	how	
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these	concepts	were	compatible	with	science	and	reason.	Once	he	had	his	audience	in	
the	palm	of	his	hand,	agreeing	with	the	wondrous	aspects	of	Hindu	philosophy,	only	
then	did	he	approach	the	topic	of	idolatry.	No	doubt,	this	was	because	he	knew	that	this	
was	a	tricky	subject	for	Western	listeners	for	whom	idolatry,	or	polytheism,	was	usually	
seen	as	a	sign	of	a	backward	society.	Perhaps	Vivekananda	surmised	that	to	completely	
ignore	the	issue	could	be	seen	either	as	a	sign	of	shame,	or	mute	acceptance	and	as	such,	
decided	to	tackle	the	question	head	on:	
At	the	very	outset,	I	may	tell	you	that	there	is	no	polytheism	in	India.	In	every	
temple,	if	one	stands	by	and	listens,	one	will	find	the	worshippers	applying	all	
the	attributes	of	God,	including	omnipresence,	to	the	images.	It	is	not	polytheism,	
nor	would	the	name	henotheism	explain	the	situation.	“The	rose	called	by	any	
other	name	would	smell	as	sweet.”	Names	are	not	explanations	(Vivekananda,	
2009,	vol.1,	p.15,	emphasis	in	original).	
	
It	was	important	for	Vivekananda	to	demonstrate	why,	just	because	someone	prayed	to	
multiple	deities,	it	did	not	mean	that	they	did	not	comprehend	that	these	were	tools	
used	to	understand	Brahman.	He	accomplished	this	by	stating	that	some	of	the	holiest	
men	he	had	ever	known	prayed	to	various	forms	of	deities,	but	who,	by	their	actions	
and	deeds	were	enlightened	souls.	Clearly,	Vivekananda	was	speaking	of	his	guru	
Ramakrishna	here.	Vivekananda	then	adeptly	turned	the	focus	onto	the	Christian	use	of	
images	and	symbols	and	argued	that	the	need	for	such	tools,	in	order	to	engage	with	the	
divine,	was	universal	and	not	limited	to	Hindus:	
Why	is	the	cross	holy?	Why	is	the	face	turned	toward	the	sky	in	prayer?	Why	are	
there	so	many	images	in	the	Catholic	Church?	Why	are	there	so	many	images	in	
the	minds	of	Protestants	when	they	pray?	My	brethren,	we	can	no	more	think	
about	anything	without	a	mental	image	than	we	can	live	without	breathing.	By	
the	law	of	association,	the	material	image	calls	up	the	mental	idea	and	vice	versa.	
This	is	why	the	Hindu	uses	an	external	symbol	when	he	worships.	He	will	tell	
you,	it	helps	to	keep	his	mind	fixed	on	the	Being	to	whom	he	prays.	He	knows	as	
well	as	you	do	that	the	image	is	not	God,	is	not	omnipresent	(Vivekananda,	2009,	
vol.1,	pp.15-16).	
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In	this	manner,	Vivekananda	built	his	argument	that	stated	that	whereas	Hindus	did	
pray	to	idols	and	symbols,	just	like	the	Christians,	they	did	this	with	an	awareness	that	
this	was	simply	a	stage	in	their	journey	towards	Brahman.	Arguments	such	as	these	
have	their	basis	in	Advaita	philosophy,	but	Vivekananda	did	not	specify	this	here;	
instead	he	presented	these	arguments	as	if	they	were	aspects	of	a	pan-Hindu	
philosophy.	Furthermore,	in	a	very	interesting,	and	at	some	level	disturbing	tactic,	
Vivekananda	turned	arguments	that	had	been	utilized	by	the	West,	against	Hindu	
traditions	in	general,	on	to	idol	worship	in	particular.	In	an	obvious	effort	to	separate	
himself,	yet	show	some	level	of	unity	amongst	Hindu	traditional	practices,	he	adopted	
the	‘childhood	of	humanity’	argument	when	describing	Hindus	who	worshipped	idols:	
Mark,	the	same	earnest	man	who	is	kneeling	before	the	idol	tells	you,	“Him	the	
sun	cannot	express,	nor	the	moon,	nor	the	stars,	the	lightning	cannot	express	
Him,	nor	what	we	speak	of	as	fire;	through	Him	they	shine.”	But	he	does	not	
abuse	any	one’s	idol	or	call	its	worship	sin.	He	recognizes	in	it	a	necessary	stage	
of	life.	“The	child	is	the	father	of	the	man.”	Would	it	be	right	for	an	old	man	to	say	
that	childhood	is	a	sin	or	youth	a	sin?		
If	a	man	can	realize	his	divine	nature	with	the	help	of	an	image,	would	it	be	right	
to	call	that	a	sin?	Nor	even	when	he	has	passed	that	stage,	should	he	call	it	an	
error.	To	the	Hindu,	man	is	not	travelling	from	error	to	truth,	but	from	truth	to	
truth,	from	lower	to	higher	truth	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.1,	pp.16-17).	
	
As	a	result,	we	now	have	Vivekananda	using	images	of	childhood,	and	references	to	
different	stages	of	spiritual	growth,	that	had	previously	been	used	against	Hindu	
traditions.	Images	that	he	hotly	contested,	but	which	he	now	willingly	applied	to	Hindu	
practitioners	who	adhered	to	bhakti	versus	Vedantic	ideals.	And,	it	was	this	Vedantic	
worldview	that	he	used	when	he	spoke	of	relative	and	absolute	truths	(not	surprisingly,	
he	does	not	credit	Buddhism	for	these	ideas),	in	an	effort	to	establish	the	practical	uses	
of	idols	and	symbols	in	a	layperson’s	life.	This	hierarchy	that	Vivekananda	incorporated	
is	of	particular	interest	and	I	will	return	to	this	discussion	in	the	next	chapter	as	it	is	one	
of	the	most	disturbing	contributions	of	his	legacy.		
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Conclusion	
As	we	turn	our	gaze	to	Vivekananda’s	celebrated	return	to	India	there	are	a	few	
aspects	of	his	speeches	at	the	Parliament	that	are	particularly	important	to	note,	points	
which	we	will	return	to	again	in	the	following	chapter.	First,	Vivekananda	was	very	
concerned	about	the	way	Hindu	traditions	were	understood	by	his	Western	audience.	
As	such,	he	was	determined	to	‘repackage’	their	perception	of	India’s	philosophic	legacy.	
However,	unlike	previous	Hindu	elites,	who	had	engaged	with	Western	audiences,	
Vivekananda	was	unapologetic	about	his	traditional	beliefs.	Consequently,	rather	than	
embracing	a	reformist	attitude,	he	exhibits	a	superiority	complex	when	speaking	of	
Hindu	philosophical	ideas.	Secondly,	he	believed	that	the	best	way	to	justify	his	claims	
of	superiority	was	by	using	Vedanta	as	his	vehicle	of	communication.	Of	course,	as	we	
saw	in	the	previous	chapter,	this	was	a	strategy	that	had	already	been	used	by	his	
predecessors	like	Rammohan	and	Bankimchandra.	In	fact,	this	is	a	point	that	we	will	
revisit	in	the	ensuing	chapters	as	we	investigate	the	ways	Vivekananda	fits	into	the	
dialogue	that	was	taking	place	on	the	Indian	subcontinent.	That	being	said,	in	
Vivekananda’s	opinion,	Vedanta	with	its	lofty	non-dualistic	ideals,	highlighted	aspects	of	
Hindu	philosophy	that	overshadowed	Christianity’s	high	moralistic	credo,	since	it	went	
beyond	monotheism	and	championed	monism	instead.	As	far	as	Vivekananda	was	
concerned,	monism	could	claim	the	higher	moral	ground	since	its	basis	of	‘no	difference’	
placed	everybody	on	an	equal	footing.	It	is	important	to	remember	here	that	whereas	
the	term	‘monotheism’	is	oftentimes	laden	with	Eurocentric	sensibilities,	this	does	not	
mean	that	the	philosophical	questions	which	underscored	such	labels	were	limited	to	
the	Western	hemisphere.	For	example,	McEvilley	draws	attention	to	the	fact	that	
questions	regarding	‘monism’	and	‘pantheism’	had	been	extensively	debated	by	ancient	
Egyptians,	Greeks	and	Indians,	and	their	conclusions	were	remarkably	comparable:	
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A	monistic	tendency	of	thought,	gathering	momentum,	creates	a	meltdown	in	a	
polytheistic	mythology.	Toward	the	end	of	the	New	Kingdom	this	tendency	
reached	the	breaking	point	in	the	theology	of	Amon-Re.	The	priests	of	this	
school,	at	the	great	temple	of	Karnak,	were	on	the	verge	of	the	abstract	
conception	of	monism.	Their	sacred	discourse	had	gone	beyond	narrative,	as	
they	declared	Amon-Re	to	be	“the	solitary	sole	one,”	“the	one	only,”	the	“one	who	
has	no	second,”	the	“one	one”	–	all	ideas	that	are	essentially	antinarrative.	Amon-
Re	was	elevated	beyond	discursive	reach,	including	the	reach	of	mythological	
narrative	and	imagery,	through	a	series	of	paradoxes	–	the	first	series	of	studied	
and	carefully	refined	paradoxes	on	record	(2002,	pp.24-25).	
	
Similarly,	he	highlights:	
	
The	pantheos	was	highlighted	many	times	in	India,	where	archaic	concepts	were	
not	discarded	but	continued	to	exist,	with	the	force	of	traditional	validation,	
alongside	new	ones.	The	Upanisadic	atman,	or	Universal	Subject	for	example,	is	
described	as	a	pantheos	in	terms	that	mix	the	imagery	of	the	Purusasukta	with	
new	more	abstract	elements	(McEvilley,	2002,	pp.26-27).	
	
Interestingly	enough	however,	McEvilley’s	conclusion	resonates	with	Vivekananda’s	
declarations	that	India	was	the	place	where	such	ideas	were	nurtured:	
In	India	the	whole	tenor	of	literature	changed	when	the	polytheism	was	decayed,	
or	was	absorbed,	into	the	monistic	framework.	All	subsequent	Indian	literature	
is	saturated	with	the	monistic	view.	Yet	in	Greece,	literature	in	general	continued	
the	polytheistic	view	of	Homer	and	Hesiod	as	if	the	monistic	revisions	of	
Xenophanes	and	others	had	never	occurred.	The	monistic	attitude	became	a	
small	enduring	philosophical	cult	as	it	were,	kept	alive	by	special	sheltering	from	
society	as	a	whole.	It	would	seem	that,	if	any	diffusion	claims	are	to	be	made	as	a	
result	of	this	thorough	and	detailed	parallelism,	it	is	diffusion	from	India	or	
elsewhere	into	Greece	that	is	most	likely	to	be	its	form,	not	the	other	way	around	
(McEvilley,	2002,	p.61).		
	
What	this	demonstrates	is	that	Vivekananda	is	building	on	philosophical	arguments	that	
had	been	evolving	for	centuries.	Consequently,	his	theories	were	not	developed	in	a	
vacuum	(just	as	Kapoor	contends	in	the	beginning	of	this	chapter).	Rather,	they	were	
the	result	of	the	‘continental	collision’	that	had	been	occurring	since	antiquity,	which,	in	
turn,	made	him	just	one	of	the	more	recent	voices	to	have	joined	the	fray.	Be	that	as	it	
may,	it	is	noteworthy	that	by	expounding	on	idol	worship,	he	was	willing	to	
demonstrate	that	he	was	not	afraid	to	not	only	discuss,	but	also	explain,	how	and	why	
praying	to	a	myriad	of	deities	was	not	something	to	fear	or	scoff	at.	As	we	turn	to	the	
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next	chapter,	where	we	explore	the	differences	between	the	speeches	that	Vivekananda	
made	at	the	Parliament,	versus	the	declarations	he	made	in	India,	we	will	be	able	to	
examine	how	he	adjusted	his	message	when	speaking	to	an	Indian	audience.	His	
technique	offer	us	a	unique	window	through	which	to	observe	the	way	Hindu	
traditional	ideas	responded	to	the	‘continental	collision’	that	occurred	during	the	British	
Raj.	Especially	since	those	aftershocks	are	still	being	felt	in	India	today	with	the	
widespread	impact	of	the	Hindutva	movement	and	their	message	of	supremacy.		
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Swami	Vivekananda:	A	Hero	Returns	
	
Before	we	examine	the	speeches	made	by	Vivekananda,	when	he	returned	to	
India,	there	are	a	few	points	we	must	keep	in	mind.	First,	when	Vivekananda	left	India	
he	was	simply	one	of	Ramakrishna’s	renunciate	disciples,	and	as	such,	was	relatively	
unknown.	Secondly,	despite	his	unheralded	arrival	in	the	US,	Vivekananda	was	very	
well	received	at	the	Parliament,	as	a	result	of	which,	reports	of	his	successful	speeches	
reached	Indian	ears	and	were	published	in	multiple	Indian	newspapers.	And,	finally,	
Vivekananda	acquired	several	Western	followers	due	to	the	various	lecture	circuits	he	
participated	in,	and	the	multiple	Vedanta	centres	that	he	helped	establish,	in	the	United	
States	and	England.	This	change	in	status,	and	level	of	recognition,	are	important	when	
analysing	the	tone	of	his	voice,	and	the	authority	with	which	he	spoke,	when	he	
returned	to	India.	The	years	Vivekananda	had	spent	overseas	had	given	him	a	better	
understanding	about	many	Western	theories,	strategies	and	practices.	Indeed,	because	
of	his	time	in	the	West,	Vivekananda	experienced	a	unique	form	of	‘continental	collision’	
that	impacted	how	he	packaged	his	ideas	about	Hindu	concepts.	And,	as	we	saw	in	the	
last	chapter,	he	was	quick	to	adapt	his	message	and	use	language	and	concepts	that	
were	more	familiar	for	the	Western	world		
In	India,	however,	he	was	faced	with	the	task	of	convincing	his	compatriots	that	
his	way	of	‘packaging’	Hindu	traditions	was	crucial	if	they	wanted	to	convince	both	their	
colonizers,	as	well	as	the	world	at	large,	that	Hindu	philosophy	was	not	only	at	par	with	
other	traditions	but	in	fact	was	superior.	Of	particular	interest	to	us	are	the	strategies	
that	Vivekananda	used	to	accomplish	his	mission;	strategies	that	continue	to	be	used	
today	by	many	Hindus,	both	in	India	as	well	as	the	diaspora.	Vivekananda	was	one	of	
the	early	architects	of	this	phenomenon	whereby	Hindus	began	embracing	the	idea	of	
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an	all-encompassing,	all-inclusive,	almost	monolithic	‘Hinduism’.	As	I	explore	how	the	
‘cyclonic	monk’63	took	India	by	storm	I	will	juxtapose	his	methods	with	the	conclusions	
of	certain	contemporary	scholars,	who	may	not	always	recognize	Vivekananda	as	one	of	
the	game	changers	of	the	nineteenth	century,	but,	who	nevertheless,	identify	how	Hindu	
traditional	concepts	were	restructured	during	the	colonial	era	and	beyond.	In	the	
second	and	third	chapters	of	this	study	I	offered	up	a	theoretical	analysis	on	how	the	
terms	‘religion’	and	‘Hinduism’	developed	over	the	centuries	and	across	continents.	This	
theoretical	analysis	gave	me	a	framework	from	which	to	determine,	in	the	previous	
chapter,	how	Vivekananda	engaged	with	these	concepts	in	an	effort	to	present	India	as	a	
united	entity,	with	a	comprehensible	philosophical	system,	capable	of	standing	shoulder	
to	shoulder	with	Western	states.	Now,	as	he	returns	to	India,	we	shall	see	that	he	
continued	on	this	trajectory	thereby	establishing	that	the	Indian	elite	were	not	passive	
responders	to	this	‘continental	collision’.	Instead,	they	actively	participated	in	the	
restructuring	of	their	society.	Unfortunately	however,	some	of	this	restructuring	
resulted	in	a	derivative	discourse	that	that	can	still	prove	to	be	harmful	to	the	integrity	
of	Indian	traditions.	
Perhaps	a	few	points	of	clarification	might	be	useful	here.	Vivekananda	was	not	
the	first	Hindu	to	try	and	repackage	Hindu	ideas	in	such	a	way	as	to	make	them	more	
palatable	to	both	Western	and	Indian	audiences;	there	were	many	before	him.	For	
example,	Bankimchandra	Chattopadhyay	recreated	the	popular	image	of	Krishna	to	suit,	
what	he	believed	to	be	modern	India’s	needs.64	Many	Hindu	intellectuals,	not	only	
Vivekananda,	opted	to	use	religious	language	to	help	unite	their	countrymen.	What	
																																																								
63	Vivekananda	was	referred	to	as	the	‘cyclonic	monk’	by	several	newspaper	articles	
after	he	spoke	at	the	Parliament.		
64	Bankimchandra	Chattopadhyaya,	Krishna	Charitra	(1888).		
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made	Vivekananda	unique	was	the	fact	that	he	had	lectured	his	audiences	in	the	West,	
on	the	merits	of	Hindu	traditions,	in	a	forceful	yet	conciliatory	manner;	the	likes	of	
which	were	not	seen	again	until	Gandhi	entered	the	world’s	political	arena.	As	such,	the	
tactics	used	by	Vivekananda	to	build	up	the	confidence	and	self-esteem	of	his	
countrymen,	whilst	at	the	same	time	redeeming	the	perceived	image	of	Hindu	traditions	
are	an	important	stepping	stone	to	understanding	how	Vivekananda’s	emphasis	on	
Advaita	Vedanta	became	so	widespread.		
No	doubt,	the	additional	insight	that	Vivekananda	obtained,	into	how	the	
Western	mind	worked,	due	to	his	close	connections	with	several	Western	elites65,	
helped	him	to	identify	how	best	to	package	Hindu	ideas.	Vivekananda	himself	
acknowledged	that	he	had	seen	a	need	for	the	adaptation	of	Hindu	ideas	and	therefore	
had	taken	the	liberty	to	do	so.	In	a	letter	written	by	Vivekananda	to	his	brother	disciple,	
Alasinga,	in	February	1896,	while	he	was	still	on	his	first	American	tour,	he	wrote:	
to	put	the	Hindu	ideas	into	English	and	then	make	out	of	dry	philosophy	and	
queer	startling	psychology,	a	religion	which	shall	be	easy,	simple,	popular,	and	at	
the	same	time	meet	the	requirements	of	the	highest	minds	–	is	a	task	only	those	
can	understand	who	have	attempted	it.	The	dry	abstract	Advaita	must	become	
living	–	poetic	–	in	everyday	life;	out	of	hopelessly	intricate	mythology	must	
come	concrete	moral	forms;	out	of	bewildering	Yogi-ism	must	come	the	most	
scientific	and	practical	psychology	–	and	all	this	must	be	put	in	a	form	so	that	a	
child	may	grasp	it.	That	is	my	life’s	work	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.5,	pp.104-105,	
emphasis	added).	
	
It	is	this	vision	of	his	that	resulted	in	Vivekananda	presenting	Hindu	traditions	in	a	way,	
which	he	believed,	would	not	only	earn	the	West’s	respect,	but,	at	the	same	time,	make	
Hindus	proud	of	their	rich	heritage.	Ironically,	it	is	largely	due	to	his	success	in	the	West,	
where	he	was	able	to	present	Hindu	ideas	in	a	manner	that	made	them	both	attractive	
																																																								
65	In	Swami	Vivekananda	in	the	West:	New	Discoveries	(2013),	Marie	Louise	Burke	offers	
a	detailed	account	of	Vivekananda’s	travels	and	the	people	he	met	and	cultivated	
relationships	with.	He	not	only	engaged	with	an	impressive	array	of	foreigners	but	also	
developed	long	and	meaningful	bonds	with	many	of	them.	
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and	powerful,	which	gave	him	the	momentum	to	return	to	India	and	demonstrate	to	his	
countrymen	why	his	interpretation	of	Hindu	traditions	was	effective.	If	one	adds	this	to	
the	fact	that	his	success	coincided	with	the	rising	popularity	of	the	Indian	nationalist	
movement,	who	were	also	looking	for	ways	to	unite	India	under	a	single	banner,	then	it	
becomes	easier	to	understand	why	Vivekananda’s	ideas	were	so	influential.	
As	we	turn	now	to	examine	how	Vivekananda	presented	these	ideas	to	his	Indian	
audience,	we	must	be	aware	of	a	few	consequences	with	this	approach.	Since	
Vivekananda’s	‘repackaging’	of	Hindu	traditions	emphasized	the	concepts	usually	
associated	with	Vedanta,	this	resulted	in	a	hierarchy	that	effected	the	diverse	traditions	
that	represent	Hindu	philosophic	thought.	Vivekananda	was	not	the	first	person	to	
overemphasize	the	importance	of	the	Vedanta	or	the	Upanishads.	As	we	have	discussed	
in	previous	chapters,	both	Indians,	and	Westerners,	before	him	had	used	this	tactic	
extensively.	Now,	we	need	to	study	how	Vivekananda	impacted	this	trend	and	the	
ensuing	repercussions	they	had.	A	second,	related	consequence	of	Vivekananda’s	
analysis	was	the	demotion	of	dualism,	or	bhakti	and	the	traditions	and	rituals	associated	
with	the	various	gods.	This	resulted	in	many	Hindus	believing	that	their	conviction	in	a	
Saguna	Brahman	was	somehow	less	advanced	than	the	ideas	associated	with	a	Nirguna	
Brahman,	a	sentiment	that	continues	to	thrive	today.	Since	it	was	the	ability	to	coexist	in	
relative	harmony	with	others,	whose	belief	structure	was	not	only	different	from	theirs,	
but	whose	final	perception	of	the	divine	was	at	cross	purposes	with	their	own,	the	
creation	of	this	hierarchy	was,	and	continues	to	be	deeply	problematic.	
A	quick	word	about	how	I	will	structure	this	chapter	is	required	here.	In	this	
chapter	I	will,	highlight	certain	recurring	themes	in	Vivekananda’s	various	public	talks	
as	he	travelled	from	Colombo	(now	Sri	Lanka)	to	Almora.	This	strategy	will	be	necessary	
because	there	are	many	more	speeches	in	this	period	of	his	life,	and	as	such,	addressing	
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them	individually	would	be	unnecessarily	repetitious.	Especially	since,	as	we	shall	see,	
Vivekananda	had	certain	ideas	that	he	wanted	to	convey	and	he	brings	them	up	
frequently	to	drive	his	point	home.	For	example,	one	of	Vivekananda’s	favourite	stories	
was	about	two	birds	that	sat	in	a	tree,	and	he	used	it	at	various	times	while	he	was	in	
the	United	States.	He	referred	to	it	again	in	a	speech	he	made	upon	his	return	to	India:	
Upon	the	same	tree	there	are	two	birds	of	beautiful	plumage,	most	friendly	to	
each	other,	one	eating	the	fruits,	the	other	sitting	there	calm	and	silent	without	
eating	–	the	one	in	the	lower	branch	eating	sweet	and	bitter	fruits	in	turn	and	
becoming	happy	and	unhappy,	but	the	other	one	on	the	top,	calm	and	majestic;	
he	eats	neither	sweet	nor	bitter	fruits,	cares	neither	for	happiness	nor	misery,	
immersed	in	his	own	glory.	This	is	the	picture	of	the	human	soul.	…	Man	catches	
a	glimpse,	then	again	he	forgets	and	goes	on	eating	the	sweet	and	bitter	fruits	of	
life;	perhaps	after	a	time	he	catches	another	glimpse,	and	the	lower	bird	goes	
nearer	and	nearer	to	the	higher	bird	as	blows	after	blows	are	received.	If	he	be	
fortunate	to	receive	hard	knocks,	then	he	comes	nearer	and	nearer	to	his	
companion,	the	other	bird,	his	life,	his	friend;	and	as	he	approaches	him,	he	finds	
that	the	light	from	the	higher	bird	is	playing	around	his	own	plumage;	and	as	he	
comes	nearer	and	nearer,	lo!	the	transformation	is	going	on.	The	nearer	and	
nearer	he	comes,	he	finds	himself	melting	away,	as	it	were,	until	he	has	entirely	
disappeared.	He	did	not	really	exist;	it	was	but	the	reflection	of	the	other	bird	
who	was	there	calm	and	majestic	amidst	the	moving	leaves.	It	was	all	his	glory,	
that	upper	bird’s.	He	then	becomes	fearless,	perfectly	satisfied,	calmly	serene.	In	
this	figure,	the	Upanishads	take	you	from	the	dualistic	to	the	utmost	Advaitic	
conception	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3.	pp.235-236).66	
	
With	the	way	Vivekananda	told	this	tale	one	was	immediately	made	aware	of	an	
inherent	hierarchy.	After	all,	the	only	way	for	anybody	to	be	free	and	majestic,	like	the	
bird	on	the	top	branch,	was	by	adopting	Vedantic	ideals.	There	was	a	higher	and	a	lower	
level	in	this	story,	and	by	using	this	ancient	Hindu	analogy,	Vivekananda	transmitted	the	
message	that	Vedanta	was	the	higher	ideal.	And,	if	you	did	not	adopt	Vedanta,	or	at	least	
aspired	to	it,	then	you	could	not	find	happiness	or	moksha.	Whereas	Vivekananda	was	
not	the	first	person	to	interpret	Vedantic	ideology	in	this	manner,	he	was	one	of	the	first	
elites	to	find	himself	in	a	position	to	address	a	pan-Indian	audience.	For	example,	while	
																																																								
66	This	is	an	adaptation	of	the	parable	of	two	birds	from	the	Mundaka	Upanishad	III.	1.1-
3,	which	seeks	to	identify	the	relationship	between	paramataman	and	jivatman		
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both	Bankimchandra	and	Rammohan	were	largely	limited	to	their	Bengali	audience,	
Vivekananda	was	promoting	this	Vedantic	message	to	the	country	at	large.	A	message	
that	was	so	powerful	that	it	continues	to	influence	Hindu	thought	today.	Many	have	
asked	why	this	was	problematic,	and	the	question	is	a	valid	one.	The	short	answer	is	
that	by	allowing	a	hierarchy	to	be	created	in	India,	and,	by	placing	Vedanta	at	the	apex,	a	
crucial	aspect	of	Hindu	society	was	at	risk	of	being	lost.	In	this	chapter,	and	the	one	
concluding	this	study,	I	will	not	only	highlight	how	Vivekananda	was	instrumental	in	
presenting	this	hierarchy	in	a	way	which	made	it	extremely	attractive	to	his	fellow	
countrymen,	but	I	will	also	try	and	shed	some	light	on	why	his	ideas	can	still	undermine	
many	layers	of	Hindu	thought,	practice	and	custom,	which	in	turn	can	shake	the	very	
foundation	of	modern	India	and	its	diverse	traditions.	
	
‘Colonial	Masculinity’,	‘Muscles	of	iron	and	nerves	of	steel’67	
The	first	thing	that	one	perceives	when	one	reads	the	welcome	speeches	that	
were	given	upon	Vivekananda’s	return	to	India	is	the	enthusiasm	with	which	he	was	
received.	These	speeches	emphasize	that	the	people	welcoming	him,	in	the	many	places	
where	he	stopped	upon	his	return	to	India,	were	enamoured	by	his	apparent	triumph	in	
the	West.	However,	it	soon	becomes	evident	that	whereas	Vivekananda’s	overall	
success	interested	them,	it	was	one	particular	aspect	of	his	accomplishments	that	made	
a	real	impact	on	how	they	viewed	Vivekananda	and	his	methods.	Most	introductory	
speakers	marvelled	at	how	Vivekananda	had	succeeded	in	promoting	the	idea	that	
Hindu	philosophy	should	be	admired	and	lauded	by	the	West.	Especially	since,	this,	in	
																																																								
67	I	am	not	unaware	of	the	many	issues	that	feminists,	like	myself,	can	and	should	have	
with	how	masculinity	was	privileged	during	this	era	in	general,	and	by	Vivekananda	in	
particular.	However,	for	the	purposes	of	this	section	I	will	not	underscore	these	issues	
leaving	them	to	be	addressed	in	the	chapter	that	follows.		
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turn,	had	highlighted	the	value	of	traditional	concepts	to	the	Hindu	masses,	particularly	
the	elite	reformers,	many	of	whom	had,	for	too	long,	ignored	the	merits	of	their	native	
traditions.	For	instance,	on	Jan	15,	1897,	when	Vivekananda	landed	in	Colombo,	Mr	P.	
Coomara	Swamy	of	the	Legislative	Council	of	Ceylon	stated:	
Western	nations	owe	the	priceless	boon	of	being	placed	in	living	contact	with	the	
spiritual	genius	of	India,	while	to	many	of	our	own	countrymen,	delivered	from	
the	glamour	of	Western	civilisation,	the	value	of	our	glorious	heritage	has	been	
brought	home	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.103).	
	
It	is	interesting	to	read	how	similar	these	sentiments	were	amongst	Vivekananda’s	
Indian	admirers,	and	how	they	were	motivated	by	his	repackaging	of	Hindu	ideas.	One	
is	soon	able	to	discern	that	Vivekananda	had	not	only	demonstrated	how	Hindu	ideas	
were	relevant	in	the	modern	world,	but,	that	he	had	in	fact,	at	least	in	the	eyes	of	his	
compatriots,	proved	that	in	some	respects	they	could	be	considered	superior.	For	
example,	one	tactic	that	Vivekananda	used	was	the	repackaging	of	the	concept	of	yoga,	
the	repercussions	of	which	continue	to	be	felt	today.	Peter	van	der	Veer	observes	in	
Imperial	Encounters	(2006):	
A	major	achievement	was	Vivekananda’s	creation	of	yoga	as	the	Indian	science	of	
supraconsciousness.	Yoga	is	a	Sanskrit	word	that	can	be	translated	as	
“discipline.”	It	has	a	complex	history	with	a	number	of	disparate	traditions,	but	
the	classical	text	is	Patanjali’s	Yoga-sutras	which	was	probably	composed	around	
the	fifth	century	A.D.	Yoga	was	now	made	into	the	unifying	sign	of	the	Indian	
nation	–	and	not	only	for	national	consumption	but	for	consumption	by	the	
entire	world.	This	is	a	new	doctrine,	although	Vivekananda	emphasized	that	it	
was	ancient	“wisdom.”	Especially	the	body	exercises	of	hatha	yoga,	underpinned	
by	a	metaphysics	of	mind-body	unity,	continues	to	be	a	major	entity	in	the	health	
industry,	especially	in	the	United	States.	What	I	find	important	in	Vivekananda’s	
construction	of	yoga	as	the	core	of	Hindu	“spirituality”	is	that	it	is	devoid	of	any	
specific	devotional	content	that	would	involve,	for	example,	temple	worship	and	
thus	a	theological	and	ritual	position	in	sectarian	debates.	Vivekananda	is,	first	
and	foremost,	interested	in	Hindu	unity	(van	der	Veer,	2006,	p.73).	
	
What	this	example	demonstrates	is	that	Vivekananda’s	interpretations	of	ancient	
scriptures	gave	Indians	the	opportunity	to	hold	their	heads	up	high	amongst	
Westerners.	And,	perhaps	even	more	importantly,	showed	many,	who	had	rejected	their	
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Indian	heritage,	that	they	were	mistaken	to	believe	that	the	answers	they	sought	for	the	
advancement	of	Indian	society	could	not	be	found	in	native	texts.	In	Vivekananda,	Hindu	
philosophy	seemed	to	have	found	a	voice	that	could	resonate	with	both	Western	and	
Indian	audiences.	His	message	that	India	was	the	greatest	nation,	delivered	in	his	
uncompromising	authoritative	tone,	on	foreign	soil,	was	infectious.	Vivekananda	clearly	
believed	that	whereas	Indians	were	not	openly	aggressive,	this	did	not	mean	that	they	
had	no	backbone;	instead	he	argued	that	this	backbone	was	not	politically,	socially,	or	
materialistically	inclined	but	rather	spiritually	oriented	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	
p.314).	One	cannot	help	but	speculate	if	Vivekananda	used	‘religion’	as	his	‘weapon	of	
choice’	because	he	knew	that	this	would	allow	him	to	make	political	statements	and	
declarations	without	impunity.	Was	this	his	Trojan	horse?	Was	this	a	clever	tactic	that	
assuaged	the	colonizers	concerns	about	political	unrest?	As	we	explore	Vivekananda’s	
views	on	political	and	national	topics	later	in	this	chapter,	perhaps	we	will	be	able	to	
make	an	educated	guess	as	to	whether	his	motives	were	clear,	or	if	they	were	
intentionally	ambiguous.	
That	being	said	however,	it	is	evident	that	Vivekananda	was	deeply	concerned	
about	the	impression	that	had	been	created	during	the	British	Raj,	which	suggested	that	
Indian	men	were	weak,	and	lacked	a	certain	manliness	that	Western	men	possessed.	
This	image	of	the	‘effeminate’,	and	therefore	weak,	‘Bengali	babu’	is	examined	in	some	
detail	by	Mrinalini	Sinha	in	Colonial	masculinity	(1995).	Sinha	first	elaborates	on	what	
this	title	‘effeminate	Bengali’	babu	means	and	how	it	came	to	be	applied,	at	least	
initially,	specifically	to	the	Western	educated	Bengali	men	who	often	held	clerical	
positions	in	British	India:	
the	‘Bengali	babu’	alludes	to	a	quite	specific	historical	ordering	of	colonial	
masculinity.	By	the	late	nineteenth	century,	the	politics	of	colonial	masculinity	
was	organized	along	a	descending	scale:	senior	British	officials	associated	with	
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the	administrative	and	military	establishment,	and	elite	non-officials,	those	not	
directly	related	to	the	colonial	administration,	occupied	positions	at	the	top	of	
the	scale.	Other	groups	and	classes	that	made	up	colonial	society	supposedly	
shared	some,	though	not	all,	of	the	attributes	associated	with	the	figure	of	the	
‘manly	Englishman’.	In	this	colonial	ordering	of	masculinity,	the	politically	self-
conscious	Indian	intellectuals	occupied	a	unique	place:	they	represented	an	
‘unnatural’	or	‘perverted’	form	of	masculinity.	Hence	this	group	of	Indians,	the	
most	typical	representatives	of	which	at	the	time	were	middle-class	Bengali	
Hindus,	became	the	quintessential	referents	for	that	odious	category	designated	
as	‘effeminate	babus’	(1995,	p.2).	
	
Eventually	however,	this	label	was	extended	beyond	the	boundaries	of	Bengal	and	came	
to	be	applied	more	generally	to	Indian	middle	class	men	(Sinha,	1995,	p.16).	According	
to	Sinha,	this	image	that	had	been	cultivated	by	the	colonialists,	in	order	to	rationalize	
their	dominant	role	in	the	Indian	subcontinent,	had	become	a	rallying	point	amongst	
Indian	political	leaders	who	were	intent	on	highlighting	the	most	demeaning	aspects	of	
colonial	rule:	
the	degeneration	of	the	body	of	the	elite	Hindu	male	became	the	symbol	of	the	
negative	impact	of	colonial	rule	on	indigenous	society	as	a	whole.	On	the	other	
hand,	the	self-perception	of	effeminacy	also	facilitated	a	challenge,	however	
limited	and	contradictory,	to	the	dominance	of	the	colonizing	elites;	for	the	
emasculation	of	Indians	was	also	the	basis	for	challenging	specific	colonial	
policies	(1995,	p.7).	
	
Indeed,	it	became	quite	routine	for	Indian	leaders	in	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	
century	to	draw	attention	to,	what	they	perceived	to	be,	a	specifically	Indian	weakness	
and	try	to	find	ways	to	remedy	the	issue:	
Prominent	nineteenth-century	Bengali	intellectuals	were	indeed	concerned	
about	the	consequences	of	effeminacy.	In	the	1860’s	the	famous	Tagores	of	
Jorasanko	and	the	organization	with	which	they	were	most	closely	associated,	
the	Adi	Brahmo	Samaj,	launched	a	concerted	drive	for	the	physical	regeneration	
of	the	Bengalis.	Bankimchandra	Chatterjee,	one	of	the	most	famous	Bengali	
writers,	oscillated	between	mocking	the	modern	babu	and	attempting	to	answer	
the	charge	of	Bengali	effeminacy	which	he	called	Bharat	Kalanka	or	the	Indian	
Stigma.	Bengali	social	and	religious	reformer,	Swami	Vivekanand	[sic],	was	
similarly	a	great	proponent	of	cultivating	a	‘manly’	physique,	in	his	most	quoted	
words	on	the	subject	he	is	reported	to	have	remarked:	‘You	will	be	nearer	to	God	
through	football	than	through	the	Bhagwad-Gita	(Sinha,	1995,	p.21).	
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Vivekananda	made	statements	such	as	these	liberally	immediately	upon	his	
return	to	India.	However,	what	makes	Vivekananda’s	declarations	unique,	against	what	
he	perceived	to	be	a	weakness	amongst	his	countrymen,	was	how	he	argued	that	this	
need	for	strength	and	‘manliness’	would	best	be	met	with	Advaita	philosophy	rather	
than	the	prevalent	emphasis	on	dualism:	
When	I	was	in	America,	I	heard	once	the	complaint	made	that	I	was	preaching	
too	much	of	Advaita,	and	too	little	of	dualism.	Ay,	I	know	what	grandeur,	what	
oceans	of	love,	what	infinite,	ecstatic	blessings	and	joy	there	are	in	the	dualistic	
love-theories	of	worship	and	religion.	I	know	it	all.	But	this	is	not	the	time	with	
us	to	weep	even	in	joy;	we	have	had	weeping	enough;	no	more	is	this	the	time	for	
us	to	become	soft.	This	softness	has	been	with	us	till	we	have	become	like	masses	
of	cotton	and	are	dead.	What	our	country	now	wants	are	muscles	of	iron	and	
nerves	of	steel,	gigantic	wills	which	nothing	can	resist	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	
p.190,	emphasis	added).	
	
This	assertion	not	only	points	to	Vivekananda’s	acquiescence	of	this	negative	label,	but	
indeed,	highlights	inherent	attitudes	which	deserve	to	be	examined.	The	first	and	
foremost	of	which	was	his	opinion	that	dualists	were	weak	and	as	such	had	adopted	a	
belief	system	which	was	holding	them	back	from	achieving	true	greatness.	Considering	
that	Vivekananda’s	guru,	Ramakrishna,	was	given	to	weeping	with	his	deity,	it	is	rather	
interesting	that	Vivekananda	considered	this	behaviour	as	a	sign	of	weakness.	For	
example,	Sil	points	out:	
He	[Vivekananda]	was	also	quite	contemptuous	of	ecstatic	enthusiasm.	Toward	
the	end	of	his	guru’s	life,	at	the	Shyampukur	residence,	Narendranath	openly	
inveighed	against	the	Paramahamsa	style	of	dances	and	trances	indulged	in	by	
several	eager	young	devotees	of	the	Master.	He	boldly	declared	that	shedding	
tears,	experiencing	horripilation	or	“even	a	temporary	withdrawal	of	normal	
consciousness”	was	“the	result	of	nervous	weakness”	(1997,	p.104).	
	
Another	factor	that	makes	Vivekananda’s	anti-dualism	stance	noteworthy	is	that	
he	changed	his	emphasis	substantially,	when	discussing	Advaita	with	his	Indian	
audience,	in	comparison	with	the	speeches	he	gave	at	the	Parliament.	When	in	the	West,	
Vivekananda	championed	Advaita	Vedanta	by	stating	that	there	was	no	philosophy	that	
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resonated	as	deeply	with	a	human	being’s	desire	to	be	compassionate	and	loving.	For	
instance,	at	the	Parliament	he	told	his	audience	that	the	best	way	to	worship	the	
“Almighty	and	the	All-merciful”	was	“Through	love.	‘He	is	to	be	worshipped	as	the	one	
beloved,	dearer	than	everything	in	this	and	the	next	life”	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.1,	
p.11).	When	he	returned	to	India	however,	he	no	longer	accentuated	Vedanta’s	basis	of	
love,	but	rather	emphasized	its	compatibility	with	‘muscles	of	iron	and	nerves	of	steel’!	
He	used	this	argument	against	mysticism	and	occultism	as	well,	once	again	attacking	
some	of	the	basic	premises	of	Ramakrishna’s	teachings.	Now,	there	can	be	no	doubt	of	
Vivekananda’s	knowledge	of	Ramakrishna’s	mystic	leanings,	especially	since	he	
repeatedly	warned	his	brother	disciples	to	underplay	those	aspects	of	Ramakrishna	
when	speaking	of	their	master.	For	example,	in	a	letter	written	from	the	United	States,	
on	30th	November,	1894,	to	Kidi	(P.	Singaravelu	Mudaliyar),	a	brother	disciple,	
Vivekananda	asserted:	
As	to	the	wonderful	stories	published	about	Shri	Ramakrishna,	I	advise	you	to	
keep	clear	of	them	and	the	fools	who	write	them.	They	are	true,	but	the	fools	will	
make	a	mess	of	the	whole	thing,	I	am	sure.	He	had	a	whole	world	of	knowledge	to	
teach,	why	insist	upon	unnecessary	things	as	miracles	really	are!	They	do	not	
prove	anything	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.5,	p.54).	
	
Similarly,	he	repeatedly	advised	his	fellow-disciples	to	avoid	referring	to	Ramakrishna	
as	a	‘God’,	or	an	incarnation,	as	that	would	diminish	the	Vedantic	aspects	of	his	message.	
In	a	letter	to	his	brother	disciple	Sarada	(Swami	Trigunatitananda)	from	New	York	in	
April	of	1896	he	stated:	
That	Ramakrishna	Paramahamsa	was	God	–	and	all	that	sort	of	thing	–	has	no	go	
in	countries	like	this.	M	–	has	a	tendency	to	put	that	stuff	down	everybody’s	
throat,	but	that	will	make	our	movement	a	little	sect.	You	keep	aloof	from	such	
attempts;	at	the	same	time,	if	people	worship	as	God,	no	harm.	Neither	
encourage	nor	discourage.	The	masses	will	always	have	the	person,	the	higher	
ones	the	principle;	we	want	both.	But	principles	are	universal,	not	persons.	
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Therefore	stick	to	the	principles	he	taught,	let	people	think	whatever	they	like	of	
his	person	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.6,	p.362,	emphasis	in	original).68	
	
Considering	that	Ramakrishna	is	remembered	as	one	of	India’s	most	important	modern	
mystics,	it	is	troubling	to	hear	that	Vivekananda	made	light	of,	dismissed,	and	even	
criticized	this	aspect	of	his	master’s	teachings.	Jeffrey	Kripal	points	out:	
Rather	than	sacrifice	his	agenda	to	the	fire	of	historical	accuracy,	however,	the	
young	preacher	much	preferred	to	throw	his	Master	into	the	flames.	Consider,	
for	example,	his	reaction	to	a	fellow	monk’s	charge	that,	by	falsely	claiming	that	
social	service	lies	at	the	core	of	Ramakrishna’s	message,	he	had	introduced	
Western	ideas	of	service	and	action	into	a	life	where	they	did	not	belong.	
Narendra’s	reply	is	unambiguous:	“What	do	you	know?	You	are	an	ignorant	
man…	Your	Bhakti	is	sentimental	nonsense,	which	makes	you	impotent…	Hands	
off!	Who	cares	for	your	Ramakrishna?	Who	cares	for	Bhakti	and	Mukti?	Who	
cares	what	your	Scriptures	say?	…	I	am	not	a	slave	of	Ramakrishna”	(1998,	p.172,	
emphasis	in	original).	
	
It	is	important	to	mention	here	that	even	though	Vivekananda	did	make	
comments	like	these	when	speaking	privately,	or	in	his	personal	correspondence,	he	did	
not	commit	the	mistake	of	making	these	claims	in	public,	especially	upon	his	return	to	
India.	Instead,	he	cleverly	acknowledged	his	guru’s	devotion	to	bhakti	and	even	used	it	
to	challenge	some	of	the	arguments	made	by	Indian	reformers	(an	interesting	
manoeuvre	that	we	will	discuss	in	the	next	section).69	As	such,	Vivekananda	was	careful	
to	articulate,	in	public,	that	when	he	was	speaking	of	mystics,	or	weeping	devotees,	he	
was	not	referring	to	his	guru,	for	whom	he	had	nothing	but	the	utmost	respect.	It	could	
also	be	possible	that	Vivekananda	was	reacting	to	how	mysticism	was	being	
disassociated	from	the	so-called	rational	and	scientific	‘religions’	of	the	Enlightenment	
																																																								
68	‘M’	was	Mahendranath	Gupta,	one	of	Ramakrishna’s	primary	biographers.		
69	However,	Ramakrishna’s	disciples	were	not	as	easily	convinced	and	many	scholars	
have	highlighted	Vivekananda’s	disagreements	with	some	of	Ramakrishna’s	most	
prominent	householder	disciples.	They	make	an	effort	to	demonstrate	how	different	
Ramakrishna’s	methods	and	ideology	was	when	compared	to	Vivekananda;	and	how	
this	often	led	to	acrimonious	circumstances	between	Ramakrishna’s	followers.	For	
example,	Chattopadhyaya	(1999)	pp.156-157,	234-235;	Sen	(1993)	p.312;	Sil	(1997)	
pp.103-113.	
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era,	a	point	that	King	articulates	when	he	questions	the	label	‘Hinduism’.	If	this	is	the	
case,	then	it	stands	to	reason	why	Ramakrishna’s	mysticism	did	not	sit	well	with	
Vivekananda’s	own	vision	of	a	strong	Vedantic	Hindu	public	that	he	was	endeavouring	
to	inspire:		
We	have	become	weak,	and	that	is	why	occultism	and	mysticism	come	to	us	–	
these	creepy	things;	there	may	be	great	truths	in	them,	but	they	have	nearly	
destroyed	us.	Make	your	nerves	strong.	What	we	want	is	muscles	of	iron	and	
nerves	of	steel.	We	have	wept	long	enough.	No	more	weeping,	but	stand	on	your	
feet	and	be	men.	…	The	truths	of	the	Upanishads	are	before	you.	Take	them	up,	
live	up	to	them,	and	the	salvation	of	India	will	be	at	hand	(Vivekananda,	2009,	
vol.3,	pp.224-225).	
	
This	skill	of	Vivekananda’s,	where	he	took	arguments	and	allegations	made	by	the	West	
against	Indian	society,	and	found	ways	to	use	the	Vedas,	particularly	Advaita	Vedanta,	to	
contest	them,	is	what	aided	his	efforts	to	place	Vedanta	at	the	apex	of	Indian	philosophy.	
In	fact,	it	is	this	kind	of	manoeuvring	that	gives	meaning	to	Sinha’s	premise,	which,	in	
turn,	harks	back	to	Nandy’s	assertions	that	the	walls	separating	the	colonizer	and	the	
colonized	are	porous:	
the	categories	of	the	colonizer	and	the	colonized	are	not	fixed	or	self-evident	
categories.	Although	these	categories	may	appear	to	have	represented	‘natural’	
differences	of	race	or	national	origin,	there	was	nothing	natural	or	fixed	about	
them.	There	was	a	constant	need,	therefore,	to	define,	and	redefine	the	coloniser	
and	the	colonised.	Moreover,	since	the	coloniser	and	the	colonised	were	
themselves	historically	constructed	categories,	the	relations	between	the	two	
were	neither	fixed	nor	given	for	all	time.	Indeed,	the	relations	between	the	
coloniser	and	colonised	were	constantly	rearticulated	in	accordance	with	the	
continually	changing	political	and	economic	imperatives	of	colonial	rule	(Sinha,	
1995,	p.1).		
	
Vivekananda	is	a	prime	example	of	this	strategy	whereby	he	endeavoured	to	adjust,	
accentuate	and	accommodate	his	emphasis	on	the	Vedanta	to	better	package	his	
message	upon	his	return	to	India.	And,	since	these	efforts	of	his	were	based	on	the	
premise	that	India	was	more	spiritually	advanced	than	their	British	colonizers,	this	was	
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perceived,	at	least	by	his	Indian	compatriots,	as	a	direct	challenge	to	the	supremacy	of	
the	West.	Thus,	Vivekananda	declared:	
Great	works	are	to	be	done,	wonderful	powers	have	to	be	worked	out,	we	have	to	
teach	other	nations	many	things…	This	is	the	motherland	of	philosophy,	of	
spirituality,	and	of	ethics,	…	my	experience	of	the	world	leads	me	to	stand	on	
firm	ground	and	make	the	bold	statement	that	India	is	still	the	first	and	foremost	
of	all	the	nations	of	the	world	in	these	respects	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.147).	
	
Nandy	who	is	particularly	concerned	with	the	psychology	of	both	the	colonizers	
and	the	colonized	(see	Chapter	1),	raises	some	questions	about	this	emphasis	on	
masculinity	and	its	ensuing	ramifications.	He	contends	that	during	the	late	nineteenth	
and	early	twentieth	century	there	were	several	elite	Indian	men	who	reacted	to	how	
masculinity	was	privileged	in	Western	societies.	These	Indian	elite	had	bought	into	the	
hyper-masculine	image	that	the	colonizers	had	adopted	in	order	to	warrant	their	
motives	for	the	colonization	of	India.	One	tactic	that	the	British	adopted	was	to	argue	
that	over	the	centuries	the	Indian	man	had	become	weak	and	effeminate.	This	theory	
allowed	the	English	to	justify	their	presence	as	the	foreign	rulers	of	India.	Because,	after	
all,	as	Nandy	reminds	us,	“[c]olonialism	minus	a	civilizational	mission	is	no	colonialism	
at	all.	It	handicaps	the	colonizer	much	more	than	it	handicaps	the	colonized”	(2006,	
p.11).	Nandy	surmises	that	both	the	colonizers	and	the	colonized	bought	into	the	theory	
that	the	Indian	man	had	become	unfit	to	rule	because	he	lacked	“what	in	the	dominant	
culture	of	the	colony	had	already	become	the	final	differentiae	of	manliness:	aggression,	
achievement,	control,	competition	and	power”	(2006,	p.9).	According	to	Nandy,	Indian	
elites	such	as	Madhusudan,	Bankimchandra70	and	Vivekananda	were	responding	to	this	
colonial	ideal	when	they	championed	masculine	traits	amongst	their	Indian	brethren.	
Furthermore,	he	contends	“[b]y	the	time	Vivekananda	entered	the	scene,	the	West	had	
																																																								
70	See	Chapter	1	where	I	refer	to	Nandy’s	analysis	of	both	Michael	Madhusudan	Dutta	
and	Bankimchandra	Chattopadhyay.		
	 189	
made	deeper	inroads	into	the	minds	of	Indians.	To	him,	therefore,	the	real	threat	was	
the	West	within”	(Nandy,	2014,	p.292).	As	such,	Vivekananda	found	it	necessary	to	use	
the	Western	ideals	of	masculinity	to	convince	his	fellow	countrymen,	who	had	already	
internalized	this	Western	value	system.	In	fact,	Nandy	goes	a	step	further	when	he	
argues	that	Vivekananda	and	Dayananda	Saraswati	(who	he	lumps	together	as	the	“two	
redoubtable	Swamis,”	a	characterization	which	is	problematic	in	and	of	itself)	
“identified	the	West	with	power	and	hegemony,	which	in	turn	they	identified	with	a	
superior	civilization”	(2006,	pp.24-25).	
	 Now,	whereas	Vivekananda	may	have	agreed	that	the	West	was	more	advanced	
in	certain	aspects,	it	is	hard	to	find	credence	for	this	blanket	statement	that	the	West	
was	a	‘superior	civilization’	that	Nandy	projects	onto	him.	On	the	other	hand,	one	has	to	
acknowledge	that	Nandy	is	right	when	he	suggests	that	Madhusudan,	Bankimchandra	
and	Vivekananda,	all	searched	for	a	way	to	communicate	this	need	for	aggression	by	
highlighting	examples	within	Hindu	mythology:	
Many	nineteenth-century	Indian	movements	of	social,	religious	and	political	
reform	–	and	many	literary	and	art	movements	as	well	–	tried	to	make	
Ksatriyahood	the	‘true’	interface	between	the	rulers	and	ruled	as	a	new,	nearly	
exclusive	indicator	of	authentic	Indianness.	The	origins	and	functions	of	this	new	
stress	on	Ksatriyahood	is	best	evidenced	by	the	fact	that,	contrary	to	the	beliefs	
of	those	carrying	the	psychological	baggage	of	colonialism,	the	search	for	martial	
Indianness	underwrote	one	of	the	most	powerful	collaborationist	strands	within	
Indian	society	(Nandy,	2006,	p.7).	
	
For	example,	Bankimchandra	chose	to	do	this	by	remodelling	the	image	of	Krishna,	
presenting	him	less	as	a	lover	of	gopis	and	more	as	a	Kshatriya	king.	On	the	other	hand,	
Madhusudan	vilified	the	Kshatriya	king	Rama,	who	pined	for,	and	then	rejected,	his	wife	
Sita	and	instead	held	up	the	Rakshasa	king	Ravana	as	the	true	model	for	Indian	
manliness.	Whereas	both	images	achieved	some	traction,	Hindus	today	have	not	
discarded	their	love	for	the	Krishna	who	continues	to	be	the	centre	of	the	ever-popular	
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rasa-lila.	Similarly,	whereas	many	have	questioned	Rama’s	treatment	of	Sita,	the	Ram-
lila	continues	to	be	an	integral	aspect	for	a	great	number	of	Hindu	devotees.		
Vivekananda	chose	a	different	tactic;	a	tactic	that	not	only	resonated	with	his	
audience	but	also	helped	him	to	establish	Advaita	Vedanta	as	a	tool	to	redeem	India’s	
‘lost’	manliness.	According	to	Nandy,	Victorian	culture	recognized	that	there	were	two	
kinds	of	masculinity:	
the	lower	classes	[who]	were	expected	to	act	out	their	manliness	by	
demonstrating	their	sexual	prowess;	the	upper	classes	[who]	were	expected	to	
affirm	their	masculinity	through	sexual	distance,	abstinence	and	self-control…the	
latter	was	compatible	with,	of	all	things,	one	strand	in	the	traditional	Indian	
concept	of	manliness.	The	Brahman	in	his	cerebral,	self-denying	asceticism	was	
the	traditional	masculine	counterpoint	to	the	more	violent,	‘virile’,	active	
Kshatriya,	the	latter	representing	–	however	odd	this	many	seem	to	the	modern	
consciousness	–	the	feminine	principle	in	the	cosmos	(2006,	p.10).	
	
This	argument	suggests	that	the	brahmin	man	who	is	austere	and	cerebral	resonates	
well	with	the	British	version	of	a	highbrow	upper-class	‘manly’	gentleman.	If	that	is	the	
case,	then	it	is	easy	to	understand	how	a	man	like	Vivekananda	who	was	a	sanyasi	and	
therefore	naturally	should	be	both	austere	and	celibate,	and	who,	in	this	case,	was	also	
intellectually	competent	could	have	made	such	an	impact.	Here	was	a	man	who	both	the	
elite,	as	well	as	the	common	man,	could	identify	with	and	whose	qualities	resonated	
with	aspects	of	their	own	cultural	background,	albeit	recessive	ones.	Nandy	observes	
that	when	two	cultures	collide	it	is	common	for	traits	that	are	normally	recessive	to	
become	more	evident	thereby	“alter[ing]	the	original	cultural	priorities	on	both	sides	
and	bring[ing]	to	the	centre	of	the	colonial	culture	subcultures	previously	recessive	or	
subordinate	in	the	two	confronting	cultures”	(2006,	p.2).	
Perhaps	Vivekananda	was	not	simply	mimicking	Western	ideals	blindly	but	
instead,	was	accessing	aspects	of	his	own	cultural	identity	to	reach	out	to	his	
countrymen.	This,	in	turn,	allow	him	to	privilege	Advaitic	ideas	that	had	previously	been	
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championed	by	ascetics	who	were	now	being	identified,	at	least	subconsciously,	as	the	
‘manly’	version	of	the	Indian	man.	It	is	difficult	to	claim	definitively	whether	this	was	an	
intentional	tactic	used	by	Vivekananda	or,	if	instead,	and	this	seems	more	likely,	he	
instinctively	reflected	his	own	quest	for	perfection	as	a	sanyasi	onto	Hindu	men	in	
general.	Be	that	as	it	may,	the	end	result	was	that	Vivekananda	had	found	that	Advaitin	
philosophy,	with	its	emphasis	on	austerity	and	its	insistence	on	a	monistic	philosophy	
(a	philosophy	that	apparently	rested	on	a	‘higher	branch’	than	bhakti),	was	one	way	for	
Hindu	men	to	be	more	‘manly’.	
	
Reformer,	Revivalist,	Traditionalist,	Orthodox…	
	 Another	recurring	theme	in	Vivekananda’s	speeches,	upon	his	return	to	India,	
was	his	penchant	to	critique	the	various	elite	Indian	movements	that	were	commanding	
attention	and	forming	alliances	in	India.	For	example,	he	did	not	disguise	his	
condescension	for	the	Indian	reform	movement.		
To	the	reformers	I	will	point	out	that	I	am	a	greater	reformer	than	any	one	of	
them.	They	want	to	reform	only	little	bits.	I	want	root	and	branch	reform.	Where	
we	differ	is	in	the	method.	Theirs	is	the	method	of	destruction,	mine	is	that	of	
construction.	I	do	not	believe	in	reform;	I	believe	in	growth	(Vivekananda,	2009,	
vol.3,	p.213).	
	
Obviously,	this	leads	one	to	question	whether	Vivekananda’s	vehement	distaste	for	the	
reformers	of	his	day	indicated	that	he	was,	instead,	more	comfortable	placing	himself	in	
the	revivalist	camp.	However,	one	simply	has	to	read	Vivekananda’s	arguments	against	
revivalists	to	realize	that	this	label	was	not	a	comfortable	fit	for	his	ideals	either.		
revival	sometimes	breeds	fanaticism,	sometimes	goes	to	the	extreme,	so	that	
often	it	is	not	even	in	the	power	of	those	who	start	the	revival	to	control	it	when	
it	has	gone	beyond	a	certain	length	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.172).	
	
Before	analysing	Vivekananda’s	arguments	about	these	native	responses	to	
colonization,	it	is	necessary	to	acknowledge	that	part	of	the	problem	here	lies	with	the	
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difficulties	associated	with	defining	some	of	the	terms	used	both	by	the	movements	
themselves,	and	by	others,	to	describe	their	differing	agendas.	This	leads	us	back	to	
Hacker’s	assertions	(see	Chapter	3),	where	I	highlighted	the	dilemma	with	using	labels	
such	as	‘revivalist’	and	‘reformer’	as	they	cannot	be	rigidly	defined.	Rather,	they	should	
be	understood	as	fluid	categories	relative	to	the	groups	and	circumstances	they	
described;	an	argument	that	is	explored	in	some	detail	by	Vasudha	Dalmia	in	The	
Nationalization	of	Hindu	Traditions	(1997).	According	to	Dalmia,	the	revivalist	
movements	played	a	much	bigger	role	in	effecting	change	in	colonial	India	than	they	are	
usually	given	credit	for:		
Though	the	more	radical	reform	movements	served	as	catalysts	the	most	vital	
issues	concerning	notions	of	cultural,	religious	and	political	identity	were	
thrashed	out	in	the	traditionalist	quarters	as	well,	and	perhaps	with	more	lasting	
effect,	and	it	was	here	that	the	face	of	modern	Hinduism	–	within	which	temple	
and	varna	continue	to	play	a	prominent	role	–	was	finally	to	be	coined	(1999,	
p.4).	
	
Dalmia	contends	that	reform	movements	were	quite	comfortable	with	this	label	since	it	
suggested	that	their	leaders	were	open	to	change	and	accommodation.	On	the	other	
hand,	revivalists	rejected	any	association	with	reform	movements,	and	objected	to	the	
suggestion	that	they	supported	reform	(even	if	this	was	true),	because	they	did	not	
want	to	advertise	the	modifications	they	occasionally	advocated:	
The	changes	in	traditional	formations,	widespread	as	they	are,	are	simply	not	
registered,	since	they	do	not	choose	to	define	themselves	as	different,	and	in	fact	
emphasize	the	constancy	of	the	tradition	they	stand	for	(Dalmia,	1999,	pp.4-5).	
	
Furthermore,	she	states:	
the	nineteenth	century	social	and	religious	leadership,	specially	when	defending	
sanatana	dharma,	developed	its	own	deliberately	antiquarian	vocabulary	to	
designate	its	priorities	and	preferences,	and	equally	deliberately,	it	set	itself	off	
from	the	modern.	The	traditional/modern	polarity,	used	to	establish	the	
distinction	between	the	indigenous	and	the	alien,	was	a	part	of	the	self-
representation	of	those	who	sought	to	depict	their	tradition	as	standing	firm	
against	the	pressure	of	change	(Dalmia,	1999,	p.5).	
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Dalmia	emphasizes	that	this	was	simply	a	tactic	employed	by	revivalists	and	should	not	
be	misunderstood	to	suggest	that	they	did	not,	in	fact,	execute	numerous	changes	in	
accordance	with	the	changing	political	and	social	climate.	As	a	result,	Dalmia	argues	that	
the	term	‘revivalist’	is	not	a	useful	one	since	it	can	be	both	limiting	and	negative:	
‘Revival’	then	is	not	only	misleading	since	it	disallows	the	possibility	of	change,	it	
has	the	added	disadvantage	of	having	been	used	pejoratively	all	too	often,	as	if	it	
referred	to	no	more	than	outmoded	religious	practice	which	had	lain	inert	up	to	
then,	but	which	had	ultimately	refused	to	be	suppressed	by	the	more	enlightened	
reform	movements,	such	as	the	Brahmo	or	even	Arya	Samaj	(1999,	p.6).	
	
Instead,	she	suggests	the	use	of	the	label	‘traditionalist’	“for	their	one	binding	feature	
was	the	stress	on	the	sanatanata	or	constancy	of	tradition,	rather	than	any	breach	with	
some	original,	more	pristine	past”	(Dalmia,	1999,	p.7).	As	for	the	label	‘reformer’,	she	
believes,	and	I	concur,	that	at	least	for	the	time	being,	it	seems	to	serve	its	purpose	as	
long	as	it	is	not	coupled	with	the	term	‘Neo-Hindu’	(a	label	which	Hacker	used	liberally	
but	which	Dalmia	states	“reeks	with	inauthenticity”	(Dalmia,	1999,	p.7)	and	is	
recognized	as	a	complex	label,	which	has	both	similarities	and	differences	when	
compared	to	the	term	‘traditionalist’.	We	should	not	lose	sight	of	the	fact	that	whereas	
traditionalists	wanted	to	hold	on	to	their	inherited	belief	system	they	were	also	aware	
that	some	change	was	necessary.	Especially	since,	they	were	endeavouring,	at	the	same	
time,	to	bring	together	some	extremely	disparate	ideas	under	a	single	banner;	no	matter	
if	they	labelled	it	‘Hinduism’	or	‘Vedantism’	or	‘sanatana	dharma’.	With	her	detailed	
analysis,	Dalmia	warns	us	against	using	labels	such	as	these	without	caution	since,	
according	to	her,	“reformist	tendencies	were	common	to	all	the	movements.	The	
difference	lay	only	in	selection	and	the	degree	of	emphasis”	(Dalmia,	1999,	p.7).	
Furthermore,	she	reminds	us:	
In	itself	the	process	of	thus	welding	disparate	elements	was	not	novel.	There	had	
always	been	strong	assimilative	tendencies	in	the	smarta	traditions	which	had	
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tried	to	project	unitariness	and	which	had	inevitably	recurred	to	the	Vedas	as	the	
legitimating	instance	(Dalmia,	1999,	p.430).	
	
	 Dalmia’s	arguments	become	particularly	noteworthy	when	we	apply	them	to	
Vivekananda.	We	already	know	that	he	did	not	like	the	label	‘reformer’	since	he	was	
constantly	attacking	them	and	would	have	been	loath	to	be	categorized	as	one:		
I	grant	that	we	have	to	take	a	great	many	things	from	other	nations,	that	we	have	
to	learn	many	lessons	from	outside;	but	I	am	sorry	to	say	that	most	of	our	
modern	reform	movements	have	been	inconsiderate	imitations	of	Western	
means	and	method	of	work;	and	that	surely	will	not	do	for	India;	therefore,	it	is	
that	all	our	recent	reform	movements	have	had	no	result	(Vivekananda,	2009,	
vol.3,	p.195).	
	
On	the	other	hand,	he	was	also	quite	liberal	with	his	criticism	of	traditionalists	(he	
referred	to	them	as	the	‘orthodox’)	who	insisted	on	holding	on	to	certain	rituals	and	
regulations	which	he	believed	were	not	conducive	to	the	advancement	of	India	in	the	
modern	world:		
A	petty	village	custom	seems	now	the	real	authority	and	not	the	teaching	of	the	
Upanishads.	A	petty	idea	current	in	a	wayside	village	in	Bengal	seems	to	have	the	
authority	of	the	Vedas,	and	even	something	better.	And	that	word	“orthodox”,	
how	wonderful	its	influence!	To	the	villager,	the	following	of	every	little	bit	of	the	
Karma	Kanda	is	the	very	height	of	“orthodoxy”,	and	one	who	does	not	do	it	is	
told,	“Go	away,	you	are	no	more	a	Hindu”	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.333).	
	
According	to	Sen,	Vivekananda	had	a	very	complex	relationship	with	the	orthodox.	He	
argues	that	Vivekananda	had	been	quite	critical	of	the	Hindu	opposition	to	the	Consent	
Bill	that	was	passed	by	the	British	in	March	1891	which	raised	the	age	of	sexual	
intercourse	for	girls,	married	or	unmarried,	from	10	years	to	12	years.	This	was	a	direct	
blow	to	child	marriage	and	was	viewed	as	an	affront	to	conservative	Hindu	practices.	
Whereas	Vivekananda	did	not	openly	come	out	and	support	the	Consent	Bill,	he	
consistently	opposed	early	marriages,	criticism	which	the	orthodox	did	not	take	lightly:	
His	[Vivekananda]	basic	criticism	of	the	orthodox	position	on	the	Consent	Bill	
followed	directly	from	his	sharp	and	consistent	opposition	to	the	institution	of	
early	marriage;	in	fact	he	was	plainly	upset	to	find	his	brother-disciples	back	
home	were	unable	to	show	such	forthright	opposition.	He	should	have	realized	
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however	that	such	remonstrances	were	far	more	easily	made	from	the	relative	
safety	of	American	homes	than	from	the	heart	of	orthodox	society	in	Calcutta.	
That	premature	marriages	were	a	principal	cause	behind	India’s	social	
degeneration	was	nonetheless	an	argument	that	was	consistently	upheld	by	
Vivekananda	(Sen,	1993,	p.329).	
	
But	what	did	Vivekananda	mean	when	he	used	the	term	‘orthodox’,	an	equivocal	
term	even	for	him?	It	was	not	always	clear	whether	he	was	using	this	term	in	a	
derogatory	fashion;	rather,	it	seemed	to	depend	on	the	point	he	was	trying	to	get	across.	
The	truth	is,	once	again,	like	most	words	adopted	from	the	English	language,	we	are	left	
with	an	ambiguous	answer.	Nicholson	articulates:	
The	words	astika	and	nastika	are	difficult	to	translate.	One	reason	for	this	is	the	
fluctuation	in	the	meanings	of	the	terms	themselves	between	different	periods	of	
time	and	different	social	contexts	in	India.	This	difficulty	becomes	even	worse	
when	we	look	at	those	words	in	English	that	have	been	used	to	translate	these	
two	terms.	Despite	the	best	efforts	of	historians	of	Indian	philosophy,	the	terms	
used	to	translate	Sanskrit	philosophical	concepts	are	imbued	with	Eurocentric	
(and	specifically	Christian-centric)	meanings.	The	two	words	most	commonly	
used	to	translate	astika/nastika,	“orthodox’	and	“heterodox,”	come	out	of	the	
Christian	theological	tradition	and	hence	carry	historical	connotations	that	
distort	the	understanding	of	native	Indian	categories	of	thought	
For	late	medieval	Vedantins,	the	word	astika	denotes	schools	that	nowadays	are	
often	described	as	“Hindu,”	and	the	nastikas	correspond	to	the	non-Hindu	
schools	of	Jainas,	Buddhists,	and	materialists.	Yet	the	term	orthodoxia	and	
heterodoxia	in	their	early	Christian	usages	did	not	simply	correspond	to	
Christian	versus	non-Christian	doctrines.	Rather,	orthodoxia	referred	to	true	
Christian	doctrine,	and	heterodoxia,	to	both	false	teachings	within	the	church	
(e.g.	Gnosticism	and	Arianism)	and	the	teachings	of	pagan	philosophical	schools	
(2014,	p.176).	
	
Vivekananda’s	ideas	do	not	fit	neatly	into	any	of	these	categories	making	him	an	
excellent	example	of	why	these	labels	should	be	used	only	as	guidelines,	not	as	airtight	
definitions.	What	is	evident	however,	is	that	every	position	he	took,	every	idea	he	
defended,	eventually	led	back	to	his	belief	that	Advaita	Vedanta	was	the	answer	to	the	
modern	Hindu’s	needs.	As	a	result,	he	tailored	all	his	arguments	along	these	lines;	even	
if	at	times	it	made	him	sound	like	a	traditionalist,	sometimes	orthodox,	and	at	other	
times	like	a	reformer.	Vivekananda’s	agenda	was	clear;	he	wanted	to	establish	that	the	
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Vedanta	was	the	epitome	of	Hindu	traditions	and	he	was	not	concerned	about	which	
garb	he	had	to	don	to	convince	his	readers	of	this	truth.	He	adopted	any	of	these	titles	
when	it	suited	him	and	discarded	them	when	they	did	not.	For	him,	the	end	justified	the	
means,	and	the	end	was	to	establish	Vedantic	superiority	over	all	other	schools	of	
thought,	Eastern	and	Western.		
Conversely,	one	could	also	argue	that	Vivekananda	recognized	that	Advaita	
Vedanta	could	be	used	as	a	strategic	vehicle	to	bring	diverse	Hindu	groups	closer	
together.	Of	course,	this	came	at	a	price.	For	example,	as	Dalmia	points	out,	most	
traditionalists	accepted	the	authority	of	both	the	sruti	and	smriti	texts,	held	the	
Dharmasastras	and	Puranas	as	legitimate	yardsticks	to	govern	society,	and	“continue[d]	
to	lay	stress	on	the	centrality	of	the	temple	and	ritual	practice”	(Dalmia,	1999,	p.8).	We	
already	know	that	the	reformists	did	not	agree	with	the	traditionalists’	premise.	Of	
course,	Vivekananda	had	his	own	interpretation	of	which	texts	had	the	authority	to	
speak	for	his	version	of	‘Hinduism’:		
The	first	class	of	truths	is	chiefly	embodied	in	our	Vedas,	our	scriptures;	the	
second	in	the	Smritis,	the	Puranas,	etc.	We	must	remember	that	for	all	periods	
the	Vedas	are	the	final	goal	and	authority,	and	if	the	Puranas	differ	in	any	respect	
from	the	Vedas,	that	part	of	the	Puranas	is	to	be	rejected	without	mercy	
(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.173).	
	
In	Eclecticism	and	the	Modern	Hindu	Discourse	(1999),	Brian	Hatcher	argues	that	
Vivekananda	represents	“the	eclectic	spirit	at	its	best”	(1999,	p.58).	To	explain	what	he	
means	when	he	uses	the	term	‘eclectic’,	Hatcher	first	defines	‘syncretism’	which	he	
claims	is	oftentimes	erroneously	used	as	a	synonym	for	‘eclecticism’.	Hatcher	agrees	
with	van	der	Veer’s	assessment	(see	Chapter	4)	when	he	contends	that	syncretism	
needs	to	be	disassociated	from	its	Christian	context.	Furthermore,	Hatcher	argues	that	
because	of	this	association	this	label	has	become	normative,	thereby	infusing	the	term	
with	a	“pejorative	sense	of	illegitimate	mixing,	as	in	the	corrupting	of	something	
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originally	pure”	(1999,	p.6,	emphasis	in	original).	Instead,	he	presents	his	own	set	of	
guidelines	on	how	to	appropriately	define	and	distinguish	these	terms:	
(1)	the	historian	of	religion	has	no	business	using	the	category	of	syncretism	
as	a	normative	category;	(2)	if	it	is	to	be	used,	then	it	will	serve	as	a	kind	of	
shorthand	for	the	idea	that	religions	are	culturally	constructed	and	are	
continually	transformed	through	“the	combining	of	various	religious	forms”;	
and	(3)	if	so	used,	then	the	concept	should	be	carefully	distinguished	from	
other	concepts,	most	notably	eclecticism.	That	is,	if	syncretism	is	used	to	
refer	to	broad	processes	of	historical	change	and	systemic	interaction	among	
religions,	then	eclecticism	should	be	used	to	refer	to	something	else.	What	I	
propose	is	that	we	use	eclecticism	to	denote	not	patterns	and	processes	of	
historical	change,	but	a	particular	method	of	change	–	a	method	based	on	
conscious	selection	–	and	the	systems	of	criteria	and	classification	that	may	
(or	may	not)	guide	this	method.	To	follow	this	distinction,	syncretism	names	
a	historical	process,	while	eclecticism	names	a	method	of	interpretation	and	
appropriation	(Hatcher,	1999,	p.8,	emphasis	added).	
	
Keeping	these	guidelines	in	mind,	Hatcher	argues	that	men	like	Vivekananda,	the	
‘founders’	he	refers	to	in	Chapter	1,	were	not	restricted	by	boundaries	historically	
created	by	philosophical	schools,	sects	or	even	‘world	religions’.	(1999,	p.4).	Instead,	
they	used	all	of	these	ideas	to	freely	construct	their	own	brand	of	ideology.	For	example,	
in	the	case	of	Vivekananda,	he	highlights	how	he	used	a	smattering	of	concepts	from	
Vaisesika,	Nyaya,	Purva	Mimamsa,	Uttara	Mimamsa	and	even	Buddhism	to	finally	come	
up	with	his	own	brand	of	Advaita	Vedanta:	
The	goal	is	not	so	much	to	indict	him	for	failing	to	achieve	consonance	with	any	
particular	classical	system,	but	simply	to	highlight	the	eclectic	pragmatics	of	his	
discourse:	a	bit	of	Nyaya	here,	a	bit	of	Mimamsa	there.	And	–	as	we	shall	see	–	
why	not	throw	in	a	touch	of	Buddha’s	heterodoxy	to	boot?	It	strikes	us	as	odd	to	
find	Vivekananda	juxtaposing	such	disparate	authorities	in	his	quest	to	
universalize	the	means	of	attaining	saving	knowledge.	The	violence	of	his	
eclecticism	can	get	a	bit	dizzying	at	times	(Hatcher,	1999,	p.65).	
	
What	is	the	most	compelling,	yet	deeply	problematic,	consequence	of	this	eclecticism	
however,	is	that	very	often	these	eclectic	ideas	become	the	normative	discourse,	which	
is	certainly	the	case	with	Vivekananda’s	interpretation	of	Advaita	Vedanta.	Vivekananda	
adopted	and	adapted	existing	philosophies	to	get	his	point	across.		Accordingly,	he	
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developed	an	interpretation	that	appropriated	bits	and	pieces	from	different	native	
sects,	philosophies	and	practices.	An	interpretation	that	celebrated	only	certain	aspects	
of	Vedanta	traditions.	An	interpretation	that	oftentimes	also	showed	a	complete	
disregard	for	established	systems	that	he	considered	to	be	at	cross-purposes	with	his	
version	of	Advaita	Vedanta.		
It	is	this	dilemma	that	Anantanand	Rambachan	seeks	to	address	in	The	Limits	of	
Scripture	(1994).	Rambachan	highlights	the	vast	discrepancies	that	exist	between	
Vivekananda’s	assessment	and	translation	of	Vedanta,	versus	that	of	Adi	
Shankaracharya	(ca	early	8th	century),	who	is	considered,	by	most	scholars,	to	be	the	
authority	on	this	particular	darsana.71	According	to	Rambachan,	Vivekananda	did	not	
simply	adapt	Sankaracharya’s	interpretation	to	suit	his	needs	but	rather,	he	arrived	at	a	
version	that	Sankaracharya	himself	would	have	most	likely	rejected:	
Unlike	Vivekananda,	who	presented	the	affirmations	of	sruti	[‘that	which	is	
heard’	i.e.	The	Vedas]	as	having	only	a	hypothetical	or	provisional	validity	and	
needing	the	verification	that	only	anubhava	[personal	experience]	could	provide,	
Sankara	argued	for	sruti	as	the	unique	and	self-valid	source	of	our	knowledge	of	
absolute	reality	(brahman).	In	relation	to	the	gain	of	this	knowledge,	all	ways	of	
knowing	were	subordinate	to	sruti.	In	important	contrast	to	Vivekananda’s	
arguments	that	the	declarations	of	sruti	needed	further	verification	to	become	
conclusive	was	Sankara’s	contention	that	liberation	(moksa)	is	the	immediate	
result	of	understanding	the	words	of	the	sruti.	For	a	qualified	aspirant,	nothing	
beyond	a	proper	investigation	of	the	meaning	of	those	sentences	in	the	sruti	
revealing	brahman	is	required	(Rambachan,	1994,	p.3).	
	
Rambachan	argues	that	whereas	Vivekananda	was	within	his	rights	to	interpret	Advaita	
differently	from	Sankaracharya,	it	also	must	be	recognized	that	because	of	his	unique	
circumstances	it	is	Vivekananda’s	version	that	has	become	the	most	widely	accepted	
																																																								
71	Sankaracharya	himself	did	not	escape	the	allegations	of	eclecticism,	an	issue	that	is	
investigated	in	Richard	King’s	Early	Advaita	Vedanta	and	Buddhism	(1995)	where	he	
articulates	how	Sankaracharya	may	have	‘borrowed’	some	of	his	philosophical	
arguments	from	Mahayana	Buddhism.		
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interpretation.	This,	in	turn,	has	led	to	the	repackaging	of	Hindu	traditions	in	
contemporary	times:		
Vivekananda’s	influence	is	so	pervasive	that	it	is	a	difficult	task	to	identify	and	
extricate	the	individual	elements	that	he	contributed	to	the	contemporary	
understanding	of	Hinduism.	Not	only	did	he	largely	formulate	this	interpretation,	
but	he	also	gave	it	the	language	in	which	it	is	articulated.	There	is	very	little	in	
modern	Hindu,	particularly	Vedanta,	apologetic	writing	that	does	not	carry	the	
clear	imprint	of	Vivekananda’s	influence.		
The	fact	that	Vivekananda	was	a	representative	of	the	system	of	Advaita	did	not	
weaken	the	impression	that	he	made	on	the	whole	of	Hinduism.	Because	Advaita,	
through	Vivekananda,	was	the	first	Hindu	system	to	be	so	elaborately	presented	
to	the	West,	its	comprehension	has	considerably	shaped	the	approach	to	
Hinduism	in	India	and	abroad.	This	was	fostered	by	Vivekananda’s	vision	and	
presentation	of	Advaita	as	the	natural	culmination	of	Hindu	religious	thought.	
From	his	basis	of	Advaita,	he	generalized	in	his	lectures	and	writings	about	the	
nature	and	features	of	Hinduism	as	a	whole.	In	his	own	time,	he	was	perceived	as	
the	spokesperson	and	champion	of	Hinduism,	not	of	any	specific	tradition	within	
it	(Rambachan,	1994,	p.7).	
	
Rambachan’s	study	allows	us	to	see	how	Vivekananda	was	able	to	create,	out	of	
existing	philosophy,	a	version	of	‘Hinduism’	that	was	sufficiently	familiar	to	make	it	
palatable	to	Indians,	but	yet,	universal	in	a	way	which	also	made	it	appealing	to	Western	
audiences.	Thus,	Rambachan	concludes:	
While	he	did	not	reject	the	urgent	necessity	for	change	and	innovation	in	
Hinduism,	Vivekananda	subtly	emphasized	that	what	he	desired	was	“growth”	
and	“expansion”	rather	than	“reformation.”	Describing	himself	as	a	nonbeliever	
in	reform,	he	defined	the	reformist	method	as	one	of	“destruction”	whereas	his	
was	an	attempt	at	“construction”.	This	delicate	and	astute	distinction	enabled	
Vivekananda	to	be	critical	of	the	Hindu	tradition	while	never	alienating	himself	
from	it.	He	struck	a	very	fine	and	original	balance	between	an	aggressive	defense	
of	Hinduism	and	a	vociferous	cry	for	transformation.	This	fact	provides	the	most	
important	clue	to	understanding	Vivekananda’s	popularity	and	the	nature	of	the	
reinterpretation	that	he	formulated	(1994,	p.128).	
	
This	gives	us	an	indication	of	why,	on	the	one	hand,	Vivekananda	was	averse	to	
acknowledging	(at	least	in	public)	that	he	was	reinterpreting	many	Hindu	ideas	to	make	
way	for	modern	political	and	philosophical	trends;	he	wanted	to	avoid	being	labelled	as	
a	reformer.	On	the	other	hand,	since	he	was	calling	for	vast	social	reform,	reform	that	
would	necessarily	impact	ancient	religious	ideals,	he	could	not	easily	be	categorized	as	a	
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traditionalist	either.	Rather	he	believed,	and	he	convinced	his	followers	of	the	same,	
that	he	had	found	the	correct	way	to	interpret	ancient	Indian	philosophies.	
Interpretations	which	would	allow	for	many	social	changes	since	they	highlighted	
Advaitic	monistic	ideals	that	he	presented	as	universal	truths.	Universal	truths,	which	in	
turn,	would	resonate	with	the	needs	of	modern	India	as	it	struggled	to	become	a	nation.		
Another	tactic	that	Vivekananda	used	to	make	his	point	that	Advaita	was	the	
answer	for	all	of	‘Hinduism’s’	apparent	ailments	was	to	highlight	the	attention	that	was	
being	paid	by	both,	reformers	and	traditionalists,	Westerners	and	Orientalists,	on	the	
issue	of	idol	worship.	As	we	saw	in	the	previous	chapter,	this	was	a	topic	that	
Vivekananda	could	not	afford	to	ignore.	However,	the	arguments	that	Vivekananda	
made	in	India	differed	from	the	position	the	took	in	the	West.	This	was	necessary	
because	he	understood	that	this	idea	of	idol	worship	had	a	different	connotation	on	the	
Indian	subcontinent.	As	such,	once	again	we	are	faced	with	the	dilemma	of	translation	
and	the	adoption	of	terminology	that	was	foreign	to	native	ideas.	According	to	Geoffrey	
Oddie,	one	of	the	reasons	why	“idol	worship”	or	“idolatry”	was	perceived	so	negatively	
was	because	of	the	influence	of	missionaries	who	came	to	India	in	the	18th	and	19th	
century.	Of	course,	these	missionaries	themselves	had	been	impacted	by	their	own	
religious	history:		
The	influences	affecting	missionary	attitudes	and	responses	to	this	issue	go	back	
to	the	time	of	Old	Testament	prophets,	to	at	least	as	early	as	the	prophet	
Jeremiah	in	the	seventh	century	BCE.	As	one	of	the	missionaries	declared,	‘the	
Bible	everywhere	condemns	the	practice,	by	precept	and	example,	by	
prohibitions	and	threatenings’.	Idols,	wrote	the	prophet	Jeremiah,	‘are	both	
stupid	and	foolish;	the	instruction	of	idols	is	but	wood…	They	are	the	work	of	the	
craftsman	and	of	the	hands	of	the	goldsmith…	But	the	Lord	is	the	true	God;	he	is	
the	living	God	and	the	everlasting	King’.	Similarly,	in	the	New	Testament	Paul,	
when	speaking	to	the	Athenians,	declared	that	‘we	ought	not	to	think	that	the	
Deity	is	like	gold,	or	silver,	or	stone,	a	representation	by	the	art	and	imagination	
of	man’.	The	main	objections	to	idolatry	as	expressed	in	these	and	other	passages	
of	Scripture	were	that	it	was	‘stupid’	or	irrational;	it	involved	the	neglect	of	the	
worship	of	‘the	one	true	god’,	and	was	conducive	to	polytheism;	and	third,	it	
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involved	worshipping	the	created	thing	instead	of	the	Creator,	a	practice	which	
led	to	every	kind	of	corruption	of	religion	and	morals	(Oddie,	2006,	pp.24-25,	
emphasis	in	original).	
	
Oddie	contends	that	what	made	this	repulsion	for	idols	even	more	emphatic	amongst	
the	Protestant	missionaries	in	India	was	“the	fact	that	this	practice	and	other	rituals	
reminded	them	of	much	of	what	they	had	so	vigorously	opposed	and	attempted	to	
abolish	during	the	Reformation”	(2006,	p.26).	What	further	complicated	this	attack	on	
idol	worship	was	that	many	Hindu	reformers	joined	the	missionaries	on	this	crusade.72	
These	reformers	seemed	to	buy	into	the	arguments	that	viewed	these	idols	as	crude	
tools	of	worship	which	were	holding	Hindus	back	from	using	reason	and	scientific	
knowledge	to	access	the	divine.	According	to	Dalmia:	
When	Hinduism	as	a	whole	was	to	be	laid	to	siege,	it	was	this	practice	which	
most	often	and	most	consistently	came	under	attack,	initially	by	Christian	
missionaries,	and	later	increasingly	by	the	leaders	of	the	newer	trends	within	
Hinduism,	which	we	have	collectively	termed	reformists	(1999,	p.381).	
	
However,	idol	worship	as	understood	by	Protestant	missionaries,	and	the	Hindu	
reformers	who	followed	their	lead,	did	not	necessarily	coincide	with	how	it	had	been	
viewed	by	Hindus	over	the	centuries.	Indeed,	Oddie	points	out	that	as	early	as	1841	J.	
Murray	Mitchell:	
a	missionary	of	the	Church	of	Scotland,	noted	the	complexity	of	the	issue	and	the	
fact	that	many	Hindu	devotees	had	different	views.	He	also	realized	that	in	
commonplace	Hindu	worship,	there	was	a	special	ceremony	invoking	the	spirit	
into	the	image	(or	removing	it)	and	hence	an	established	distinction	between	the	
spirit	and	the	image	itself	(2006,	p.26).	
	
The	truth	is	that	the	debate	about	idol	worship	was	one	that	was	carried	out	for	
centuries	between	Orientalists,	missionaries,	reformers	and	traditionalists.	Brian	
Pennington	explores	these	arguments	in	detail	in	Was	Hinduism	Invented?	Britons,	
																																																								
72	For	example,	both	Rammohan	Roy	and	Dayanand	Saraswati	were	vociferous	in	their	
disdain	of	idol	worship.	
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Indians	and	the	Colonial	Construction	of	Religion	(2005)	where	he	highlights	both	the	
missionaries’	strategies,	as	well	as	how	Hindu	reformers	and	traditionalists	responded	
(by	using	the	press	as	their	weapon	of	choice)	in	the	late	1700’s	and	early	1800’s.	
Turning	back	to	Vivekananda,	it	is	interesting	to	note	how	he	also	tried	to	negotiate	
between	these	opposing	viewpoints	without	completely	alienating	himself	from	his	
Ramakrishna	brethren.	Indeed,	in	a	deft	move,	he	criticized	reformers	for	looking	down	
on	idol	worshippers	by	using	Ramakrishna	as	an	example	of	an	idol	worshipper	who	
had	attained	great	spiritual	heights:	
If	such	Ramakrishna	Paramahamsas	are	produced	by	idol-worship,	what	will	you	
have	–	the	reformer’s	creed	or	any	number	of	idols?	I	want	an	answer.	Take	a	
thousand	idols	more	if	you	can	produce	Ramakrishna	Paramahamsas	through	
idol-worship,	and	may	God	speed	you!	Produce	such	noble	natures	by	any	means	
you	can.	Yet	idolatry	is	condemned!	Why?	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.218).	
	
One	naturally	presumes,	after	reading	this	that	Vivekananda	was,	in	fact,	upholding	
idolatry	and	not	condemning	it,	a	seemingly	surprising	move	for	him.	Especially	since,	
as	we	saw	earlier,	he	had	spoken	out	against	idol	worship	at	various	times,	particularly	
in	his	personal	correspondences.	Are	we	to	surmise	that	Vivekananda	was	a	hypocrite	
who	believed	his	guru	was	wrong	but	was	loathe	to	say	so	in	public?	The	truth	is	that	
Vivekananda	also	argued,	on	many	other	occasions,	that	his	guru	was	a	Vedantic	scholar	
who	had	taught	him	everything	he	knew.	That	he	was	in	fact	a	‘Parliament	of	Religions’	
in	and	of	himself:	
Ay,	long	before	ideas	of	universal	religion	and	brotherly	feeling	between	
different	sects	were	mooted	and	discussed	in	any	country	in	the	world,	here	in	
sight	of	this	city	[Calcutta],	had	been	living	a	man	whose	whole	life	was	a	
Parliament	of	Religions	as	it	should	be	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.315).	
	
So	how	did	Vivekananda	reconcile	the	idol	worshipping	Ramakrishna	with	the	Advaitic	
scholar	that	he	claimed	he	actually	was?	As	far	as	Vivekananda	was	concerned	Nirguna	
Brahman	was	the	ultimate	goal.	However,	he	recognized	that	Ramakrishna	believed	that	
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this	was	a	difficult	path	for	many	and	as	such	had	shown	his	devotees	a	path	to	Nirguna	
Brahman	by	using	Saguna	Brahman	as	a	stepping	stone:	
It	has	become	a	trite	saying	that	idolatry	is	wrong,	and	every	man	swallows	it	at	
the	present	time	without	questioning.	I	once	thought	so,	and	to	pay	the	penalty	of	
that	I	had	to	learn	my	lesson	sitting	at	the	feet	of	a	man	who	realized	everything	
through	idols;	I	allude	to	Ramakrishna	Paramahamsa	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	
p.218).	
	
However,	this	does	not	imply	that	Vivekananda	believed	that	idol	worship	was	the	best	
way,	but	rather,	that	he	acknowledged	that	oftentimes	this	was	the	way	that	was	most	
amenable	to	the	masses:	
The	highest	ideal	in	our	scriptures	is	the	impersonal,	and	would	to	God	everyone	
of	us	here	were	high	enough	to	realize	that	impersonal	ideal;	but,	as	that	cannot	
be,	it	is	absolutely	necessary	for	the	vast	majority	of	human	beings	to	have	a	
personal	ideal	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.315).	
	
Thus,	Vivekananda	argued	that	Ramakrishna	had	all	the	knowledge	of	the	Vedas	but	
chose	to	help	those	who	could	not	grasp	the	higher	truths	by	donning	the	garb	of	a	
bhaktayogi.	And	what	a	bhakt	he	was!	Accordingly,	Vivekananda	told	his	listeners	that	if	
they	thought	they	were	capable	of	the	one	minded,	utterly	devoted	bhakti	that	
Ramakrishna	demonstrated	then	that	was	acceptable.	However,	he	argued	that	
Ramakrishna’s	way	was	extremely	difficult.	Particularly	since	Vivekananda	was	certain	
that	the	dualist	path	was	a	means	to	an	end,	and	that	end	was	the	ultimate	truth	of	
Nirguna	Brahman.	For	others,	bhakti	was	a	treacherous	path	since	it	made	them	look	
weak,	both	in	the	eyes	of	their	countrymen,	as	well	as	in	the	eyes	of	the	world.	
Furthermore,	unlike	his	guru,	Vivekananda	did	not	believe	that	this	path	was	suitable	
for	the	emerging	Indian	nation	who	needed	to	prove	that	they	had	“muscles	of	iron	and	
nerves	of	steel”.	Only	Vedanta	could	display	that	kind	of	strength.		
What	Vivekananda	did	extremely	well	here	was	to	exploit	the	divide	that	already	
existed	between	the	reformers,	and	the	orthodox,	to	establish	that	it	was	only	with	the	
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aid	of	Advaitic	ideals	that	this	gulf	could	be	bridged.	At	times,	it	seems	as	if	he	was	
endorsing	the	value	systems	of	the	orthodox.	And	indeed,	at	some	level	he	was,	since	he	
was	arguing	that	they	may	be	antiquated	in	their	ways	but,	in	spite	of	that,	they	had	
remained	loyal	to	their	traditional	values	and	had	not	‘sold	out’	to	the	Westerners.	Upon	
closer	scrutiny	however,	it	soon	becomes	evident	that	while	Vivekananda	may	have	
been	speaking	in	favour	of	the	orthodox,	he	was	also	aware	that	these	orthodox	ideas	
required	open	reform,	a	reform	that	he	believed	would	be	best	provided	by	Advaita	
ideals:	
There	are	two	great	obstacles	on	our	path	in	India,	the	Scylla	of	old	orthodoxy	
and	the	Charybdis	of	modern	European	civilization.	Of	these	two,	I	vote	for	the	
old	orthodoxy,	and	not	for	the	Europeanized	system;	for	the	old	orthodox	man	
may	be	ignorant,	he	may	be	crude,	but	he	is	a	man,	he	has	a	faith,	he	has	strength,	
he	stands	on	his	own	feet;	while	the	Europeanized	man	has	no	backbone,	he	is	a	
mass	of	heterogeneous	ideas	picked	up	at	random	from	every	source	–	and	these	
ideas	are	unassimilated,	undigested,	unharmonized.	…	His	schemes	of	reforms,	
his	vehement	vituperations	against	the	evils	of	certain	social	customs,	have,	as	
the	mainspring,	some	European	patronage.	Why	are	some	of	our	customs	called	
evils?	Because	the	Europeans	say	so.	That	is	about	the	reason	he	gives.	I	would	
not	submit	to	that.	Stand	and	die	in	your	own	strength	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	
p.151).		
	
A	few	points	need	to	be	highlighted	in	these	declarations	of	his.	First,	it	is	
immediately	clear	that	he	believed	that	the	reformers	were	simply	puppets	of	the	West.	
Second,	it	is	obvious	that	he	was	playing	to	his	audience	at	Ramnad,	a	province	whose	
ruler,	the	Raja	of	Ramnad,	was	one	of	Vivekananda’s	main	benefactors	and	who	
Vivekananda	himself	acknowledged	as	an	orthodox	Hindu.	That	being	said	however,	
what	is	the	most	interesting	aspect	of	this	speech	is	that	whereas	Vivekananda	seemed	
to	be	railing	against	the	reformers	and	speaking	in	defence	of	the	orthodox,	he	was	in	
fact	stating	that	both	these	groups	were	‘great	obstacles’	for	India.	A	point	that	
somehow	gets	swept	away	in	this	tirade	against	reformers	and	Europeans,	but	which	he	
obviously	believed	was	true.	Especially	since	he	used	this	analogy,	‘Scylla	and	
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Charybdis’,	repeatedly	in	various	speeches	after	his	return.	Indeed,	it	does	not	take	long	
to	discover	that	whilst	Vivekananda	did	not	want	to	completely	antagonize	the	
orthodox,	or	eradicate	idol	worship,	he	did	want	to	place	these	ideas	within	a	hierarchy,	
a	hierarchy	where	their	practices	were	on	a	lower	rung	than	the	ideals	of	Advaita	
Vedanta.	What	is	ironic	is	that	he	chose	to	use	analogies	that	Westerners	had	previously	
used	in	a	derogatory	manner	for	Eastern	traditions.	As	we	saw	in	the	previous	chapter,	
he	used	language	which	suggested	that	the	Hindus	who	were	on	the	path	of	bhakti	were	
not	wrong,	but	simply	at	a	lower	level	of	evolution,	when	compared	to	those	who	had	
relinquished	their	attachments	to	idols,	and	the	rituals	associated	with	them:		
So	we	should	not	speak	ill	of	a	man	who	worships	idols.	He	is	in	that	stage	of	
growth,	and	therefore,	must	have	them;	wise	men	should	try	to	help	forward	
such	men	and	get	them	to	do	better	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.363).	
	
What	these	statements	demonstrate	is	that	whereas	Vivekananda	tried	to	show	
his	compassion	and	understanding	for	those	on	other	paths,	he	was	not	prepared	to	do	
so	at	the	expense	of	acknowledging	their	equal	worth.73	Rather,	he	was	only	willing	to	
grant	them	a	place	on	the	path,	a	spot	that	was	nowhere	near	where	he	placed	the	
practice	of	Advaita.	So	much	so,	that	Vivekananda	ultimately	shrunk	all	the	various	
darsanas	into	the	three	Vedantic	ideals	of	dualism,	qualified	dualism	and	monism;	only	
to	finally	declare	that	Advaita	was	the	logical	resting	place	for	all	philosophical	ideas:	
we	find	they	are	a	gradual	unfolding	of	the	grand	principles	whose	music	
beginning	far	back	in	the	soft	low	notes,	ends	in	the	triumphant	blast	of	the	
Advaita,	so	also	in	these	three	systems	we	find	the	gradual	working	up	of	the	
human	mind	towards	higher	and	higher	ideals	till	everything	is	merged	in	that	
wonderful	unity	which	is	reached	in	the	Advaita	system	(Vivekananda,	2009,	
vol.3,	pp.396-397).	
	
																																																								
73	In	the	following	chapter,	we	will	analyze	how	this	so-called	‘inclusive’	language	can	be	
both	problematic	and	divisive.		
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The	most	interesting	aspect	of	these	arguments	is	that	he	did	not	believe	that	this	
change	could	be	achieved	without	reform!	The	question	that	one	must	ask	now	
however,	is	what	were	the	motives	that	fuelled	his	call	for	reform?	What	was	his	agenda	
as	he	helped	create	this	hierarchy	between	the	different	darsanas	and	traditions?	One	
gets	the	distinct	impression	that	Vivekananda	had	a	vision	for	India	that	crystallized	
after	he	garnered	so	much	attention	from	his	countrymen,	due	to	his	success	in	the	
West.	No	doubt,	he	wanted	to	use	his	influence	in	a	way	that	would	promote	the	
wellbeing	of	his	homeland.	And	what	better	way	than	to	emphasize	the	role	that	
‘religion’	in	general,	and	Advaita	Vedanta	in	particular,	could	play	in	building	up	the	
backbone	of	the	nation.	His	success	is	what	made	him	one	of	the	major	players	in	
establishing	national	unity,	a	bona-fide	political	activist,	a	role	he	never	openly	claimed	
for	himself.		
	
Swami	Vivekananda:	Nation	builder?	
	 The	main	thrust	of	my	research	has	been	to	identify	how	Vivekananda	
responded	to	the	intellectual	‘continental	collision’	between	the	West	and	India.	He	
manipulated	definitions	and	interpretations,	which	included	large	concepts	such	as	
‘religion’	and	‘Hinduism’	as	well	as	lesser	labels	such	as	‘reformer’	and	‘revivalist’.	
Another	crucial	concept	that	Vivekananda	engaged	with,	and	which	will	be	necessary	
for	us	to	examine	to	understand	his	role	in	India	today	is	‘nationalism’.	Nationalism	is	
not	usually	conflated	with	‘religion’	in	the	West.	However,	the	same	cannot	be	said	for	
India.	Vivekananda	was	one	of	the	architects	who	helped	renegotiate	how	this	idea	
could	be	used	to	help	create	the	Indian	nation	state.	We	have	seen	that	Vivekananda	
was	convinced	that	his	version	of	‘Hinduism’	was	authentic,	and	wielded	it	like	a	
powerful	tool,	to	remind	Hindus	that	they	were	fully	equipped	to	view	the	world	as	
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rationally	as	the	Western	world	claimed	to	view	their	own.	According	to	Vivekananda,	it	
was	Advaita	Vedanta	that	allowed	for	all	the	nuances	that	existed	within	Hindu	
traditions,	whilst	at	the	same	time	offering	a	trajectory	along	which	Hindus	could	aspire	
to	perfection.	Indeed,	just	like	the	birds	in	the	tree,	with	which	we	started	this	chapter,	
so	also	Vivekananda	saw	all	Hindus	(and	Buddhists	and	Jains	and	Sikhs!)74	as	working	
their	way	upwards	through	the	hierarchy	of	the	system	he	had	helped	repackage.	He	
was	convinced	that	they	would	finally	realize	that	Advaita	was	the	ultimate	resting	
place	for	all	Hindus,	nay	all	religions.	So,	how	did	he	use	these	convictions	to	promote	
national	unity?		
	 One	of	the	aspects	of	Western	culture	that	seemed	to	resonate	with	Vivekananda	
was	the	apparent	cohesiveness	of	their	society.	He	argued	that	each	nation	had	some	
common	traits	that	bound	them	together	thereby	creating	a	sense	of	‘oneness’.	This	
instilled	a	sense	of	pride	and	helped	them	identify	as	citizens	of	a	particular	nation:	
each	nation	has	its	own	peculiarity	and	individuality	with	which	it	is	born.	Each	
represents,	as	it	were,	one	peculiar	note	in	this	harmony	of	nations,	and	this	is	its	
very	life,	its	vitality.	In	it	is	the	backbone,	the	foundation,	and	the	bed-rock	of	the	
national	life	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.148).	
	
This	realization,	that	a	similar	feeling	of	unity	needed	to	be	encouraged	amongst	Indians	
but	which,	could	not	easily	be	accomplished	by	using	the	same	language	of	nationality	
commonly	used	in	the	West,	is	an	excellent	example	of	how	‘continental	collision’	
worked.	In	the	West,	particularly	since	the	Enlightenment,	ideas	of	‘race’,	‘national	
history	and	‘national	language’	bound	people	together.	However,	this	did	not	translate	
easily	in	India	where	colonization,	coupled	with	multiple	native	principalities,	had	not	
bred	a	widespread	sense	of	nation.	Add	to	this	the	fact	that	different	regions	spoke	
																																																								
74	I	have	already	demonstrated	how	Vivekananda	conflated	these	traditions	in	the	
previous	chapter.	Additionally,	I	will	address	how	this	effects	India	today	in	the	next	
chapter.		
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vastly	different	languages	and	it	is	not	difficult	to	see	some	of	the	hurdles	Indian	
nationalists	encountered.	Vivekananda,	and	other	Indian	leaders	like	him,	realized	that	
whereas	they	needed	to	find	a	way	to	unite	Indians,	they	could	not	just	as	easily	
replicate	the	Western	model.	Accordingly,	Vivekananda	declared:	
We	see	how	in	Asia,	and	especially	in	India,	race	difficulties,	linguistic	difficulties,	
social	difficulties,	national	difficulties,	all	melt	away	before	this	unifying	power	of	
religion.	We	know	that	to	the	Indian	mind	there	is	nothing	higher	than	religious	
ideals,	that	this	is	the	keynote	of	Indian	life,	and	we	can	only	work	in	the	line	of	
least	resistance.	It	is	not	only	true	that	the	ideal	of	religion	is	the	highest	ideal;	in	
the	case	of	India	it	is	the	only	possible	means	of	work;	work	in	any	other	line,	
without	first	strengthening	this,	would	be	disastrous.	Therefore	the	first	plank	in	
the	making	of	a	future	India,	the	first	step	that	is	to	be	hewn	out	of	that	rock	of	
ages,	is	this	unification	of	religion	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.287).	
	
This	conscious	decision,	and	intentional	adaptation,	is	described	metaphorically	by	how	
landmasses	accommodate	collisions	at	geographical	suture	zones.	Vivekananda	
represents	one	such	suture	zone	whereby	he	helped	repackage	the	concept	of	national	
unity	to	suit,	what	he	perceived	to	be,	India’s	needs.	He	believed	he	was	maintaining	
some	of	the	integrity	of	the	Indian	ideological	landmass	whilst	simultaneously	
integrating	layers	of	Western	principles.		
	 Of	course,	the	downside	of	such	a	collision	is	that	some	integral	aspects	are	lost	
from	both	cultures,	losses	that	oftentimes	are	not	identified	until	it	is	much	too	late.	This	
certainly	was	the	case	with	the	nationalist	discourse	in	India	because	whereas	it	
mobilized	the	masses,	it	also	resulted	in	the	loss	of	diversity;	a	loss	that	Guha,	and	other	
subaltern	scholars,	strive	to	highlight.	As	Thapar	points	out	(see	Chapter	3),	according	
to	this	group	of	scholars,	the	Indian	elite	were	not	representative	of	the	nation.	
Consequently,	Guha	argues,	“the	historiography	of	Indian	nationalism	has	for	a	long	
time	been	dominated	by	elitism	–	colonialist	elitism	and	bourgeois-nationalist	elitism”	
(Guha,	1997,	p.xiv).	Furthermore,	he	contends:	
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What	is	clearly	left	out	of	this	un-historical	(elitist)	historiography	is	the	politics	
of	the	people.	For	parallel	to	the	domain	of	elite	politics	there	existed	throughout	
the	colonial	period	another	domain	of	Indian	politics	in	which	the	principal	
actors	were	not	the	dominant	groups	of	the	indigenous	society	or	the	colonial	
authorities	but	the	subaltern	classes	and	groups	constituting	the	mass	of	the	
labouring	population	and	intermediate	strata	in	town	and	country	–	that	is,	the	
people.	This	was	an	autonomous	domain,	for	it	neither	originated	from	elite	
politics	nor	did	its	existence	depend	on	the	latter.		
The	co-existence	of	these	two	domains	or	streams,	which	can	be	sensed	by	
intuition	and	proved	by	demonstration	as	well,	was	the	index	of	an	important	
historical	truth,	that	is,	the	failure	of	the	India	bourgeoisie	to	speak	for	the	nation.	
There	were	vast	areas	in	the	life	and	consciousness	of	the	people	which	were	
never	integrated	into	their	hegemony	(Guha,	1997,	pp.xiv-xv,	emphasis	in	
original).	
		 	
What	Guha	seems	to	be	highlighting	here	is	that	the	nationalist	project	is	inherently	
flawed	and	as	such,	it	must	be	understood	as	only	one	way	to	survey	the	history	of	
India,	both	during	the	colonial	period	as	well	as	in	contemporary	India.	Consequently,	as	
we	proceed	to	analyse	how	Vivekananda	impacted	the	creation	of	the	Indian	nation,	it	is	
equally	important	for	us	to	take	note	of	the	premise	from	which	subalternists,	like	Guha,	
operate.	We	must	not	forget	that	whereas	Vivekananda	did	become	one	of	the	dominant	
voices	in	India,	this	does	not	mean	that	his	was	the	voice	of	the	masses.	Rather,	his	voice	
was	one	of	the	few	that	were	heard	amongst	the	many	who	spoke.		
So,	which	kind	of	nationalism	did	Vivekananda	promote	and	how	did	‘religion’	
come	to	play	such	a	widely	accepted	role	in	its	definition?	Elite	Hindu	voices	like	
Vivekananda	did	not	simply	try	to	mimic	European	national	historical	ideas;	there	was	
an	integral	difference.	In	Nationalist	Thought	and	the	Colonial	World	(2008),	Partha	
Chatterjee	discusses	the	differences	between	Eastern	and	Western	nationalism.	
Chatterjee	cites	the	political	philosopher	John	Plamenatz	who	states:	
nationalism	is	‘primarily	a	cultural	phenomenon’	although	it	often	takes	a	
‘political	form’.	One	type	is	‘western’,	having	emerged	primarily	in	Western	
Europe,	and	the	other	‘eastern’	to	be	found	in	Eastern	Europe,	in	Asia	and	Africa,	
and	also	in	Latin	America.	Both	types	depend	upon	the	acceptance	of	a	common	
set	of	standards	by	which	the	state	of	development	of	a	particular	national	
culture	is	measured	(2008,	p.1).	
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However,	whereas	Plamenatz	and	Chatterjee	both	recognize	that	there	were	similarities	
between	the	two	kinds	of	nationalisms,	they	also	clearly	articulate	the	differences	that	
set	them	apart.	In	particular,	they	highlight	that	there	was	an	obvious	disparity	between	
importing	the	concept	of	nationalism	into	other	Western	nations,	that	were	still	
developing	ideas	of	citizenship,	versus	Eastern	states	that	had	been	colonized.	This	
resulted	in	distinct	‘nationalisms’	that	they	argue	need	to	be	defined	and	understood	as	
separate	entities	in	their	own	right:	
In	the	first	type	[Western]…	although	there	is	a	feeling	that	the	nation	is	at	a	
disadvantage	with	respect	to	others,	it	is	nevertheless	already	‘culturally	
equipped’	to	make	the	attempt	to	remove	those	deficiencies.	Thus	although	the	
new	global	standard	of	progress	may	have	been	set	for	the	rest	of	the	world	by	
France	or	Britain,	they	were	based	upon	a	set	of	ideas	‘about	man,	morals	and	
society’	which,	in	their	social	and	intellectual	origins,	were	West	European	
generally.	Britain	and	France	may	have	been	the	cultural,	economic	and	political	
pace	makers,	and	may	have	been	envied	or	admired	for	this	reason,	but	
simultaneous	with	the	process	of	their	emergence	as	world	leaders,	there	had	
emerged	a	‘comity	of	nations’	in	Western	Europe	‘which	had	already	learned	to	
think	of	itself	as	ahead	of	all	the	others’	(Chatterjee,	2008,	p.1).	
	
Eastern	nations	however,	did	not	function	in	the	same	way	since	they,	unlike	
nations	such	as	Germany	and	Italy,	did	not	have	“the	necessary	linguistic,	educational	
and	professional	skills	that	were	deemed	necessary	for	a	‘consciously	progressive	
civilisation’	(Chatterjee,	2008,	p.1).	Instead,	Eastern	nationalism	was	inherently	‘alien’	
to	the	native	cultures,	a	point	that	is	not	lost	on	Plamenatz	and	is	highlighted	by	
Chatterjee.	The	most	interesting	observation	is	not	that	these	‘nationalisms’	are	
different,	but	that	these	differences	were	accompanied	by	a:	
fundamental	awareness	that	those	standards	have	come	from	an	alien	culture,	
and	that	the	inherited	culture	of	the	nation	did	not	provide	the	necessary	
adaptive	leverage	to	enable	it	to	reach	those	standards	of	progress.	The	‘Eastern’	
type	of	nationalism,	consequently,	has	been	accompanied	by	an	effort	to	‘re-
equip’	the	nation	culturally,	to	transform	it.	But	it	could	not	do	so	simply	by	
imitating	the	alien	culture,	for	then	the	nation	would	lose	its	distinctive	identity.	
The	search	therefore	was	for	a	regeneration	of	the	national	culture,	adapted	to	
the	requirements	of	progress,	but	retaining	at	the	same	time	its	distinctiveness	
(Chatterjee,	2008,	p.2).	
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Accordingly,	Chatterjee	goes	on	to	argue	that	“the	nation	is	‘thought	out’,	‘created’”	
(2008,	p.19),	an	argument	that	holds	true	for	how	Indian	nationalists	‘built’	the	Indian	
nation	by	borrowing	some	Western	ideas	but	not	without	challenging	and	questioning	
many	of	its	claims	(2008,	pp.30-41).	Indeed,	he	even	goes	as	far	as	to	assert	that	
nationalist	texts	must	question	colonial	claims	because	if	they	do	not,	they	cannot	and	
should	not,	be	considered	nationalist	since	they	lose	their	claim	to	the	individuality	that	
makes	them	stand	apart	from	other	nations:	
Thus	nationalist	texts	will	question	the	veracity	of	colonialist	knowledge,	dispute	
its	arguments,	point	out	contradictions,	reject	its	moral	claims.	Even	when	it	
adopts,	as	we	will	see	it	does,	the	modes	of	thought	characteristic	of	rational	
knowledge	in	the	post-Enlightenment	age,	it	cannot	adopt	them	in	their	entirety,	
for	then	it	would	not	constitute	itself	as	a	nationalist	discourse	(Chatterjee,	2008,	
pp.41-42,	emphasis	in	original).	
	
This	analysis	resonates	with	the	fact	that	Indian	nationalists	in	the	nineteenth	
century,	like	Vivekananda,	were	keenly	aware	that	they	had	to	find	a	way	to	unite	India,	
whilst	using	tools	that	were	not	commonly	associated	with	nationalism	in	the	West.	
Thus,	whereas	they	took	the	basic	Western	idea	of	nationalism	they	also	adapted	it	to	
accommodate	the	proclivities	of	Indian	society,	which	was	traditionally	oriented.	
Indeed,	van	der	Veer	states	that	he	disagrees	with	the	premise	of	Said’s	arguments	in	
Orientalism	since	scholars	must	be:	
wary	of	giving	orientalism	hegemonic	force,	as	Edward	Said	has	done	in	his	
important	book.	I	do	not	agree	with	Said’s	notion	that	colonialism	and	
orientalism	created	the	reality	in	which	Indians	had	to	live.	This	notion	is	in	itself	
an	orientalist	fallacy	that	denies	Indians	agency	in	constructing	their	society	and	
simplifies	the	intricate	interplay	of	Western	and	Indian	discourses	(1994(a),	
p.21).	
	
This	is	a	valid	point,	and	one	that	I	have	been	trying	to	emphasize	by	demonstrating	
how	Vivekananda	was	not	simply	imitating	the	West	but,	in	fact,	was	participating	in	an	
Indian	dialogue,	in	an	effort	to	respond	to	the	needs	of	this	newly	developing	nation.	
Evidently,	this	dialogue	led	the	Indian	elite	leaders	to	surmise	that	they	would	have	to	
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build	their	nationalist	dreams	on	a	religious	foundation.75Indeed,	van	der	Veer	echoes	
some	of	Asad’s	arguments	(see	Chapter	2)	when	he	recognizes	that,	“[e]xcept	for	those	
of	the	Marxist	left,	Indian	dreams	of	the	nation	always	take	religion	as	one	of	the	main	
aspects	of	national	identity”	(1994(a),	p.23).	
Similarly,	Vivekananda	emphasized	the	spiritual	nature	of	India	and	stressed	the	
role	that	‘religion’	would	play	in	uniting	Indians.	He	made	this	point	repeatedly	when	he	
returned	to	India:	
I	have	been	in	the	countries	of	the	West	–	have	travelled	through	many	lands	of	
many	races;	and	each	race	and	each	nation	appears	to	me	to	have	a	particular	
ideal	–	a	prominent	ideal	running	through	its	whole	life;	and	this	ideal	is	the	
backbone	of	the	national	life.	Not	politics	nor	military	power,	not	commercial	
supremacy	nor	mechanical	genius	furnishes	India	with	that	backbone,	but	
religion;	and	religion	is	all	that	we	have	and	mean	to	have	(Vivekananda,	2009,	
vol.3,	p.137).	
	
So	firmly	did	Vivekananda	believe	that	‘religion’	was	the	‘backbone’	of	national	life	in	
India,	that	he	reiterated	this	at	every	opportunity,	and	appropriated	ideas	from	the	
Manusmrti	to	make	his	point:	
Such	is	the	law	laid	down	by	our	great	and	peerless	legislator,	the	divine	Manu.	
This	is	true.	Stand	on	your	own	feet,	and	assimilate	when	you	can;	learn	from	
every	nation,	take	what	is	of	use	to	you.	But	remember	that	as	Hindus	everything	
else	must	be	subordinated	to	our	own	national	ideals.	Each	man	has	a	mission	in	
life,	which	is	the	result	of	all	his	infinite	past	Karma.	Each	of	you	was	born	with	a	
splendid	heritage,	which	is	the	whole	of	the	infinite	past	life	of	your	glorious	
nation.	Millions	of	your	ancestors	are	watching,	as	it	were,	every	action	of	yours,	
so	be	alert.	And	what	is	the	mission	with	which	every	Hindu	child	is	born?	Have	
you	not	read	the	proud	declaration	of	Manu	regarding	the	Brahmin	where	he	
says	that	the	birth	of	the	Brahmin	is	“for	the	protection	of	the	treasury	of	
religion”?	I	should	say	that	that	is	the	mission	not	only	of	the	Brahmin,	but	of	
every	child,	whether	boy	or	girl,	who	is	born	in	this	blessed	land	“for	the	
protection	of	the	treasury	of	religion”.	And	every	other	problem	in	life	must	be	
subordinated	to	that	one	principal	theme	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.152,	
emphasis	in	original).	
	
																																																								
75	It	is	important	to	recognize	that	Vivekananda	was	not	attempting	to	create	a	
theocracy;	a	distinction	that	is	sometimes	lost	on	certain	Hindu	radical	elements,	which	
will	be	discussed	as	we	proceed	into	the	final	chapter.		
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That	being	said	however,	Vivekananda	was	also	quite	aware	that	‘Hinduism’	was	
generally	understood,	as	a	vastly	diverse,	often	contradictory	entity,	particularly	as	it	
had	been	described	by	Westerners	and	Orientalists	for	over	a	century.	As	such,	he	knew	
that	it	would	be	challenging	for	the	various	sects	to	find	common	ground.	Consequently,	
his	representation	of	Hindu	traditions	suggested	that	there	was	a	real	need	to	highlight	
the	commonality	amongst	all	that	rich	diversity.	This,	in	turn,	allowed	him	to	champion	
the	Upanishadic	philosophy	that	forms	the	core	of	Advaita	Vedanta;	a	philosophy	that	
he	believed	emphasized	universal	‘religious’	truths	and	explains	why	he	was	so	
successful:		
It	is	a	man-making	religion	that	we	want.	It	is	man-making	theories	that	we	want.	
It	is	man-making	education	all	round	that	we	want.	And	here	is	the	test	of	truth	–	
anything	that	makes	you	weak	physically,	intellectually,	and	spiritually,	reject	as	
poison;	there	is	no	life	in	it,	it	cannot	be	true.	…	These	mysticisms,	in	spite	of	
some	grains	of	truth	in	them,	are	generally	weakening.	Believe	me,	I	have	a	
lifelong	experience	of	it,	and	the	one	conclusion	that	I	draw	is	that	it	is	
weakening.	I	have	travelled	all	over	India,	searched	almost	every	cave	here,	and	
lived	in	the	Himalayas.	I	know	people	who	lived	there	all	their	lives.	I	love	my	
nation,	I	cannot	see	you	degraded,	weakened	any	more	than	you	are	now.	
Therefore	I	am	bound	for	your	sake	and	for	truth’s	sake	to	cry,	“Hold!”	and	to	
raise	my	voice	against	this	degradation	of	my	race.	Give	up	these	weakening	
mysticisms	and	be	strong.	Go	back	to	your	Upanishads	–	the	shining,	the	
strengthening,	the	bright	philosophy	–	and	part	from	all	these	mysterious	things,	
all	these	weakening	things.	…	The	truths	of	the	Upanishads	are	before	you.	Take	
them	up,	live	up	to	them,	and	the	salvation	of	India	will	be	at	hand	(Vivekananda,	
2009,	vol.3,	pp.224-225).	
	
What	made	Vivekananda’s	arguments	particularly	effective	was	that	he	did	not	deny	
that	differences	existed	in	how	his	Indian	brethren	followed	their	traditions.	He	
acknowledged	them	by	name	and	repeatedly	demonstrated	that	he	was	aware	of	the	
various	sects	and	philosophies	that	formed	the	diverse	Indian	religious	landscape.	
Nevertheless,	he	believed	that	these	differences	needed	to	be	subordinated	to	the	
greater	need	of	the	unification	of	the	nation:	
the	first	plank	in	the	making	of	a	future	India,	the	first	step	that	is	to	be	hewn	out	
of	that	rock	of	ages,	is	this	unification	of	religion.	All	of	us	have	to	be	taught	that	
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we	Hindus	–	dualists,	qualified	monists,	or	monists,	Shaivas,	Vaishnavas,	or	
Pashupatas	–	to	whatever	denomination	we	may	belong,	have	certain	common	
ideas	behind	us,	and	that	the	time	has	come	when	for	the	well-being	of	ourselves,	
for	the	well-being	of	our	race,	we	must	give	up	all	our	little	quarrels	and	
differences	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	pp.287-288).	
	
Of	course,	Vivekananda	had	the	solution,	a	way	to	make	all	these	so	called	‘minor’	
differences	fit	into	the	bigger	picture;	a	bigger	picture	that	was	necessary	if	India	was	to	
become	a	united	nation:	
It	is	easy	to	find	out	the	way	of	reconciliation	that	will	not	hurt	the	dualist	or	the	
qualified	monist.	There	is	not	one	system	in	India	which	does	not	hold	the	
doctrine	that	God	is	within,	that	Divinity	resides	within	all	things.	Every	one	of	
our	Vedantic	systems	admits	that	all	purity	and	perfection	and	strength	are	in	
the	soul	already.	According	to	some,	this	perfection	sometimes	becomes,	as	it	
were,	contracted,	and	at	other	times	it	becomes	expanded	again.	Yet	it	is	there.	
According	to	the	Advaita,	it	neither	contracts	nor	expands,	but	becomes	hidden	
and	uncovered	now	and	again.	Pretty	much	the	same	thing	in	effect.	The	one	may	
be	a	more	logical	statement	than	the	other,	but	as	to	the	result,	the	practical	
conclusions,	both	are	about	the	same;	and	this	is	the	one	central	idea	which	the	
world	stands	in	need	of,	and	nowhere	is	the	want	more	felt	than	in	this,	our	own	
motherland	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.191).	
	
It	was	in	the	creation	of	this	hierarchy,	whereby	he	insisted	that	Advaita	was	the	
crowning	jewel	of	Hindu	traditions,	that	Vivekananda	left	his	most	significant	mark.	
Vivekananda	was	one	of	the	architects	of	a	monolithic	‘Hinduism’	that	encompassed	all	
of	India’s	native	religious	vagaries	under	a	single	banner.	And	one	of	the	primary	
reasons	he	did	this	was	to	inspire	a	sense	of	unity	that	he	found	lacking	amongst	his	
Indian	brethren.	What	is	ironic	about	this	is	that	Vivekananda	repeatedly	claimed	that	
he	was	not	interested	in	becoming	involved	in	national	movements.	So	much	so,	that	in	
one	of	the	letters	he	wrote	to	his	brother	disciple	Alasinga,	even	before	he	returned	
from	his	first	visit	to	the	West,	he	vehemently	denied	being	involved	in	anything	that	
could	be	considered	political:	
One	thing	I	find	in	the	books	of	my	speeches	and	sayings	published	in	Calcutta.	
Some	of	them	are	printed	in	such	a	way	as	to	savour	of	political	views;	whereas	I	
am	no	politician	or	political	agitator.	I	care	only	for	the	Spirit	–	when	that	is	right	
everything	will	be	righted	by	itself…	So	you	must	warn	the	Calcutta	people	that	
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no	political	significance	be	ever	attached	falsely	to	any	of	my	writings	or	sayings.	
What	nonsense!	…	I	heard	that	Rev.	Kali	Charan	Banerji	in	a	lecture	to	Christian	
missionaries	said	that	I	was	a	political	delegate	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.5,	p.46).	
	
Despite	his	disclaimers,	the	role	that	Advaita	played,	with	Vivekananda’s	assistance,	in	
uniting	India	cannot	be	ignored	or	denied.	One	simply	has	to	read	the	speeches	given	by	
leaders	such	as	Jawaharlal	Nehru	or	Sarvepalli	Radhakrishnan	to	understand	how	their	
interpretation	of	Hindu	traditions	was	strongly	influenced	by	Vivekananda’s	
presentation	of	Advaitic	philosophy.	What	is	of	particular	interest	to	us	however,	is	that	
not	only	did	this	Vedantic	ideology	impact	the	nationalist	movement	but	that	these	
Vedantic	repercussions	continue	to	be	represented	in	how	contemporary	Hindus	view	
their	traditions	today.	By	highlighting	Vivekananda’s	tactics	for	encouraging	national	
unity,	via	Advaita,	we	can	understand	how	effective	his	methods	were	and	how	
necessary	it	has	become	for	contemporary	Hindus	to	unpack	some	of	these	ideas.	It	is	
time	to	reassess	if	this	version	of	‘Hinduism’	has	not	only	outlived	its	usefulness	but	
indeed,	in	many	cases,	has	become	a	dangerous	worldview	which	can	threaten	the	very	
survival	of	the	diversity	that	exists	within	Hindu	traditions.	A	diversity	that	most	
modern	Hindus	wear	as	a	badge	of	honour.	Indeed,	Hindus	need	to	ask	themselves	if	
Vivekananda’s	methods,	which	have	permeated	through	most	of	modern	Hindu	
ideology,	are	truly	conducive	to	how	Hindus	actually	practice	their	traditions.		
	
Conclusion	
	 	In	Hindutva:	Exploring	the	Idea	of	Hindu	Nationalism	(2003),	Jyotirmaya	Sharma	
makes	an	interesting	claim	where	he	argues	that	Vivekananda	was	one	of	the	
precursors,	to	the	Hindu	activist	V.D.	Savarkar,	who	created	the	term	‘Hindutva’;	a	
concept	that	has	become	the	battle	cry	for	a	great	number	of	conservative	Hindus	today:	
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Savarkar	legitimately	claimed	paternity	for	the	idea	of	Hindutva;	but	Hindutva	
could	lay	claim	to	an	equally	formidable	patrimony	in	the	thought	of	Dayananda,	
Vivekananda	and	Aurobindo.		
What	binds	these	four	thinkers	together	is	the	systematic	marshalling	of	a	Hindu	
identity	in	the	service	of	Indian	nationalism	(2003,	p.4).	
	
So	what	did	‘Hindutva’	mean	according	to	Savarkar	and	how	does	it	relate	to	what	
Vivekananda	was	saying	a	quarter	of	a	century	before	him?	Hindutva:	What	is	a	Hindu?,	
which	was	published	in	1923	under	the	pen	name	‘A	Maratha’	(since	Savarkar	was	still	
in	jail	when	he	wrote	it)	is	where	Savarkar	identifies	certain	traits	that	constitute	the	
concept	Hindutva.	According	to	Savarkar,	a	shared	‘religion’	was	not	enough	to	
determine	a	certain	‘Hinduness’	that	linked	his	native	Indian	brethren.	In	Hindu	
Nationalism:	A	Reader	(2007)	Christophe	Jaffrelot	highlights	the	main	characteristics	
that	Savarkar	viewed	as	essential	to	Hindutva:	
Savarkar	defines	the	nation	primarily	along	ethnic	categories.	For	him,	the	
Hindus	descend	from	the	Aryas,	who	settled	in	India	at	the	dawn	of	history	and	
who	already	formed	a	nation	at	that	time.	However,	in	Savarkar’s	writings,	ethnic	
bonds	are	not	the	only	criteria	of	Hindutva.	National	identity	rests	for	him	on	
three	pillars:	geographical	unity,	racial	features	and	a	common	culture.	Savarkar	
minimizes	the	importance	of	religion	in	his	definition	of	a	Hindu	by	claiming	that	
Hinduism	is	only	one	of	the	attributes	of	‘Hinduness’.	…	The	third	criterion	of	
Hindutva	–	a	‘common	culture’	–	reflects	for	Savarkar	the	crucial	importance	of	
rituals,	social	rules,	and	language	in	Hinduism.	Sanskrit	is	cited	by	him	as	the	
common	reference	point	for	all	Indian	languages	and	as	‘language	par	
excellence’.	Any	political	programme	based	on	Hindu	nationalist	ideology	has	
after	Savarkar	demanded	recognition	of	Sanskrit	or	Hindi	–	the	vernacular	
language	closest	to	it	–	as	the	national	idiom	(Jaffrelot,	2007,	p.86).	
	
As	Sharma	suggests,	when	one	compares	Vivekananda’s	ideas	with	some	of	Savarkar’s	
statements,	there	are	certain	undeniable	similarities.	For	example,	in	Hindutva	Savarkar	
declares:		
It	must	not	be	forgotten	that	we	have	all	along	referred	to	the	progress	of	the	
Hindu	movement	as	a	whole	and	not	to	that	of	any	particular	creed	or	religious	
section	thereof	–	of	Hindutva	and	not	Hinduism	only.	Sanatanists,	Satnamis,	
Sikhs,	Aryas,	Anaryas,	Marathas	and	Madrasis,	Brahmins	and	Panchamas	–	all	
suffered	as	Hindus	and	triumphed	as	Hindus.	Both	friends	and	foes	contributed	
equally	to	enable	the	words	Hindu	and	Hindusthan	to	supersede	all	other	
designations	of	our	land	and	our	people	(Savarkar,	1989,	p.45).	
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This	statement	sounds	remarkably	like	Vivekananda,	when	he	declared	that	all	the	
differences	between	the	sects	must	be	subsumed	under	Advaitic	philosophy.	
Vivekananda’s	approach	seems	more	benign	because,	whereas	Savarkar	was	
intentionally	identifying	those	who	must	be	left	out	of	the	Hindutva	movement,	
Vivekananda	was	insisting	that	all	philosophical	and	religious	ideas	could	find	a	place	
under	the	Advaitic	umbrella.	The	question	we	must	ask	ourselves	now	is;	what	if	some	
of	these	groups	do	not	accept	Advaita	as	a	valid	option?	Are	they	to	be	forcefully	
included?	Is	that	fair?	Isn’t	it	equally	important	for	us	to	respect	their	need	to	be	
different?	Don’t	they	have	equal	rights	as	Hindus,	or	more	importantly	as	Indians,	if	they	
do	not	adhere	to	Vedantic	principles?	While	most	scholars	acknowledge	Vivekananda’s	
appropriation	and	adaptation	of	Vedanta	to	suit	his	needs,	very	few	recognize	that	his	
interpretations,	which	have	become	so	widespread,	can	now	actually	threaten	the	
integrity	of	the	landmass	that	he	fought	so	hard	to	preserve.	Whereas	many	of	his	ideas	
are	valid	and	can	still	serve	a	purpose,	others	can	prove	to	be	extremely	detrimental	to	
the	unified	India	that	he	dreamt	of.	Vivekananda	was	instrumental	in	giving	Indians	a	
voice	that	they	deserved.	He	modified	and	adapted	large	concepts	to	suit	the	Indian	
philosophical	landscape.	He	challenged	Western	labels	and	questioned	their	validity	
repeatedly.	These	are	all	essential	aspects	of	his	legacy.	However,	he	also	created	a	
hierarchy	that	can	threaten	the	Indian	religious	model	that	has	allowed	India	to	be	one	
of	the	only	nations	to	have	survived	colonization	with	its	religious	ideals	relatively	
intact.	Although	the	two	birds	in	the	tree	is	a	wonderful	way	to	look	at	the	quest	for	
Brahman,	let	us	not	forget	that	there	are	many	other	trees	in	the	forest,	and	that	the	
birds	in	those	trees	may	be	learning	different	lessons.		
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Swami	Vivekananda:	The	Two	Narendras	
	
	
	 The	current	Prime	Minister	of	India,	Narendra	Modi,	has	taken	to	citing	
Vivekananda	in	an	effort	to	draw	a	nexus	between	Vivekananda’s	ideology	and	his	own.	
No	doubt,	the	reason	that	Modi	is	making	such	a	concentrated	effort	towards	allying	
himself	to	Vivekananda	is	because	the	popular	image	of	Vivekananda	is	one	of	religious	
tolerance,	inclusivity	and	‘manly’	youthful	vigour.76	Accordingly,	Modi’s	recent	2014	
election	campaign	not	only	used	quotes	from	Vivekananda,	but	also	imagery	which	
included,	but	were	not	limited	to,	life-size	posters	of	the	Swami	side	by	side	with	Modi,	
both	bearing	statements	from	their	respective	public	speeches.	One	journalist	
suggested,	“Modi	has	replaced	Mahatma	Gandhi,	the	icon	of	non-violence,	with	
Vivekananda,	the	19th	century	Hindu	revivalist	who	was	obsessed	with	making	India	a	
‘manly’	nation”	(Mishra,	2014).	This	ploy	was	obviously	successful	since	Modi	not	only	
won	the	election,	but	has	also	gone	from	being	a	man	who	was	refused	a	visa	to	the	
United	States	in	2005,77	to	being	welcomed	at	the	Madison	Square	Garden	in	New	York,	
by	the	Indian	diaspora	and	accorded	a	“Rock	Star	Reception”	in	2014	(Sinha,	2014).	So	
effective	has	Modi	been	in	cultivating	a	connection	between	himself	and	Vivekananda	
that	President	Barack	Obama	gifted	him	a	rare	volume	of	speeches	from	the	Parliament	
of	Religions	in	1893	when	Vivekananda	shot	to	fame.	A	note	accompanying	the	book	
reads,	“This	gift	celebrates	Swami	Vivekananda’s	valuable	contribution	as	a	bridge	
between	India	and	US	and	honors	our	two	nations’	shared	traditions	of	pluralism	and	
diversity”	(HT	Correspondent,	2014).	Keeping	this	recent	resurgence	of	Vivekananda	in	
																																																								
76	I	am	aware	that	the	word	‘inclusive’	is	a	complex	term	and	I	will	unpack	some	of	the	
issues	associated	with	using	it	in	the	following	sections.		
77	This	was	as	a	consequence	of	Modi’s	alleged	involvement	in	the	2002	Gujarat	riots,	
where	he	was	Chief	Minister	at	the	time,	which	resulted	in	the	unfortunate	deaths	of	
numerous	Muslims.	
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Indian	politics	in	mind,	it	has	now	become	imperative	to	question	why	Modi,	and	the	
Hindu	nationalist	movement	in	India,	have	been	able	to	appropriate	Vivekananda	and	
his	teachings.	Do	Vivekananda’s	words	lend	themselves	to	Hindutva	interpretations?	Is	
this	Hindu	nationalist	image	of	Vivekananda’s	unfounded?	Or,	if	instead,	as	other	
scholars	have	also	intimated,78	have	these	ideas	always	existed	in	Vivekananda’s	
message,	albeit	shrouded	in	the	idiom	of	inclusivity?	Although	Vivekananda	has	
oftentimes	been	ignored,	or	marginalized,	by	political	scientists	when	speaking	of	the	
emergence	of	Indian	nationalism	in	the	18th	and	the	19th	century,79	recent	studies	have	
begun	to	take	notice	of	the	role	he	played	in	the	creation	of	the	Hindu	nationalist	
movement.	Especially	since,	he	is	resurging	as	a	key	inspirational	figure	for	proponents	
of	Hindutva,	a	faction	that	has	become	a	force	to	be	reckoned	with	in	21st	century	India.	
And,	as	we	shall	discover,	very	often	it	is	Vivekananda’s	brand	of	‘Hinduism’	that	the	
followers	of	Hindutva	are	promoting.		
	 In	keeping	with	this	renewed	focus	on	Vivekananda,	popular	journalism	has	
taken	to	referring	to	Vivekananda	and	Modi	as	the	‘two	Narendras’	(Bhattacharya,	
2013).	However,	for	the	purposes	of	this	study,	I	am	more	interested	in	focusing	on	the	
Narendra	who,	as	Swami	Vivekananda,	toted	ideas	of	inclusivity,	masculinity	and	
Vedanta	in	the	19th	and	20th	century,	versus	the	Narendra	who	has	become	the	Swami	
most	commonly	associated	with	Hindu	nationalism	in	the	21st	century.	Is	there	a	nexus?	
Do	they	share	the	same	ideology?	Does	the	Hindu	nationalist	movement,	currently	led	
by	Modi,	have	good	reason	to	appropriate	this	Indian	hero?	And	if	they	do,	is	it	time	for	
																																																								
78	For	e.g.,	Jyotirmaya	Sharma	(2003),	Shamita	Basu	(2002)	and	Gwilym	Beckerlegge	
(2009).	
79	For	e.g.	Partha	Chatterjee	ignores	Vivekananda	in	his	seminal	study,	National	Thought	
and	the	Colonial	World	which	was	originally	published	in	1986.	Similarly,	Vivekananda	
is	absent	from	the	work	done	by	Christophe	Jaffrelot	including,	but	not	limited	to,	his	
recent	edited	work	titled	Hindu	Nationalism:	A	Reader	(2007).	
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Indians	to	revaluate	the	words	of	Vivekananda,	and	come	to	terms	with	the	fact	that	
whereas	his	brand	of	inclusivism	and	‘manly’	stance	may	have	been	exactly	what	the	
nation	needed	when	they	were	fighting	for	their	freedom	from	the	British	Raj,	today,	
much	of	what	he	advocated	can	cause	more	harm	than	good	to	an	Indian	nation	that	is	
so	proud	of	its	diversity.		
In	this	chapter,	we	will	first	survey	how	Vivekananda’s	propensity,	to	privilege	
Advaita	Vedanta	as	the	epitome	of	Hindu	traditional	ideology,	undermines	alternate	
Hindu	philosophical	schools	and	sects	who	historically	never	considered	themselves	to	
be	travelling	on	a	lesser	path.	To	do	this,	we	will	investigate	the	ways	in	which	
‘inclusive’	language	can	be	quite	problematic.	Furthermore,	we	will	examine	what	
Vivekananda	had	to	say	about	his	Buddhist,	Christian	and	Muslim	brethren,	and	
whether	his	views	are	respectful	or,	if	instead,	they	are	covertly	(and	oftentimes	
overtly)	intolerant.	Moreover,	we	will	also	determine	whether	Vivekananda’s	opinions	
on	women	are	views	that	we	want	to	imbibe	in	the	21st	century.	Has	his	language	of	
masculinity	had	adverse	effects	on	how	the	Hindutva	movement	views	the	role	of	
women	in	contemporary	India?	And	last	but	not	least,	we	will	determine	whether	the	
way	Vivekananda	has	been	appropriated,	by	the	Hindu	nationalist	movement,	is	
justified.	And	if,	as	a	result,	this	means	that	we	must	be	prepared	to	view	our	national	
heroes	without	the	pedestals	we	have	placed	them	on,	but	rather,	as	ordinary	people	
who	sometimes	achieved	great	feats;	people	who	we	cannot	afford	to	emulate	
unconditionally.80			
																																																								
80	I	owe	this	idea	to	James	Loewen	whose	book	Lies	my	Teacher	Told	Me,	not	only	
inspired	me	to	look	deeper	for	truths	in	Indian	religious	history	but	also	to	understand	
that	heroes	who	are	ordinary	men	and	women	are	more	likely	to	be	emulated	by	the	
youth	than	those	who	are	believed	to	be	completely	untainted:	“Whatever	the	causes,	
the	results	of	Herofication	are	potentially	crippling	to	students…	Our	children	end	up	
without	realistic	role	models	to	inspire	them”	(Loewen,	1995,	p.	25).	
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As	we	saw	in	the	last	two	chapters,	Vivekananda	intentionally	privileged	Advaita	
Vedanta	over	all	other	schools	of	thought.	For	him,	Advaita	was	the	answer,	Advaita	was	
the	way,	Advaita	was	the	highest	level	of	philosophy	that	one	could	attain.	But	what	
does	this	mean	for	other	paths?	How	did	this	effect	the	validity	and	position	of	the	other	
sects,	and	traditions,	that	he	was	relegating	to	a	lower	rung	on	the	Hindu	totem	pole?	
How	did	this	hierarchy	affect	them	and	the	Indian	spiritual	landscape?	And	perhaps	
most	importantly,	why	did	these	sects	allow	Advaita	to	be	privileged	over	their	own	
ideology?	There	are	multiple,	complex	reasons	for	why	such	a	hierarchy	was	not	only	
allowed	to	be	cultivated,	but	at	some	junctures	even	encouraged.	One	could	argue	that	
this	was	a	by-product	of	‘continental	collision’.	As	King	and	Thapar	have	already	pointed	
out,	similarly,	Basu	argues	that	elites	across	India	were	clear	on	the	fact	that	they	had	to	
find	a	way	to	unite	the	country:	
Nationalists	in	nineteenth-century	India	were	in	search	of	an	appropriate	
concept	for	describing	a	society	which	was	like	a	mosaic,	being	composed	of	
diverse	races	and	religions;	the	challenge	for	the	intellectuals	of	that	time	was	to	
find	a	justification	for	this	unique	social	structure	without	denying	its	presence.	
The	Advaita	theology	provided	the	answers	to	both	these	problems;	it	enables	its	
acknowledgement	while	at	the	same	time	it	provided	a	philosophical	defence	
(2002,	p.78).	
	
Vivekananda’s	success	at	the	Parliament	served	as	a	catalyst	for	Hindus	who	had	been	
struggling	amongst	themselves	to	find	a	cohesive	path.	His	declaration	that	India’s	
greatest	strength	was	its	spirituality	gave	other	elite	leaders	a	way	to	find	common	
ground.	This	had	not	been	easy	since,	as	we	have	already	discussed,	traditionalists	and	
reformers	were	not	always	in	consensus.	However,	Vivekananda	seemed	to	have	struck	
a	chord	with	those	who	wanted	a	banner	under	which	they	could	all	unite.		
For	the	reformers,	his	emphasis	on	Vedanta,	which	was	a	rational	philosophical	
school	of	thought,	that	seemingly	promoted	universal	religious	ideals	was	a	cause	they	
could	rally	behind.	Of	course,	this	was	not	a	new	development	but	rather	one	that	had	
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been	maturing	for	over	a	century.	For	example,	we	saw	how	Hatcher	highlighted	that	
from	the	time	of	Rammohan	Roy,	the	Brahmos	had	defended	Vedanta	philosophy	in	
their	own	unique	fashion.	Indeed,	the	Brahmos	had	a	long	and	complicated	history	with	
the	Vedas	and	whereas	they	did	not	accept	these	texts	to	be	infallible	scriptures,	they	
did	accept	that	they	contained	certain	invaluable	truths:	
One	of	the	missionaries’	favorite	targets	from	early	in	the	nineteenth	century	had	
been	the	philosophy	of	Vedanta,	by	which	they	meant	the	renunciant	monism	of	
Sankara’s	Advaita	Vedanta.	Rammohun	had	internalized	enough	of	this	critique	
to	wish	to	argue	that	the	core	philosophy	of	Hinduism	was	not	monistic	
illusionism	but	a	monotheism	consistent	with	that	found	in	Judaism,	Christianity	
and	Islam.	At	the	same	time,	however,	Rammohun	would	not	concede	everything	
to	the	missionaries.	Instead,	he	worked	zealously	to	retain	and	redeem	the	name	
of	Vedanta	by	publishing	and	commenting	on	his	own	Bengali	translations	of	its	
Sanskrit	sources,	namely,	the	Upanisads	and	the	Brahma	Sutras.	The	implication	
of	this	is	that	from	the	time	of	Rammohun,	Vedanta	became	what	we	might	call	
the	sacred	cow	of	the	modern	Hindu	interpreter	–	a	cultural	marker,	but	one	
which	needed	constant	explanation	and	defense	(Hatcher,	1999,	p.112).	
	
This	complex	relationship	continued	over	decades	with	the	Vedanta	becoming	an	
“embattled	emblem”	which	the	Brahmo	leaders	continuously	fought	to	uphold	by	
arguing:	
their	Vedantic	theism	was	not	an	innovation	but	simply	a	return	to	the	so-called	
unitrarian,	or	monotheistic,	religion	of	the	ancient	Vedas.	However,	Rajnarain’s	
[Bose,	a	Brahmo	leader	in	the	19th	century]	essays	also	appealed	to	modernist	
arguments	drawn	from	rationalism	and	natural	theology	(Hatcher,	1999,	pp.112-
113).	
	
Thus	Hatcher	concludes,	“The	creative	eclecticism	of	Vivekananda…	did	wonders	for	
giving	Vedanta	a	central	place	in	the	emerging	discourse	of	apologetic	Hinduism	and	
Indian	nationalism”	(1999,	p.115).	
Similarly,	for	the	traditionalists,	the	fact	that	this	school	privileged	the	ancient	
Vedic	scriptures,	that	formed	the	basis	for	much	of	their	own	orthodox	rituals	and	
practices,	calmed	their	fears	of	their	way	of	life	being	usurped	by	reform	in	the	name	of	
modernity.	Indeed,	Vivekananda	began	his	campaign	to	promote	Advaita	Vedanta,	as	
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the	voice	of	Hindu	ideas,	by	first	establishing	the	primacy	of	the	Vedanta,	with	the	
traditionalists,	soon	after	he	returned	to	India	from	his	first	visit	overseas;	“All	the	
philosophers	of	India	who	are	orthodox	have	to	acknowledge	the	authority	of	the	
Vedanta”	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.120).	So	much	so,	that	Anantanand	Rambachan	
contends	that	one	of	the	main	reasons	why	Vivekananda’s	version	of	Advaita	became	
the	dominant	model	for	‘Hinduism’	in	India	was	because:	
He	saw	clearly	that	the	acceptance	of	the	authority	of	the	Vedas	was	one	of	the	
few	common	points	around	which	different	religious	allegiances	in	India	could	
be	united…	Like	his	employment	of	the	distinctions	between	sruti	and	smriti,	
Vivekananda’s	stress	on	the	common	authority	of	the	Vedas	and	his	equation	of	
it	with	orthodoxy	must	be	placed	in	the	wider	context	of	his	anxiety	for	and	
commitment	to	national	and	religious	unity.	One	of	the	most	common	of	
Vivekananda’s	themes	throughout	this	triumphal	lecture	tour	was	the	view	that	
religion	constituted	the	central,	indispensable	characteristic	of	national	life	in	
India	(1994,	p.57).	
	
Consequently,	as	we	turn	to	this	final	chapter	on	the	current	effects	of	
Vivekananda’s	legacy,	we	will	focus	on	unpacking	how	his	words	have	been	
appropriated	by	the	Sangh	Parivar.81	How	have	they	interpreted	his	message	in	such	a	
way	as	to	advocate	for	Hindu	supremacy	in	India?	And,	how,	by	privileging	the	
supremacy	of	Advaita	Vedanta,	multiple,	alternate	voices	have	been	marginalized.	One	
simply	has	to	investigate	how	textbooks	are	being	challenged,	and	scholars	are	being	
silenced,	to	understand	how	problematic	this	stance	is.82	Heterodoxy	is	a	trait	that	has	
been	cultivated	on	Indian	soil	since	ancient	times.	Different	sects,	and	so-called	‘world	
religions’	came	into	existence	on	Indian	soil	because	they	refused	to	comply	with	the	
dominant	world	view.	This,	is	what	made	India	both	strong	and	unique.	This,	is	what	
																																																								
81	The	Sangh	Parivar	is	a	Hindu	nationalist	conglomerate	whose	parent	organization	is	
the	Rashtriya	Swayamsevak	Sangha	(RSS)	
82	I	will	outline	the	way	history	textbooks	and	historians	are	being	interrogated	later	in	
this	chapter	when	we	discuss	how	other	traditions	are	marginalized	by	using	
Vivekananda’s	ideology.		
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allowed	Hindu	traditions	to	endure	multiple	‘continental	collisions’	and	survive.	In	The	
Argumentative	Indian	(2005),	the	Nobel	laureate	Amartya	Sen	states:	
It	is	indeed	important	to	understand	the	long	tradition	of	accepted	heterodoxy	in	
India.	In	resisting	the	attempts	by	the	Hindutva	activists	to	capture	ancient	India	
as	their	home	ground	(and	to	see	it	as	the	unique	cradle	of	Indian	civilization),	it	
is	not	enough	to	point	out	that	India	has	many	other	sources	of	culture	as	well.	It	
is	necessary	also	to	see	how	much	heterodoxy	there	has	been	in	Indian	thoughts	
and	beliefs	from	very	early	days	(2005,	p.xii).	
	
Accordingly,	Sen	contends:	
The	contemporary	relevance	of	the	dialogic	tradition	and	of	the	acceptance	of	
heterodoxy	is	hard	to	exaggerate.	Discussions	and	arguments	are	critically	
important	for	democracy	and	public	reasoning.	They	are	central	to	the	practice	
of	secularism	and	for	even-handed	treatment	of	adherents	of	different	religious	
faiths	(including	those	who	have	no	religious	beliefs).	Going	beyond	these	basic	
structural	priorities,	the	argumentative	tradition,	if	used	with	deliberation	and	
commitment,	can	also	be	extremely	important	in	resisting	social	inequalities	and	
in	removing	poverty	and	deprivation.	Voice	is	a	crucial	component	of	the	pursuit	
of	social	justice	(2005,	p.xiii).	
	
It	is	my	contention	that	the	most	useful	way	to	analyse	how	Vivekananda’s	
words	have	been	brought	into	the	21st	century	is	by	examining	how	the	Sangh	Parivar	
has	been	using	the	language	and	ideology	that	Vivekananda	helped	popularize.	As	such,	
I	will	use	the	Rashtriya	Swayamsevak	Sangh	(henceforth	RSS)	and	the	Sangh	Parivar	as	
a	lens	through	which	to	unpack	Vivekananda’s	statements	and	its	impact	on	India.	So,	
who	are	the	Sangh	Parivar?	What	is	the	RSS?	And,	what	is	their	relationship	with	the	
Hindutva	movement?		
	
The	Sangh	Parivar	
In	the	previous	chapter	we	saw	that	V.D.	Savarkar	conceived	the	term	‘Hindutva’,	
whereby	he	articulated	that	‘Hindu-ness’	was	comprised	of	three	basic	characteristics,	
“geographical	unity,	racial	features	and	a	common	culture”	(Jaffrelot,	2007,	p.86).	One	of	
the	reasons	why	Savarkar	formulated	these	ideas	was	because	he	was	reacting	to	
	 225	
growing	hostilities,	between	the	Hindus	and	the	Muslims,	in	the	1920’s.	It	was	
presumed	that	a	pan-Islamic	movement	could	prove	to	be	a	formidable	opponent	to	the	
Hindu	community,	since	the	British	were	intent	on	using	‘divide	and	rule’	tactics	to	
control	their	colonies:	
[Savarkar’s]	book	was	the	first	attempt	at	endowing	what	he	called	the	Hindu	
Rashtra	(the	Hindu	nation)	with	a	clear-cut	identity:	namely	Hindutva,	a	word	
coined	by	Savarkar	and	which,	according	to	him	does	not	coincide	with	
Hinduism…	Savarkar	argued	that	religion	was	only	one	aspect	of	Hindu	identity…	
The	first	criterion	of	the	Hindu	nation,	for	him,	is	the	sacred	territory	of	
Aryavarta	as	described	in	the	Vedas…	Then	comes	race:	for	Savarkar	the	Hindus	
are	the	descendants	of	‘Vedic	fathers’	who	occupied	this	geographical	area	since	
antiquity.	In	addition	to	religion,	land	and	race,	Savarkar	mentions	language	as	a	
pillar	of	Hindu	identity.	When	doing	so	he	refers	to	Sanskrit	but	also	to	Hindi:	
hence	the	equation	he	finally	established	between	Hindutva	and	the	triptych:	
‘Hindu,	Hindi,	Hindustan’.	Hindu	nationalism	appears	for	the	first	time	as	
resulting	from	the	superimposition	of	a	religion,	a	culture,	a	language,	and	sacred	
territory	–	the	perfect	recipe	for	ethnic	nationalism	(Jaffrelot,	2007,	pp.14-15).	
	
However,	whereas	Savarkar	was	the	person	who	created	the	ideology	for	Hindu	
nationalism,	it	was	Keshav	Baliram	Hedgewar	who	took	Sarvarkar’s	ideas	and	went	on	
to	form	the	RSS	in	1925:	
This	organization	–	which	quickly	developed	into	the	largest	Hindu	nationalist	
movement	–	was	intended	not	only	to	propagate	the	Hindutva	ideology	but	also	
to	infuse	new	physical	strength	into	the	majority	community.		
To	achieve	this	twofold	objective	the	RSS	adopted	a	very	specific	modus	operandi.	
Hedgewar	decided	to	work	at	the	grassroots	in	order	to	reform	Hindu	society	
from	below:	he	created	local	branches	(shakhas)	of	the	movement	in	towns	and	
villages	according	to	a	standard	pattern.	Young	Hindu	men	gathered	every	
morning	and	every	evening	on	a	playground	for	games	with	martial	connotations	
and	ideological	training	sessions.	The	men	in	charge	of	the	shakhas,	called	
pracharaks	(preachers),	dedicated	their	whole	life	to	the	organization;	as	a	part	
of	RSS	cadres	they	could	be	sent	anywhere	in	India	to	develop	the	organization’s	
network….	The	RSS	soon	became	the	most	powerful	Hindu	nationalist	movement	
but	it	did	not	have	much	impact	on	public	life	because	it	remained	out	of	politics	
(Jaffrelot,	2007,	p.16).	
	
Not	surprisingly,	this	ban	on	politics	in	the	RSS	did	not	last	long	and	“the	Bharatiya	Jana	
Sangha	(forerunner	of	the	present	Bharatiya	Janata	Party	or	BJP)”	was	founded	in	1951	
(Jaffrelot,	2007,	p.17).	
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However,	politics	was	not	the	only	arena	where	the	RSS	wanted	to	start	exerting	
its	influence,	but	rather,	it	established	several	different	organizations	for	a	wide	array	of	
social	categories	and,	as	such,	there	was	a	proliferation	of	associations	that	emerged	
over	the	following	decades,	a	few	of	which	are	mentioned	below:	
Thus	in	1948	RSS	cadres	based	in	Delhi	founded	the	Akhil	Bharatiya	Vidyarthi	
Parishad	(ABVP	–	Indian	Students’	Association)	…	In	1955	the	RSS	gave	itself	a	
workers’	union,	the	Bharatiya	Mazdoor	Sangh	(BMS	–	Indian	Workers	
Association)	[which]	became	India’s	largest	trade	union…	in	1952	it	founded	a	
tribal	movement,	the	Vanavasi	Kalyan	Ashram	(VKA	–	Centre	for	Tribal	Welfare),	
which	aimed	above	all	to	counter	the	influence	of	Christian	movements	among	
aboriginals	of	India…	In	1964,	in	association	with	Hindu	clerics,	the	RSS	set	up	
the	Vishva	Hindu	Parishad	(VHP	–	World	Council	of	Hindus),	a	movement	
responsible	for	grouping	the	heads	of	various	Hindu	sects	in	order	to	lend	this	
hitherto	unorganized	religion	a	sort	of	centralized	structure…	Another	
subsidiary,	Vidya	Bharati	(Indian	Knowledge),	was	established	in	1977	to	
coordinate	a	network	of	schools…	Lastly,	in	1979	the	RSS	founded	Seva	Bharati	
(Indian	Service)	to	penetrate	India’s	slums	through	social	activities	(free	schools,	
low-cost	medicines,	etc.).	Taken	together,	these	bridgeheads	are	represented	by	
the	mother	organization	as	forming	the	‘Sangh	Parivar’	or	‘the	family	of	the	
Sangh’,	that	is,	of	the	RSS	(Jaffrelot,	2007,	pp.18-19).	
	
What	is	interesting	is	that	many	of	the	tactics,	that	the	RSS	used	to	spread	its	
message	and	influence,	were	ideas	that	Vivekananda	himself	had	spoken	about	during	
his	lifetime.	According	to	Vivekananda,	the	best	way	to	improve	the	lives	and	
circumstances	of	his	poverty	stricken,	uneducated	Indian	brethren	was	through	selfless	
seva	(service).	Indeed,	this	was	a	goal	that	was	extremely	important	to	him,	and	which	
he	fought	to	accomplish,	even	when	it	meant	going	up	against	many	of	his	brother	
disciples	who	did	not	always	agree	that	Vivekananda’s	interpretation	of	seva	was	what	
Ramakrishna	had	in	mind.	Seva,	in	the	religious	context,	was	commonly	understood	to	
be	service	to	the	divine,	an	act	of	devotion	towards	a	deity	or	a	guru.	However,	
Vivekananda	argued	that	one	could	also	interpret	this	term	to	signify	service	to	
humankind,	in	the	name	of	the	divine.		
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Of	course,	Vivekananda	was	not	unique	in	highlighting	the	need	for	service	to	
humanity.	After	all,	social	service	was	an	important	aspect	of	Christian	missionary	
activity	during	the	colonial	era.	Furthermore,	the	Brahmo	Samaj	can	be	accredited	with	
several	social	reforms	and	projects.	However,	it	was	Vivekananda	who	encouraged	his	
brother	disciples	to	become	sanyasis	who	took	action	in	the	world	by	urging	them	to	
dedicate	their	lives	to	the	poor	and	downtrodden.	He	argued	that	by	selfishly	choosing	
personal	salvation	they	were	turning	their	backs	on	the	poverty	and	hardships	that	
their	fellow	human	beings	were	facing.	Some	scholars	have	argued	that	Vivekananda,	
like	the	Brahmos,	was	simply	incorporating	ideas	that	he	had	imbibed	from	the	West.	
However,	in	Swami	Vivekananda’s	Legacy	of	Service	(2006),	Gwilym	Beckerlegge	
cautions	against	scholars	who	take	a	simplistic,	West	to	East,	linear	view	of	how	social	
service	and	philanthropic	movements	developed	in	India.	Rather,	he	contends:	
Vivekananda’s	early	involvement	in	famine-relief	marks	the	point	at	which	
feeding	the	hungry,	already	a	charitable	act	required	within	the	dictates	of	Hindu	
dharma,	became	transformed	into	a	form	of	‘social	service’	as	that	phrase	has	
come	to	be	understood.	This	was	sustained	intervention	on	an	expanding	scale	
that	required	planning,	organization,	fund-raising,	liaison	with	other	agencies,	
and	thus	public	accountability.	It	was	no	longer	an	ad	hoc	expression	of	
charitable	action	nor	merely	the	sum	of	individually	motivated	actions.	The	
nineteenth	century	saw	the	introduction	also	in	Britain	of	measures	that	
signalled	a	realization	that	private,	in	this	context	Christian-inspired,	
philanthropy	could	no	longer	be	relied	upon	to	redress	the	extent	of	social	
deprivation	encountered	in	a	rapidly	industrializing	society.	Similar	changes	
were	taking	place	in	the	United	States.	Although	different	in	kind,	British	India	
experienced	no	less	sweeping	changes	during	this	same	period	which	made	plain	
the	limitations	in	the	capacity	of	traditional	forms	of	charitable	action	to	meet	
new	levels	of	need.	Vivekananda’s	policies	in	this	respect	were	thus	very	much	in	
tune	with	the	new	‘scientific	spirit’	that	had	begun	to	percolate	organized	activity	
in	the	West	(Beckerlegge,	2006(b),	pp.177-178).	
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Beckerlegge	articulates,	in	detail,	the	pitfalls	associated	with	suggesting,	as	J.N.	Farquhar	
does	in	his	seminal	work	Modern	Religious	Movements	in	India	(1915),	that	
Vivekananda’s	‘sadhana’	of	service	was	simply	inspired	by	the	West:83	
Ultimately,	arguments	that	the	mature	Ramakrishna	movement’s	commitment	to	
serving	the	poor	and	oppressed	is	founded	upon	a	discontinuity	between	
Vivekananda	and	Ramakrishna,	and	thus	between	Vivekananda	and	the	
extended	Hindu	tradition,	may	carry	implicit	judgements	on	the	capacity	of	the	
Hindu	tradition	to	change	and	to	provide	an	authentic	basis	for	social	activism	
(Beckerlegge,	2006(b),	p.3).	
	
Be	that	as	it	may,	this	was	not	a	common	interpretation	of	seva,	and	it	is	not	
surprising	that	Vivekananda	met	with	a	considerable	amount	of	resistance	when	he	put	
forth	his	ideas.84	Indeed,	Sumit	Sarkar	surmises:	
He	[Vivekananda]	had	to	fight,	in	a	way,	against	an	entire	Hindu	tradition	in	
which	charity	might	at	times	be	considered	a	part	of	the	dharma	of	a	king	or	
householder,	but	where	the	sanyasi’s	principal	ideal	was	individual	moksha,	not	
improvement	of	the	world	(2014,	p.207).	
	
However,	despite	his	many	critics,	Vivekananda	was	obviously	successful	since	
the	motto,	to	this	day,	for	the	Ramakrishna	Math	and	Mission	is:	
Atmanomo	mokshartham	jagad	hitaya	cha	
For	one’s	own	salvation,	and	for	the	welfare	of	the	world85	
	
Vivekananda	began	his	efforts	towards	this	goal	as	soon	as	he	returned	to	India	from	his	
first	Western	tour.	He	encouraged	his	listeners	to	serve	humanity	by	linking	it	to	service	
to	God.	Not	surprisingly,	he	used	an	anecdote	to	get	his	point	across	and,	for	added	
emphasis,	he	presented	his	ideas	in	a	temple	setting:	
A	rich	man	had	a	garden	and	two	gardeners.	One	of	these	gardeners	was	very	
lazy	and	did	not	work;	but	when	the	owner	came	to	the	garden,	the	lazy	man	
would	get	up	and	fold	his	arms	and	say,	“How	beautiful	is	the	face	of	my	master”,	
and	dance	before	him.	The	other	gardener	would	not	talk	much,	but	would	work	
																																																								
83	Farquhar	clearly	states	“the	truth	is	that	ancient	Hinduism	does	not	teach	the	duty	of	
service	at	all”	(Farquhar,	1915,	p.206).	Beckerlegge	defines	‘sadhana’	as	‘means	of	
attainment’	or	‘spiritual	discipline’	(2006,	p.1-2).	
84	See	Beckerlegge,	(2006b)	for	a	detailed	study	on	this	topic.		
85	http://belurmath.org/	
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hard,	and	produce	all	sorts	of	fruits	and	vegetables	which	he	would	carry	on	his	
head	to	his	master	who	lived	a	long	way	off.	Of	these	two	gardeners,	which	
would	be	the	more	beloved	of	his	master?	Shiva	is	that	master,	and	this	world	is	
His	garden,	and	there	are	two	sorts	of	gardeners	here;	the	one	who	is	lazy,	
hypocritical,	and	does	nothing,	only	talking	about	Shiva’s	beautiful	eyes	and	nose	
and	other	features;	and	the	other,	who	is	taking	care	of	Shiva’s	children,	all	those	
that	are	poor	and	weak,	all	animals	and	all	His	creation.	Which	of	these	would	be	
the	more	beloved	of	Shiva?	Certainly	he	that	serves	His	children.	He	who	wants	
to	serve	the	father	must	serve	the	children	first.	He	who	wants	to	serve	Shiva	
must	serve	His	children	–	must	serve	all	creatures	in	this	world	first.	It	is	said	in	
the	Shastra	that	those	who	serve	the	servants	of	God	are	His	greatest	servants.	So	
you	will	bear	this	in	mind	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.142).86	
	
Here,	Vivekananda	made	it	abundantly	clear	that	he	believed	that	seva	entailed	serving	
the	poor	and	downtrodden.	And,	Vivekananda	had	a	vision	for	what	seva	he	wanted	the	
Ramakrishna	Math	sanyasis	to	focus	on:	
know	for	certain	that	absolutely	nothing	can	be	done	to	improve	the	state	of	
things,	unless	there	is	spread	of	education	first	among	the	women	and	the	
masses.	And	so	I	have	it	in	my	mind	to	train	up	some	Brahmacharins	and	
Brahmacharinis,	the	former	of	whom	will	eventually	take	the	vow	of	Sannyasa	
and	try	to	carry	the	light	of	education	among	the	masses,	from	village	to	village,	
throughout	the	country	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.6,	p.489).	
	
Before	departing	for	his	second	tour	in	the	West,	Vivekananda	instructed	the	junior	
sanyasis	of	Belur	Math:	
In	our	country,	the	old	idea	is	to	sit	in	a	cave	and	meditate	and	die.	To	go	ahead	of	
others	in	salvation	is	wrong.	One	must	learn	sooner	or	later	that	one	cannot	get	
salvation	if	one	does	not	try	to	seek	the	salvation	of	his	brothers.	You	must	try	to	
combine	in	your	life	immense	idealism	with	immense	practicality.	You	must	be	
prepared	to	go	into	deep	meditation	now,	and	the	next	moment	you	must	be	
ready	to	go	and	cultivate	these	fields	(Swamiji	said,	pointing	to	the	meadows	of	
the	Math).	You	must	be	prepared	to	explain	the	difficult	intricacies	of	the	
Shastras	now,	and	the	next	moment	to	go	and	sell	the	produce	of	the	fields	in	the	
market.	You	must	be	prepared	for	all	menial	services,	not	only	here,	but	
elsewhere	also	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.447).	
	
It	is	rather	surprising	to	discover	that	the	similarities	between	Vivekananda’s	
instructions	to	his	sanyasis,	regarding	seva,	and	the	Sangh	Parivar’s	rules	for	their	
																																																								
86	The	subtle	criticism	that	Vivekananda	aims	at	bhaktas	is	evident	in	this	anecdote;	an	
issue	that	we	will	address	in	the	following	section.		
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organizations’	dedication	to	service,	are	remarkably	homogenous.		Both	required	their	
leaders	to	be	celibate	and	austere.	Both	advocate	for	reform	at	a	grass	roots	level.	And	
both	expect	their	followers	to	be	prepared	to	travel	to	spread	their	message.	
Beckerlegge	highlights	the	parallels	that	can	be	drawn	between	the	Ramakrishna	
Math	and	Mission,	and	the	Sangh	Parivar,	by	investigating	the	similarities	in	their	
respective	concepts	of	seva,	and	the	commonalities	in	the	structuring	of	their	individual	
organizations.	Interestingly,	the	first	two	leaders	of	the	RSS	had	been	influenced,	in	
their	youth,	by	Vivekananda’s	ideology	and	methods:	
Both	the	first	two	supreme	leaders	(sarsanghchalaks)	of	the	RSS	had	significant	
degrees	of	association	with	the	Ramakrishna	Math	and	Mission.	Keshav	Baliram	
Hedgewar	(1889-1940),	the	founder	of	the	RSS,	participated	in	relief	operations	
organized	by	the	Ramakrishna	Mission	(1912/1913)	while	a	student	in	Kolkata.	
The	second	sarsanghchalak	and	one	of	its	most	influential	ideologues,	Madhav	
Sadashiv	Golwalkar	(1906-1973),	was	devoted	to	Swami	Akhandananda	(1865-
1937)	of	the	Ramakrishna	Math,	who	had	been	Vivekananda’s	gurubhai	[brother	
disciple].	Had	it	not	been	for	Akhandananda’s	death	in	1937,	Golwalkar	might	
well	have	offered	himself	for	training	to	enter	the	Ramakrishna	Math	
(Beckerlegge,	2010,	p.71).	
	
Indeed,	the	connection	between	the	RSS	and	the	Ramakrishna	Math	and	Mission	is	not	a	
recent	phenomenon,	especially	since	the	RSS	routinely	“makes	considerable	use	of	
images	of	Vivekananda	and	quotations	from	his	works	in	its	literature	and	websites”	
(Beckerlegge,	2006(a),	p.49).	What	is	of	particular	interest:	
The	role	of	the	pracharak,	the	full-time	worker	and	organizer	who	is	expected	to	
remain	unmarried	and	to	maintain	a	celibate	and	ascetic	lifestyle	has	also	been	
central	to	the	creation	and	management	of	seva	projects	within	the	RSS	
(Beckerlegge,	2006(a),	p.49).	
	
These	leaders	of	the	RSS	are	not	expected	to	become	sanyasis	but	they	are	asked	to	
show	an	extremely	similar	sense	of	devotion	to	their	chosen	path.	The	development	of	
the	Vivekananda	Kendra,	which	is	another	organization	within	the	Sangh	Parivar,	is	also	
noteworthy:		
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Vivekananda	Kendra	–	a	lay	order	of	men	and	women	dedicated	to	promoting	
Vivekananda’s	teaching	and	offering	seva	(in	this	context,	service	to	humanity)	–	
was	created	out	of	the	residual	momentum	built	by	the	RSS’s	national	campaign	
to	erect	the	Rock	Memorial	(Beckerlegge,	2010,	p.72).	
	
The	Rock	Memorial	was	built	in	1970,	by	the	RSS,	in	Kanyakumari,	to	commemorate	the	
place	where	Vivekananda	is	said	to	have	made	his	decision	to	travel	West	in	search	of	a	
solution	to	alleviate	the	poverty	he	had	witnessed	amongst	his	Indian	brethren.	Some	
hagiographies	also	claim	that	this	is	where	Vivekananda	experienced	enlightenment.	
The	fact	that	it	was	the	RSS	who	took	it	upon	themselves	to	build	this	monument	and,	
who	continue	to	run	it	using	the	funds	they	collect	to	support	the	service	projects	they	
spearhead	in	this	region,	shows	a	remarkable	attachment	to	Vivekananda	and	his	
mission.	What	Beckerlegge	accomplishes	with	this	study	is	to	demonstrate	how	
Vivekananda’s	ideology	has	been	appropriated,	and	cultivated,	by	the	Sangh	Parivar	and	
how	closely	the	RSS	has	been	associating	itself	with	the	legacy	of	Vivekananda.	It	could	
be	argued	that	one	of	the	reasons	why	the	RSS	has	been	able	to	gain	such	a	large	
following	is	specifically	because	of	the	multiple	service	programs	that	they	have	
established,	and	continue	to	maintain,	across	the	nation.	Using	some	of	Vivekananda’s	
methods,	they	have	been	successful	at	reaching	the	masses	the	way	he	envisioned.	Yet,	
it	is	only	recently	that	Vivekananda	has	come	to	be	linked	with	the	Sangh	Parivar.	Why	
is	this?	Why	have	renown	political	scientists	like	Partha	Chatterjee	and	more	recently,	
Christophe	Jaffrelot	chosen	to	ignore	Vivekananda’s	role	in	the	development	of	the	
Sangh	Parivar?	For	instance,	in	his	study	which	focuses	primarily	on	Hindu	nationalism,	
Jaffrelot	offers	the	following	justification	for	excluding	Vivekananda:	
The	selection	of	the	political	thinkers,	or	ideologues,	included	in	this	anthology	
has	been	determined	by	a	very	simple	consideration:	those	who	have	played	a	
role	in	organized	Hindu	nationalist	movements	have	been	systematically	
preferred	to	individuals	who	have	never	been	mentors	to	institutionalized	socio-
political	associations.	As	a	result	Sri	Aurobindo	and	Swami	Vivekananda	–	whose	
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thought	processes	had	affinities	with	Hindu	nationalism	–	have	been	omitted	
(Jaffrelot,	2007,	p.24).	
	
What	is	it	about	Vivekananda	that,	despite	scholars	(like	Gwilym	Beckerlegge	and	
Jyotirmaya	Sharma)	who	underscore	the	role	that	he	played,	and	continues	to	play,	in	
the	philosophy	of	the	Sangh	Parivar,	that	Vivekananda	continues	to	be	seen	as	a	benign	
universalist	who	only	sought	to	promote	a	united	‘Hinduism’?	Perhaps	the	clue	lies	in	
the	fact	that	Vivekananda	apparently	never	tried	to	promote	a	Hindu	nation	the	way	
that	the	RSS	does?	Or	did	he?	Was	he	just	more	careful	and	better	at	camouflaging	his	
message	than	his	RSS	progeny?	As	we	compare	his	message	with	that	of	the	Sangh	
Parivar	perhaps	we	will	find	that	the	Narendra	who	spoke	at	the	time	when	India	was	
searching	for	its	place	in	the	global	arena	transforms	into	a	completely	different	
Narendra	when	we	are	faced	with	a	nation	that	is	being	threatened	by	fundamentalist	
ideas.		
Or,	alternatively,	could	this	apparent	dichotomy	be	more	visible	now	that	
Vivekananda’s	corpus	of	writing	is	available,	as	a	whole,	for	scholars	to	examine	and	
unpack?	Could	Vivekananda’s	writings	be	susceptible	to	a	‘hermeneutics	of	suspicion’?	
This	theory,	that	post-modern	scholars	occasionally	opt	to	use	when	analysing	primary	
texts	could	be	applicable	here;	a	theory	that	was	made	popular	by	the	“masters	of	
suspicion”:	
Marx,	Freud	and	Nietzsche	–	each	in	his	own	way	–	suggest	that	subjectivity	may	
indeed	be	deceived,	not	from	without,	but	from	within:	it	is	self-deceived…	The	
Marxist	therefore	engages	in	a	critique	of	ideology	in	order	to	uncover	the	covert	
interests	lurking	behind	the	apparent	meaning	of	the	text.	A	Freudian	is	
suspicious	of	received	texts	for	quite	different	reasons,	but	the	hermeneutical	
effect	is	comparable.	Here	the	‘ideological’	factor	is	not	economic	and	social	but	
unconscious	and	individual:	to	understand	a	text	rightly	the	interpreter	must	
take	into	account	the	unconscious	motivations	that	may	be	at	work	behind	the	
façade	of	rational	discourse.	With	Nietzsche	the	situation	is	more	complex…	but	
the	need	to	take	a	kind	of	false	consciousness	into	account	links	his	positions	to	
that	of	Marx	and	Freud	(Green,	2005,	p.401,	emphasis	in	original).	
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For	example,	in	In	Search	of	Dreamtime	(1993),	Masuzawa	analyses	Emile	
Durkheim’s	The	Elementary	Forms	of	the	Religious	Life	(1912).	Here,	she	contends	that	
Durkheim	seems	to	be	‘shadow	boxing’	with	himself	when	he	is	developing	the	
arguments	he	presents	in	his	book	(Masuzawa,	1993,	p.34).	She	argues	that	this	is	
because	Durkheim	apparently	has	two	theses,	which	are	at	cross	purposes	with	each	
other.	The	question	any	reader	of	Durkheim	has	to	ask	then	is	whether	he	was	aware	of	
the	split	personality	of	his	book	or,	if	instead,	he	was	unable	to	silence	his	inner	voice	
sufficiently,	resulting	in	it	rearing	its	head	unbeknownst	to	its	creator,	in	the	most	
inappropriate	spaces.		
While	the	author	[Durkheim]	claims	that	there	is	one	origin	of	religion	and	it	is	
simple,	the	text	also	demonstrates	that	it	is	not	so,	that	origin	as	such	is	
something	disjunctive.	In	due	course,	the	reader	comes	to	recognize	a	certain	
unnamed	and	unacknowledged	element	that	continually	interrupts	and	
obfuscates	the	authorial	writing.	In	effect,	this	unauthorized	“voice”	silently	
criticizes	the	metaphysical	quest	that	motivates	the	text,	and	in	time	induces	
some	muffled	confessions	concerning	the	disparity	that	inhabits	every	assertion	
of	origin	(Masuzawa,	1993,	p.34).	
	
Are	we	witnessing	a	similar	dissonant	voice	in	Vivekananda’s	writings?	It	is	no	secret	
that	scholars	who	have	worked	with	Vivekananda	have	oftentimes	found	him	
contradicting	himself.87	One	can	argue,	that	Vivekananda’s	message	changes	depending	
on	who	his	audience	is.	Similarly,	one	can	also	argue	that	his	public	speeches	and	
lectures	have	a	different	tone	and	tenor	than	his	private	correspondence.	However,	this	
may	not	be	all	we	are	dealing	with	here.	Perhaps,	as	Masuzawa	suggests	with	Durkheim,	
now	that	we	as	Vivekananda’s	readers	must	interpret	his	written	words,	alternate	
strands	of	his	arguments	are	becoming	visible.	Strands	that	do	not	correspond	to	his	
dominant	message	of	a	sanyasi.	An	Advaitin	sanyasi	who	was	primarily	interested	in	
																																																								
87	Brian	Hatcher,	Narasingha	Sil,	Anantanand	Rambachan	and	Rajgopal	Chattopadhyaya,	
to	mention	just	a	few,	all	allude	to	Vivekananda’s	contradictory	statements	and	
penchant	to	give	seemingly	opposing	arguments.		
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promoting	philanthropic	projects	while	articulating	how	his	version	of	‘Hinduism’	was	
best	suited	to	represent	Hindu	traditions.	After	all,	the	fact	that	his	words	are	being	
appropriated	so	blithely	by	the	Hindutva	movement	would	suggest	that	there	are	latent	
messages	in	his	ideology	that	must	be	brought	to	light.	That	we	may	indeed	be	dealing	
with	multiple	Narendras.		
	
Is	it	time	to	reject	the	hierarchy?	
	 One	of	the	topics	that	we	have	covered	extensively	is	Vivekananda’s	propensity	
to	paint	all	Indian	traditions	with	an	Advaita	whitewash.	Whereas	this	may	have	been	a	
useful	tactic	during	the	colonial	era,	it	has	now	become	a	problem	that	is	escalating	at	a	
rapid	pace	with	the	help	of	the	Sangh	Parivar.	This	hierarchy,	that	these	methods	have	
cultivated,	have	not	only	marginalized	multiple	religious	traditions,	but,	have	also	
changed	how	many	Hindus	justify	their	continued	regard	for	devotional	and	ritual	
practices	and	norms.	An	essay	that	impacted	me	when	I	started	my	graduate	studies	is	
Vasudha	Narayanan’s	“Diglossic	Hinduism:	Liberation	and	Lentils”	(2000).	Here,	
Narayanan	highlights	how	she	was	dismayed	when	she	discovered	that	the	Hindu	
traditions	she	grew	up	with,	were	not	considered	to	be	important	aspects	of	the	
‘Hinduism’	she	had	come	to	study	as	a	graduate	student	at	Harvard	University.	This	
experience	propelled	her	to	make	the	following	observations:	
The	Hindu	tradition,	like	many	other	religions,	is	complex	and	diglossia	is	
rampant.	There	are	clear	distinctions	between	androcentric	Sanskrit	texts	and	
practice.	There	is	a	further	removal	from	the	“on	the	ground”	picture	when	we	
come	to	the	representation	of	“Hinduism”	as	a	tradition	trying	to	fit	the	
straightjacket	of	a	nineteenth-century	understanding	of	“religion.”	To	some	
extent	this	is	because	early	western	Indologists	and	scholars	of	religion	relied	on	
male	brahmins	for	their	understanding	of	the	tradition.	None	of	this	was	wrong;	
it	was	just	that	the	epic	stories,	the	variations	of	the	stories,	the	varieties	of	
devotional	activity,	the	celebrations	of	festivals,	and	the	fuss	about	food	seem	far	
more	important	than	doctrine	and	philosophy	in	the	practice	of	Hindu	traditions	
(Narayanan,	2000,	p.762).	
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Accordingly,	she	draws	attention	to	the	fact	that	not	only	are	a	multitude	of	practices,	
that	many	Hindus	consider	to	form	the	basis	of	their	religious	belief,	absent	from	
textbooks	but	also:	
Hindus	do	not	usually	walk	around	worrying	about	their	karma	or	working	
toward	moksha	(liberation),	nor	are	most	folk	familiar	with	anything	more	than	
the	name	Vedanta	among	the	various	schools	of	philosophy	(Narayanan,	2000,	
p.762).	
	
Narayanan	reasons	that	this	myopic	view	of	Hindu	traditions	has	been	fuelled	by	the	
textbooks	that	speak	for	Hindu	traditions:	
What	was	left	out	of	almost	all	of	these	texts	that	presented	the	“religion”	of	
“Hinduism”	includes	(a)dharmic	practices	like	the	giving	of	gifts,	making	
donations,	and	merit-making	exercises	like	digging	wells	or	celebrations	in	
planting	trees;	(b)	vernacular	literature	and	therefore,	the	voices	of	women,	who	
did	not	compose	in	Sanskrit	but,	rather,	in	the	regional	languages;	(c)	rituals	and	
practices	of	the	so-called	lower	castes,	especially	of	women;	and	(d)	practices	
that	came	under	the	categories	of	“pollution”	and	“purity.”	“auspiciousness”	and	
“inauspiciousness.”	The	latter	include	the	much	lamented	lentils	that	my	
grandmother	made	(the	right	one	for	the	right	occasion),	the	right	astrological	
times	for	starting	journeys	or	embarking	on	any	task,	celebrating	weddings	and	
so	on.	These	were	just	a	few	of	the	topics	jettisoned	when	the	concept	of	
Hinduism	was	matched	with	the	term	religion.	Some	of	these	concepts	were	
mopped	up	by	anthropology,	others	like	temple	rituals	have	only	recently	made	
it	to	textbooks.		
What	we	have,	therefore,	in	some	of	the	popular	texts	that	have	been	around	for	
many	years	is	a	tradition	based	on	parts	of	the	Sanskrit	textual	tradition.	This	
reliance	immediately	indicates	two	things:	the	texts	were	written	by	men	who	
were	generally	high	caste.	Among	the	choice	of	texts	written	by	these	high-caste	
men,	it	was	the	ritual	of	the	Vedas;	notions	of	karma,	samsara,	and	moksha;	the	
spiritual	paths	of	the	Bhagavad	Gita;	and	the	philosophical	traditions	of	the	later	
period	that	were	the	focus	of	most	discussions	(Narayanan,	2000,	pp.763-764,	
emphasis	in	original).	
	
Unfortunately,	Narayanan	does	not	draw	a	nexus	from	these	texts	to	
Vivekananda’s	teachings	or	the	RSS’	influence.	However,	we	just	have	to	examine	how	
Vivekananda	demoted	bhakti	and	orthopraxy	to	realize	that	these	texts,	which	are	
lacking	in	so	many	integral	aspects	of	Hindu	religious	life,	are	simply	reflecting	the	
groundwork	that	was	laid	a	century	before.	For	example,	even	in	the	short	anecdote	that	
was	quoted	in	the	previous	section,	we	find	that	Vivekananda	belittled	the	‘gardener’	
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(read	‘devotee’)	who	danced	and	sang	in	front	of	his	‘master’	(read	‘deity’).	Most	of	
Vivekananda’s	references	to	bhakti	are	shrouded	in	this	kind	of	language.	He	did	not	
reject	it	from	the	religious	landscape	of	the	Hindus	but	he	did	repeatedly	demote	it	to	a	
rung	lower	than	Advaita.	For	instance,	one	of	the	issues	that	Vivekananda	had	with	
bhakti	was	that	it	brought	out	the	feminine	principle	in	its	devotees.	Indeed,	he	was	
quite	vociferous	in	his	denouncement	of	the	Vaishnava	sects	whose	followers	often	
adopted	feminine	traits:	
Vaishnavism	was	proclaimed	as	the	religion	of	the	heart	which	relied	on	the	
feminine	principle	of	piety,	devotion,	and	emotional	attachment	to	God	which	
was	in	contrast	to	what	was	seen	as	the	masculine	principle	in	religion	that	
centered	on	dry	philosophical	discussions	(Basu,	2002,	p.155).	
	
Even	though	this	mode	of	bhakti	bears	a	distinct	resemblance	to	Ramakrishna,	it	was,	as	
we	have	already	seen,	not	the	kind	of	devotion	that	Vivekananda	was	willing	to	
encourage.	Thus,	it	is	hardly	surprising	that	Vivekananda	thought	it	was	necessary	to	
highlight,	what	he	perceived	to	be,	the	problematic	stance	taken	by	the	Vaishnavites	at	a	
time	in	history	when	Indians	needed	to	demonstrate	‘nerves	of	steel	and	muscles	of	
iron’	to	their	colonial	rulers:	
Vivekananda	launched	a	frontal	attack	on	the	neo-Vaishnava	practices	of	
Sankirtan	[communal	singing	of	devotional	songs]	…	one	of	his	favorite	objects	of	
ridicule	was	the	rendition	of	devotional	songs	by	the	Vaishnavites.	He	was	
particularly	enraged	by	the	fact	that	during	times	of	plague,	the	neo-Vaishnava	
cult	took	recourse	to	Sankirtan	as	the	most	appropriate	religious	instrument	for	
the	protection	of	people	from	the	scourge	of	the	dreaded	disease.	The	way	
Vivekananda	justified	this	equivocal	position	of	uplifting	Bhakti	while	
simultaneously	negating	the	efforts	of	the	Vaishnavites	suggests	an	inherently	
complex	but	familiar	ruse	to	‘sanitize	the	popular’	in	order	to	make	the	popular	
eligible	as	the	modern	and	the	national	(Basu,	2002,	p.157).88	
	
																																																								
88	In	a	move	that	is	remarkably	similar	to	the	ones	he	makes	for	other	religious	leaders	
like	Ramakrishna,	Jesus	and	Buddha,	he	disengages	the	Vaishnava	sects	from	their	
founder	Chaitanya,	arguing	that	the	followers	are	not	living	up	to	their	master’s	ideals	
(Basu,	2002,	pp.155-158).	
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Of	course,	Vivekananda	was	careful	to	cloak	his	words	in	language	that	was	both	
tolerant	and	inclusive	but	nevertheless,	the	message	was	usually	clear.	Bhakti	and	
rituals	were	simply	how	Hindus	began	their	relationship	with	the	divine.	And	unless	the	
bhakti	they	practiced	was	of	the	purest	form,	like	Ramakrishna	or	Chaitanya,	it	was	not	
enough;	neither	to	attain	moksha	nor	to	form	a	strong	and	independent	nation.	For	
those	goals,	Advaita	ideals	would	eventually	have	to	be	embraced.	
	 Perhaps	this	would	be	a	good	place	for	us	to	unpack	what	the	terms	‘exclusive’,	
‘inclusive’	and	‘pluralist’	can	signify.	This	should	offer	us	some	insight	on	how	
Vivekananda	was	actually	demeaning	certain	traditions	and	sects	without	any	outward	
signs	of	violence.	Many	religious	scholars	in	general,	and	Christian	theologians	in	
particular,	have	grappled	with	these	terms	over	the	centuries.	I	do	not	presume	to	offer	
up	an	exhaustive	study	here,	but	rather,	will	streamline	my	argument	so	that	it	sheds	
some	light	on	how	Vivekananda’s	ideas	can	be	interpreted.	Although	there	are	multiple	
definitions	available,	it	is	Perry	Schmidt-Leukel’s	interpretation	that	appears	to	be	the	
most	comprehensive:	
It	is,	however,	possible	to	define	the	terms	of	the	tripartite	scheme	in	a	clear	and	
consistent	way	so	that	one	finally	arrives	at	a	coherent	and	–	if	naturalism	is	
added	–	a	logically	comprehensive	classification.	If	the	crucial	question	in	the	
assessment	of	religious	diversity	is	whether	there	is	truth	in	the	claims	of	the	
various	religions	(made	in	different	forms)	to	relate	humans	in	a	soteriologically	
decisive	way	to	transcendent	reality,	the	answer	can	be	either	‘no’	or	‘yes’.	While	
the	‘no’-answer	signifies	naturalism	the	‘yes’-answer	is	open	for	further	sub-
classification.	Does	this	‘yes’	relate	to	the	claim	of	only	one	religion	or	to	more	
than	one?	Affirming	the	first	would	constitute	exclusivism,	affirming	the	second	
would	lead	to	the	further	question	whether	among	the	various	true	religions	one	
is	standing	out	as	superior	to	all	the	others	or	whether	there	is	no	such	single	
superiority.	The	first	position	defines	inclusivism	and	the	latter	pluralism.	Note	
that	in	this	definition	pluralism	does	not	say	that	the	soteriological	claims	of	all	
religions	are	equally	true	and	valid.	Some	of	these	could	indeed	be	deficient	or	
even	entirely	wrong.	But	what	it	says	is	that	at	least	some	religions,	despite	their	
differences,	can	be	understood	as	being	indeed	on	the	same	level	and	truly	and	
efficiently	mediating	a	saving	relation	to	an	ultimate	transcendent	reality,	that	is:	
this	position	adds	indeed	theological	‘parity’	to	‘plurality’	(Schmidt-Leukel,	2010,	
pp.57-58,	emphasis	in	original).	
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What	is	of	particular	interest,	for	the	purposes	of	understanding	where	Vivekananda	fits	
into	this	classification	system,	is	that	the	term	‘inclusive’,	even	though	it	has	such	a	
seemingly	positive	quality	to	it,	in	actuality	is	a	word	that	promotes	a	hierarchy.	
Schmidt-Leukel	draws	attention	to	this	point:	
Inclusivism	cannot	really	appreciate	diversity.	As	Wilfred	Cantwell	Smith	once	
said	in	comparing	his	own	views	to	the	inclusivist	position	of	Karl	Rahner:	‘He	
has	assumed	that	Christian	formulations	are	the	making	explicit	of	the	truth	of	
God’s	relation	to	humankind,	whereas	I	have	observed	that	they	are	an	explicit	
formulation,	but	not	the’	(2010,	p.59,	emphasis	in	original).	
	
In	the	third	chapter	of	this	study	we	engaged	with	Paul	Hacker’s	theories	which	
included,	but	were	not	limited	to,	his	use	of	the	word	‘inclusivism’	when	describing	
Hindus	and	their	traditions.	Now	however,	it	is	clear	that	this	description	of	the	Hindu	
propensity,	for	engaging	with	other	traditions	by	‘including’	them	into	their	ideological	
framework,	is	actually	just	as	problematic	as	the	‘exclusivist’	position.	Indeed,	some	
could	argue	that	it	is	worse	since	it	comes	across	as	a	benign	label	but,	in	actuality,	it	is	
creating	a	hierarchical	scheme	whereby	the	tradition	that	is	doing	the	‘including’	is	
actually	claiming	its	superiority.	This	is	reflected	in	John	Hick’s	definition:	
By	inclusivism	I	mean	the	view	(advocated	by	Karl	Rahner	in	his	influential	
theory	of	‘anonymous	Christianity’	and	largely	adopted,	though	without	use	of	
the	term,	by	Vatican	II)	that	one’s	own	tradition	alone	has	the	whole	truth	but	that	
this	truth	is	nevertheless	partially	reflected	in	other	traditions	(1983,	p.487,	
emphasis	added).	
	
Of	course,	scholars	who	might	want	to	come	to	the	defence	of	Vivekananda	could	argue	
that	he	did	not	invoke	this	title	himself,	but	rather,	is	one	that	is	routinely	applied	to	his	
ideology.89	Perhaps,	it	may	be	more	appropriate	to	label	him	as	a	pluralist?	However,	
according	to	Gavin	D’Costa	even	the	label	‘pluralist’	is	laden	with	undertones:	
the	pluralist	by	virtue	of	the	act	of	exclusion	of	Jim	Jones	or	the	Nazis,	can	
thereby	include	various	other	doctrines	and	practices	in	so	much	as	they	do	not	
																																																								
89	For	example,	Basu	states,	“The	concept	of	inclusivist	Hinduism	came	to	be	preached	
by	such	diverse	thinkers	as	Vivekananda	and	Rabindranath	Tagore”	(2002,	p.67).	
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contradict	their	own	basic	truth	claims	and	in	this	act	of	inclusion	and	exclusion	
such	pluralists	are	logically	no	different	from	exclusivists	who	simply	argue	that	
those	who	properly	relate	to	the	revelation	are	included	in	salvation	and	those	
who	do	not	are	excluded	(D'Costa,	1996,	p.226).	
	
	 One	scholar	who	has	addressed	some	of	these	issues,	in	relation	to	Vivekananda,	
and	his	interpretation	of	Hindu	traditions,	is	Glyn	Richards:	
Vivekananda’s	expressed	preference	for	the	impersonal	concept	of	God	as	the	
fundamental	ground	or	basis	for	any	understanding	of	the	personal	concept	
meant	that	the	type	of	religion	that	had	the	greatest	appeal	for	him	was	that	
which	propounded	impersonal	rather	than	personal	concepts	of	the	absolute.	He	
was	well	aware	that	certain	historical	religious	laid	claim	to	universality,	but	he	
doubted	whether	it	was	possible	for	any	historical	religion	to	make	such	a	claim	
which	presumably	included	Advaita	Vedanta	(1995,	p.132).	
	
However,	Richards	is	not	really	convincing	because	he	then	goes	on	to	admit	that	as	far	
as	Vivekananda	was	concerned,	“dualism	(Dvaita)	is	on	a	lower	level	of	understanding	
than	qualified	non-dualism	(Visistadvaita)	and	perfect	non-dualism	(Advaita)”	(1995,	
p.133).	Richards	argues	that	even	though	Vivekananda	has	been	at	the	receiving	end	of	
much	criticism	regarding	his	seemingly	exclusive	stance,	in	truth	he	is	actually	speaking	
of	the	‘principle’	of	non-dualism,	rather	than	its	particular	manifestation	as	Advaita	
Vedanta:	
The	question	is	whether	he	equates	non-dualism	with	Advaita	Vedanta	as	a	
particular,	historical	religion	or	rather	as	a	principle	that	ought	to	determine	our	
understanding	of	ultimate	reality	and	the	absolute.	His	critics	would	accuse	him	
of	the	former	and	ipso	facto	guilty	of	sectarianism	(1995,	p.134).	
	
According	to	Richards,	this	criticism	is	too	harsh	since	he	believes	that	Vivekananda	
would	view	any	‘religion’	that	took	a	non-dualistic	view	of	existence	to	be	a	valid	and	
equal	path,	comparable	to	Advaita	Vedanta.	However,	there	is	one	major	problem	with	
this	argument	because	Richards	also	argues	that	Vivekananda,	like	the	German	
philosopher	Friedrich	Schleiermacher,	believes	“it	is	not	possible	to	nominate	a	
particular	historical	religion	as	the	perfect	embodiment	of	the	essence	of	religion”	
(Richards,	1995,	p.136).	And	since,	Vivekananda	considered	the	Vedas,	and	the	tradition	
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associated	with	it,	to	be	the	only	tradition	not	to	be	historically	founded,	like	
Christianity,	Islam,	Buddhism	etc.,	one	could	just	as	easily	conclude	that	for	
Vivekananda	only	the	Vedanta,	with	its	presumably	ahistorical	roots,	could	reflect	the	
essence	of	the	divine.	In	fact,	these	sentiments	are	amply	demonstrated	in	his	words:	
This	is	a	peculiarity	which	we	have	to	understand	–	that	our	religion	preaches	an	
Impersonal	Personal	God.	It	preaches	any	amount	of	impersonal	laws	plus	any	
amount	of	personality,	but	the	very	fountain-head	of	our	religion	is	in	the	
Shrutis,	the	Vedas,	which	are	perfectly	impersonal;	the	persons	all	come	in	the	
Smritis	and	Puranas	–	the	great	Avataras,	Incarnations	of	God,	Prophets,	and	so	
forth.	And	this	ought	also	to	be	observed	that	except	our	religion,	every	other	
religion	in	the	world	depends	upon	the	life	or	lives	of	some	personal	founder	or	
founders.	Christianity	is	built	upon	the	life	of	Jesus	Christ,	Mohammedanism	
upon	Mohammed,	Buddhism	upon	Buddha,	Jainism	upon	the	Jinas,	and	so	on.	It	
naturally	follows	that	there	must	be	in	all	these	religions	a	good	deal	of	fight	
about	what	they	call	the	historical	evidences	of	these	great	personalities.	If	at	any	
time	the	historical	evidences	of	these	personages	in	ancient	times	become	weak,	
the	whole	building	of	the	religion	tumbles	down	and	is	broken	to	pieces.	We	
escaped	this	fate	because	our	religion	is	not	based	upon	persons	but	on	
principles	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.249).	
	
Similarly:	
Today	I	stand	here	and	say,	with	the	conviction	of	truth,	that	it	is	so.	If	there	is	
any	land	on	this	earth	that	can	lay	claim	to	be	the	blessed	Punya	Bhumi,	to	be	the	
land	to	which	all	souls	on	this	earth	must	come	to	account	for	Karma,	the	land	to	
which	every	soul	that	is	vending	its	way	Godward	must	come	to	attain	its	last	
home,	the	land	where	humanity	has	attained	its	highest	towards	gentleness,	
towards	generosity,	towards	purity,	towards	calmness,	above	all,	the	land	of	
introspection	and	of	spirituality	–	it	is	India	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.105).	
	
And	finally:	
You	have	also	heard,	quite	within	recent	times,	the	claims	put	forward	by	Dr.	
Barrows,	a	great	friend	of	mine,	that	Christianity	is	the	only	universal	religion.	
Let	me	consider	this	question	a	while	and	lay	before	you	my	reasons	why	I	think	
that	it	is	Vedanta,	and	Vedanta	alone	that	can	become	the	universal	religion	of	
man,	and	that	no	other	is	fitted	for	the	role	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.182).	
	
	 Of	course,	one	could	make	a	legitimate	argument,	as	has	been	done	repeatedly	in	
previous	chapters,	that	terms	like	‘inclusive’,	‘exclusive’	and	‘pluralist’	are	Western,	
Christocentric	terms	that	are	being	applied	to	Vivekananda.	Sumit	Sarkar	seems	to	
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anticipate	this	allegation	by	articulating	how	Vivekananda’s	methods	can	be	interpreted	
using	the	Hindu	concept	of	adhikari-bheda	which	Sarkar	describes	in	some	detail:	
immense	catholicity,	going	along	with	firmly	conservative	maintenance	of	rules	
appropriate	for	each	level,	jati,	or	sampraday	(community),	which	are	all	
conceived	as	having	a	place	in	a	multiplicity	of	orthopraxies.	Adhikari-bheda	had	
emerged	as	a	formal	doctrine	in	the	seventeenth-eighteenth	century	as	a	high-
Brahmanical	way	of	accommodating	difference	in	philosophy,	belief	and	ritual.	A	
particular	application	of	it	was	the	concept	of	smarta	panchopasana	–	the	equal	
validity	and	orthodoxy	of	devotion	to	Ganapati,	Vishnu,	Siva,	Shakti,	and	Surya.	
The	roots,	perhaps	go	much	further	back,	to	the	notion,	basic	to	Hindu	concepts	
of	hierarchy	and	caste,	of	each	human	group	having	its	svadharma	(one’s	own	
religious	path)	(2014,	p.188).	
	
However,	like	most	terms	of	this	kind,	Sarkar	is	quick	to	highlight	that	there	are	
different	interpretations	of	this	concept	that	are	relevant:	
Adhikari-bheda	is	open	to	somewhat	different	implications,	depending	on	
whether	looked	upon	‘from	below’	or	‘from	above’.	Adhikari-bheda	catholicity	
has	allowed	the	formation	and	survival	of	a	multitude	of	practices	and	beliefs,	
numerous	sampradayas	with	a	fluidity	and	openness	in	their	initial	phases	which	
makes	even	classification	as	Hindu	or	Muslim	not	always	easy	(2014,	p.188).	
	
Unfortunately,	sometimes	this	ideology	can	also	be	interpreted	in	a	less	than	exemplary	
manner:	
Catholicity,	grounded	in	adhikari-bheda,	can	also	have	an	opposite	thrust.	In	
official,	high-caste	doctrine,	adhikari-bheda	often	becomes	synonymous	with,	not	
fluidity	or	openness,	but	neat	compartmentalization,	the	drawing-up	of	more	
definite	boundaries,	and	the	arrangement	of	the	various	philosophies,	rituals,	
beliefs	and	sampradayas	in	a	fixed	hierarchy	culminating	in	high-Brahman	
practices	and	Advaita	Vedantist	philosophy	(Sarkar,	2014,	p.189,	emphasis	
added).	
	
What	Sarkar	does	here	is	to	describe	a	classification	structure	which	can	be	compared	
to	the	‘exclusive,	inclusive,	pluralist’	system	used	by	contemporary	scholars	using	
Western	terminology.	Not	surprisingly,	both	these	methods	of	classification	arrive	at	a	
similar	verdict:	
In	Vivekananda,	we	shall	see,	the	transition	would	be	completed,	with	Vedanta	
jnana	firmly	placed	at	the	apex	of	a	single,	well-defined	hierarchy.	This	was	
accompanied	by	a	much	sharper	definition	of	dividing	lines	between	Hindu	and	
other	religious	traditions	(Sarkar,	2014,	p.190).	
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It	is	imperative	that	we	note	here	that	Vivekananda	was	not	only	relegating	other	
historical	traditions	to	a	lower	rung,	but	also	the	other	Hindu	traditions	that	are	
associated	with	the	srutis	and	the	many	incarnations	of	the	divine.	However,	he	takes	
pains	to	create	a	distinction	between	bhakti	in	its	highest	form,	where	it	is	pure	love	for	
the	divine,	versus	bhakti	in	its	orthopraxis	form,	which	involves	symbols	and	images	
and	rituals.	The	difference	seems	subtle	but	in	reality,	it	is	not.	The	bhakti	that	
Vivekananda	accepts	as	a	good	and	equally	valid	path	to	the	divine	is	complete	and	utter	
surrender:		
He	alone	has	attained	the	supreme	state	of	love	commonly	called	the	
brotherhood	of	man;	the	rest	only	talk.	He	sees	no	distinctions;	the	mighty	ocean	
of	love	has	entered	into	him,	and	he	sees	not	man	in	man,	but	beholds	his	
Beloved	everywhere.	Through	every	face	shines	to	him	his	Hari.	The	light	in	the	
sun	or	the	moon	is	all	His	manifestation.	Wherever	there	is	beauty	or	sublimity,	
to	him	it	is	all	His…	Such	men	alone	have	the	right	to	talk	of	universal	
brotherhood	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	p.76).	
	
Anything	less	than	that	was	just	not	good	enough;	“Temples	or	churches,	books	or	
forms,	are	simply	the	kindergarten	of	religion,	to	make	the	spiritual	child	strong	enough	
to	take	higher	steps”	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.2,	p.43,	emphasis	added).	Basically,	
Vivekananda	is	relegating	all	the	Hindus	who	are	orthopraxic	to	a	lower	realm,	
indicating	that	they	have	not	yet	realized	that	they	need	to	give	up	all	their	rituals	and	
images.	What	Vivekananda	does	with	these	arguments	of	his,	which	are	extremely	
skilful,	is	accept	that	bhakti,	a	la	Ramakrishna,	is	an	exalted	path	but	at	the	same	time	
argue	that	the	bhakti	that	millions	of	Hindus	practice,	which	are	wrapped	up	in	bells	and	
rituals	and	lentils,	are	a	lesser	way.	Vivekananda	is	not	the	first	Indian	to	make	such	
proclamations.	After	all	this	is	the	Advaitin	path.	However,	what	makes	his	declarations	
problematic	is	that	his	conceptualization	of	Hindu	traditions	has	become	so	widespread	
that	they	have	influenced,	and	continue	to	influence,	the	Hindu	psyche.	Indeed,	a	great	
number	of	Hindus	actually	ascribe	to	this	hierarchy.	Perhaps	a	personal	anecdote	will	
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help	clarify	my	point	here.	I	still	remember	when,	a	few	years	ago,	I	was	asked	by	a	
student	if	I	believed	in	a	Saguna	Brahman	or	a	Nirguna	Brahman.	I	responded	that	I	was	
a	devotee	of	Krishna	and	as	such	ascribed	to	a	Saguna	Brahman.	However,	even	before	I	
realized	what	I	was	saying,	I	continued	by	acknowledging	that	acceptance	of	a	Nirguna	
Brahman	was	a	higher	ideal	and	one	that	I	was	working	my	way	towards.	With	a	start,	I	
acknowledged	that	I	had	internalized	the	emphasis	on	the	superiority	of	Advaita	
Vedanta,	I	had	internalized	this	hierarchy.		
Of	course,	Vivekananda	does	not	limit	this	hierarchy	to	Hindu	traditions.	He	goes	
on,	as	we	have	already	seen	in	some	of	the	quotes	cited	above,	as	well	as	in	the	chapter	
based	on	his	speeches	at	the	Parliament,	to	argue	that	Vedanta	was	the	highest	path,	
superseding	all	other	traditions.	Most	of	his	comments	are	shrouded	in	the	cloak	of	
inclusivity,	which,	as	we	have	already	seen,	is	a	problematic	stance	when	speaking	of	
other	traditions.	One	of	the	tactics	that	Vivekananda	used	to	include	other	traditions	
under	the	Hindu	umbrella	was	a	call	for	a	‘universal	religion’.	He	used	a	multi-pronged	
approach	to	accomplish	this.	On	the	one	hand,	he	praised	certain	aspects	of	other	
traditions	and	claimed	that	these	traits	deserved	to	be	emulated.	On	the	other	hand,	he	
criticized	them	saying	that	they	had	flaws	that	could	only	be	overcome	by	adopting	
Advaita	principles.	The	ultimate	goal,	according	to	Vivekananda,	was	to	identify	a	
‘universal	religion’	that	would	be	suitable	for	all	humanity.		
Needless	to	say,	the	search	for	universals	is	an	ancient	one.	According	to	
McEvilley:	
The	first	philosophical	question,	“The	Problem	of	the	One	and	the	Many,”	
expresses	the	same	ordering	impulse	that	fueled	the	obsession	with	astronomy	
and	geometry	–	the	desire	to	find	unifying	principles	behind	apparent	diversity.	
It	is	also	an	attempt	to	justify	the	claims	for	certainty	of	knowledge	that	the	
mathematically	based	sciences	inspired.	If	things	are	different	and	separate,	then	
the	universe	at	large	is	unknowable	since	only	specific	things	may	be	“known,”	
one	at	a	time.	The	preoccupation	with	The	Problem	of	the	One	and	the	Many	
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expressed	a	desire	to	know	the	universe	in	some	larger	sense	than	that,	by	
finding	principles	which	would	render	every	situation	knowable	with	or	without	
direct	experience	of	it.	Superficial	diversity	was	to	be	tamed	and	made	knowable	
by	apprehension	of	underlying	unity	(2002,	p.24).	
	
Indeed,	McEvilley	quotes	Aristotle	who	argues	that	Plato’s	Theory	of	Forms	is	based	on	
the	expressed	need	to	find	such	unifying	symbols:	
“Essential	reality	[for	Plato]	is	the	One,”	says	Aristotle;	“the	Forms	are	the	
essential	cause	of	all	other	things,	and	the	One	is	the	essential	cause	of	the	
Forms”	(as	cited	in	McEvilley,	2002,	p.157).	
	
Accordingly,	Vivekananda	was	just	another	voice	trying	to	find	a	way	to	make	his	
ideology	applicable	to	the	world	at	large.	Ironically,	his	arguments	for	describing	his	
idea	of	a	‘universal	religion’	are	rather	fragmented,	a	point	that	Arvind	Sharma	
articulates	in	The	Concepts	of	Universal	Religion	in	Modern	Hindu	Thought	(1998):	
Vivekananda’s	concept	of	universal	religion	is	characterized	by	a	certain	
measure	of	fluidity.	Sometimes	he	uses	the	term	universal	religion	to	emphasize	
the	multiplicity	of	religions;	sometimes	the	eternality	of	religion;	sometimes	the	
complementarity	of	religions;	at	other	times,	the	humanity	of	religions;	yet	again,	
the	harmony	of	religions;	and	yet	again,	the	unity	of	religions.	Sometimes	he	even	
discusses	the	possibility	of	Vedanta	as	a	universal	religion.	Even	this	description	
does	not	exhaust	the	ways	in	which	Vivekananda	works	with	the	concept	of	
universal	religion,	for	sometimes	he	proceeds	to	identify	it	with	his	own	version	
of	an	ideal	religion	as	well	(1998,	p.54).	
	
What	Sharma	is	referring	to,	when	he	tentatively	states	that	“sometimes	he	even	
discusses	the	possibility	of	Vedanta	as	a	universal	religion”	is	a	lecture	that	Vivekananda	
gave	titled	“Is	Vedanta	the	Future	Religion?”	Here,	Vivekananda	seems	to	be	resigned	to	
the	idea	that	his	vision	of	Advaita	becoming	the	‘universal	religion’	was	a	dream	that	
might	never	be	fulfilled:	
Unless	society	changes,	how	can	such	a	religion	as	Vedanta	prevail?	It	will	take	
thousands	of	years	to	have	large	numbers	of	truly	rational	human	beings.	It	is	
very	hard.	It	is	very	hard	to	show	men	new	things,	to	give	them	great	ideas.	It	is	
harder	still	to	knock	off	old	superstitions,	very	hard;	they	do	not	die	easily	
(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.8,	p.136).	
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What	also	becomes	abundantly	clear,	when	one	reads	the	many	ways	that	Vivekananda	
speaks	of	‘universal	religion’,	is	that	he	was	a	man	on	a	mission.	A	mission	he	doubted	
he	would	be	able	to	succeed	in,	but	one	which	he	was,	nevertheless,	going	to	attempt	no	
matter	the	consequences.	Accordingly,	even	though	he	repeatedly	claimed	that	he	was	
not	trying	to	create	a	hierarchy,	he	continually	elevated	Vedanta	by	advocating	that	it	
was	the	most	viable	option	for	a	‘universal	religion’.	It	must	be	noted	however,	that	
Sharma	disagrees	since	he	argues	that	as	far	as	Vivekananda	is	concerned:		
Vedanta	may	be	the	eternal	religion	but	it	was	unlikely,	that,	in	the	near	future,	it	
was	going	to	be	the	manifest	universal	religion.	It	remained	potentially	and	
ideally	universal	in	the	sense	that	it	upheld	the	unity	of	all	existence,	but	whether	
such	unity	would	ever	be	realized	in	practice	defies	prediction	(1998,	p.64,	
emphasis	in	original).	
	
Thus,	Sharma	concludes,	“the	teachings	of	his	[Ramakrishna’s]	disciple	Vivekananda	
could	be	reduced	to	the	motto:	‘Advaitic	preferences	but	no	exclusion’	(1998,	p.72).	
Similarly,	Basu	also	argues	against	Vivekananda’s	intent	to	create	a	hierarchy:	
Vivekananda	tries	various	principles,	religious,	social,	and	spiritual,	for	the	
construction	of	the	Hindu	identity.	What	is	implicit	in	the	argument	is	that	
differences	will	continue	to	exist	but	hierarchies	must	be	abolished	(2002,	p.79).	
	
However,	in	my	opinion,	even	though	Vivekananda	does	say	that	other	religious	
traditions	must	be	allowed,	nay	encouraged,	to	coexist	side	by	side,	his	underlying	
message	is	that	they	need	to	exist	because	humanity	is	not	yet	capable	of	overcoming	
such	differences.	Only	Advaitins,	like	himself,	can	see	the	unity	of	creation.	And,	as	such,	
a	hierarchy	is	created.	Even	though	it	is	evident	that	this	attitude	of	his	seems	to	coexist	
uncomfortably	with	his	alter	ego	that	celebrates	other	traditions.		
For	example,	Vivekananda	gave	a	talk	at	the	Parliament	on	Buddhism	even	
though	he	had	befriended	Anagarika	Dharmapala	who	was	the	representative	for	
Buddhism	in	Chicago.	As	such,	one	could	argue,	that	there	was	no	reason	for	
Vivekananda	to	give	a	speech	on	Buddhist	traditions.	Nevertheless,	not	only	did	he	
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choose	to	give	a	lecture	on	the	Buddha	and	his	teachings	at	the	Parliament	but	he	also	
went	on	to	speak	about	Buddhism	on	multiple	occasions	while	he	was	overseas.	What	is	
even	more	problematic	is	that	on	the	one	hand,	Vivekananda	appropriated	Buddhist	
ideas	and	incorporates	them	into	Vedantic	ideology.	On	the	other	hand,	he	also	went	on	
to	criticize	the	contemporary	followers	of	Buddhism	by	claiming	that	they	did	not	
understand	the	teachings	of	their	founder.90	Considering	that	Buddhism	survived,	and	
indeed	dominated,	the	Indian	religious	landscape	for	close	to	a	thousand	years,	this	
flippant	disregard	for	its	Indian	history	could	be	interpreted	as	the	language	used	by	
victors	when	speaking	of	the	people	they	have	vanquished.	Thus,	according	to	
Vivekananda:	
In	spite	of	its	wonderful	moral	strength,	Buddhism	was	extremely	iconoclastic;	
and	much	of	its	force	being	spent	in	merely	negative	attempts,	it	had	to	die	out	in	
the	land	of	its	birth,	and	what	remained	of	it	became	full	of	superstitions	and	
ceremonials,	a	hundred	times	cruder	than	those	it	was	intended	to	suppress.	
Although	it	partially	succeeded	in	putting	down	the	animal	sacrifices	of	the	
Vedas,	it	filled	the	land	with	temples,	images,	symbols	and	bones	of	saints	
(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.4,	p.326).	
	
Eventually	he	surmises:	
extreme	adaptability	in	the	long	run	made	Indian	Buddhism	lose	almost	all	its	
individuality,	and	extreme	desire	to	be	of	the	people	made	it	unfit	to	cope	with	
the	intellectual	forces	of	the	mother	religion	in	a	few	centuries.	The	Vedic	party	
in	the	meanwhile	got	rid	of	a	good	deal	of	its	most	objectionable	features,	as	
animal	sacrifice,	and	took	lessons	from	the	rival	daughter	in	the	judicious	use	of	
images,	temple	processions	and	other	impressive	performances,	and	stood	ready	
to	take	within	her	fold	the	whole	empire	of	Indian	Buddhism,	already	tottering	to	
its	fall	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.6,	pp.162-163).	
	
It	is	obvious	that	for	Vivekananda,	Buddhist	traditions,	more	than	Jain	or	Sikh	traditions	
were	a	threat	to	his	argument	for	the	ancient	and	authentic	brahmanic	roots	of	Vedanta.	
																																																								
90	For	a	detailed	study	on	Vivekananda’s	engagement	with	Buddhism,	see	Sharma	
(2014)	and	(Brekke,	2002).	
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He	knew	that	these	traditions	had	a	shared	history	of	ideas	and	wanted	to	ascertain	that	
there	was	no	ambiguity	as	to	where	the	credit	for	Vedantist	ideals	must	lie:	
Our	ancient	philosophers	knew	what	you	call	the	theory	of	evolution;	that	
growth	is	gradual,	step	by	step,	and	the	recognition	of	this	led	them	to	harmonise	
all	the	preceding	systems.	Thus	not	one	of	these	preceding	ideas	was	rejected.	
The	fault	of	the	Buddhistic	faith	was	that	it	had	neither	the	faculty	nor	the	
perception	of	this	continual	expansive	growth,	and	for	this	reason	it	never	even	
made	an	attempt	to	harmonise	itself	with	the	preexisting	steps	toward	the	ideal.	
They	were	rejected	as	useless	and	harmful	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.2,	pp.346-
347).	
	
Finally,	he	declares,	“[p]resent-day	Hinduism	and	Buddhism	were	growths	from	the	
same	branch.	Buddhism	degenerated	and	Shankara	lopped	it	off!”	(Vivekananda,	2009,	
vol.6,	p.120)	
As	if	to	add	insult	to	injury	Vivekananda	also	contends;	“My	religion	is	one	of	
which	Christianity	is	an	offshoot	and	Buddhism	a	rebel	child”	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.6,	
p.105).	We	can	surmise,	from	this	quote,	that	Vivekananda	takes	a	similar	approach	
when	speaking	of	Christianity.	As	we	saw	in	his	speeches	at	the	Parliament,	he	believed	
that	India	was	the	land	of	spirituality	and	‘Hinduism’	was	the	mother	of	all	traditions.	
Obviously,	Christianity	was	not	exempt	from	this	appraisal	and	Vivekananda	argued,	in	
no	uncertain	terms,	that	Christianity	with	its	foundation	built	upon	a	historical	figure,	
could	not	be	considered	a	legitimate	candidate	for	a	‘universal	religion’:	
Excepting	our	own	almost	all	the	other	great	religions	in	the	world	are	inevitably	
connected	with	the	life	or	lives	of	one	or	more	founders.	All	their	theories,	their	
teachings,	their	doctrines,	and	their	ethics	are	built	around	the	life	of	a	personal	
founder,	from	whom	they	get	their	sanction,	their	authority	and	their	power;	and	
strangely	enough,	upon	the	historicity	of	the	founder’s	life	is	built,	as	it	were,	all	
the	fabric	of	such	religions.	If	there	is	one	blow	dealt	to	the	historicity	of	that	life,	
as	has	been	the	case	in	modern	times	with	the	lives	of	almost	all	the	so-called	
founders	of	religion	–	we	know	that	half	of	the	details	of	such	lives	is	not	now	
seriously	believed	in,	and	that	the	other	half	is	seriously	doubted	–	if	this	
becomes	the	case,	if	that	rock	of	historicity,	as	they	pretend	to	call	it,	is	shaken	
and	shattered,	the	whole	building	tumbles	down,	broken	absolutely,	never	to	
regain	its	lost	status	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	pp.182-183).	
	
Similarly:	
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No	religion	built	upon	a	person	can	be	taken	up	as	a	type	by	all	the	races	of	
mankind…	How	is	it	possible	that	one	person	as	Mohammed	or	Buddha	or	Christ,	
can	be	taken	up	as	the	one	type	for	the	whole	world,	nay,	that	the	whole	of	
morality,	ethics,	spirituality,	and	religion	can	be	true	only	from	the	sanction	of	
that	one	person,	and	one	person	alone?	Now	the	Vedantic	religion	does	not	
require	any	such	personal	authority	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.3,	pp.250-251).	
	
What	is	fascinating	is	that	this	did	not	stop	him	from	completely	appropriating	aspects	
of	Christianity	that	he	found	appealing.	For	example,	Sister	Nivedita	recounts:	
One	gathers	that	during	his	travels	in	Catholic	Europe,	he	had	been	startled,	like	
others	before	him,	to	find	the	identity	of	Christianity	with	Hinduism	in	a	
thousand	points	of	familiar	detail.	The	Blessed	Sacrament	appeared	to	him	to	be	
only	an	elaboration	of	the	Vedic	prasadam.	The	priestly	tonsure	reminded	him	of	
the	shaven	head	of	the	Indian	monk;	and	when	he	came	across	a	picture	of	
Justinian	receiving	the	Law	from	two	shaven	monks,	he	felt	that	he	had	found	the	
origin	of	the	tonsure.	He	could	not	but	remember	that	even	before	Buddhism,	
India	had	had	monks	and	nuns,	and	that	Europe	had	taken	her	orders	from	
Thebaid.	Hindu	ritual	had	its	lights,	its	incense	and	its	music.	Even	the	sign	of	the	
cross,	as	he	saw	it	practiced,	reminded	him	of	the	touching	of	different	parts	of	
the	body,	in	certain	kinds	of	meditation.	And	the	culmination	of	this	series	of	
observations	was	reached,	when	he	entered	some	cathedral,	and	found	it	
furnished	with	an	insufficient	number	of	chairs,	and	no	pews!	Then,	at	last,	he	
was	really	at	home.	Henceforth	he	could	not	believe	that	Christianity	was	foreign	
(Nivedita,	1993,	pp.229-230).	
	
Vivekananda	oscillates	between	admiration	for	Christianity	and	his	denigration	of	its	
beliefs	throughout	his	adult	life.	However,	even	though	he	spoke	out	against	most	
religious	traditions	in	his	inimical	‘inclusive’	way,	Christianity	was	the	tradition	with	
which	he	seemed	to	suffer	the	most	angst.	No	doubt,	this	was	because	he	was	a	product	
of	colonization	and,	as	such,	had	felt	the	reverberations	of	this	‘continental	collision’	
most	closely.	Accordingly,	we	find	that	he	fights	an	intense	battle	with	Christianity,	a	
battle	which	interestingly,	takes	precedence	over	the	arguments	he	made	against	Islam.	
Nandy	makes	some	valuable	observations	regarding	this	precedence	which,	he	believes,	
Christianity	took	in	Vivekananda’s	arguments.	In	his	essay,	“Vivekananda	and	
Secularism”	(2014)	Nandy	contends:	
By	the	time	Vivekananda	entered	the	scene,	the	West	had	made	deeper	inroads	
into	the	minds	of	Indians.	To	him,	therefore,	the	real	threat	was	the	West	within,	
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particularly	the	attractiveness	of	Christianity	and	Brahmoism	to	the	young	
babus,	rather	than	the	colonial	system.	Vivekananda	in	this	sense	was	dealing	
with	more	divided	men	and	was	perhaps	himself	a	more	divided	man	(2014,	
p.292).	
	
Nandy	reiterates	that	Vivekananda	could	never	commit	fully	to	the	idea	that	he	was	
playing	a	political	role	when	he	was	finding	ways	to	unite	Indians.	Instead,	Vivekananda	
insisted	that	his	role	was	limited	to	the	spiritual	arena	which,	in	turn,	resulted	in	his	
ignoring	the	importance	of	identifying	Islam,	not	Christianity,	as	the	tradition	with	
which	his	Hindu	brethren	most	needed	to	find	common	ground:		
Perhaps	because	of	the	career	he	chose	for	himself,	Vivekananda	always	
remained	associated	with	the	earlier	religion-as-key-sector	model.	Nowhere	is	
this	more	obvious	than	in	the	low	emphasis	which	he	placed	on	Hindu-Muslim	
relations	as	a	crucial	problem	of	Indian	secularism.	Because	he	was,	
paradoxically,	a	highly	political	animal	and	deeply	sensitive	to	the	colonial	
situation,	the	basic	inter-religious	relationship	to	him	was	always	that	between	
Hinduism	and	Christianity.	(Brahmoism,	his	other	bête	noire,	was	to	him	virtually	
an	offshoot	of	Christianity.)	That	is	why	he	spent	most	of	his	time	demonstrating	
the	supremacy	of	Vedanta	over	the	Judeo-Christian	system,	not	over	Islam	
(Nandy,	2014,	p.292).	
	
This	does	not	imply	that	Vivekananda	had	nothing	to	say	about	Islam,	he	most	
certainly	did;	he	just	wasn’t	as	vociferous	in	his	criticism	of	them.	As	we	have	already	
observed,	he	included	Islam	to	the	category	of	historical	traditions	which,	as	far	as	
Vivekananda	was	concerned,	were	built	on	shaky	foundations	and	could	be	undermined	
at	any	time.	Unfortunately	however,	he	did	not	stop	there	with	his	negative	remarks:	
The	Mohammedan	religion	allows	Mohammedans	to	kill	all	who	are	not	of	their	
religion.	It	is	clearly	stated	in	the	Koran,	“Kill	the	infidels	if	they	do	not	become	
Mohammedans.”	They	must	be	put	to	fire	and	sword	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.2,	
p.335).	
	
On	the	other	hand,	he	also	believed	that	the	brotherhood	that	Islam	advocated	was	one	
that	Hindus	needed	to	aspire	towards:	
For	our	own	motherland	a	junction	of	the	two	great	systems,	Hinduism	and	Islam	
–	Vedanta	brain	and	Islam	body	–	is	the	only	hope	
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I	see	in	my	mind’s	eye	the	future	perfect	India	rising	out	of	this	chaos	and	strife,	
glorious	and	invincible,	with	Vedanta	brain	and	Islam	body	(Vivekananda,	2009,	
vol.6,	p.416).	
	
What	should	be	apparent	by	this	point	in	our	discussion	is	that	Vivekananda	was	
intent	on	creating	a	‘universal	religion’	in	India.	A	‘universal	religion’	which	may	have	
included	all	other	traditions,	but	at	a	heavy	price.	No	doubt,	he	believed	he	was	being	
both	tolerant	and	all-embracing	but	oftentimes	his	language	belies	his	intended	
message.	This	is	evident	in	the	many	ways	he	argued	for	the	continued	existence	of	
alternate	traditions;	an	existence	that	was	not	to	be	confused	with	complete	parity.	At	
times	one	actually	believes	that	he	was	committed	to	being	unbiased	and	respectful.	At	
others,	there	is	no	way	to	find	a	positive	way	to	interpret	his	message.	Indeed,	there	are	
too	many	instances	where	his	words	are	filled	with	intolerant	subtext.	Consequently,	
Nandy	surmises	that	there	exists	a	‘crucial	dichotomy’	in	the	messages	of	Vivekananda	
and	the	mission	he	founded:		
They	granted	the	equality	of	all	religions,	but	in	a	special	sense.	They	conceived	
Hinduism	as	consisting	of	two	subsystems:	the	Hindu	dharma	as	a	system	of	
action	and	the	Vedantic	metaphysics	as	a	system	of	thought.	They	were	quite	
willing	to	equate	Hindu	dharma	with	other	dharmas.	After	all,	all	paths	led	to	God	
and	if	somebody	chose	a	long-winded	or	inferior	path	that	was	his	business.	But	
the	Hindu	metaphysical	system,	which	was	considered	to	be	above	and	beyond	
Hindu	dharma	and	a	summation	of	the	principles	of	universal	laws	and	
godliness,	was	considered	to	be	superior	to	all	others.	In	other	words,	they	
introduced	the	concept	of	hierarchy	into	Hindu	metaphysics	and	the	concept	of	
equity	into	Hindu	institutions.	As	a	technique	of	change,	this	had	its	handicaps	in	
a	system	which	thrived	on	ideological	flexibility	and	institutional	rigidity.	
Besides,	in	this	formulation,	the	very	tolerance	of	Hinduism	became	proof	of	its	
metaphysical	superiority.	As	a	corollary,	the	non-Hindu’s	fear	of	being	engulfed	
or	of	being	fitted	into	the	Hindu	hierarchy	became	an	indicator	of	his	
metaphysical	poverty	(2014,	p.293).	
	
So	how	do	the	RSS	and	the	Sangh	Parivar	use	these	ideas	to	further	their	cause?	
Nowhere	is	their	emphasis	on	these	issues	more	apparent	than	in	their	war	on	
textbooks	and	scholars	who	have	alternate,	opposing	opinions.	This	is	where	we	must	
turn	our	attention	next.	
	 251	
The	War	of	the	Textbooks	
	 One	of	the	most	acrimonious	battles	that	the	RSS	has	fought,	and	continues	to	
fight,	over	the	last	few	decades	has	had	to	do	with	textbooks,	and	in	particular	history	
textbooks,	that	are	used	in	primary	and	secondary	education	across	the	Indian	
subcontinent.	In	the	1970’s,	when	Morarji	Desai,	of	the	Janata	Party,	became	the	Prime	
Minister	of	India	he	got	embroiled	in	the	‘Textbook	controversy’.	Desai	had	risen	to	
power	with	the	help	of	a	coalition	government	which	included	the	Bharatiya	Jana	
Sangha	(precursor	to	the	BJP).	As	such,	he	could	not	afford	to	ignore	this	issue	which	
was	evidently	crucial	to	the	RSS	who	had	already	begun	making	inroads	into	the	
educational	system	of	rural	India:	
Morarji	Desaii	revealed	the	intensity	of	his	Hindu	traditionalist	outlook	in	the	
‘Textbook	Controversy’.	In	May	1977,	he	received	an	anonymous	memorandum	
demanding	the	withdrawal	from	public	circulation	of	four	history	books,	of	
which	three	were	intended	for	use	in	teaching.	The	books	in	question	were	
Medieval	India,	by	Romila	Thapar,	Modern	India,	by	Bipan	Chandra,	Freedom	
Struggle,	by	A.	Tripathi,	Barun	De	and	Bipan	Chandra,	and	Communalism	and	the	
Writing	of	Indian	History,	by	Romila	Thapar,	Harbans	Mukhia	and	Bipan	Chandra.	
The	memorandum	criticised	the	works	above	all	for	not	condemning	forcefully	
enough	certain	Muslim	invaders	in	the	Medieval	period	and	because	they	
emphasized	the	responsibility	of	leaders	like	Tilak	and	Aurobindo	for	
antagonism	between	the	Hindus	and	Muslims.	The	RSS	campaigned	separately	
for	the	withdrawal	of	these	textbooks	(Jaffrelot,	1996,	pp.287-288).	
	
Furthermore,	this	government	was	encouraged,	and	eventually	obliged,	by	their	
coalition,	to	lend	their	support	to	an	alternate	organization,	the	Bharatiya	Vidya	Bhavan,	
“which	had	published	a	History	and	Culture	of	the	Indian	People	under	the	direction	of	
R.C.	Majumdar,	the	veteran	of	Indian	nationalist	historiography	whose	pro-Hindu	bias	
was	allegedly	becoming	more	pronounced”	(Jaffrelot,	1996,	p.	288).	However,	the	Janata	
Party	did	not	stay	in	power	long	enough	to	effect	any	permanent	change	to	the	
educational	system	at	a	federal	level.	On	the	other	hand,	the	RSS	took	education	very	
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seriously,	much	like	Vivekananda,	and	started	a	grassroots	program	which	enabled	
them	to	spread	their	brand	of	Hindu	nationalism:	
The	expansion	of	the	RSS	educational	sector	was	also	a	shrewd	move	given	the	
growing	demand	for	education	and	the	reluctance	of	some	citizens	to	rely	on	the	
ill-managed	and	underfunded	public	system.	Vidya	Bharti	(‘Indian	knowledge’),	
the	RSS	affiliate	and	umbrella	body	which	runs	the	Saraswati	Shishu	Mandirs,	
was	responsible	for	managing	700	such	schools	in	1977,	the	year	of	its	
foundation.	By	the	early	1990’s	the	organisation	had	5,000	schools	(1,325	of	
which	were	in	Uttar	Pradesh	and	about	1,000	in	Madhya	Pradesh)	with	1.2	
million	pupils	enrolled	and	40,000	teachers	employed.	Shishu	Mandirs	are	
increasingly	running	classes	aimed	at	the	poor	(Jaffrelot,	1996,	p.531).	
	
Consequently,	it	is	not	surprising	that	when	the	BJP	came	to	power	in	1998,	education	
was	one	of	the	areas	where	they	focused	their	attention.	Accordingly,	Sylvie	Guichard	
states	in	The	Construction	of	History	and	Nationalism	in	India:	Textbooks,	controversies	
and	politics	(2010):	
Shortly	after	it	formed	the	government	coalition	in	1998,	the	Hindu	nationalist	
BJP	announced	that	education	should	be	‘Indianised,	nationalized	and	
spiritualised’.	New	subjects	were	introduced	at	the	university	level	such	as	
astrology	and	Vedic	mathematics	and	the	entire	school	curriculum	was	
overhauled.	Immediately,	journalists,	researchers	and	members	of	non-
governmental	organizations	(NGOs)	severely	criticized	these	reforms	and	
accused	the	BJP	of	attempting	to	‘saffronize’	education.	After	the	change	in	
curriculum,	the	National	Council	of	Educational	Research	and	Training	(NCERT),	
which	is	the	federal	institution	in	charge	of	elaborating	curricula,	syllabi	and	
textbooks,	prepared	new	textbooks	for	primary	and	secondary	classes.	Public	
criticism	of	the	new	curriculum	focused	in	particular	on	the	history	textbooks,	
pointing	at	the	ideological	bias	they	contained.	The	main	accusations	concerned	
historical	distortions	by	way	of	purposeful	omission	of	important	and	
meaningful	historical	events	from	the	textbooks,	the	stigmatization	of	the	
Muslims	as	the	main	cause	of	India’s	misfortunes	and	the	general	glorification	of	
everything	related	to	Hinduism	(Guichard,	2010,	pp.1-2).	
	
What	ensued	was	a	battle	that	is	still	ongoing	between	the	RSS	and	the	so-called	liberals	
who	disagree	with	them.		
One	of	the	major	issues	that	the	Sangh	Parivar	has	against	these	textbooks,	that	
were	first	published	in	the	1960’s,	is	that	they	are	intensely	secular.	‘Secular’	is	another	
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term	that	has	multiple	connotations	and	needs	to	be	unpacked	before	we	can	proceed.	
Amartya	Sen	offers	a	clear	and	concise	definition	of	Indian	secularism:	
Secularism	in	contemporary	India,	which	received	legislative	formulation	in	the	
post-independence	constitution	of	the	Indian	Republic,	contains	strong	
influences	of	Indian	intellectual	history,	including	the	championing	of	intellectual	
pluralism.	One	reflection	of	this	historical	connection	is	that	Indian	secularism	
takes	a	somewhat	different	form	and	makes	rather	different	demands	from	the	
more	austere	Western	versions,	such	as	the	French	interpretation	of	secularism	
which	is	supposed	to	prohibit	even	personal	display	of	religious	symbols	or	
conventions	in	state	institutions	at	work.	Indeed,	there	are	two	principal	
approaches	to	secularism,	focusing	respectively	on	(1)	neutrality	between	
different	religions,	and	(2)	prohibition	of	religious	associations	in	state	activities.	
Indian	secularism	has	tended	to	emphasize	neutrality	in	particular,	rather	than	
prohibition	in	general	(2005,	pp.19-20).	
	
However,	Hindu	nationalists	have	been	accusing	the	federal	government	of	not	actually	
practicing	secularism	but	rather	charges	them	with	being	‘pseudo	secularists’.	This	
allegation	is	meant	to	highlight	how	the	government,	led	by	the	Congress	party,	made	
certain	concessions	for	minorities,	particularly	the	Muslim	community.	They	are	
referring	to	the	fact	that	Sharia	law	continues	to	be	allowed	in	the	Indian	Penal	Code	
which	delineates	laws	derived	from	the	Koran	and	the	Hadith.	Jaffrelot	points	out	that	
the	RSS	are	particularly	opposed	to	the	policies	concerning	marriage	and	divorce	which	
they	argue	should	be	universal	for	all	Indians	in	a	secular	state:	
Ironically,	Hindu	nationalists	have	always	looked	at	themselves	as	more	sincere	
secularists	than	have	Congressmen.	They	denounced	the	Congress	Party	as	
‘pseudo-secular’	because	of	its	bias	in	favour	of	religious	minorities.	As	early	as	
the	1950s	the	Sangh	Parivar	criticized	the	Hindu	Code	Bill	which	reformed	Hindu	
customs	of	marriage,	adoption	and	inheritance,	whereas	the	shariat	and	the	
personal	laws	of	other	religious	minorities	remained	untouched.	This	issue	
resurfaced	in	the	1980s	during	what	is	known	as	the	Shah	Bano	affair,	when	the	
Congress	was	accused	of	pampering	its	Muslim	vote	bank	by	reaffirming	the	
status	of	the	shariat	in	regulating	the	private	sphere	of	this	minority	(Jaffrelot,	
2007,	p.313).	
	
According	to	L.K.	Advani,	who	is	one	of	the	leading	voices	for	the	RSS,	these	
‘pseudo-secularists’	have	tried	to	suppress	the	Hindu	ethos	of	the	nation,	an	action	that	
has	negated	the	very	character	of	this	predominantly	Hindu	nation.	He	reminds	
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listeners	that	Gandhi	had	repeatedly	called	for	‘Rama	Rajya’	(a	moral	kingdom	worthy	
of	the	Hindu	god	Ram)	and,	as	such,	had	never	denied	his	Hindu	roots.	In	contrast,	he	
argues	in	the	“The	Ayodhya	Movement”:	
Unfortunately,	for	four	decades	now,	in	the	name	of	secularism,	politicians	have	
been	wanting	the	nation	to	disown	its	essential	personality.	For	the	left	inclined,	
secularism	has	become	a	euphemism	to	cloak	their	intense	allergy	to	religion,	
and	more	particularly,	to	Hinduism	(as	cited	in	Jaffrelot,	2007,	p.292).	
	
Advani’s	statements	against	the	politicians	who	he	labels	‘pseudo-secularists’	do	not	
disguise	his	primary	motives,	which	clearly	argue	for	India	to	be	unabashedly	
recognized	as	a	Hindu	nation:	
The	BJP	is	unequivocally	committed	to	secularism.	As	conceived	by	our	
Constitution	makers,	secularism	meant	sarvapantha	sama	bhava,	that	is	equal	
respect	for	all	religions.	Secularism	as	embedded	into	the	Indian	Constitution	has	
three	important	ingredients,	namely	(i)	rejection	of	theocracy;	(ii)	equality	of	all	
citizens,	irrespective	of	their	faith;	and	(iii)	full	freedom	of	faith	and	worship.	
We	also	believe	that	India	is	secular	because	it	is	predominantly	Hindu.	
Theocracy	is	alien	to	our	history	and	tradition.		
Indian	nationalism	is	rooted,	as	was	India’s	freedom	struggle	against	colonialism,	
in	a	Hindu	ethos.	It	was	Gandhiji	who	projected	Rama	Rajya	as	the	goal	of	the	
freedom	movement.	He	was	criticized	by	the	Muslim	League	as	being	an	
exponent	of	Hindu	Raj.	The	League	did	not	relish	the	chanting	of	Ram	Dhun	at	
Gandhiji’s	meetings	or	his	insistence	on	Goraksha	(cow-protection).	The	Muslim	
League	at	one	of	its	annual	sessions	passed	a	formal	resolution	denouncing	
Vande	Mataram	as	‘idolatrous’.	All	this	never	made	leaders	of	the	freedom	
struggle	apologetic	about	the	fountainhead	of	their	inspiration	(as	cited	in	
Jaffrelot,	2007,	pp.291-292).	
	
Of	course,	Advani’s	sympathies	are	no	secret	since	he	is	one	of	the	architects	of	the	
Ramjanmabhumi	movement,	which	demolished	the	Babri	Masjid	in	Ayodhya.	An	
unprecedented	act	of	violence	against	a	minority	tradition	in	recent	Indian	history.	As	
such,	his	proclamation	that	he	is	a	true	secularist	and	is	not	calling	for	a	theocracy	does	
not	ring	true.		
	 Unfortunately	however,	the	historians	who	wrote	the	first	set	of	textbooks	that	
are	being	challenged,	in	the	1960’s,	were	intent	on	building	a	nation	out	of	a	mosaic	of	
communities.	As	such,	they	may	have	been	overzealous	in	their	attempt	to	diminish	the	
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existence	of	differences,	preferring	instead	to	accentuate	the	similarities	between	these	
groups:	
writing	a	decade	after	independence	and	partition,	the	texts	were	shaped	by	the	
intellectual	climate	of	the	time.	Troubled	by	the	memories	of	communal	carnage	
and	the	traumatic	experience	of	the	partition	years	–	when	thousands	of	Hindus	
and	Muslims	killed	each	other	–	the	intellectuals	of	this	new	India	struggled	to	
create	a	secular	and	democratic	public	culture.	Inspired	by	the	ideals	of	
democratic	citizenship,	they	hoped	for	a	society	where	individuals,	emancipated	
from	their	religious	and	affective	ties,	would	be	reborn	as	secular	citizens	of	a	
democratic	state.	Historians	turned	to	the	past	to	counter	communal	
representations	of	history,	question	communal	stereotypes	and	write	a	secular	
national	history.	The	history	textbooks	written	in	the	1960’s	embodied	this	
secular	ideal	(Bhattacharya,	2009,	p.102).	
	
Romila	Thapar,	who	was	one	of	the	authors	of	these	textbooks	offers	some	insight	into	
the	thought	processes	that	went	into	writing	these	texts:	
The	history	of	‘the	nation’	also	became	a	focus.	Was	the	nation	a	creation	of	the	
colonial	experience?	Or	did	it	emerge	from	factors	related	to	modernization	such	
as	the	coming	of	industrialization	and	capitalism	as	well	as	the	need	for	a	
democratic	and	secular	society?	The	issue	was	not	just	one	of	building	a	history	
which	required	a	common	history,	memory	and	culture,	but	also	of	explaining	
the	nature	of	the	societies	and	economics	of	the	past	that	contributed	to	this	
commonness	(Thapar,	2009,	p.92).	
	
However,	other	historians	have	argued	that	this	not	only	misrepresented	the	diverse	
traditions	of	India’s	past91	but	also	gave	Hindu	nationalists	a	soapbox	from	which	to	
attack	the	federal	government’s	secular	policies:	
The	textbooks	of	the	1960s	and	the	‘70s	provoked	controversy	from	the	moment	
they	were	published.	The	Hindu	right	in	particular	was	impassioned	in	its	
attacks.	And	for	the	next	three	decades,	while	these	textbooks	remained	in	print,	
controversies	surfaced	over	and	over	again	around	a	set	of	core	issues	
(Bhattacharya,	2009,	p.102).	
	
Not	surprisingly,	most	of	these	core	issues,	which	the	Hindu	nationalists	argued	
against,	had	to	do	with	the	secular	representation	of	Indian	history	which	denied	the	
																																																								
91	For	a	detailed	survey	on	the	way	Indian	historians	continue	to	discuss	the	
complexities	and	ramifications	of	secularism	in	India	see	Nandy	(1997)	and	Nandy	
(1988)	and	Thapar	(2013).			
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notion	which	asked,	“should	the	Indian	past	be	framed	through	religious	categories?”	
(Bhattacharya,	2009,	p.102).	This	denial,	in	turn,	allowed	the	secular	historians	to	focus	
attention	on	the	social,	economic	and	aesthetic	qualities	of	different	eras	thereby	
diminishing	the	need	to	emphasize	the	negative	impact	of	the	Mughal	Raj.	Furthermore,	
this	method	of	historiography	also	undercut	the	Hindu	right’s	glorification	of	ancient	
India	which	they	attributed	to	the	mastery	of	the	Vedic	sages.	Interestingly,	Thapar	
argues	that	this	view	of	history	is	actually	a	remnant	of	colonial	interpretations	which	
the	Hindu	nationalists	have,	ironically,	adopted	as	their	own:	
Mind	you,	their	own	understanding	–	the	Hindutva	understanding	of	India	–	is	
rooted	in	colonial	theories	which	they	try	and	project	as	the	“indigenous	
understanding”	of	the	Indian	past.	Among	these	are	the	theories	that	Indian	
civilisation	originated	with	the	Vedas,	that	of	Hindus	and	Muslims	having	been	
antagonistic	towards	each	other,	and	that	Hindus	were	victimised	under	Muslim	
rule.	Given	these	beliefs,	the	observances	of	the	Vedic	Aryan	model	of	society	are	
advocated,	even	for	contemporary	times	–	or	at	least	what	they	think	was	such	a	
model.	And	revenge	must	be	sought	for	the	tyranny	of	Muslim	rule.	These	are	
ideas	that	come	from	nineteenth-century	colonial	writing	and	have	little	to	do	
with	indigenous	views	(The	Caravan,	2016).	
	
Be	that	as	it	may,	the	Sangh	Parivar	continues	to	be	deeply	invested	in	
overturning	the	way	the	Hindu	past	is	represented	in	the	textbooks	that	the	next	
generation	of	Hindus	are	reading.	In	Gujarat,	which	is	Modi’s	home	state,	students	are	
using	books	written	by	Dina	Nath	Batra	“the	founder	of	the	Shiksha	Bachao	Andolan	
Samiti	(Save	Education	Foundation)”	which	belongs	to	the	Sangh	Parivar	(Krishnan,	
2015).	Batra,	who	is	responsible	for	bringing	the	civil	suit	against	Wendy	Doniger’s	
controversial	book	The	Hindus,	begins	all	his	texts	with	“a	salutation	to	the	Hindu	
Goddess	Saraswati,	known	for	knowledge	and	wisdom	and	will	have	essays,	couplets,	
stories	and	poems	to	inculcate	Indian	values”	(Krishnan,	2015).	Indeed,	Michael	Witzel,	
along	with	a	group	of	other	consenting	authors,	who	are	responsible	for	the	recent	
pushback	in	this	textbook	controversy	argue:	
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The	curriculum	designed	by	the	NCF	[The	National	Curriculum	Framework	
established	in	1998	by	the	BJP]	in	2000	and	the	textbooks	published	a	year	later	
also	interchanged	the	roles	assigned	to	science	and	spirituality.	The	earlier	
emphasis	on	science	–	seen	as	essential	to	the	creation	of	a	rational,	modern,	and	
enlightened	society	–	was	supplanted	in	the	new	framework	by	the	idea	of	a	
unique	and	distinctive	“Indian	tradition”	based	on	formulaic	notions	of	
spirituality	and	religion	and	a	conservative	social	bias.	The	new	framework	was	
severely	criticized	for	violating	the	constitutional	commitment	to	secularism	by	
advocating	the	idea	of	religion-based	value	education	as	a	crucial	factor	in	the	
syllabi.	Value	education,	however,	was	integral	to	the	NCF’s	plan	its	main	plank	
to	launch	the	spiritual	and	moral	renewal	of	India.	It	was	only	through	learning	
of	the	“lives	of	prophets,	saints	and	the	sacred	texts”	that	children	could	achieve	
higher	SQs	(Spiritual	Quotients)	and	EQs	(Emotional	Quotients)	(Visweswaran,	
et	al.,	2009,	p.103).	
	
Unfortunately,	this	trend	continues	to	spread	under	Modi’s	government	since	in	2015:	
Culture	Minister	Mahesh	Sharma	stated	unequivocally	that	the	BJP-led	
government	will	not	be	deterred	by	criticism	that	it	was	trying	to	promote	RSS	
ideology.	His	department	is	already	chalking	out	a	roadmap	where	lessons	from	
epic	Hindu	literature	such	as	the	Mahabharata,	Ramayana	and	Bhagavad	Gita	
would	soon	be	taught	in	school	and	colleges	to	rid	the	country	of	“cultural	
pollution”	and	inculcate	“values”	among	young	minds	(Krishnan,	2015).	
	
	 Drawing	a	nexus	between	the	arguments	put	forth	by	the	Sangh	Parivar	and	the	
ideology	of	Vivekananda	is	not	very	difficult.	Vivekananda	argued	repeatedly	that	India	
was	governed	by	its	spirituality.	He	also	insisted	that	the	Vedic	past	had	scientific	
answers	that	modern	minds	have	only	recently	‘rediscovered’.	He	may	not	have	been	as	
aggressive	in	his	denunciation	of	Islam,	as	he	was	of	Buddhism	and	Christianity,	but	
Nandy	may	have	reason	when	he	argues	that	by	attacking	any	tradition	so	viciously	
Vivekananda	actually	left	the	door	open	for	others	to	do	the	same:	
It	allowed	one	to	extend	to	Islam	Vivekananda’s	attitude	to	Christianity.	If	the	
Swami	attacked	one	religion	did	he	not,	by	implication,	think	of	other	religions	in	
the	same	terms?	(2014,	p.293)	
	
What	makes	matters	worse	is	that	this	battle	over	textbooks	has	spread	to	the	diaspora	
whereby	Hindu	nationalists,	living	in	the	United	States,	have	begun	demanding	changes	
in	the	depiction	of	Indian	culture	in	the	textbooks	used	in	the	United	States.	Even	
though	they	were	not	successful	in	their	endeavours,	this	action	sheds	light	on	how	the	
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RSS	has	gained	momentum	on	the	international	scene,	whereby	they	now	have	support	
for	their	nationalistic	efforts	from	the	wealthy,	educated	Indians	living	in	the	diaspora.	
Nowhere	is	this	more	evident	than	in	the	fact	that	eminent	scholars	such	as	Wendy	
Doniger,	Sheldon	Pollock	and	Michael	Witzel,92	to	mention	just	a	few,	have	all	had	to	
defend	their	right	to	interpret	Hindu	traditions.	What	should	be	evident	is	that	the	
Sangh	Parivar,	like	Vivekananda,	are	not	comfortable	with	any	arguments	or	theories	
that	impede	their	worldview	which	clearly	places	Hindu	ideology	at	the	apex	of	all	
intellectual	endeavours,	past	and	present.		
	
Mother	India:	Chaste	but	fiery	
As	we	saw	in	the	previous	chapter,	‘masculinity’	or	a	‘manly	nation’	were	issues	
that	were	of	great	importance	to	Vivekananda.	Naturally,	this	language	leads	one	to	
question	where	he	placed	women	since	he	was	so	adamant	that	Indian	men	could	no	
longer	afford	to	be	‘effeminate’.	According	to	Basu,	Vivekananda	tried	to	distinguish	
between	‘effeminate’	(which	was	viewed	negatively)	versus	‘feminine’:	
In	his	portrayal	of	the	national	hero	as	the	gallant,	masculine,	and	valiant	he	
evoked	the	category	of	the	feminine	with	great	ingenuity	in	order	to	outwit	the	
charges	of	anti-feminism	through	a	conceptual	strategy	of	distinguishing	the	
effeminate	from	the	feminine	(2002,	p.158).	
	
These	efforts	led	to	some	interesting	contradictions	in	the	‘feminine’	narrative,	many	of	
which	continue	to	impact	the	lives	of	Indian	women	today.	Indeed,	some	scholars	have	
																																																								
92	For	example	see,	“Why	Hindutva	groups	have	for	long	had	Sheldon	Pollock	in	their	
sights”	https://scroll.in/article/804517/why-hindutva-forces-have-for-long-had-
sheldon-pollock-in-their-sights;	“I	am	not	a	Hindu	hater”		
http://m.rediff.com/news/2005/dec/30inter1.htm;	and	“Indian	publishers	nervous	
about	taking	books	that	might	offend	Hindutva:	Wendy	Doniger”	
https://www.google.com/amp/m.economictimes.com/magazines/panache/indian-
publishers-nervous-about-taking-books-that-might-offend-hindutva-wendy-
doniger/amp_articleshow/50940104.cms?client=safari	
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argued	that	the	role	of	women	in	Indian	society	became	one	of	the	most	crucial	
battlegrounds	for	nationalists,	both	reformers	and	traditionalists,	in	the	nineteenth	and	
twentieth	century.	For	example,	in	Hindu	Wife,	Hindu	Nation	(2010),	Tanika	Sarkar	
draws	attention	to	the	way	the	literature	of	this	period	reflected	this	trend:	
Patriotic	themes	came	to	constitute	a	significant	domain	in	Bengali	literature	
from	about	the	1880’s,	and	the	corpus	went	through	many	developments	and	
mutations	down	to	Gandhian	times.	A	constant	preoccupation	was	with	the	
figure	of	the	woman.	She	dominates	Bengali	works	through	the	conceptualisation	
of	the	country	itself	in	her	image;	by	investing	the	ideal	patriot	with	womanly	
qualities;	and	by	the	reconstruction	of	feminine	roles	and	duties	–	and,	
consequently,	of	the	familial	universe	by	the	nationalist	enterprise	(Sarkar,	2010,	
p.250).	
	
Uma	Chakaravarti	concurs	with	Sarkar’s	basic	premise	when	discussing	the	works	of	
nationalist	leaders	like	Bankimchandra	Chattopadhyay	and	Dayanand	Saraswati.	
Accordingly,	in	“Whatever	Happened	to	the	Vedic	Dasi?”	(1990)	she	contends:	
How	much	and	what	aspects	of	tradition	went	into	the	construction	of	a	new	
feminine	identity	varied	from	one	writer	to	another	but	on	many	essentials	there	
was	considerable	similarity;	indeed	the	convergence	on	the	fundamental	
characteristics	of	Hindu	womanhood	cut	across	the	liberal-revivalist	divide	
(Chakravarti,	1990,	p.52).	
	
	 What	is	clear	is	that	in	the	nineteenth	century	we	witness	a	‘continental	collision’	
which	had	religious,	social	and	economic	repercussions.	Indian	intellectuals	had	begun	
to	push	back	against	British	colonization	and,	as	such,	the	colonizers	needed	to	prove	
that	the	Indians	required	colonial	rule	since	they	were	unfit	to	govern	themselves.	One	
example	of	a	writer	who	put	forth	this	theoretical	framework	was	James	Mills	in	The	
History	of	British	India	(1840)	whereby	he	debunked	the	previous,	more	positive,	
Orientalist	literature,	which	had	marvelled	at	India’s	Vedic	culture,	declaring	it	to	be	the	
‘golden	age’	of	Indian	civilization.	It	was	arguments	made	by	scholars	such	as	Mills	that	
leads	Chakravarti	to	conclude:	
The	degeneration	of	Hindu	civilization	and	the	abject	position	of	Hindu	women,	
requiring	the	‘protection’	and	‘intervention’	of	the	colonial	state,	were	two	
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aspects	of	colonial	politics.	The	third	aspect	was	the	‘effeminacy’	of	the	Hindu	
men	who	were	unfit	to	rule	themselves.	On	all	three	counts	British	rule	in	India	
could	be	justified	on	grounds	of	moral	superiority	(1990,	p.35).	
	
In	fact,	one	of	the	main	thrusts	for	reform,	from	the	British	Raj,	concerned	the	state	of	
women	and	how	they	were	mistreated,	particularly	via	the	institution	of	marriage:	
Around	this	time	numerous	reform	bills	focused	on	marriage.	The	Age	of	Consent	
controversy,	debates	about	the	Restitution	of	Conjugal	Rights	and	the	Marriage	
of	Widows	had	accentuated	the	‘barbaric’	practices	of	the	Hindus	and	thrown	up	
questions	about	the	nature	of	the	conjugality	such	unions	encouraged	
(Chowdhury,	2014,	p.389).	
	
Thus,	one	could	argue	that	Hindu	nationalists	had	no	choice	but	to	respond	to	these	
allegations	against	the	treatment	of	women	in	Indian	society.	Chakravarti	traces	how	
Hindus	like	Rammohan	Roy,	Bankimchandra	Chattopadhyay	and	Dayanand	Saraswati	
articulate	their	arguments	and	create	a	new	narrative	for	Indian	women.	So	much	so,	
that	Chakravarti	concludes	that	this	resulted	in	the	cultivation	of	a	powerful	myth,	a	
doxa,93	that	continues	to	influence	the	role	of	Indian	women	in	society	today:	
What	was	gradually	and	carefully	constituted,	brick	by	brick,	in	the	interaction	
between	colonialism	and	nationalism	is	now	so	deeply	embedded	in	the	
consciousness	of	the	middle	classes	that	ideas	about	the	past	have	assumed	the	
status	of	revealed	truths.	Any	suggestion	that	we	might	fruitfully	analyse	the	
manner	and	the	different	stages	by	which	this	body	of	knowledge	was	built	up,	
or	how	and	when	we	came	by	our	immediate	intellectual	and	cultural	heritage	
(which	is	often	only	a	hundred	and	fifty	years	old)	would	therefore	be	
considered	quite	unnecessary	or	even	futile.	But	for	women	in	particular	this	
heritage,	this	perception	of	the	past,	of	the	‘lost	glory’	is	almost	a	burden.	It	has	
led	to	a	narrow	and	limiting	circle	in	which	the	image	of	Indian	womanhood	has	
become	both	a	shackle	and	a	rhetorical	device	that	nevertheless	functions	as	a	
historical	truth	(1990,	p.28).	
	
Unfortunately,	Chakravarti	does	not	spend	much	time	analysing	Vivekananda’s	role	in	
the	creation	of	this	doxa	since	she	believes	that	by	the	time	he	was	popular	the	
nationalists	had	already	‘closed	ranks’	and	as	such	“there	is	no	women’s	question	for	
Vivekananda”	(1990,	p.78).	However,	seeing	as	Vivekananda	has	become	such	a	crucial	
																																																								
93	For	a	detailed	explanation	of	this	term	‘doxa’	see	Chapter	3.		
	 261	
element	in	the	Hindutva	movement,	and	that	his	battle	cry	for	a	‘manly’	nation	
continues	to	be	used,	it	seems	imperative	for	us	to	understand	the	way	he	interpreted	
the	role	of	women	in	India.		
	 So,	is	Chakravarti	right	in	presuming	that	other	than	arguing	for	a	‘manly’	nation,	
Vivekananda	did	not	engage	with	the	question	of	women?	Did	women	not	figure	in	his	
theoretical	‘manly’	nation?	Vivekananda	seemed	to	have	a	complex	relationship	with	
the	feminine	principle.	On	the	one	hand,	as	we	saw	in	the	previous	section,	he	demoted	
bhakti	because	it	was	too	feminine.	On	the	other	hand,	he	was	a	devotee	of	Kali	and	
wrote	poems	dedicated	to	her.	When	addressing	the	role	of	women	in	India	his	answers	
were	not	only	ambiguous	and	complex,	but	also,	oftentimes	filled	with	a	chauvinistic	
ideology	that	can	take	the	reader	by	surprise.	Indeed,	simply	reading	his	lecture	
“Women	of	India”	which	he	delivered	in	1900,	on	his	second	visit	to	the	United	States,	
leads	to	the	realization	that	there	definitely	was	a	‘women’s	question’	in	Vivekananda’s	
vision	of	India.	However,	one	just	has	to	scratch	the	surface	to	recognize	that	the	only	
concept	of	femininity	that	Vivekananda	was	comfortable	with,	and	which	he	upheld,	
was	the	role	of	the	mother:	
Now,	the	ideal	woman	in	India	is	the	mother,	the	mother	first	and	the	mother	
last.	The	word	woman	calls	up	to	the	mind	of	the	Hindu,	motherhood;	and	God	is	
called	Mother	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.	8,	p.57).	
	
		 This,	of	course,	is	not	a	new	concept,	but	rather	one	that	had	been	developing	
since	Rammohan	Roy	and	his	peers	began	investigating	the	role	that	women	played	in	
the	Vedic	age.	Examples	such	as	Gargi	and	Maitreyi	became	very	popular	since	both	
were	scholarly	women	who,	reportedly,	had	not	only	held	their	own,	but	at	times	
bested,	their	Vedic	male	peers	with	their	philosophical	acumen	(Chakravarti,	1990,	
pp.33,	43).	However,	it	was	with	Dayanand	Saraswati	that	we	witness	the	way	the	ideal	
Hindu	woman	becomes	‘sacralized’	in	the	role	of	the	mother.	Interestingly,	it	was	not	
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only	the	Hindu	woman,	but	also	the	Hindu	nation	that	was	seen	as	a	reflection	of	the	
feminine	principle	and	was	idolized	as	the	‘Motherland’.	Tanika	Sarkar	emphasizes	how,	
even	though	this	is	a	relatively	new	phenomenon,	it	has	become	an	ideology,	a	doxa	if	
you	will,	that	is	irrefutable	in	the	modern	Hindu’s	worldview:	
The	first	such	principle	and	cultural	artefact	is	the	concept	of	the	Motherland	–	
Deshmata.	As	is	usual	with	other	nationalist	discourses,	the	country	is	not	just	a	
piece	of	land	with	people	living	on	it.	It	is	abstracted	from	the	people	and	
personified	as	the	Mother	Goddess,	the	most	recent	and	most	sacred	deity	in	the	
Hindu	pantheon.	The	people,	then,	are	not	the	‘desh’	itself,	but	are	sons	of	the	
Mother	–	detached	from	an	imagined	entity	and	put	in	a	subordinate	relation	to	
it.	Through	long	and	continuous	usage	this	concept	has	acquired	such	a	seeming	
naturalness	that	its	disjunction	as	a	cultural	construct	is	worth	emphasizing	
(2010,	p.251).	
	
As	far	as	Dayanand	Saraswati	was	concerned,	Hindu	women	needed	to	do	all	they	could	
to	provide	the	Motherland	with	strong	and	virile	sons	who	could	protect	the	nation:		
What	was	central	to	Dayananda’s	thinking	was	his	understanding	of	the	role	of	
women	in	the	maintenance	of	race,	and	inter-alia,	concern	about	their	sexuality.	
Motherhood	for	Dayananda	was	the	sole	rationale	of	woman’s	existence	but	
what	was	crucial	in	his	concept	of	motherhood	was	its	specific	role	in	the	
procreation	and	rearing	of	a	special	breed	of	men	(Chakravarti,	1990,	p.56).	
	
Bankimchandra,	on	the	other	hand,	strove	to	create	an	image	of	a	Hindu	woman	who	
could	stand	shoulder	to	shoulder	with	her	husband	to	fight	for	freedom	from	colonial	
oppression.	Accordingly,	in	his	most	acclaimed	novel	Anandmath	(1882),	
Bankimchandra	presented	a	new	revised	version	of	the	perfect	Hindu	woman.	It	was	no	
longer	sufficient	for	a	woman	to	be	a	loyal	partner	to	her	husband	in	his	religious	
activities,	nor	was	it	enough	for	her	to	be	intellectually	advanced	like	Gargi	and	
Maitreyi:	
Externally	and	internally	the	threatened	moral	and	social	order	desperately	
required	a	new	kind	of	woman	for	which	the	old	sahadharmini	[partner	in	
religious	duties]	model	was	too	passive	and	could	only	apply	once	order	had	
been	re-established.	A	ravaged	nation	required	heroic	action	from	both	men	and	
women;	if	anything	it	was	women	who	could	actually	release	the	potential	for	
such	action.	It	was	therefore	incumbent	upon	them	to	energize	men	who	might	
easily	fall	into	temptation	otherwise.	Only	women,	by	controlling	or	sublimating	
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their	sexuality,	could	release	both	men	and	women	for	the	selfless	sacrifices	
required	for	the	liberation	of	the	ravaged	motherland.	Bankim	thus	provided	a	
powerful	image	of	womanhood,	one	that	dynamized	the	image	of	a	sahadharmini	
of	the	past	into	a	force	for	the	present	and	the	future.	In	this	aspect	the	
transformed	woman	“defied	the	normal	canons	of	femininity	in	order	to	join	the	
resistance	against	the	crisis	in	the	order	(Chakravarti,	1990,	p.53).	
	
What	is	particularly	noteworthy	about	Vivekananda’s	interaction	in	this	ongoing	
debate	is	that	he	did	not	fall	squarely	into	any	of	these	camps.	Instead,	he	argued	that	
the	best	course	of	action	for	all	women,	and	all	men	associated	with	them,	was	to	
encourage	celibacy.		
For,	mind	you,	our	religion	teaches	that	marriage	is	something	bad,	it	is	only	for	
the	weak.	The	very	spiritual	man	or	woman	would	not	marry	at	all.	So	the	
religious	woman	says	“Well,	the	Lord	has	given	me	a	better	chance.	What	is	the	
use	of	marrying?	Thank	God,	worship	God,	what	is	the	use	of	my	loving	man?	Of	
course,	all	of	them	cannot	put	their	mind	on	God.	Some	find	it	simply	impossible.	
They	have	to	suffer	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.8,	pp.65-66).	
	
Accordingly,	he	was	not	interested	in	the	reproductive	role	of	women,	neither	did	he	
encourage	any	of	his	young	male	followers	to	get	married.	Rather,	he	encouraged	one	
and	all	to	follow	the	path	of	the	sanyasi,	while	labouring	to	uplift	the	masses.	Thus,	
whereas	it	is	true	that	Vivekananda	revered	the	woman	in	the	role	of	the	mother,	it	was	
as	a	chaste	mother,	not	a	reproducing	one:		
Woman!	thou	shalt	not	be	coupled	with	anything	connected	with	the	flesh.	The	
name	has	been	called	holy	once	and	for	ever,	for	what	name	is	there	which	no	
lust	can	ever	approach,	no	carnality	ever	come	near,	than	the	one	word	mother?	
That	is	the	ideal	in	India	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.8,	p.58).	
	
Given	his	narrow	minded	and	restrictive	ideas	regarding	the	role	of	women	in	Indian	
society	it	is	not	surprising	to	learn	that	women’s	issues	proved	to	be	somewhat	of	a	
thorn	in	his	side.	First,	as	we	saw	in	the	last	chapter,	he	endured	the	wrath	of	the	
traditionalists	when	he	refused	to	speak	out	against	the	Age	of	Consent	Bill.	However,	
even	though	he	did	not	publicly	side	with	the	traditionalists	on	these	matters,	he	
nevertheless	makes	his	views	on	these	reforms	abundantly	clear:	
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In	my	opinion	society	in	every	country	shapes	itself	out	of	its	own	initiative.	So	
we	need	not	trouble	our	heads	prematurely	about	such	reforms	as	the	abolition	
of	early	marriage,	the	remarriage	of	widows,	and	so	on.	Our	part	of	the	duty	lies	
in	imparting	true	education	to	all	men	and	women	in	society.	As	an	outcome	of	
that	education,	they	will	of	themselves	be	able	to	know	what	is	good	for	them	
and	what	is	bad,	and	will	spontaneously	eschew	the	latter.	It	will	not	be	then	
necessary	to	pull	down	or	set	up	anything	in	society	by	coercion	(Vivekananda,	
2009,	vol.8,	p.493).	
	
Moreover,	he	also	had	a	few	unpleasant	encounters	with	Pandita	Ramabai,	an	Indian	
widow	who	became	quite	popular	in	the	West	because	of	her	willingness	to	speak	out	
publicly	against	the	atrocities	committed	against	widows	in	India.	In	“Spiritual	
Masculinity	and	Swami	Vivekananda”	(2014),	Indira	Chowdhury	argues	that	that	these	
allegations,	about	the	state	of	women	in	India,	rattled	Vivekananda	considerably:	
The	missionary	construction	of	a	heathen	mother	who	lacked	in	maternal	
emotions	required	the	pedagogy	of	the	Bible,	and	it	is	with	reference	to	these	
that	we	can	comprehend	Vivekananda’s	statements	about	glorified	motherhood.	
The	same	mechanism	operates	on	his	statements	about	widows	–	he	repeatedly	
refused	to	acknowledge	the	hardships	imposed	on	them	by	Hindu	society.	
Throughout	his	stay	at	America,	Vivekananda	reiterated	this	points	at	times	
taking	it	to	an	absurd	limit:	‘a	large	part	of	the	property	in	the	country	is	held	by	
widows.	In	fact,	so	enviable	is	the	position	of	widows	that	a	woman	or	man	
either	might	almost	pray	to	be	made	a	widow’	(2014,	p.398,	emphasis	added).	
	
Thus,	Chowdhury	concludes:	
At	one	end	of	this	spectrum	of	self-representation	stood	the	learned	Ramabai,	
herself	a	widow,	elucidating	the	reasons	for	a	woman’s	low	status	in	Hindu	
society,	while	at	the	other	stood	Vivekananda	with	his	refusal	to	recognize	her	
experience.	Vivekananda	construed	Ramabai’s	activities	as	ultimately	
strengthening	the	hands	of	the	missionaries,	and	his	‘silences’	as	well	as	his	
contrary	assertions	form	an	essential	part	of	his	efforts	at	validating	a	Hindu	
identity	(2014,	pp.398-399).	
	
For	Vivekananda,	the	only	idealized	image	of	an	Indian	woman	that	he	was	willing	to	
promote	was	of	a	chaste	mother.	After	all,	as	a	sanyasi	himself:	
The	feminine	counterpart	of	the	ascetic	masculine	could	only	be	incarnated	by	
this	grand	narrative	in	spiritual	terms	–	the	mother	whom	no	lust	could	touch	
(Chowdhury,	2014,	p.399).	
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In	fact,	even	though	he	had	benefitted	from	the	hospitality	of	numerable	
American	women,	who	he	spoke	of	in	the	highest	terms,94	he	could	never	envision	a	
similar	situation	in	India	and,	as	such,	differed	substantially	from	his	predecessors.	It	is	
true	that	he	also	upheld	Vedic	women,	like	Gargi	and	Maitreyi,	using	their	example	to	
prove	to	his	Western	listeners	that	women	were	not	denigrated	in	India.	Nevertheless,	
he	envisioned	a	different	kind	of	woman	for	the	modern	age	and	he	freely	deprecated	
feminine	traits	which	he	wanted	to	eradicate	from	the	Indian	psyche.	Thus,	he	declares,	
in	a	letter	to	his	brother	disciple	Alasinga,	“I	shall	have	to	come	and	manufacture	men	
out	of	you.	I	know	that	India	is	only	inhabited	by	women	and	eunuchs”	(Vivekananda,	
2009,	vol.5,	p.86).	Needless	to	say,	this	single	faceted	version	of	the	Indian	woman	is	
deeply	problematic.	Women	were	not	viewed	as	dynamic	beings	but	rather	as	tools	to	
accentuate	and	aid	the	vision	that	their	male	counterparts	had	for	Indian	society	and	the	
Hindu	nation.	Women	were	not	seen	as	full	partners	in	the	project	of	nation	building	but	
rather	as	cogs	in	a	male	oriented	universe.	This	is	extremely	disappointing,	especially	in	
regard	to	Vivekananda,	who	not	only	had	rich	and	meaningful	relationships	with	a	
number	of	his	female	Western	admirers	and	followers,	but	also	because	he	
acknowledged	the	power	of	the	divine	mother.	Consequently,	when	one	considers	his	
multifaceted	relationship	with	the	feminine	principle,	it	is	disheartening	to	learn	that	he	
held	such	an	archaic	view	of	the	Indian	woman’s	potential	and	role	in	society.	Thus,	he	
tells	the	Western	women	he	encounters	on	his	travels:	
I	should	very	much	like	our	women	to	have	your	intellectuality,	but	not	if	it	must	
be	at	the	cost	of	purity…	Intellectuality	is	not	the	highest	good.	Morality	and	
spirituality	are	the	things	for	which	we	strive.	Our	women	are	not	so	learned,	but	
they	are	more	pure	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.5,	p.412).	
																																																								
94	For	example,	in	a	letter	to	his	disciples	in	Madras,	Vivekananda	writes	“About	the	
women	of	America,	I	cannot	express	my	gratitude	for	their	kindness.	Lord	bless	them.	In	
this	country,	women	are	the	life	of	every	movement,	and	represent	all	the	culture	of	the	
nation,	for	men	are	too	busy	to	educate	themselves”	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.5,	p.28).	
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Accordingly,	it	is	with	grave	concern	that	one	realizes	that	Vivekananda’s	model	
of	a	chaste,	renunciate	mother	is	what	comes	to	mind	when	one	examines	some	of	the	
women	who	are	currently	active	in	the	Hindutva	movement.95	In	“Feminism	Inverted”	
Amrita	Basu	highlights	the	image	of	three	women	who	have	become	key	players	in	the	
Sangh	Parivar.	Whereas	she	acknowledges	that	there	are	many	ways	in	which	these	
three	women	differ	from	each	other,	she	does	recognize	that	there	is	one	crucial	trait	
that	is	common	to	all	three:	
There	is,	amidst	their	many	differences,	one	striking	similarity	between	Scindia,	
Bharati	and	Rithambara,	that	is	critical	to	the	project	of	Hindu	nationalism.	All	
three	women	are	celibate:	Vijayraje	Scindia	is	a	widow	and	Uma	Bharati	and	
Sadhvi	Rithambara	are	sanyasins	(Sadhvi	means	celibate).	
Their	chastity	heightens	their	iconic	status	for	it	is	deeply	associated	in	Hinduism	
with	notions	of	spirituality,	purity	and	otherworldliness;	these	qualities	also	
make	these	women	reliable	spokespersons	for	the	future	Hindu	rashtra	(Basu,	
1995,	p.161).	
	
There	are	several	factors	which	make	the	popularity	of	these	women	particularly	
troubling.	Sadhvi	Rithambhara,	for	example,	is	one	of	the	people	attributed	with	the	
success	of	the	Ramjanmabhumi	movement.	Tape	cassettes	with	her	speeches,	riling	up	
her	audiences	to	rise	up	and	take	down	the	Babri	masjid,	are	credited	with	the	violence	
that	erupted	after	this	event.	This	led	to	many	of	the	unforgivable	acts	of	rape	and	
murder	that	were	committed	by	Hindus	upon	Muslims.	Tanika	Sarkar	reports:	
Her	ringing	exhortations	to	Hindus	to	arise	and	kill	Muslims	have	paid	rich	
dividends	in	the	form	of	anti-Muslim	pogroms	even	in	places	earlier	free	of	
communal	conflict.	At	the	small	western	UP	town	of	Khurja,	for	instance,	the	old	
lanes	were	strewn	with	nearly	200	Muslim	corpses	after	two	bouts	of	violence	in	
December	and	January	1990-1.	Interviewing	some	of	the	inhabitants	we	were	
told	that	though	old	habits	die	hard,	and	though	peaceful	coexistence	had	been	
one	such	old	habit,	repeated	broadcasts	of	Rithambhara’s	cassette	over	
successive	days	at	local	temples	had	finally	done	the	trick.	Priests	from	Basti	in	
																																																								
95	The	Hindutva	movement	does	not	only	use	the	role	of	the	mother	to	further	its’	
political	agenda.	They	also	utilize	Bankimchandra’s	and	Saraswati’s	concept	of	
womanhood	quite	liberally.	However,	for	the	purposes	of	the	current	discussion	we	will	
focus	on	the	concept	of	the	chaste	mother,	which	Vivekananda	promoted,	and	the	way	it	
operates	within	the	Sangh	Parivar.		
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UP	informed	us	that	they	had	suspended	their	normal	programmes	of	recitation	
from	sacred	texts	at	temples	in	order	to	continuously	play	the	cassette.	The	Pesh	
Imam	of	the	Babri	mosque	at	Ayodhya	pleaded	with	P.K.	Datta,	a	member	of	our	
investigating	team,	to	help	ban	the	cassette	via	an	agitation	in	Delhi.	He	said	that	
this	cassette	had	by	itself	‘erected	a	wall	of	hatred	between	hearts’	(Sarkar,	2010,	
pp.269-270).	
	
Under	no	circumstances	am	I	suggesting	that	Vivekananda	would	have	condoned	such	
actions.	He	never	advocated	for	violence	in	any	situation.	However,	one	can	also	argue	
that	his	call	for	a	virile,	manly	nation	could	be	interpreted	as	a	call	for	aggression.	
Similarly,	his	devotion	to	Kali,	who	is	the	most	formidable	of	all	Hindu	Goddesses	could	
also	be	viewed	as	a	nod	towards	personalities	like	Rithambhara,	who,	after	one	watches	
just	a	few	minutes	of	her	speeches	(they	are	readily	available	online),	leaves	one	with	
the	impression	of	an	extremely	angry	and	impassioned	female	ascetic,	a	veritable	Kali.	
	 Yet,	Amrita	Basu	highlights	how	these	women,	despite	being	powerful	voices	in	
the	public	arena	of	Hindutva	politics,	insist	that	nevertheless,	a	woman’s	place,	is	first	
and	foremost	with	her	family.	So	much	so,	Vijayraje	Scandia,	who	is	a	widow	herself,	
was	unwilling	to	speaking	out	against	sati,	a	practice	that	has	been	outlawed	for	over	a	
century:	
Reiterating	a	position	that	she	had	made	publicly,	Vijayraje	Scandia	defended	sati	
in	an	interview	with	me.	Referring	to	religious	scriptures,	she	drew	a	highly	
questionable	distinction	between	voluntary	sati,	to	which	she	attributed	a	
glorious	tradition,	and	the	coerced	sati	of	recent	times,	which	she	considered	
immoral.	She	was	evasive	when	asked	how	she	would	describe	Roop	Kanwar’s	
sati,	saying	that	it	must	have	been	wrong	if	in	fact	it	had	been	coerced	but	she	
could	not	be	sure.	In	other	respects	she	remained	committed	to	asymmetrical	
gender	roles.	She	argued	that	Indian	religion	and	culture	supported	the	notion	
that	women’s	primary	duties	were	as	wives	and	mothers	(Basu,	1995,	pp.167-
168).96		
	
																																																								
96	Roop	Kanwar	was	an	18-year-old	woman	who	allegedly	committed	sati	in	1987.	For	a	
deeper	analysis	of	this	controversial	issue	see	Banerjee	(2011).	
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The	double	standards	employed	by	Scindia	are	not	lost	to	some,	leading	the	communal	
harmony	activist	Ram	Puniyani	to	quip,	“somehow	she	herself	never	exercised	this	right	
herself”	(Puniyani,	2012).		
	 What	makes	the	efforts	of	women	such	as	these	particularly	disturbing	is	that	
they	represent	a	growing	number	of	females	who	are	associating	themselves	with	the	
Sangh	Parivar	and	their	ideology.	The	women’s	wing	of	the	RSS	was	established	in	1936,	
11	years	after	the	RSS	was	formed,	and	is	called	the	Rashtrasevika	Samiti.	Sarkar	argues	
that	this	apparent	inclusion	of	females,	in	what	had	been	an	all-male	organization,	
should	not	be	taken	to	signify	equality	between	genders.	Accordingly,	she	draws	
attention	to	the	fact	that	the	word	‘volunteer’	is	absent	from	this	title:	
We	must	note	that	while	the	name	Rashtriya	Swayamsevak	Sangh	means	
‘Nationalist	Volunteers’,	the	term	Rashtrasevika	denotes	women	who	serve	the	
nation.	The	difference	in	the	names	is	significant	in	several	ways.	It	not	only	
relegates	women’s	work	within	the	Samiti	organization	to	a	domestic	role,	but	
also	consigns	their	domestic	labour	firmly	to	the	sphere	of	humble	service.	The	
sense	of	autonomy	and	self-choice	that	are	associated	with	the	word	‘volunteer’	
are	notably	missing	(Sarkar,	1995,	pp.184-185).	
	
Be	that	as	it	may,	this	group	is	rapidly	gaining	access	and	influence	over	middle	class	
women	in	India	today.	These	women	are	given	physical	training	and	taught	how	to	
defend	themselves	since,	more	often	than	not,	they	are	required	to	work	outside	the	
home.	However,	it	is	evident	that	the	most	crucial	aspect	for	the	formation	of	this	
woman’s	group	was	so	that	the	RSS	could	disseminate	their	ideology	via	the	vehicle	of	
the	Hindu	mother,	who	is	responsible	for	the	early	education	of	her	Hindu	sons:		
The	mother	is	pivotal	to	the	RSS	scheme	of	mobilizing	its	own	family.	Golwalkar	
also	advised	her	[the	sevikas]	to	make	‘useful	contacts	among	the	women	folk	
within	the	neighborhood	and	carry	out	programmes	which	would	inculcate	our	
cherished	ideas	among	them	and	their	children.’	Mothers,	then,	are	political	
creatures	and	agents	and	we	will	not	grasp	the	deeply	political	import	of	this	
agenda	unless	we	are	clear	about	the	directly	political	and	not	merely	ideological	
significance	of	everyday	relations,	personal	disposition	and	habits,	of	domestic	
ritual	and	practice	within	the	RSS	scheme	for	hegemony,	and	the	full	significance	
of	the	much	used	and	key	term	‘samskaras’	in	the	Sangh	vocabulary.	The	mother	
	 269	
is	to	instil	habits	of	deference,	of	obedience,	of	respect	for	the	RSS	version	of	
patriotism.	She	should	scramble	the	child’s	earliest	notion	of	history,	mythology	
and	patriotism	through	moral	lessons	about	‘faith	in	Dharma	and	pride	in	our	
history’,	and	instructions	about	‘tirthas	and	temples’.	The	importance	of	learning	
them	in	earliest	infancy	when	critical	faculties	are	not	aroused,	of	learning	them	
through	stories	whose	format	demands	a	suspension	of	questioning	and	passive	
listening	is	enormous.	As	to	how	important	the	lessons	in	Dharma	and	history,	
pilgrimages	and	temples	lumped	together	are,	should	be	evident	in	the	success	of	
the	Ramjanmabhoomi	campaign	which	pitted	a	Muslim	king	against	the	sacred	
figure	of	Ram,	and	insisted	that	the	destruction	of	the	Babri	Mosque	was	not	only	
a	religious	but	also	a	patriotic	duty.	One	cannot	learn	these	lessons	too	young	
(Sarkar,	1995,	p.189).	
	
Whereas	there	are	multiple	aspects	of	these	methods	and	ideology	that	are	deeply	
disturbing,	for	the	purposes	of	our	current	discussion	it	becomes	clear	that	
organizations	such	as	these	do	not	encourage	female	empowerment	in	the	normative	
sense.	Indeed,	Elen	Turner	in	“Empowering	Women?	Feminist	Responses	to	Hindutva”	
(2012),	emphasizes	the	need	to	recognize	that	these	women	would	not	consider	
themselves	feminists	even	though	many	of	their	activities	and	programs	use	feminist	
“symbols,	slogans	and	ideas”:	
Despite	these	womens’	own	unconventional	images	and	lifestyles,	they	by	no	
means	encouraged	women’s	emancipation	in	ways	that	feminists	understand.	
Calls	for	women	to	leave	traditional	roles	or	step	outside	of	patriarchal	society	
were	solely	for	the	sake	of	Hindutva.	This	represents	a	fundamental	political	
problem	for	feminists	at	the	level	of	strategy	–	outspoken,	politically	engaged	
and	unconventional	women	were	utilising	methods	and	discourse	akin	to	those	
used	by	feminists	to	promote	anti-feminist	ideology.	This	allowed	the	right	wing	
to	occupy	discursive	spaces	that	feminists	believed	they	had	control	of,	forcing	
re-evaluations	of	the	supposedly	pacifist	nature	of	women	and	the	role	of	
feminism	in	Indian	society	(Turner,	2012,	p.4).	
	
One	of	the	biggest	concerns	with	this	development,	whereby	women	are	pitted	against	
women,	is	that	this	allows	the	male	population	to	maintain	the	patriarchal	status	quo	in	
India.	In	“Women,	Muscular	Nationalism	and	Hinduism	in	India:	Roop	Kanwar	and	the	
Fire	Protests”	(2011),	Sikata	Banerjee	makes	an	interesting	observation	that	highlights	
how	such	methods	only	result	in	harming	women	themselves.		
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In	muscular	nationalism	this	focus	on	the	purity	and	chastity	of	female	bodies	
stems	from	their	role	as	border	guards.	By	border	guards	I	mean	the	notion	that	
the	boundaries	separating	‘we	the	people’	from	‘them’	are	represented	by	chaste	
women’s	bodies.	Put	another	way,	this	line	of	thinking	argues	that	our	women	
are	chaste	and	pure,	yours	are	not.	This	is	the	difference	that	separates	our	
nation	from	yours.	Women’s	role	as	border	guards	requires	that	their	purity	be	
vigilantly	guarded.	Thus,	other	members	of	the	national	community	(usually	
men,	but	sometimes	other	women)	police	their	bodies	and	behaviour	(Banerjee,	
2011,	p.273).97		
	
Thus,	she	contends:	
Hindu	muscular	nationalism	highlights	the	role	of	women	as	border	guards	of	
the	nation.	Indeed,	the	masculine	is	reliant	on	the	virtuous	woman.	In	short,	
Hindu	male	martial	spirit	loses	some	of	its	value	if	female	chastity	fails	to	be	a	
dominant	symbol	of	the	national	community	(Banerjee,	2011,	p.274).	
	
The	idea	that	Hindu	women	have	to	be	chaste	has	already	had	numerable	negative	
consequences	for	women	in	India.	For	instance,	it	is	not	uncommon	for	rape	victims	to	
be	blamed	for	the	attack	because	of	how	the	women	are	dressed	or	because	they	are	
perceived	to	be	promiscuous.98	Similarly,	women	who	visit	bars,	or	have	pre-marital	
relationships	and	engage	in	any	activities	that	are	deemed	to	be	‘Western’,	are	
considered	to	be	‘loose’	and	‘immoral’	and	at	some	level,	deserving	of	any	inappropriate	
or	violent	acts	committed	against	them.99	An	Indian	magazine,	Tehelka,	highlights	this	
narrative	that	is	being	publicized	by	the	Hindutva	movement	in	an	article	that	is	aptly	
titled	“Rape.	And	how	men	see	it”	(2013):	
How	endemic	is	the	prejudice	that	stalks	our	society?	What	produces	and	
perpetuates	it?	What	creates	the	idea	of	women	as	‘fair	game’	for	sexual	
violence?	What,	in	effect,	do	Indian	men	think	about	women?		
It	would	have	been	comforting	if	vile	foolishness	in	India	had	been	the	domain	of	
a	few.	But	Asaram	Bapu	is	not	alone	when	he	says	one	hand	cannot	clap	by	itself.	
																																																								
97	Interestingly,	these	theories	have	been	put	to	the	test	by	journalists	who	have	
conducted	investigations	to	uncover	the	way	the	“Hindutva	brigade”	have	tried	to	
combat	the	‘sullying’	of	chaste	Hindu	girls	by	Muslim	men	(Bakhshi,	2015).	
98	For	example,	see,	“The	Anatomy	of	a	Rape”	http://www.tehelka.com/2013/01/the-
anatomy-of-a-rape/	
99	For	example	see,	“Politics	of	Kiss”	http://www.tehelka.com/2014/11/kerala-kiss-of-
love-protests-indian-culture-moral-policing/	and	“Valentine’s	Warriors”	
http://www.tehelka.com/2009/02/valentines-warriors/	
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Or	that	taking	diksha,	reciting	a	mantra	and	pleading	with	her	rapists	as	brothers	
might	have	saved	the	young	girl	that	fateful	night.		
The	clergy	of	Jamaat-e-Islaami-Hind	are	not	alone	when	they	advocate	co-
educational	institutes	to	be	shut	down,	pre-marital	sex	to	be	outlawed	and	girls	
to	dress	in	sober	and	dignified	clothes	as	ways	to	prevent	rape.		
Mohan	Bhagwat	is	not	alone	when	he	asserts	more	rapes	happen	in	‘India’	than	
‘Bharat’	–	the	first	a	synecdoche	for	promiscuous	modernity,	the	latter	for	a	more	
pious	and	traditional	order	where	women	live	within	boundaries	prescribed	by	
men	(Chaudhury,	2013).	
	
The	scary	truth	is	that	these	‘absurd’	claims	are	not	dissimilar	from	the	‘absurd’	ones	
that	Indira	Chowdhury	highlights	regarding	the	way	Vivekananda	defended	the	Indian	
treatment	of	widows	when	faced	with	the	allegations	of	Pandita	Ramabai.	Furthermore,	
his	insistence	for	chastity,	when	taken	to	its	logical	extreme,	could	be	used	as	an	excuse	
for	attacking	girls	at	a	local	pub	in	Kerala	because	they	were	allegedly	behaving	
promiscuously.	As	both	Tanika	Sarkar	and	Uma	Chakravarti	have	reminded	us,	this	
vision	of	the	chaste	Hindu	woman/mother	has	become	a	doxa	that	is	almost	impossible	
to	challenge	in	India	today.	Unfortunately,	it	is	a	worldview	that	both	genders	involved	
with	the	Hindutva	movement	have	embraced.	Thus,	even	though	it	is	true	that	
Vivekananda	cannot	be	blamed	for	how	his	vision	of	a	chaste	mother,	who	would	uplift	
India,	has	been	appropriated,	it	is	hard	to	forget	his	words:	
Even	I,	who	have	never	married,	belonging	to	an	Order	that	never	marries,	would	
be	disgusted	if	my	wife,	supposing	I	had	married,	dared	to	displease	my	mother.	I	
would	be	disgusted.	Why?	Do	I	not	worship	my	mother?	Why	should	not	her	
daughter-in-law?	Whom	I	worship,	why	not	she?	Who	is	she,	then,	that	would	try	
to	ride	over	my	head	and	govern	my	mother?	She	has	to	wait	till	her	womanhood	
is	fulfilled;	and	the	one	thing	that	fulfils	womanhood,	that	is	womanliness	in	
woman,	is	motherhood.	Wait	till	she	becomes	a	mother;	then	she	will	have	the	
same	right.	That,	according	to	the	Hindu	mind,	is	the	great	mission	of	woman	–	to	
become	a	mother	(Vivekananda,	2009,	vol.8,	p.59).	
	
Conclusion	
	
One	of	the	central	purposes	of	this	thesis	has	been	to	articulate	the	impact	that	
Vivekananda	has	had	on	the	way	Hindu	traditions	are	interpreted	to	date.	Particularly	
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since	his	influence	is	oftentimes	still	shrouded	either	in	hagiographical	accounts	(and	
their	rebuttals)	or	by	Orientalist	influenced	scholarship	that	refuses	to	recognize	the	
role	he	played	in	Indian	politics.	Consequently,	I	began	by	describing	this	exchange	of	
ideas,	between	the	East	and	the	West,	as	a	form	of	‘continental	collision’.	This	allowed	
us	to	establish	that	there	was	a	mutual	sharing	of	theories	and	philosophy;	that	it	was	
not	one-sided.	‘Continental	collision’	not	only	highlights	the	fact	that	this	was	a	clash	of	
civilizations	but	also	that	the	effects	of	this	encounter	continue	to	reverberate	today.	
This	point	is	driven	home	by	Nandy	who	with	his	explication	of	‘colonized	minds’	opens	
up	a	conversation	whereby	we	can	begin	to	appreciate	how,	and	why,	men	like	
Vivekananda,	who	were	prominent	over	a	century	ago,	can	still	impact	the	daily	lives	of	
Indians.	Vivekananda’s	popularity,	combined	with	the	tremendous	effects	of	this	
‘continental	collision’,	put	him	in	a	unique	position	to	push	back	against	the	suture	
zones	that	were	forming	between	the	West	and	the	East.	By	challenging	Westerners	on	
the	concepts	and	terminology	they	used	to	describe	Indian	philosophy,	and	by	
demonstrating	that	Vedanta	could	stand	shoulder	to	shoulder	with	Western	
philosophical	truths,	Vivekananda	created	an	atmosphere	of	hope	and	pride	amongst	
his	Indian	listeners.	Thus,	Vivekananda,	and	other	leaders	like	him,	fought	against	the	
‘colonization	of	Indian	minds’	that	was	rampant	in	colonial	India.		
However,	in	order	to	analyse	Vivekananda’s	impact	on	modern	India,	we	had	to	
first	examine	the	definitions	of	two	key	concepts,	concepts	that	Vivekananda	engaged	
with	closely	and	which	modern	academics	continue	to	grapple	with.	As	such,	in	the	
second	chapter,	we	explored	how	scholars	have	struggled	to	define	‘religion’,	
particularly	when	it	is	used	to	describe	traditions	other	than	Christianity.	This	allowed	
us	to	consider	the	lens	that	is	commonly	used	to	analyse	cultures,	a	lens	that	academics	
have	repeatedly	determined	is	compromised	because	of	its	emphasis	on	Western	
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models.	With	the	help	of	a	variety	of	scholars	we	were	able	to	identify	the	numerous	
risks	associated	with	the	indiscriminate	use	of	this	label.	In	fact,	by	tracing	the	
complexities	associated	with	the	history	of	the	concept	‘religion’	I	was	able	to	defend	
the	use	of	the	term	‘tradition’	since	its	versatility	is	better	suited	to	describing	India’s	
diverse	past.	Furthermore,	this	analysis	allowed	us	to	determine,	in	subsequent	
chapters,	how	Vivekananda	struggled	with	this	concept	and	the	parameters	it	used	to	
define	traditions	that	were	‘worthy’	of	being	classified	as	‘world	religions’.	Thus,	we	
learned	that	despite	repeatedly	arguing	for	the	unique	qualities	of	Indian	traditions	he	
was	still	susceptible	to	the	influence	of	this	terminology.		
	Similarly,	in	Chapter	3,	we	saw	that	the	term	‘Hinduism’	continues	to	be	a	
minefield	for	scholarship	associated	with	the	study	of	Indian	traditions.	By	highlighting	
the	dilemmas	that	are	commonly	linked	to	the	usage	of	this	label	we	discussed	the	
precarious	nature	of	‘naming’	ideas	that	do	not	naturally	lend	themselves	to	essentialist	
categories.	We	saw	how	scholars	were	divided	into	camps,	who	were	supposedly	
arguing	opposing	viewpoints,	but	who,	in	reality,	were	simply	two	sides	of	the	same	
coin.	This	only	helped	to	reinforce	the	predicament	with	bundling	the	vastly	different	
traditions	that	are	native	to	India,	under	the	umbrella	of	‘Hinduism’;	a	point	that	is	
stressed	by	Balagangadhara	and	Thapar.	Unfortunately	however,	despite	the	fact	that	I	
determined	that	I	would	opt,	instead,	to	use	the	term	‘Hindu	traditions’,	I	had	to	do	so	
with	the	explicit	understanding	that	it	was	non-conclusive.	Nevertheless,	this	analysis	
gave	us	a	framework	from	which	to	understand	the	importance	of	this	label	and	how	
Vivekananda’s	description	and	usage	of	this	term	continues	to	be	relevant	in	modern	
scholarship.	Indeed,	we	saw	how	even	Vivekananda,	despite	being	keenly	aware	of	the	
polythetic	quality	of	Indian	traditions,	was	instrumental	in	confining	Hindu	philosophy	
and	practices	under	a	single	banner.		
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As	we	saw	in	Chapter	4,	what	made	Vivekananda’s	packaging	of	Hindu	traditions	
so	successful	was	his	eclectic	upbringing	and	eventual	association	with	Ramakrishna,	
which	led	to	his	acceptance	of	monks’	orders.	We	discussed	how	his	strong	Indian	roots,	
combined	with	his	aptitude	to	analyse	Western	concepts	to	suit	Indian	audiences,	while	
dressed	in	the	garb	of	a	sanyasi,	converted	him	into	the	ideal	symbolic	figure	of	a	
burgeoning	nation.	In	this	way,	Vivekananda’s	Indian	voice,	coupled	with	his	capacity	
for	appealing	to	a	vast	variety	of	audiences,	propelled	him	into	becoming	an	influential	
personality.	We	were	able	to	determine	that	even	though	scholars	like	Hacker,	
Frykenberg	and	von	Stietencron,	to	mention	just	a	few,	have	repeatedly	argued	that	a	
united	Hindu	identity	owes	its	creation	to	Orientalist	scholars,	the	truth	was	that	Indian	
voices	like	Vivekananda’s	were	equally	responsible	for	this	apparent	unification.	
Consequently,	we	explored	how	Vivekananda’s	early	childhood	education,	interaction	
with	the	Brahmo	Samaj,	and	relationship	with	Ramakrishna	contributed	to	the	
development	of	his	message.		
By	investigating	Vivekananda’s	speeches	at	the	Parliament	in	Chapter	5,	we	
ascertained	how	he	developed	his	arguments	which	led	him	away	from	Ramakrishna’s	
experimentation	with	other	paths	to	the	repackaging	of	Hindu	traditions.	This	
repackaging	allowed	him	to	present	Hindu	philosophy	as	the	perfect	vehicle	for	a	
‘universal	religion’.	He	argued,	unlike	Hegel,	that	India	was	not	only	the	birthplace	of	
‘religion’	but	that	Vedanta	was	the	mother	of	all	‘religions’.	Drawing	out	the	
complexities	associated	with	such	claims	allowed	us	to	discover	how	Vivekananda	
began	to	privilege	Advaita	over	all	other	forms	of	tradition,	both	Eastern	and	Western.	
Throughout	the	analysis	of	Vivekananda’s	methodology	in	cultivating	a	united	front	for	
Hindu	traditions,	we	measured	how	he	appropriated	and	accommodated	ideas	that	he	
culled	from	both	Western	philosophy	and	Eastern	traditions.	Indeed,	it	was	while	he	
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was	still	at	the	Parliament	that	we	witness	Vivekananda’s	privileging	of	Vedanta	at	the	
expense	of	other	native	Indian	traditions	which	included,	but	were	not	limited	to,	
Buddhist	and	Jain	traditions	and	the	path	of	bhakti.		
In	Chapter	6	we	observed	that	Vivekananda	continued	on	this	trajectory	when	he	
returned	to	India	whereby	he	refused	to	side	with	the	ideals	of	the	traditionalists	or	
revivalists	because	neither	resonated	with	his	vision	for	India.	Here,	we	established	how	
Vivekananda	pulled	away	from	devotional	traditions	by	calling	his	countrymen	to	
cultivate	“muscles	of	iron	and	nerves	of	steel”.	Indeed,	even	though	he	claimed	he	was	
not	interested	in	entering	the	political	arena	nevertheless,	he	argued	that	India	
responded	best	to	religious	arguments.	Add	this	to	his	call	for	sanyasis	to	put	
themselves	at	the	service	of	the	masses	and	it	becomes	clear	that	Vivekananda’s	
message	had	a	high	visibility	profile	which	could	prove	to	be	a	useful	political	strategy.	
Accordingly,	we	saw	that	through	his	emphasis	on	a	united	front,	which	was	based	on	
the	universal	appeal	of	Vedanta,	he	was	able	to	help	create	a	hierarchy	thereby	
undermining	other	Indian	traditions	by	insisting	that	they	belonged	on	a	lower	rung,	the	
apex	of	which	was	Advaita.		
In	this	final	chapter,	I	brought	Vivekananda	into	the	21st	century	by	articulating	
the	role	he	continues	to	play	in	Indian	public	policy.	Thus,	even	though	political	
scientists	like	Chatterjee	and	Jaffrelot	have	chosen	to	side-line	his	impact	on	Indian	
politics,	recent	events	have	demonstrated	otherwise.	This	is	why	he	has	been	
appropriated	by	the	Indian	nationalist	movement	who	are	trying	to	establish	a	Hindu	
state.	Indeed,	what	these	arguments	should	have	highlighted	is	that	by	taking	certain	
positions	Vivekananda	lent	himself	to	a	more	fundamental	form	of	Hindu	thought.	His	
stance	on	women,	his	argument	for	the	superiority	of	Indian	philosophy,	his	call	for	a	
more	muscular	nation,	and	his	dismissal	of	bhakti	as	a	lesser	path	have	all	allowed	him	
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to	be	appropriated	by	the	Indian	nationalists	for	their	cause.	Vivekananda	has	been	
adopted	as	a	role	model	by	Indian	nationalists.	As	such,	it	has	become	necessary	for	
Hindus	to	closely	analyse	his	message	in	order	to	really	understand	how	deeply	his	
words	have	influenced	the	Indian	psyche.	Asad	made	a	very	strong	argument	whereby	
he	warned	readers	not	to	ignore	the	role	that	traditions	play	in	public	policy.	Ironically,	
Vivekananda	would	have	agreed	with	Asad	because	he	also	argued	that	‘religion’	was	a	
crucial	element	when	communicating	with	the	Indian	masses.	He	knew	that	it	was	a	
motivating	factor	and	used	it	when	speaking	to	his	audiences	in	India.	The	Indian	
nationalists	are	using	Vivekananda’s	playbook.	The	Babri	masjid,	the	textbook	
controversies,	the	restrictions	on	women’s’	freedoms	and	the	recent	spate	of	horrific	
lynchings	all	have	a	‘religious’	undertone.	It	has	become	imperative	for	Indians	to	take	
notice	of	what	is	being	said	in	their	‘name’.		
This	urgent	need	is	highlighted	in	an	article	titled	“Not	in	my	Name:	I	refuse	to	
cede	Hinduism	to	those	who	want	to	make	India	a	Hindu	rashtra”	(Viswanath,	2017).	
Here,	Sunita	Viswanath	makes	the	argument	that	Hindus,	who	are	witnessing	the	
atrocities	committed	in	the	name	of	their	traditions	have	to	stand	up	and	take	action.	
They	must	lay	claim	to	the	traditions	that	right-wing	politicians	have	dominated	over	
the	last	few	decades.	This	has	allowed	groups	like	the	RSS	to	dictate	what	Hindu	
traditions	signify	and	in	turn	have	changed	the	religious	landscape	of	India.	Could	it	be	
that	the	relegation	of	‘religion’	to	the	private	sphere	in	countries	where	this	is	not	a	
natural	state	of	affairs	has	brought	about	this	fundamental	landslide?	Is	it	because	the	
Hindu	public,	in	general,	ignored	the	use	of	‘religion’	by	politicians	because	they	were	
comforted	by	the	Western	concept	of	separation	of	‘church	and	state’?	Is	this	why	they	
did	not	take	the	incursions	of	the	religious	right	into	politics	seriously?	Has	India	been	
lulled	into	a	state	of	complacency?	Why	have	they	forgotten	that	religious	traditions	
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have	always	formed	one	of	the	pillars	of	Indian	society?	Vivekananda,	Gandhi,	
Bankimchandra	et	al,	acknowledged	the	place	of	Hindu	traditions	in	Indian	life.	Only	
after	Independence,	with	secularism	becoming	such	a	crucial	slogan	of	the	newly	
independent	state,	was	it	relegated	to	the	private	sphere.	This,	in	turn,	has	led	to	the	
present	where	Hindus	are	finding	themselves	in	a	position	where	they	must	defend	
their	vision	of	Hindu	traditions	or	else	be	at	the	receiving	end	of	scathing	editorials	
which	legitimately	accuse	them	of	being	complicit	with	the	violence	being	committed	
against	minorities	because	of	their	silence	(Mehta,	2017).	
And	finally,	I	have	argued	that	Vivekananda	had	many	faces.	That	he	was	intent	
on	uniting	‘Hinduism’.	That	he	believed	that	Advaita	was	the	perfect	vehicle	for	a	
universal	‘religion’.	That	he	was	guilty	of	undermining	other	traditions	in	order	to	reify	
his	own.	That	he	had	controversial	views	about	women.	But	he	never	advocated	for	
violence.	Vivekananda	would	have	never	condoned	the	lynchings	that	are	being	carried	
out	in	India	today	(Bhattacharjee,	2017	and	Halarnkar,	2017).	It	is	easy	to	imagine	him	
clearly	stating	in	his	inimitable,	oratory	voice,	“Not	in	my	name!”	That	is	the	
Vivekananda	we	need	today.	A	Vivekananda	who,	as	Hatcher	reminded	us,	was	quick	to	
assess	his	surroundings	and	the	needs	of	his	nation.	He	was	a	master	of	adjusting	the	
narrative	to	suit	his	situation.	He	helped	create	a	hierarchy	because	he	believed	it	was	
necessary	to	unite	his	people.	Would	he	be	just	as	willing	to	dismantle	this	hierarchy	if	
he	thought	it	was	the	only	way	to	maintain	the	integrity	of	the	Indian	landmass?	I	would	
like	to	believe	he	would.	After	all,	Vivekananda	was	extremely	adept	at	renegotiating	
concepts	and	ideas	and	as	such	it	is	this	strategy	of	his	that	Indians	must	try	and	
emulate	today.	Indeed,	it	is	the	skill	with	which	past	leaders	like	Vivekananda	were	able	
to	rethink	and	accommodate	traditional	Hindu	concepts	that	allowed	for	their	
continued	survival.	Is	it	really	hard	to	believe	that	Vivekananda	would	have	shifted	his	
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emphasis	from	a	hierarchical	tradition	that	was	threating	the	integrity	of	the	Indian	
landmass?	I	think	not.	One	could	argue	that	one	of	the	most	important	lessons	that	
Vivekananda	imparted	was	his	will	to	survive.	A	will	that	he	imposed	on	the	traditions	
he	loved.	A	will	that	helped	him	create	a	hierarchy.	It	is	that	same	kind	of	will	that	
Indians	must	now	use	to	re-examine	the	dangerous	trajectory	of	Hindu	nationalism.		
To	conclude,	there	are	a	few	crucial	points	that	have	conceivably	been	brought	
into	focus	with	this	survey	on	Vivekananda	and	his	influence	on	the	(re)packaging	of	
modern	Hindu	thought.	First	and	foremost,	by	cultivating	the	alternative	lens,	
‘continental	collision’,	with	which	to	analyse	the	exchange	of	ideas	that	occurred	during	
the	colonial	era,	we	were	able	to	clearly	determine	that	this	exchange	was	not	one-
sided,	but	rather	multi-directional.	Hopefully,	this	will	help	to	address	the	continued	
emphasis	on	the	impact	of	the	West	on	the	East	in	modern	scholarship.	Academics	need	
to	constantly	‘debunk’	these	theories	if	we	want	to	engage	in	a	truly	equitable	
discussion	of	philosophy	whereby	each	traditions’	contributions	are	recognized	as	
equally	valuable	to	the	global	dialogue.	Furthermore,	the	framework	provided	by	
‘continental	collision’	shows	the	continued	relevance	of	Vivekananda’s	arguments	which	
challenged	the	very	premise	of	certain	Western	concepts;	concepts	that	are	still	being	
disputed	today.	This	could	allow	for	further	research	on	how	other	Indian	voices	have	
also	impacted	such	discussions	which,	in	turn,	should	accentuate	the	arguments	that	
other	scholars	have	also	made	as	to	why	Western	terminology	must	not	be	used	
indiscriminately	to	describe	alternate	traditions.		
Secondly,	by	turning	our	gaze	on	to	the	hierarchy	that	was	cultivated	by	
Vivekananda,	I	was	able	to	highlight	how	the	continued	use	of	this	hierarchy	can	prove	
to	be	detrimental	to	the	survival	of	the	multiple	diverse	Hindu	traditions	in	
contemporary	India.	Not	enough	attention	is	paid	to	this	hierarchy	and	the	damage	it	
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has	done,	and	continues	to	do.	Nowhere	are	Nandy’s	observations	about	‘colonized	
minds’	more	rampant	than	in	this	milieu.	Unfortunately	however,	since	India	was	
declared	a	secular	state	after	Independence	the	ramifications	of	this	hierarchy	have	
been,	at	least	until	recently,	developing	under	the	surface	of	Indian	society.	
Consequently,	much	was	lost	in	an	effort	to	prove	how	worthy	Indian	philosophy	was,	
when	compared	to	Western	ideology.	The	need	to	present	a	united	front	when	facing	
the	West	resulted	in	the	creation	of	a	hierarchy	amongst	Hindu	traditions	that	still	
threatens	to	undermine	the	layers	of	sedimentation	that	are	part	of	India’s	rich	heritage.	
The	irony	is	that	the	very	creation	of	this	hierarchy	was	in	response	to	the	claim	that	
India’s	traditions	lacked	a	sense	of	order	and	conformity.	As	such,	one	could	just	as	
easily	argue	that	the	hierarchy	which	was	created	by	Indian	men,	such	as	Vivekananda	
was,	in	reality,	a	way	of	succumbing	to	the	colonization	of	their	minds!	By	privileging	
Advaita	over	other	Hindu	traditions,	the	complex	web	of	ideas	with	which	India	is	
oftentimes	identified	is	compromised.	Hopefully	this	study	will	alert	both	academics,	as	
well	as	practitioners,	that	they	need	to	be	vigilant	if	they	want	to	protect	the	integrity	of	
India’s	diverse	landscape.		
And	finally,	I	demonstrated	that	whereas	Vivekananda	always	insisted	that	he	
was	not	interested	in	politics,	one	could	also	surmise	that	his	emphasis	on	the	‘religious’	
nature	of	the	Indian	population	has	lent	itself	to	the	creation	of	a	Hindu	nation.	
Particularly	when	this	is	coupled	with	his	emphasis	on	Advaita	and	the	establishment	of	
a	hierarchy	amongst	traditions.	Whereas	this	may	have	been	acceptable	during	the	
colonial	period,	due	to	its	usefulness	when	fighting	for	Independence,	today	it	promises	
to	undermine	the	very	foundation	upon	which	Hindu	ideas	were	built.	This	study	has	
made	it	evident	that	Vivekananda	had	a	multifaceted	personality	which	needs	to	be	
unpacked	and	not	taken	at	face	value.	Not	enough	scholarship	has	focused	on	this	aspect	
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of	Vivekananda’s	contribution	and	his	continued	relevance	for	modern	Indian	thought.	
It	is	time	for	academics	to	recognize	the	need	for	a	deeper	exploration	of	the	impact	of	
Indian	voices	like	Vivekananda’s.	Otherwise	we	might	find	ourselves	in	a	situation	
where	his	ideology,	which	is	not	only	harmful	to	the	inherently	polythetic	nature	of	
Indian	traditions,	but	can	also	be	chauvinistic	and	prejudiced,	will	become	second	
nature	in	India.	By	examining	the	role	that	Vivekananda	played	in	the	creation	of	this	
hierarchy	we	are	one	step	closer	to	disassembling	it	before	it	causes	an	eruption	from	
which	India	cannot	recover.	Turning	the	spotlight	on	the	underlying	messages	of	
Vivekananda’s	arguments	is	a	good	place	to	start.		
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